By Dr Maryam Varij Kazemi
Geopolitical Researcher
International Peace Studies Centre – IPSC
Experts assert that the visit of Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara to Azerbaijan marks a pivotal moment in Baku’s evolving foreign policy toward the broader Middle East. This step not only reflects Azerbaijan’s intent to deepen bilateral ties with Syria following the power shift in Damascus but also signals Baku’s broader ambitions to play a more active role in regional security architecture and post-war recovery. For Syria, al-Shara’s visit to Baku is not merely ceremonial; it represents a move toward establishing new frameworks for cooperation, including energy and infrastructure development, logistics, and diplomacy.
Historical Background of Bilateral Relations
Azerbaijan-Syria relations are rooted in historical and cultural foundations, yet they are also shaped by complex strategic and geopolitical interests. Ties between the two countries date back to the Silk Road era and became more systematic after the 1970s. Following Azerbaijan’s independence, bilateral relations entered a new phase, with formal diplomatic ties established in the 1990s. Since then, Azerbaijan and Syria have demonstrated a pattern of cooperation based on mutual interests in international forums such as the UN, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Non-Aligned Movement.
However, profound political and social upheavals in the region, particularly Syria’s civil war, effectively suspended these relations. Azerbaijan’s decision to indefinitely suspend its diplomatic mission in Damascus was driven not only by security concerns but also by the international isolation of Bashar al-Assad’s regime at the time (1).
Under Assad’s rule, Azerbaijan-Syria relations faced limitations due to several factors, including the anti-Azerbaijani and anti-Turkish stance of Syria’s Armenian diaspora and the strategic alignment between Syria and Armenia. During this period, Syria adopted positions in international organisations that were at odds with Azerbaijan’s interests, refusing to take a firm or objective stance on territorial integrity issues. Syrian leadership even made statements in platforms like the OIC that contradicted the principle of Islamic solidarity.
Today, however, shifting geopolitical realities at both regional and global levels have created favourable conditions for revitalising Azerbaijan-Syria relations. Recent steps have elevated bilateral ties to a more constructive level, opening significant opportunities for substantive partnership.
Yet, Azerbaijan still faces considerable constraints in engaging comprehensively with Ahmad al-Shara’s government. These include U.S. sanctions complicating official investments in government-controlled sectors, as well as Syria’s economic collapse and persistent instability, which deter Azerbaijan from initiating long-term projects in Syria. However, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would lift sanctions on Syria, offering the war-torn country a chance to revive its shattered economy. This shift in U.S. foreign policy could facilitate Azerbaijan’s ambitions to participate in Syrian infrastructure projects, particularly in renewable energy and offshore oil fields long neglected due to the civil war. While investment figures remain unspecified, ongoing diplomatic engagements highlight Azerbaijan’s potential role in Syria’s recovery (2).
Expanding Geo-Economic Ties with a Focus on Energy
A memorandum of understanding signed between Azerbaijan’s state oil company and the Syrian government heralds a new phase of energy cooperation. Under this agreement, Azerbaijani natural gas will soon be exported to Syria, reinforcing Azerbaijan’s role as a regional energy supplier and significantly contributing to Syria’s energy stability and economic revival.
The agreement also outlines strategic collaboration to rebuild Syria’s energy and infrastructure sectors post-war. Currently, Azerbaijan exports natural gas to 12 countries, primarily in Europe. This deal expands Azerbaijan’s export geopolitics, opening access to the Middle East.
Gas exports to Syria, routed through Türkiye, are planned at an annual volume of 1 billion cubic meters—a topic extensively discussed during the Syrian president’s visit to Baku. Syria could serve as both a consumer and a transit country, with the Türkiye-Syria gas pipeline already rehabilitated and the Syria-Jordan pipeline under consideration. This could eventually enable Azerbaijan to supply gas to Egypt. Additionally, new opportunities exist for Azerbaijan in electricity production and exports, with the Middle East market emerging as a promising avenue. As a result, the number of countries importing Azerbaijani natural gas will rise to 13, showcasing the successful expansion of Azerbaijan’s energy diplomacy and its strategic role in ensuring regional energy security and economic recovery (3).
Post-War Reconstruction Collaboration
Azerbaijan has gained substantial experience in post-war reconstruction. Within just a few years, it has rebuilt roads, power plants, schools, medical centres, and even smart cities in Karabakh. This makes Azerbaijan an attractive partner for Syria, which now faces immense reconstruction challenges. Following President Ilham Aliyev’s directive, a high-ranking delegation visited Syria to assess how Azerbaijan could contribute to reconstruction efforts, encompassing not only humanitarian aid but also engineering solutions, technological cooperation, and logistical planning (4).
Strengthening Regional Engagement
Enhancing ties with Syria is part of Azerbaijan’s broader strategy to engage with the Middle East. Through active relations with Türkiye, Iran, Israel, and Persian Gulf states, Baku is expanding its influence, positioning itself as a key regional player capable of balancing interests without imposing its will.
At the same time, Ahmad al-Shara’s visit signals that Syria’s new leadership seeks relationships with countries that remained neutral during its conflict. For Syria, this visit opens doors to fresh cooperation with a nation capable of supporting its transition and reconstruction.
Damascus is eager to strengthen collaboration with Azerbaijan, viewing Baku as a useful interlocutor and partner due to its deep strategic ties with Israel and Türkiye. Israel hopes to encourage Azerbaijan to join the Abraham Accords, while Syrian officials see Azerbaijan as a potential mediator between Syria and Israel, as well as between Israel and Türkiye. Lacking military and economic leverage, Syria’s new leadership cannot prevent Israeli strikes on its soil and thus seeks support from external powers—here, Azerbaijan’s role as a strategic partner of Israel is pivotal (5).
Outlook
Azerbaijan appears increasingly determined to leverage political, economic, and humanitarian initiatives to expand its influence, playing a central role in regional cooperation through trade, energy, and transport corridors. As Europe seeks alternatives to Russian energy and Azerbaijan’s strategic infrastructure becomes a hub for diversifying gas supplies, Syria could serve as a transit centre for Azerbaijan and the Euro-Mediterranean region.
Although the region remains vulnerable to geopolitical tensions and challenges persist, Azerbaijan’s roadmap for relations with the new Syria reflects ambitions to gain advantages, reshape international connections, and strengthen military alliances.
What is clear is that Syria will play a significant role in Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policies. Baku aims to foster close economic cooperation and enhance regional connectivity with the broader Middle East and Euro-Mediterranean areas, with geo-economics at the core of its Syria strategy.
Keywords: Azerbaijan, Syria, Geopolitics, Geo-Economics, Energy,