Syrian Druze: Their current state, Variables affecting the future and prospects of federalism or independence

By ipsc

July 29, 2025

By Dr Saman Fereidouni

Political Sociology Researcher

International Peace Studies Centre – IPSC

The Syrian Druze, as one of the most prominent religious and ethnic minorities in the Levant, have played an important role in the history and politics of Syria. Concentrated mainly in Suwayda Governorate and the Jabal al-Druze region, this community—thanks to its social cohesion, distinct religious identity, and strategic geographic position—has always influenced the country’s political and military developments. Given the complexities of Syria’s civil war, foreign interventions, and the internal dynamics of the Druze society, this article attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the minority’s situation.

The Druze are an ethno-religious group whose roots lie in Ismaʿili Islam; they emerged in 11th-century Egypt during the Fatimid Caliphate (1). Calling themselves al-Muwaḥḥidūn (Monotheists), they developed a closed society because of their esoteric and mystical beliefs and the safeguarding of religious secrets (2). In Syria, their population is estimated at 3–5 percent of the total, i.e., between 700,000 and 900,000, and is concentrated chiefly in the mountainous Jabal al-Druze (Suwayda) (3). This region has geopolitical significance due to its proximity to the Jordanian and Israeli borders (4). Recent clashes in Suwayda, especially after the intensification of internal crises and foreign interventions, have once again drawn attention to the Druze situation (5).

Suwayda, a predominantly mountainous area and the main Druze stronghold, has largely avoided direct involvement in the civil war, yet it faces considerable security and economic tensions.

Current Situation of the Syrian Druze

At the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Druze adopted a policy of “armed neutrality” (6). Some local groups cooperated with the government under the framework of the national defence.

Druze religious leaders, including Sheikh al-ʿAql Hikmat al-Hijri, have occasionally clashed with the Assad government—particularly over compulsory military conscription. As the ISIS threat spread across southern Syria, the Druze took up arms through local militias such as Rijal al-Karāmah to defend their areas.

They have avoided direct participation in Syrian-army operations against takfiri groups such as ISIS and have focused on preserving relative autonomy in their regions (7). Nevertheless, the escalation of hostilities in recent years, especially after 2022, has complicated the Druze situation due to the weakening of the central government and the increasing influence of militias, including groups backed by Israel and Turkey (8).

In summer 2025, bloody clashes between the Suwayda Druze and Sunni militias—notably the so-called “Arab Tribes”—resulted in hundreds of deaths and mass displacement (9). These clashes, rooted in historical tensions and ethno-sectarian rivalries, have been further complicated by foreign interventions—especially Israel’s (10). Severe shortages of medicine, food and water in Suwayda have made the humanitarian situation critical (11).

Federalism or Independence: The Options Ahead

Druze spiritual leaders (Sheikh al-ʿAql) are divided over the community’s political future. Some, like Hikmat al-Hijri, advocate greater autonomy, whereas Yusuf Jarbou and Hammoud al-Hanawi oppose secession and favour continued ties with the central government (12). These internal divisions, combined with external pressures, have made the Druze position more fragile.

The prolonged Syrian crisis and the weakening of the central state have revived debates over federalism or even independence for Druze areas. The two options are examined below.

Federalism

Federalism has been proposed as a way to distribute power fairly and reduce ethno-sectarian tensions in Syria (13). Proponents argue it would allow the Druze to preserve their cultural and religious identity while participating in a united Syrian state (14). The Lebanese federal model, where the Druze enjoy significant political influence, has been suggested as a template for Syria (15).

Advantages for the Druze include local autonomy, access to national resources, and reduced sectarian conflict. However, challenges such as resistance from the central government, rivalry with other ethnic groups (e.g., the Kurds), and foreign interference (especially from Turkey and Israel) hinder its realisation (16).

Secessionist Trends

Among some Druze factions, secessionist inclinations have grown since the recent weakening of the central government (17). After the latest clashes, local leaders have floated the idea of an independent Druze entity in Suwayda (18). A declaration of autonomy for the Suwayda Druze region in July 2025 is an example of this trend (19).

Yet full independence faces serious regional and international obstacles. Suwayda’s economic dependence on Damascus and lack of self-sufficiency infrastructure make independent statehood impractical (20). Moreover, foreign interference—particularly by Israel—could turn Druze independence into a tool for Syria’s partition, an outcome staunchly resisted by traditional Druze leaders (21).

Variables Shaping the Future of the Syrian Druze

Several factors will determine the future of the Syrian Druze:

Civil-war trajectory & central-government capacity: The continuation of cessation of the Civil war, and whether the central government can reassert authority, will be decisive in determining the future of the Syrian Druze. Further weakening of the central government could strengthen autonomy or secessionist drives (22).

Foreign approaches & interventions: The policies and leverage of Israel, Turkey, and the United States directly affect the Druze. Israeli support, while framed as protective, could be instrumentalised to fragment Syria (23).

Druze internal cohesion: Disagreements among Druze leaders over autonomy vs. cooperation with Damascus could fragment the community. Internal unity is crucial to maintaining their strategic position (24).

Economic & humanitarian conditions: Resource shortages, displacement, and economic difficulties in Suwayda risk fuelling popular discontent and secessionism (25).

Militia movements: The presence of takfiri groups and foreign-backed militias near Druze areas poses a serious security threat (26). Local movements such as Rijal al-Karāmah, which are armed and defend Druze areas, will be pivotal to the future of the Druze community (27).

Future Outlook

The future of the Syrian Druze hinges heavily on regional political and military developments.

Short term: Continued conflict and external pressure could worsen the humanitarian crisis in Suwayda.

Medium term, two scenarios are likely:

Integration into a federal system: If political negotiations on rebuilding Syria move toward federalism, the Druze could retain relative autonomy in Suwayda as an influential minority (28). This would require cooperation with Damascus and other ethnic groups.
Escalation of secessionism: Should state weakness persist and foreign interference increase, independence-leaning sentiments could grow, but—given economic and political constraints—this would likely lead to greater instability (29).

Long term: Preserving Druze cultural and religious identity while participating in an inclusive political system could best guarantee their security and stability. The historical Lebanese experience shows the Druze can adapt to complex political conditions (30). Any solution, however, must respect Druze cultural and religious autonomy and safeguard their security against external threats (31).

The Syrian Druze stand at one of the most sensitive junctures in their history. Ethno-sectarian clashes, foreign interventions, and internal divisions pose serious challenges to their future. Federalism could be a balanced solution—preserving autonomy while embedding the Druze in Syria’s political structure. However, full independence appears difficult given economic and political limits. Variables such as the civil-war trajectory, foreign interference, internal cohesion, and economic conditions will be decisive. To secure Druze stability and security, the Syrian government and regional actors must respect Druze cultural and religious autonomy and refrain from turning them into geopolitical pawns for other actors.