Davoud Ahmadzadeh
West Asia Affairs Expert
International Peace Studies Center – IPSC
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has revived Türkiye’s plans to construct oil and gas pipelines through the country, transforming it into a regional “energy corridor” for neighbouring nations. Some of these projects offer a more convenient land route for exporting energy to Europe via Türkiye from the Arab Persian Gulf states, posing a challenge to Israel’s similar ambitions.
While Israel has alternative opportunities to export its natural gas to new markets through pipelines, Türkiye’s oil and gas projects seem to risk weakening Israel’s position and its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. Israel must closely monitor the “pipeline game” in Syria to ensure that new economic opportunities do not conflict with its interests and regional strategies.
The collapse of Assad in December 2024 revived several Turkish-led energy infrastructure projects that had been abandoned due to Syria’s civil war. While some of these projects undermine Israel’s aspirations to become an “energy corridor” between Europe and the Arab Persian Gulf states, others hold potential for Israel to access new regional markets for gas and electricity exports. These include:
- The Türkiye-Qatar joint gas pipeline through Syria.
- The expansion of the Arab Gas Pipeline to Türkiye.
- New oil pipelines from the Arab Persian Gulf states to Syria, replacing Iranian oil.
The Türkiye-Qatar Gas Pipeline Project via Syria
Immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, Turkish media began reporting on their government’s interest in reviving an old plan to construct a gas pipeline between Qatar and Türkiye through Syria. This pipeline was first announced in 2009 and was primarily pursued by Türkiye. Qatar eventually abandoned it due to technical and political challenges, including the intensification of Syria’s civil war, protracted disputes between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, tensions between Türkiye and the Assad regime, and the 2014 oil price crash, which suspended many regional energy infrastructure projects.
Now that the Assad regime has fallen and Qatar-Saudi relations have warmed, Türkiye is once again keen to advance the Türkiye-Qatar gas pipeline project. A joint pipeline with Qatar would serve several key Turkish interests: strengthening its position as the primary transit country for non-Russian gas to Europe, providing an additional source of cheap gas for southeastern Türkiye (which suffers from unreliable supplies from Iran and Iraq), and bolstering Türkiye-Qatar relations with Syria’s new regime.
At this stage, there is no clear timeline for construction or estimates of the pipeline’s capacity or cost. Qatar will likely wait to see if Syria’s new regime can fully stabilize the country before committing to investment. Energy companies typically avoid investing billions in cross-border gas pipelines unless they are confident the transit country will remain stable and reliable for the next 10–15 years—the time needed to recoup costs. This is especially critical in central Syria, where the proposed pipeline would pass through areas still witnessing ISIS activity, requiring strong security guarantees.
For Israel, Türkiye-Qatar cooperation via Syria could pose a threat, as Israel seeks to establish itself as an economic corridor between Europe and Arab states through partnerships with Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel is deeply concerned about ambitious Turkish-Qatari plans that could exclude it from lucrative energy and transit collaborations. The proposed corridor, akin to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, conflicts with Israel’s economic and strategic interests in the region.
Completing this route with additional infrastructure like roads, railways, and power cables would make it far easier for countries like the UAE and other Persian Gulf states to connect and export gas and other products to Europe via Türkiye, rather than building a new corridor through Jordan and Israel to the Eastern Mediterranean.
While the UAE has no desire to depend on Qatar or Türkiye as transit partners, the ongoing war in Gaza and Israel’s political and economic challenges as a close U.S. ally in the Middle East may increase the appeal of partnering with Türkiye and Qatar as alternatives to Israel. Israel must recognise that prolonged conflict and delayed normalisation with Saudi Arabia could ultimately sideline it from a lucrative regional economic plan. Israel should continue pursuing the Eastern Mediterranean Corridor idea with Cyprus and Greece, particularly for potential investors in Europe and the U.S., as a key component of its regional economic strategy.
Türkiye’s Connection to the Arab Gas Pipeline in Syria
While Türkiye’s pipeline plans with Qatar may undermine Israel’s interests, another Turkish project could help Israel access new markets for its natural gas exports. Over the past month, Türkiye has explored connecting to the Arab Gas Pipeline through Syria’s largely neglected section. The Arab Gas Pipeline, launched in 2003, was initially designed to allow Egypt to export natural gas northward to Jordan and Syria. Plans to extend it further to Türkiye were signed in 2006 and 2008 but stalled in 2009 due to financial disputes and Egypt’s dwindling gas exports. Today, the pipeline primarily serves Israel, transporting its gas to Jordan and Egypt, while the Syrian section remains unused.
If Türkiye connects to the Arab Gas Pipeline in Syria, Israel could theoretically transit gas northward through Jordan to Türkiye and onward to Europe (directly or via swap deals). Such a plan would require significant diplomatic improvements between Israel and Türkiye, as well as normalization between Israel and Syria’s new regime. Even without these developments, Israeli gas could still reach Türkiye if Jordan or Egypt acts as an “end user” and resells it to Türkiye—a scenario already seen in recent years, where Israeli gas was exported to Egypt, liquefied, and then shipped to Türkiye and other destinations.
Türkiye’s plan to connect to the Arab Gas Pipeline is just one of several major infrastructure projects linking the two countries. Turkish officials have already discussed cross-border road, rail, and communication projects with Syria’s new regime, further expanding Ankara’s influence in Syria.
Israel must take steps to address the concerns of Cyprus and Greece, clarifying that any opportunity to export gas via Türkiye does not conflict with its plans for joint Eastern Mediterranean infrastructure. Even if Syrian pipeline projects materialise, Israeli gas companies will remain cautious, relying on Syria and Türkiye only in limited quantities. They prefer diversifying their portfolio through direct access to new markets via Cyprus.
Non-Iranian Oil Pipelines and Electricity Connections to Syria
Syria’s new regime has energy interests beyond serving as a transit zone for gas pipelines. With Iran’s regular crude and fuel supplies cut off, Syria urgently needs stable oil sources. Under Assad, Syria relied on Iran for 90% of its oil (60,000–70,000 barrels per day), with the remaining 10% from local fields. Hezbollah also smuggled fuel from Lebanon, despite Lebanon’s own severe shortages.
In the new reality, Syria is seeking cooperation agreements with neighbours for regular oil supplies. The immediate solution is cross-border trucking, which is expensive and scarce. Long-term, Syria will pursue new pipeline projects to ensure steady flows. The most obvious source is the disused Kirkuk-Syria pipeline from Iraq, which halted operations in the 1980s and requires rehabilitation.
Additionally, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are all exploring opportunities to become Syria’s new oil suppliers as part of regional political manoeuvring. In the next few months we should expect to see a lot of movement to this end. Saudi Arabia, in particular, is highly motivated to supply Syria and will likely counter Qatar’s other plans to strengthen its presence there alongside Türkiye.
Israel has yet to decide on the nature of its relationship with Syria’s new regime, given the uncertain political scenarios. This is understandable, based on the different political scenarios that could play out in Syria and change the current calculus. However, as a potential, normalisation agreement could open new energy and economic opportunities for Israel, including gas exports, oil supply assistance, and joint wind turbine projects in the Golan Heights. If Israel reacts too slowly to energy infrastructure developments in Syria—especially those led by Türkiye—it risks missing a valuable economic and political opportunity to integrate into the region’s new energy corridor.