By Dr. Maryam Varij Kazemi
Geopolitical Issues Researcher
International Peace Studies Center – IPSC
China is rejuvenating—not in terms of its population, but in its industry and economy. In this regard, transforming China into a major maritime power to achieve its geo-economic goals is a priority, and a significant increase can be seen in the number of ships, submarines, aircraft, and their operations at sea. As we approach the end of 2024, China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, is moving full speed ahead in the open seas.
Given that Beijing is surpassing U.S. naval power by expanding its fleet, it is expected that the production of new Chinese ships already in operation will continue uninterrupted at least until 2035 (1). In terms of the number of ships, each of China’s three naval forces is by far the largest in the world. The growth in China’s fleet is considered highly significant for scenarios that mainly concern the United States and its regional allies (2).
The rapid increase in China’s military power has allowed the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to outpace the U.S. Navy in several maritime sectors more quickly than anticipated. If China continues expanding its fleet at the current pace and the U.S. does not revitalise its shipbuilding industry, the likelihood of China emerging victorious in a potential inter-state, particularly long-term, great-power war increases. The result would be a more confident China that threatens its less powerful neighbours and ignores U.S. efforts to curb such behaviour.
However, the U.S. can still maintain its superiority by investing in smaller surface combatants such as corvettes, frigates, and unmanned maritime systems, along with alternative platforms such as aircraft or land-based missile launchers. It can also deepen its partnerships with Pacific countries like Japan and South Korea and increase investment in its domestic shipbuilding industry, especially its highly specialised submarine industrial base. Both the U.S. and China are developing armed surface and underwater systems that are smaller than China’s manned ships. Although smaller ships may not be as powerful as larger ones, they can be built faster and in greater numbers (3).
Nevertheless, the U.S. still holds an advantage in guided-missile cruisers and destroyers. In particular, destroyers—due to their multi-mission capabilities, speed, and cruise range—serve as the backbone of any modern fleet. The U.S.’s 73 destroyers allow it to exert more control compared to China’s 42 destroyers. However, China is closing the gap, having doubled its destroyer fleet from 20 in 2003 to 42 in 2023.
Chinese ships almost exclusively operate in the so-called “near seas” and rarely cross the first island chain (4). But from the U.S. perspective, China is attempting to expand its military presence, economic influence, and diplomatic reach by linking maritime chains—extending from the “first island chain” (including the South China Sea and East China Sea), to the “second island chain” (connecting the Ogasawara Islands, Guam, and Palau), and potentially even to the “third island chain” (linking the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, and Tonga).
In late July 2013, Xi Jinping emphasised the importance of maritime superiority, including strengthening naval power, enhancing maritime law enforcement capabilities, and establishing maritime rules and regulations. Chinese officials have recognised maritime security as a strategic national interest and have strengthened the country’s maritime capabilities. Consequently, Beijing has begun pursuing active political and military measures, most notably in the South China Sea. Besides prioritising its claims over disputed islands and reefs and increasing maritime activities in the South China Sea, China has built military facilities on 3,200 hectares of reclaimed land in disputed territories. Overall, China claims about 90% of the South China Sea based on the “nine-dash line.” Although these claims were rejected by the International Tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in July 2016, China continues to assert its sovereignty.
China also seeks to strengthen its military relations with some Indo-Pacific countries to be able to project power beyond its borders. In this regard, besides archipelagic states like Tonga and Kiribati, China has also deepened its relations with the Solomon Islands through a maritime security agreement.
In summary, while the number of U.S. aircraft carriers, ships, attack submarines, support aircraft, radar sensors, and so on, still exceeds China’s, China’s naval capabilities in the western Pacific surpass those of the U.S. Navy in the region, posing a new challenge given the declining deterrence of U.S. special forces.
Conclusion
Although the number of Chinese warships is an inadequate measure of its naval power—since it does not account for quality and capability—Beijing is determined to enhance its comprehensive power in the Indo-Pacific region by expanding its fleet and naval bases, aiming to achieve relative parity with the U.S. in this domain. In the coming decades, as China completes its maritime chain links, combined with its economic weight and soft power, the U.S. will face obstacles in the Indo-Pacific that it can only overcome through exchanges, exercises, combined operations, and industrial-commercial cooperation with regional countries to maintain its presence and influence.
Keywords: China, United States, naval power, Indo-Pacific, islands, China,
1-https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/may/another-historic-year-pla-navy
2-https://www.andrewerickson.com/2024/07/modern-chinese-maritime-forces-1-july-2024-ed-order-of-battle-for-worlds-largest-navy-coast-guard-maritime-milit
3-https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-chinas-naval-buildup
4- https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/06/13/are-we-sure-china-views-sea-power-the-same-way-the-west-does