Trump and the Future of Security in the Persian Gulf

By ipsc

November 30, 2024

By Fatemeh Khadem Shirazi
Researcher and University Lecturer
International Peace Studies Center – IPSC

During his presidency and election campaigns, Donald Trump sought to strengthen relations with the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. He emphasised the importance of these ties for the security and stability of the West Asia region and called for closer collaboration to address shared threats, particularly from Iran. Additionally, Trump focused on the need for greater financial contributions from Persian Gulf states to their own security, as well as arms deals and strategic partnerships with these nations. With Trump’s potential return to the political arena, expectations are that U.S. policy toward Persian Gulf security will undergo changes. Key questions arise: What will the security outlook for the Persian Gulf be after the 2024 elections? How will Persian Gulf countries respond to Trump’s policies? And what will the future of U.S.-GCC relations look like?

Trump and the Security Outlook for the Persian Gulf

The security landscape in the Persian Gulf is heavily influenced by U.S. military and security relations with GCC countries. For instance, these nations seek to enhance cooperation to counter shared security threats. As a result, tensions and collaborations in the region may be affected by various factors, including the domestic and foreign political dynamics of key players. Strengthening economic and military ties with countries like Israel could shift the regional balance of power.

A major concern is the potential escalation of tensions with Iran. A second Trump administration might intensify its “maximum pressure” campaign, possibly endorsing more aggressive actions, such as encouraging Israel to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Such scenarios could create significant friction with some Persian Gulf states, especially given Saudi Arabia’s recent rapprochement with Iran, mediated by China. The current regional détente has reduced tensions and opened new avenues for economic and security cooperation. A renewed U.S.-Iran confrontation could jeopardise these gains, forcing GCC countries to strike a delicate balance between their strategic partnership with Washington and efforts to maintain stability with Tehran (1).

Trump’s return to power leaves GCC countries facing considerable uncertainty, particularly as global conflicts—from the war in Ukraine to escalating tensions in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen—heighten regional pressures. Persian Gulf leaders are increasingly navigating a multipolar world and may accelerate partnerships with China and Russia to ensure economic stability and security guarantees. A U.S. focus solely on defence pacts, without addressing broader economic and diplomatic needs, could further push Persian Gulf states toward Beijing and Moscow, reshaping regional alliances and diminishing Washington’s influence. Trump’s previous strategy was heavily transactional and Israel-centric. However, given today’s complex geopolitical landscape, policymakers in Persian Gulf countries are more focused on sustainable security and economic growth (2).

Persian Gulf Countries’ Stances on Trump’s Policies

Persian Gulf Arab countries welcomed the election of the new president. King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia congratulated Trump, while the UAE stated that the two nations are united by their shared ambitions for progress. Qatar, one of the first countries to congratulate Trump, has become essential to U.S. efforts to broker a ceasefire in Gaza due to its ties with Hamas (3).

Persian Gulf states like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar may see Trump’s return as an opportunity to bolster their regional influence with U.S. backing. While their goal is to maintain strategic independence by avoiding direct involvement in conflicts, Trump’s policies could complicate their diplomatic balancing act with Washington. If Trump seeks to extend agreements, he will likely focus on persuading other Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, to formalise relations with Israel (4).

Analysts suggest that a second Trump term could give Persian Gulf leaders an opportunity to advocate for a more balanced approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Without this balance, U.S. support for Israel could fuel regional instability and strain U.S.-Persian Gulf relations. The volatile situation in Yemen continues to unsettle GCC countries, with Saudi Arabia concerned that regional conditions could reignite conflict. Persian Gulf leaders, instead of continuing the Biden administration’s military operations against the Houthis as a means to restore stability in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, want to see how much effort Trump will devote to a Gaza ceasefire (5).

Trump is expected to prioritise strengthening defence cooperation, counterterrorism efforts, and economic partnerships, aligning with his pragmatic, interest-driven foreign policy. However, these partnerships may complicate relations with Iran, as both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are committed to curbing Tehran’s regional influence. Closer collaboration with Trump could embolden Persian Gulf states to take stronger stances against Iran’s activities in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Yet, Trump may also advocate restraint, especially if hostilities threaten the stability of oil markets, which directly impact the global economy.

Trump’s alignment with Saudi Arabia and the UAE could be contentious, as Türkiye often finds itself at odds with Persian Gulf policies, particularly in Libya and Qatar, where Ankara’s influence clashes with that of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (6).

The Future of U.S.-GCC Military Relations

Persian Gulf countries largely evaluate Trump’s transactional and highly personal approach to foreign policy favourably, as it resembles their own diplomatic and international trade practices. The close rapport between high-ranking Saudi and other Persian Gulf officials with Trump and his inner circle over the past four years may also bode well for their ability to negotiate with a second Trump administration.

However, GCC leaders have concerns about Trump’s unpredictability and whether his policies could further destabilise the Middle East. His return follows significant regional shifts, and it remains unclear how his new team will adapt to this evolving environment (7).

In relations with Persian Gulf states, Trump is likely to be responsive to Saudi and Emirati positions, supporting any military action against the Houthis by the Arab coalition and the internationally recognised Yemeni government with extensive intelligence and logistical backing. Such support could be tied to larger arms and trade deals with Persian Gulf nations (8).

On the other hand, Trump’s ambiguous stance on the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities in Khurais and Abqaiq has sown doubt among GCC countries about the reliability of U.S. security commitments. In a second term, Persian Gulf states hope for a policy of “controlled toughness”—a balanced approach that counters Iran’s aggression without unnecessary escalation. Such a policy would combine sustained diplomatic and economic pressure with credible security guarantees to protect Persian Gulf interests while preserving the fragile stability achieved through the Saudi-Iran détente.

Another challenge is Trump’s unconditional support for Israel, which could create friction between the U.S. and GCC countries. While some Persian Gulf states have normalised relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, unwavering U.S. backing for Israel—and the possibility of Trump encouraging Netanyahu’s government to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities—could seriously destabilise the region and pressure the GCC (9).

Persian Gulf countries thus face significant uncertainty, especially as global conflicts from Ukraine to further escalation in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran are possible and may complicate these relations under Trump (10).

Additionally, Trump is expected to seek stronger defence and security ties with Saudi Arabia, reviving large-scale arms deals like those initiated during his first term. These agreements would likely include advanced weapons systems and continued support for Saudi defence capabilities, aiming to achieve regional stability and strengthen the security balance against challenges, particularly those posed by Iran. Saudi Arabia may also be prioritised for access to the U.S. Excess Defence Articles (EDA) program, allowing it to purchase surplus defence equipment at reduced costs (11) and modernise its defences affordably.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia could qualify to host U.S. military stockpiles, a strategic move that would enhance military cooperation and solidify its position as a key defence partner in the region (12). However, Riyadh faces two major obstacles to acquiring advanced U.S. weapons: its relationship with China and U.S. demands to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in any regional arms sales. For example normalisation between Israel and Egypt and Jordan let to the sale of advanced U.S. weaponry to these countries, however, limitations were put on the weapon systems being sold. While normalisation agreements might alleviate some concerns, operational details of such sales would need to comply with U.S. regulations (13).

Analysts note that buyers may perceive Trump as more transactional, potentially believing that increased arms purchases would grant them greater leverage over him. However, they caution that Trump is likely to push for more arms sales to Persian Gulf countries, pressuring some to buy even if it is not in their best interest. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pursued different strategic approaches, with the Saudis expressing interest in joining the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) alongside the UK, Italy, and Japan—though reports suggest Japan is reluctant to allow this. Meanwhile, the UAE has reportedly shown interest in South Korea’s KF-21 fighter jet program.

Each country in the region has slightly different arms priorities. For the UAE, the F-35 deal may hinge on other issues, such as its potential role in Gaza. For Saudi Arabia, the primary goal is securing a NATO-style agreement with the U.S., committing Washington to defend the kingdom against external threats. Qatar, on the other hand, may seek stronger military partnerships and an expanded U.S. military presence in the country.