By Dr Masumeh Muhammadi
International Relations researcher
International Peace Studies Centre – IPSC
Introduction
The South Caucasus region has long been recognized as one of the focal points in the geopolitical dynamics of Eurasia, holding significant importance for both regional and extra-regional powers. Within this context, the relations between Russia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, despite past cooperation, have entered a phase of complexity and challenge in recent years—particularly following the Second Karabakh War (2020). These developments have taken on new dimensions amid structural shifts in the international order.
After the end of the 2020 Karabakh War, Russia played a pivotal role in post-war management by deploying peacekeeping forces. However, subsequent developments including the collapse of Karabakh’s autonomous status, the decline of Russia’s presence in the region, and Baku’s growing alignment with the Western bloc and the Tel Aviv regime have led to increased political rifts and mutual distrust between the two countries.
Azerbaijan’s more aggressive policies, manifested in strategic transport and energy projects, as well as expanded military cooperation with Türkiye and Israel, have been perceived by Moscow as a threat to its historical influence in the Caucasus. In response, Russia has sought to restore its position in the region by leveraging geopolitical tools, including relations with Armenia, Iran, and regional pressure groups.
Given the intensifying geopolitical competition in the region particularly the growing roles of China and the European Union in new transit corridors the current tensions could have profound implications for regional balance and the geopolitical stability of Eurasia.
1. Historical and Strategic Foundations of Russia-Azerbaijan Relations
The relationship between Russia and the Republic of Azerbaijan is rooted in a turbulent and complex history, spanning imperial rivalries in past centuries to post-Soviet conflicts. During the Soviet era, Azerbaijan was part of the USSR, and after its dissolution in 1991, it formally gained independence while remaining within Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. However, from the outset, Baku sought to pursue a balancing strategy among regional powers, simultaneously expanding ties with Russia, Türkiye, the West, and Israel.
Russia, From the early 1990s, aimed to prevent a power vacuum in the South Caucasus by leveraging its historical dominance. Its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan reflects this strategy. During the First Karabakh War (1992–1994), Russia played a dual role, providing indirect support to both sides. However, in later years, it positioned itself as a peacekeeper, seeking to consolidate its mediator status.
In the years preceding the Second Karabakh War (2020), Russo-Azerbaijani relations were marked by a relatively high level of cooperation. Numerous agreements in energy, transportation, and arms trade indicated a pragmatic balance between the two nations. At the same time, Russia remained wary of Azerbaijan’s growing alignment with Western structures like NATO, as well as its deepening security cooperation with Türkiye and Israel.
After the 2020 Karabakh Russia reinforced its security role in the region by deploying peacekeepers in the Lachin Corridor. Initially, this was seen as a geopolitical success for the Kremlin, allowing it to maintain a fragile balance in the Caucasus without direct military intervention. However, subsequent developments particularly Azerbaijan’s rapid and unilateral military operation in September 2023 to fully seize Karabakh and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian forces shifted the equation in Baku’s favour, fuelling mutual distrust between the two sides.
Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has sought to position itself as a key energy hub for Europe, strengthening ties with the EU and Israel while deepening security and military reliance on Türkiye. This Western-leaning trajectory, which signals alignment with NATO’s bloc, contradicts Russia’s traditional policies in the Caucasus and risks eroding Moscow’s geopolitical influence in the region.
2. Causes of Tensions in Bilateral Relations (2024–2025)
Relations between Russia and the Republic of Azerbaijan entered a new phase of tension in late 2023, escalating to a peak in 2024–2025. These tensions cannot be interpreted solely through the lens of bilateral disputes but must be understood within the broader context of structural shifts in the international order, Russia’s declining regional and global standing, and Azerbaijan’s multi-alignment policy with rival powers.
2.1. Russia’s Weakened Strategic Position After the Ukraine War
One of the most critical factors driving the rift between Baku and Moscow is Russia’s diminished geopolitical clout following its prolonged war in Ukraine. Western security sources argue that Russia’s full focus on the eastern and southern Ukrainian fronts has severely limited its capacity to play an active role in the Caucasus. This power vacuum, particularly after the de facto withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh in late 2023, allowed Baku to implement its policy of “fully clearing Karabakh of Armenian forces” without facing Moscow’s interference.
2.2. Baku’s Strategic Alignment with Türkiye, Israel, and NATO
Another key source of tension is Azerbaijan’s expanding military and security cooperation with Western-aligned and regional actors, particularly Türkiye, Israel, and NATO. In 2024, Azerbaijan signed new arms deals with Israel and increased joint military drills with Turkish and NATO forces. Meanwhile, Russia has long been sensitive to growing Western influence in the South Caucasus, viewing these developments as a direct threat to its “natural sphere of influence.”
- Azerbaijan-Israel Defence Cooperation: The intelligence and military partnership between Baku and Tel Aviv including drone transfers, surveillance systems, and cyber technologies has raised alarms in Moscow.
- Energy Geopolitics: Azerbaijan’s enhanced role in supplying energy to Europe (particularly as a gas alternative to Russia) has effectively turned it into a geopolitical tool in the West’s strategy to contain Russia.
- Western Corporate Involvement: The presence of Western companies in Caspian energy projects further signals, from Moscow’s perspective, a strategic pivot by Baku toward the West.
2.3. The Collapse of the Post-War Karabakh Order and Russia’s Ineffectiveness
Following the de facto dissolution of the self-proclaimed Artsakh government and the full integration of Karabakh into Azerbaijan’s legal framework, Baku concluded that Russia’s military role in the region was no longer necessary. During this period, Azerbaijani officials openly criticised Russia’s performance in upholding the ceasefire and protecting Armenian security as “ineffective and biased.” In response, Moscow accused Azerbaijan of violating the 2020 agreements and taking unilateral actions that threatened regional stability.
2.4. Competition Over Transit Routes and Regional Transport Initiatives
The rivalry between the two countries over transport and transit corridors has also been a major driver of tensions. Key projects such as The Zangezur Corridor (backed by Türkiye and Baku) and Caspian-Europe connectivity initiatives directly clash with Russia’s strategic interests. Azerbaijan aims to solidify its position as a critical logistics hub linking Central Asia to Europe, while Russia seeks to control or monitor these routes through its own frameworks, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
3. Russia’s Approach: Redefining Its Geopolitical Role in the South Caucasus
The accelerated developments in the South Caucasus, particularly after Azerbaijan’s full control over Karabakh in late 2023 and the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, have forced Moscow to redefine its geopolitical role in this strategic region. The Kremlin, which has long considered the South Caucasus part of its “near sphere of influence,” now faces emerging alliances, geostrategic shifts, and a decline in its traditional role.
3.1. Rebalancing Through Iran and Armenia
In response to its waning influence in Baku and gradual exclusion from Azerbaijan’s strategic calculus, Russia has sought to establish a new regional balance by deepening cooperation with Iran and Armenia. In 2024, Moscow and Tehran expanded their security and military collaboration in the Caucasus, jointly opposing the Zangezur Corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, labelling it a threat to Iran’s borders and the Axis of Resistance.
This Russian strategy aligns with its efforts to control transit routes passing through Iran, which could serve as alternatives to Turkish-backed corridors. Simultaneously, Moscow has leveraged diplomatic pressure and support for domestic protests in Armenia against Prime Minister Pashinyan’s pro-Western tilt, aiming to restore its traditional sway in Yerevan.
This dual balancing act, which is amplified by Russia’s confrontation with NATO in Ukraine forms part of the Kremlin’s broader deterrence strategy in the South Caucasus.
3.2. Leveraging Economic and Energy Tools
Russia has also attempted to use the leverage of energy, transport infrastructure, and regional trade to regain its influence. Despite its reduced military footprint, Moscow retains a significant stake in Caucasus-Europe energy transit, some of Azerbaijan’s crude oil exports occur via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and other shared infrastructure.
Additionally, Azerbaijan’s dependence on Russian electricity, gas, and grain imports provides Moscow with economic leverage. In 2025, the Kremlin issued an indirect warning to Baku regarding the consequences of its confrontational strategy by temporarily blocking some key land transit routes to Central Asia. These moves underscore Russia’s shift toward geo-economic tools for creating regional balance.
3.3. Attempts to Reconstruct a Security Role Through Regional Frameworks
Following the diminished credibility of its peacekeeping forces, Russia has sought to reassert its influence through multilateral security structures like the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). While Azerbaijan is not a member of these organisations, Moscow has pursued indirect containment of Baku’s manoeuvrers and Western bloc influence in the region by expanding multilateral cooperation with Armenia, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.
Simultaneously, Russian media and security institutions have engaged in narrative-shaping, framing Azerbaijan’s approach as a “Western tool in the Caucasus” and portraying it as a threat to Eurasian stability. This media-driven policy, coupled with the Kremlin’s diplomatic efforts to re-engage with Yerevan and Tehran, underscores Russia’s attempt to revive its geopolitical sphere of influence through non-military means.
4. Azerbaijan’s Approach: Strategic Independence or Playing the Great-Power Game?
Amid shifting geopolitics and Russia’s waning influence in the South Caucasus, the Republic of Azerbaijan is pursuing an active, multi-layered policy to redefine its role in the region’s security and economic order. This strategy is framed not as an open confrontation with Moscow, but rather as a blend of balancing, strengthening multilateral coalitions, and astutely exploiting the weaknesses of its regional rivals.
4.1. Consolidating Military Gains and Ending the Semi-Independent Status of Karabakh
After the decisive military victory in September 2023 and the collapse of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, Azerbaijan moved to restore full national sovereignty over the liberated territories. The process was completed with the gradual withdrawal of Russian troops and Baku’s takeover of the Lachin corridor. Citing the international legitimacy of its territorial integrity, Baku has sought to recast the Karabakh issue from an ongoing security crisis to an internal matter. In line with this goal, since 2024 Aliyev’s government has formally dissolved all quasi-state Armenian institutions in Karabakh and launched large-scale “reconstruction and resettlement” programs in the reclaimed areas. At a first glance these moves aimed at safeguarding territorial integrity and reinforcing national unity, however, these steps also send a clear geopolitical message to Moscow: Azerbaijan no longer sees any need for Russian involvement in managing its domestic crises.
4.2. Exploiting Russia–West Rifts to Edge Closer to the Western Bloc
Baku is keenly aware of the structural rivalry between Russia and the West across Eurasia and is leveraging it to enhance its own position. In recent years, Azerbaijan has signed gas deals with the European Union and participated in energy projects designed to replace Russian supplies, most notably through the Southern Gas Corridor, thereby presenting itself to Brussels as a reliable partner for European energy security.
Moreover, closer cooperation with NATO and Israel in cyber-security, intelligence sharing, and military training forms part of Baku’s multi-vector policy to reduce dependence on Russia, gain closer proximity to the Western block and expand its international leverage. At the same time, Baku continues to rely on Türkiye as a regional ally sharing the same language. The Azerbaijani-Turkish military partnership, formalised under the 2021 Shusha Pact, has strengthened in recent years and now serves as a key deterrent against pressure from Russia and Iran.
4.3 Active multipolar policy: From China to the Turkic world:
Besides orientation towards the West, Azerbaijan has tried to increase its economic and geopolitical relations with other power such as China. Active participation in projects such as “One Belt One Road” and transforming into a vital link in the “Middle Corridor”, which connects Central Asia via the Caspian sea to Türkiye and Europe, is part of this strategy. At the same time, Baku, within the framework of Turkic-cantered organisations such as the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), is trying to link its cultural, political, and economic identity with the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia. This convergence, while reducing Azerbaijan’s strategic isolation, has strengthened Baku’s soft power and regional influence. In effect, Azerbaijan is becoming a connecting point for three global powers (the West, China, and Russia).
4.4. An Opportunity-Driven Perspective on the Diminishing Role of Russia
Contrary to many analysts who warn of the dangers of a power vacuum in the Caucasus, Baku perceives the weakening role of Russia as a historic opportunity to solidify its own position and redefine the regional security order. In this context, Azerbaijan seeks to elevate its role from a “marginal player” to a “hub of Eurasian interactions” through diplomatic, media, and economic initiatives.
However, this opportunity-driven approach is not without risks, including tensions with Iran, pressure from Russia, and reliance on unstable actors such as Türkiye or the West.
Overall, the rapid shifts in Russia-Azerbaijan relations in recent years point to a redefinition of the security and geopolitical order in the South Caucasus. A region long at the heart of competition between regional and global powers is now experiencing fundamental changes in the roles and positions of its key players. Russia’s declining influence following the Ukraine war, NATO and Türkiye’s expanding presence, and Baku’s aggressive policies have disrupted the traditional balance of power, giving rise to an “emergent yet unstable new order.”
In this process, Russia, which hitherto saw itself as the guarantor of stability and balance in the Caucasus, now faces new alliances and more independent actors like Azerbaijan, unwilling to follow the Kremlin’s lead. Moscow’s response has shifted from attempts to rebuild its military presence to leveraging geo-economic tools, diplomacy, and alliances with Iran and Armenia. This shift, however, stems not from choice but from structural constraints and multi-front pressures such as Ukraine and Eastern Europe.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, capitalising on its military gains in Karabakh and Russia’s weakened position is consolidating its role as an independent, influential player at the crossroads of energy routes, transit corridors, and geopolitics. While this approach has created major opportunities for Baku, it also carries significant risks: escalating tensions with Iran, dependence on Türkiye, and the potential for hardware reactions from Moscow.
Given current trends, three probable scenarios can be outlined for the future of Russia-Azerbaijan relations:
- Cold Confrontation and Sustained Rivalry: In this scenario, the two countries enter a structural competition—not leading to direct military conflict, but rather to geopolitical rivalry through energy projects, regional diplomacy, and soft-power warfare.
- Return to Tactical Balancing: While less likely in the short term, a compromise between Russia and the West or a reduced NATO role in the Caucasus could enable a revival of pragmatic cooperation between Baku and Moscow—similar to patterns observed in the 2010s.
- Escalating Tensions and Open Divergence: Here, Azerbaijan fully aligns with the Western-Turkish-Israeli axis, prompting Russia to respond with hard-power containment or even instigating destabilisation along Azerbaijan’s southern borders.
The Role of Third-Party Actors
The influence of third-party actors cannot be overlooked. Iran, Türkiye, the EU, Israel, and China, each guided by their geopolitical interests, could either exacerbate or mitigate bilateral tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan. For instance, Iran’s stance on the Zangezur Corridor and Azerbaijan’s growing ties with Israel are pivotal elements in the regional calculus, capable of shifting the balance of power.
Ultimately, the Russia-Azerbaijan rivalry is no longer a mere bilateral dispute but a reflection of broader geopolitical shifts in a transitioning world order. How this competition is managed will determine not only the future of the South Caucasus but also the power equilibrium across Eurasia. In this context, a foreign policy grounded in smart balancing, de-escalation, and enhanced multilateral diplomacy becomes a critical imperative for lasting regional peace.
References
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