China’s Hydropolitics and Emerging Threats in South Asia

By ipsc

August 11, 2025

By Dr Maryam Varij Kazemi

Geopolitics Researcher

International Peace Studies Centre – IPSC

In its 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), designed to guide national economic and social development and outline long-term goals through 2035, China has prioritized renewable energy (1). In this context, plans to develop hydropower plants downstream of the Yarlung Tsangpo River have raised concerns. With an annual output of 300 billion kilowatt-hours, three times that of the Three Gorges Dam. this project will become the largest hydroelectric facility in the world (2). It threatens India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh by altering water flows and creating geopolitical risks, potentially turning water into a strategic weapon. The dam could transform the Himalayan geopolitical landscape and intensify China’s water conflict with South Asia over Tibet’s rivers. If a war between China and India over the Himalayas were to occur, the eastern Himalayas could become the next battlefield, driven by Chinese authorities building a “water bomb” in the form of hydroelectric dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet.

Transboundary rivers present major security concerns for states amid ecological pressures and regional geopolitical tensions in South Asia. Water security challenges are amplified by heavy dependence on transboundary rivers, compounded by the multifaceted impacts of climate change and rising geopolitical friction, especially in the complex dynamics between India–China and India–Pakistan. As a result, transboundary water resources have become geopolitical realities, reflecting the intricate interplay between hydrology, geopolitics, and state security, particularly among China, India, and Pakistan. Notably, China has not signed formal water-sharing agreements with its neighbours, yet its growing presence in regional water infrastructure signals a significant shift in South and East Asian hydropolitics.

Further, with the Motuo hydropower project entering a new phase, tensions with India over the dam have been heightened by the fact that Arunachal Pradesh will be a focal point in Sino-Indian disputes. The dam’s location gives Beijing the potential to restrict and control India’s water supply (3). This evolving subcontinental geopolitics and emerging hydropolitics risk creating an alarming situation. China and India remain locked in competitive, unilateral water resource projects, sparking a dam-building race that intertwines economic and geopolitical interests, potentially fuelling further regional tensions (4).

The India–Pakistan Water Treaty Challenge

The drafters of the Indus Waters Treaty did not account for the effects of climate change. Himalayan glaciers that feed the rivers are melting at unprecedented rates, threatening the long-term sustainability of water supplies. Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict over Kashmir, which contains much of the basin, undermines cooperation. The latest provocation to threaten the treaty was a terrorist attack in India’s union territory of Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025. In response, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan and which sparked four days of conflict, India temporarily suspended the treaty. It should be noted, that both countries have tied their ideological disputes to hydropolitics (5).

With the treaty’s future uncertain, China is watching closely. As India and Pakistan spar over its fate, Pakistan has turned to China for diplomatic and strategic backing. In a clear move to counter India’s suspension of the treaty, China and Pakistan have accelerated the construction of a major dam to supply water and power to parts of Pakistan.

Beijing’s involvement raises concerns, China is not a neutral observer in this dispute, but has long sought to expand its influence in the region and counter India, its long-time rival. Given the tense relations China and India fought a war in 1962 and still experience sporadic border clashes, New Delhi fears Beijing could retaliate by disrupting the flow of rivers from Chinese territory into India.

Pakistan’s economy depends heavily on agriculture and the water needed to sustain its farmland, making the Indus Waters Treaty critical for its leaders. Disruptions, seasonal or strategic, could have devastating consequences for food security, rural livelihoods, and economic stability. Beyond agriculture, Pakistan’s energy sector is also vulnerable: over 20% of its electricity comes from hydropower, with nearly all plants located in the Indus basin. This vulnerability has driven Islamabad to deepen cooperation with China to secure water supplies. To this end, China provides technical expertise and financial support for multiple hydropower projects in Pakistan, including the Diamer-Bhasha Dam and the Kohala Hydropower Project. These projects are vital for meeting Pakistan’s energy needs and form a key part of their transboundary water relationship.

This alignment of Chinese and Pakistani interests in hydropower development poses further challenges to water-sharing stability in South Asia, especially in the Indus basin. Recently, the Chief Minister of India’s Arunachal Pradesh, which borders China, warned that Beijing’s water projects in western Tibet amount to a ticking “water bomb” (6).

Concerns of Bangladesh and Nepal

India’s tense water relations are not limited to Pakistan. Bangladesh and Nepal have often felt sidelined in negotiations, and India’s hints that it may revisit long-standing treaties have caused unease in both. This is particularly true for the Ganges Water Treaty, which expires in 2026. The mighty Ganges flows through India and irrigates much of Bangladesh, with the treaty guaranteeing a minimum flow to Bangladesh. Other key agreements, such as the Mahakali and Kosi River treaties with Nepal, and the Teesta water-sharing agreement with Bangladesh, remain largely unimplemented, fostering mistrust. These failures undermine confidence in regional water diplomacy and cast doubt on India’s commitment to fair cooperation.

Weakening the Indus Waters Treaty could further erode India’s position in future negotiations and strain its ties with Nepal and Bangladesh, while giving China more leverage in South Asian hydropolitics. China is already expanding its influence by offering billions in loans to Bangladesh and strengthening ties with Nepal, especially in water infrastructure.

Climate Change

While glacial melt temporarily increases river flows, long-term forecasts are bleak. If greenhouse gas emissions and warming trends persist, many glacier-fed rivers—including the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra—may see significant reductions in flow by century’s end, directly affecting hundreds of millions who rely on them.

The region is warming faster than the global average, with a shift from snowfall to rainfall disrupting the timing and volume of water flowing from mountains to farms and cities downstream. At the same time, unsustainable groundwater extraction is pushing South Asia’s aquifers toward collapse, threatening food and water security.

The seismic location of many dam projects in the Himalayan region is also cause for alarm. Experts warn that a major earthquake could unleash catastrophic flooding in low-lying areas of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Environmentalists and regional observers have also raised concerns over ecological impacts and the lack of cross-border consultation with downstream countries (7).

Outlook

China’s dam projects in Tibet reinforce fears of water becoming a strategic weapon, enhancing Beijing’s geopolitical power in South Asia. Control over Tibet’s rivers will significantly impact the social, economic, and environmental conditions of downstream countries, potentially shifting the region’s power dynamics. Combined with the multifaceted effects of climate change and rising geopolitical tensions among China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, water resources are increasingly becoming tools of geopolitical bargaining. In the coming years, security between China and South Asian states will be shaped by “water weaponization,” heightening the risk of regional crises and conflicts.

Keywords: hydropolitics, China, India, Pakistan, Tibet