By Dr Maryam Varij Kazemi
Geopolitical Researcher
International Peace Studies Centre – IPSC
Following the rise of Syria’s new regime, it adopted a hardline stance toward Russia, casting doubt on the future of Russia’s presence in the country. As part of these developments, Russia significantly reduced its military footprint in Syria, relocating troops and transferring substantial weaponry, naval vessels, aircraft, and equipment to other bases across the region. Notably, Russia expanded and reinforced its military facilities in Libya, signalling a potential complete withdrawal from Syria. Amidst rekindled relations with Libya, Russia has relied on the Al-Khadim airbase near Benghazi to bolster its military presence in Africa’s Sahel region (1).
However, by early 2025, signs of a shift began to emerge. Multiple reports indicated that Russia and Syria were negotiating to maintain Russia’s military presence in Syria. Yet, as of June 2025, no progress had been made, and officially, Russian forces remained concentrated in the Hmeimim and Tartus bases.
Reports in recent months from Syria suggest Russia is exploring alternative solutions to sustain its presence, solutions that are, at present, independent of the new regime. Based on these reports, it seems that Russia is attempting to secure a foothold at Qamishli Airport in northern Syria.
Located near the Turkish border in a Kurdish-controlled area, Qamishli airport is familiar territory for Russia. Since 2016, Russian forces have maintained a presence there, operating a base that has hosted Mi-8 and Mi-35 attack helicopters for joint patrols with Türkiye. The airbase has also accommodated cargo planes, armoured vehicles, tanks, surveillance systems, and even a field hospital, guarded by Russian military police (2).
Since March 2025, Russia has begun relocating troops, equipment, and systems to Qamishli via cargo flights from Hmeimim. These transfers intensified between April and June 2025, with the base undergoing infrastructure upgrades and significant enhancements to its security and defensive capabilities. Currently, the base primarily hosts combat helicopters. Notably, Russia’s redeployment to Qamishli coincides with the withdrawal of U.S. bases from Syria.
The central question is whether Russia can retain its military bases and political influence in post-Assad Syria. What is clear is that Russia’s presence in strategic locations such as Hmeimim Air Base and Tartus Port on the coast, as well as Qamishli Airport in northeastern Syria, remains intact. These bases function as security enclaves beyond the weak control of the new government, creating friction among security actors and serving as potential flashpoints for sectarian conflict.
Despite years of support for the Assad government, Moscow was among the first to engage with Syrian militias after its collapse, a pragmatic move reflecting Russia’s interests. The Kremlin has a vested interest in maintaining Hmeimim and Tartus, as they are critical to Russia’s logistics across the broader Middle East and Africa. Moreover, Russia’s presence in Syria is of great importance to it; in a wider framework, it serves as leverage in potential negotiations with the U.S., and as leverage in relations with Türkiye and Israel, while bolstering its authority in the Middle East (3).
International Reactions to Russia’s Continued Presence in Syria
While the West and some Arab Middle Eastern countries welcomed the fall of Assad and the formation of a transitional government, Russia’s ongoing military presence remains a concern for several Western nations. As the U.S., EU, and U.K. pivot toward supporting post-Assad Syria, their goals include stabilising the country, preparing for refugee returns, and countering Iranian and Russian influence, which they consider as barriers to a successful transition. Thus, from their perspective, Russia’s bases in Hmeimim, Tartus, and Qamishli are seen as immediate and long-term threats to Syria’s stability.
Most EU members and the U.K. view Russia’s military presence as destabilising, particularly given its role in supporting and later ousting Assad, which has deepened distrust in Moscow’s promises regarding Syrian sovereignty.
Reports suggest Israel has pressured Washington to tolerate Russian bases as a “counterbalance” against Türkiye and to keep Syria weak and non-threatening. Despite Israel’s escalating strikes on Iranian targets post-Assad, Israel has maintained communication channels with Moscow, viewing Russia as a safeguard against strategic surprises like Turkish expansion or security collapses favouring Iran or Takfiris.
Amid the Ukraine war, the EU and U.K. largely perceive Russia’s continued influence in the Mediterranean as a threat to European security, especially given reduced U.S. engagement and shifting international dynamics. Consequently, Europeans have swiftly moved to support Damascus by lifting sanctions. Europeans aim to fill the void through economic and political backing of Syria, to curb Moscow’s influence. Their goal is to prevent Syria’s return to Russia’s orbit, mitigate refugee flows, and encourage returns to ease domestic migration pressures (4).
Russian Bases as Leverage in Power Struggles
Some argue that Russia’s presence, despite its challenges, could serve as a bargaining tool for Syria’s transitional government and key international powers vying for influence in Syria or the wider region. Damascus, aware of Moscow’s need to maintain a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean where its Syrian bases are vital for regional influence and African operations, holds a unique winning card. Thus, the Syrian transitional government, by conditionally legitimising Russia’s temporary use of these bases, seeks concessions. Damascus has initiated new negotiations and has requested revisions to the lease contracts awarded to Russia by Assad, which it considers one-sided, so that it can benefit financially and politically, including debt relief and the release of frozen funds as conditions for Russia to maintain its bases.
Damascus has even linked the issue to Assad’s fate, demanding his extradition in exchange for base access—a bold move, though Russia has so far refused. The Kremlin knows that if the bases are deemed illegitimate, Syria could turn to the international community, potentially isolating Moscow. For now, Russia pursues quiet negotiations, offering symbolic gestures like President Putin’s proposal to convert Hmeimim into a relief centre while avoiding firm commitments; Russia has shown its readiness to restart negotiations.
Ultimately, the transitional government and its backers see Russia’s influence as an obstacle to Syria’s full sovereignty, but Moscow is unlikely to retreat easily (5).
Outlook
Russia appears determined to use its presence in Syria for geostrategic goals. The revival of Qamishli Air Base, amid U.S. negotiations for a potential withdrawal east of the Euphrates, presents an opportunity to expand Russian influence—albeit with soft-power tools. Israel’s calculated support for Russia’s bases reflects a fragmented security landscape, which could either hinder stability or create new dynamics for regional powers.
Keywords: Russia, Syria, military bases, security forces, Israel, Maryam Vareij Kazemi