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IPSC

International Peace Studies Centre

Our Vision:

In the beginning all people were one nation (Holy Qur'an, 2:213) Throughout human history, peace has always been the 'primary state' and war the 'accidental state'. Peace is beautiful, compassionate and constructive, while war is fearsome, merciless and destructive. Unfortunately, despite this, war has been one of 20th century's most major problems, and has proved to be the symbol of the beginning of the 21[st]century. As portrayed by the contemporary history of international relations, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia, war is not the solution, nor is it constructive or helpful in solving problems; rather, it causes problems and is the root of the continuation of violence, instability and insecurity.

War is not the solution to the differences between governments and nations. Only with peace which is based on justice, i.e. '*Just Peace*', can we reach a stable and permanent solution to our differences. Diplomacy and constructive dialogue which take into consideration the rights of both parties, is the only path to establishing 'Just Peace', stability and world security. Our aim is to change international relations with the active participation of nations on the basis of 'Just Peace'.

Let there be a group among you who will invite others to good. (Holy Qur'an, 3:104)

We, as part of the international network of intellectuals, are able to play an important and constructive role in the establishment of mutual understanding, of dialogue and in the reduction and amelioration of global problems. Our intention is to provide solutions and means for the positive and just cooperation of nations with each other, and to reach this end independent of governments, through a realistic understanding of nations and governments from each other, and through clear, truthful and constructive dialogue.

The Principles of Establishing 'Just Peace':

1. Establishing justice between the countries of the South and the North.
2. Mutual respect between different nations and different governments.
3. Respecting and considering the valid interests of all parties which have a vested interest in any given conflict.
4. Thinking globally and acting against extreme nationalism.
5. Realistic understanding of the realities of the world.
6. Upholding and respecting human rights and the principles of democracy.
7. Accepting and moving towards the destruction of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world/on a global scale

Our priorities in the current situation are to analyse the issues and problems of conflict-zones such as those of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
Our tools for aiding in the establishment of world peace are:

1. Inviting and facilitating for intellectuals from different parts of the world to engage in dialogue with each other.
2. Dialogue between intellectuals and international organizations.
3. Preparing the groundwork for dialogue between on the basis of mutual respect between opposing governments.
4. Organising international scientific conferences dealing with regional and global issues.
5. Publishing scientific research work on peace studies in the form of books and journals.
6. Providing education internationally on the culture of dialogue, understanding, compromise, justice, freedom and spirituality.

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Notice to Contributors

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Articles

Concocting The "Other" in Afghanistan

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Abstract

The validity, truth and truth value of the text and context of Euro-American, especially postmodern Anglo-American, ethnographies of Afghanistan, is rarely interrogated. A systematic scrutiny of these ethnographies reveals how prolonged blind acceptance of faulty, distorted, misinterpreted, and cooked-up information buttressed by the authority of "fieldwork" has been produced and reproduced in widely circulated packages of pseudo-knowledge about the peoples and cultures of Afghanistan. Various degrees and forms of this tradition of production and reproduction are available in virtually all postmodern Anglo-American ethnographies of Afghanistan. Some instances of pseudo-knowledge about Afghanistan have been interrogated elsewhere (Hanifi 2000, 2004, 2005, 2011). This essay offers a culturally and anthropologically informed scrutiny of a concocted "Pashtun couple" stored in photographs embedded in a postmodern Anglo-American ethnography of Afghanistan.
Keywords: Afghanistan, ethnography, Pashtun couple, other.

Introduction

Modern anthropological ethnography had been widely proclaimed by its guild leaders as a bastion of truth housing truthful packages of knowledge about the cultural and social realities of its Other objects. Starting in the middle of the twentieth century and gaining momentum through the four decades of the Cold War (the postcolonial era) anthropology experienced a rapid decline of its modern tradition and the "reinvention" of its disciplinary identity through reflexivity (the "reflexive turn" or "critical anthropology") during the late 1960s and 1970s. Viewed broadly, the reflexive turn insisted on bursting open the gates of the bastion of positivist anthropology in order to expose the real flesh and blood of the built-in subjectivities (that constituted) of the theories and methods of the so called "Science of Man". Reflexive anthropology argued for the acknowledgement and exposure of the cultural biases of Western ethnographers and the hitherto tabooed critique of the hierarchical and exploitative structure of the relationship between the Western ethnographer and the ethnographized (native/primitive/savage) Other. A major objective of reflexivity was to unveil the historical complicity of anthropology in European colonialism and the continued collaboration of the disciple with the Euro-American imperial domination of the Other. The feminist consciousness of the reflexive turn underscored the historical domination of women by men in the construction of anthropological theories and practices in all locations of the ethnographer-ethnographized relations of power and domination.

In early 1980s reflexivity merged with the postmodern literary twist in anthropology converting "'scientific' ethnographic epistemology" (Spencer 1989: 162, n. 1) into an art gallery in which how to paint the Other object became more important than its empirical cultural and social realities. Ethnography moved from empirically verifiable fieldwork experience to imaginary texts and poetic prose that frequently overlapped with literary fiction. Empirical verifiability of fieldwork data and accountability for fieldwork experience became moot issues. The combined political and academic effect of reflexivity and postmodernism produced the "crisis of representation" in which "ethnographic authority" shifted from objectivity—the solitary

ethnographer's verifiable fieldwork experience—to subjectivity—the art of "writing culture", production of texts (including photographs) in which the ethnographer, as artist, had a free hand in imposing her/his own whims, imaginings, interpretations, poetics, politics, allegories and tropes on the ethnographized "Other". Modernist verifiable fieldwork experience lost its positivist weight and was replaced by unverifiable claims about "being there", and "[y]ou are there, because I was there" (Clifford 1983a: 118). The emphasis on the art of writing culture ushered in the free for all, "anything goes" (Feyerabend 1988), "Yuppie Anthropology" (Silverstein 1985). Not surprisingly, the new ethnographic anarchy promoted hyper-cultural relativism and micro-localization and encouraged—some say required and rewarded—cooked-up "facts", experimentation, interpretation, and obsessive preoccupation with symbols and systems of meanings (symbolic anthropology) of the unverifiable Other. In theory postmodern reflexive ethnography advocated a "multi-vocal" triangle of inter-subjective dialogue between the Western observer (researcher), the observed (researched) "Other", and the audience for ethnographic texts. However, in practice, like its positivist predecessor—but with more ideological authority—particularistic postmodern reflexivity continued to invoke strategies of "confidentiality" and "anonymity" (much like espionage and intelligence gathering) for shielding from the audience the empirical Other, the source of the information from which ethnographic knowledge is purportedly constructed, with pseudonyms and fictive labels in order to protect her/his "privacy" and "safety". Thus, in Euro-American ethnography, the cultural and social identity of the Other person in place and time was and continues to be the trade secret (trademark) and copy-righted (patented) private property of the writers of ethnographic texts.

Perhaps an unintended (but unavoidable) consequence of the self-reflexive gaze of anthropologists was to engage in an epistemological critique of their discipline by scrutinizing the ethnographic writings and research practices of prominent (and a few not so prominent) figures in the genealogy of the discipline. My sense of irony in this disinterring exercise is grounded in the fact that within the guild of anthropology—"amongst us" so to speak—"[p]ublic questioning of the empirical

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contents of ethnography is extremely rare, and, tellingly, almost always confined to cases where an ostensibly anthropological text has won a wide public audience—*Coming of Age in Samoa, The Mountain People, the teachings of Don Juan, Shabono.* Such questioning seems as much a product of the patrolling of disciplinary boundaries as of anything high-minded" (Spencer 1989: 162, n. 4, italics in the original). The cases noted here became the subjects of major "anthropological scandals" (Spencer 1996). Marcel Griaule's ethnographic imaginings about the Dogon (Van Beek 1991, Clifford 1983b), the controversial writings about the Tasaday (Headland 1992) and other (not so widely circulated) cases that qualify for "scandal" could be added to Spencer's list (Needham 1985, Robin 2004). These public scandals (and others that have remained unexposed to public view) and the fear of becoming involved in scandals of their own have strengthened the anthropologists' resolve to refrain from questioning and scrutinizing the validity and truth value of claims about "being there" doing "fieldwork", interacting with "informants", and gathering "data" at the (often fictive and unspecified) location of the annonymous Other. Moving the authority of ethnography from objective and verifiable fieldwork to subjective writing and privileging the ethnographic writer with the right to invoke and manipulate the strategies and tactics of "confidentiality" for protecting the "privacy" and "safety" of the "Other" are at the heart of the construction of this taboo and the institutional reluctance of anthropology to insist on truth, truth value and the empirical validity of information from which ethnographic knowledge is constructed.

Real or potential scandals that are of interest only to areal (regional [e. g. Central Asia] or country [e. g. Afghanistan, Iran]) specialists are often kept isolated by "the small circle of scholars who know each other's work well" (Canfield 2004: 786). Canfield was referring to the authors of Anglo-American postmodern ethnographies of Afghanistan produced during the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. So protective and supportive of each other are the authors of this genre of ethnographies of Afghanistan that when a question was raised about the integrity of one of its products, the questioner received a harsh scolding and a threat from one of its authors (Canfield 2004: 786). Withstanding the

potential of such a threat and in its defiance if issued, this essay interrogates the validity of a specific ethnographic sliver claiming to be the "Other" in Afghanistan. As mentioned above, polemical engagement of ethnography is strongly frowned upon in Western anthropology. In reviewing a book by Ernest Gellner, Paul Rabinow (quoting Michel Foucault) angrily asks "[h]as anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic?" (1994: 998). This essay answers a firm "yes" to Rabinow's snide interrogative and proceeds to offer a polemical essay that contains "new ideas" for the ethnography of Afghanistan and implicit suggestions for upgraded ethical standards for the guild of Western anthropology. It is beyond the scope of this article to develop these implicit suggestions into a comprehensive discussion about new ethical standards for the production of anthropological ethnography.

Encounter with a "Pashtun Couple" in Afghanistan

In "Gender for the 99 percent"(AT 29[5]: 13-16, 2013a) Nancy Lindisfarne, a well known British "feminist" and Jonathan Neale, a British "anti-capitalist activist" provide a critique of neoliberalism and an alternative proposal for emphasis on the "elite control" of ideologies and practices of inequality at the intersection of class and gender hierarchies with focus on the United States. Situated in the article, in an ethnographic vacuum and without any cultural context, are five photographs (Figs. 1-5). Figs. 3-5 consist of three pictures under the title "a Pashtun couple ask to have their picture taken. The sober version was their favorite of the three. Afghanistan 1971" (p. 16). Perhaps these three photographs are offered as generic illustrations of Marilyn Strathern's theoretical views about "sexual imagery" as a device for class-based conceptualization of gender (Lindisfarne and Neale 2013a: 13). But the cultural and physical content of these photographs are positioned not only to stand for the "Pashtun couple" imagined by the authors but also to represent inter-gender physical and symbolic body interaction among Pashtuns in general and, implicitly, other Others in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Central and South Asia. Nothing is said about the real class and cultural, spatial, and temporal locations of this "Pashtun couple". A culturally informed reading of these photographs does not support the argument for the primacy of

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class in relations of power. The "sexual imagery" in Nancy Lindisfarne's photographs of a "Pashtun couple" who "enjoyed being modern" (Gustaaf Houtman, personal communication, March 13, 2014 [quoting Nancy Lindisfarne]) punctuates the power of gender, not class.

I first noticed these three photographs more than two decades ago under the title "A married couple ask to have their picture taken" in a widely circulated 1991 book titled *Bartered Brides: Politics, gender and marriage in an Afghan tribal society* (Cambridge University Press, p. 135) authored by Nancy Tapper. (I wonder if the title of this book and its narratives about negotiations that precede and accompany arranged marriages is inspired by or has any ideological, symbolic, literary, or ethnographic relationship to the popular Czech opera "*The Bartered Bride*", a story about "how….true love prevails over the combined efforts of ambitious parents and a scheming marriage broker" [Wikipedia]. The English language version of this 19th century opera has been regularly staged in London and New York during post-WWII decades). To my knowledge Nancy Tapper's *Bartered Brides* is one of the most popular and widely reviewed books about the purported domination of women by men in Afghanistan. Vended with the authority of anthropological "fieldwork" and "research" by the author in Afghanistan, the book has received rave reviews in academic journals in most of which it is acclaimed as a highly authoritative ethnographic work about marriage and women's life in Afghanistan. One reader considers it "the essential book for understanding gender in Afghan society" (Neale 2008b, n. 3). It is quite likely that the feminist ideological tint in the title and narratives of *Bartered Brides* has exerted considerable influence over the policies and practices of current Euro-American military occupation of Afghanistan. The propaganda leading to this imperial venture was heavily driven by Western feminist rhetoric arguing for the liberation of Afghan women from domination by men and the yoke of dreaded "Muslim fundamentalists". With its liberal feminist ideological orientation, the book has probably served as a major source of information for the Euro-American imperial civil and military policies and practices aimed at the "liberation" of Afghan women and the imposition of the Western model of "human rights" on Afghanistan.

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Ever since I first encountered these photographs during 1991 I have been curious and puzzled about the Western European-looking face of the man in the photographs and the glaring contradictions radiating from the interactive bodies of this "Pashtun couple" sitting intimately side by side, flirting and frolicking in public view inside a pre-modern and pre-industrial nomadic black tent in Afghanistan. These images of a "Pashtun couple" have nowhere been situated in an empirically verifiable social, spatial and temporal ethnographic context. For reasons that have to do with Western academic conventions of refrain from critically engaging the empirical validity of Western ethnographic claims about the Other and the politics and standards of Euro-American ethnographies of Afghanistan, these (and eight other) photographs in Nancy Tapper's 1991 book have not generated any critical engagement or commentary in anthropological (and social science or popular) discourse. Given this and because of the stark contrast between the contents of the three photographs of a "Pashtun couple" and the cultural, social, and demographic realities of Afghanistan I had concluded that the placement of these pictures in Nancy Tapper's 1991 tome may have been a postmodern experiment. The thought of a gaffe or a "printing error" had also crossed my mind. Nevertheless, over the years, I continued to be curious and puzzled about the flirting and frolicking "Pashtun couple" in public view inside a pre-industrial nomadic black tent in Afghanistan. In addition, until recently, I was unaware of the demographic survey conducted jointly by Nancy Tapper and Jonathan Neale (2013b) among the tent dwelling nomads in the outskirts of Kabul during the early 1970s. Nor had I seen any co-authored writings by these two individuals. Now, twenty three years later, these three photographs have been re-cycled in their original stacked format with a revised title in a co-authored article by Lindisfarne and Neale (2013a). This time the photographs are individually marked as the work (and property) of Nancy Lindisfarne (2013a: 16). Like the 1991 publication, the photographs in AT 29(5) are published without a cultural and historical context.

During 2013 Nancy Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neale co-authored two essays (2013a; 2013b). The 2013a essay is grounded in the more comprehensive 2013b article. To my knowledge these are Lindisfarne's

and Neale's first (and only) co-authored published writings. In the (2013b) essay they discuss the results of their joint fieldwork in the outskirts of Kabul during the early 1970s. My earlier curiosity and the appearance of these two co-authored articles (Lindisfarne & Neale 2013a, 2013b) in one of which the three photographs reappear together with my recent first encounter with the images of Jonathan Neal's face prompts me as an anthropologist with ethnographic "fieldwork" experience during 1970 in a village and nomadic camps surrounding Kabul and as a cultural product of Afghanistan (a "native" Pashtun)—in a way, the "Other" subject in Lindisfrane and Neale's writings about Afghanistan—to undertake this unavoidably polemical scrutiny of the representations of a "Pashtun couple". On behalf of the "Pashtun couple" subordinated in these photographs, this exercise produces a forceful "yes" to Gayatri Spivaks's classic question "Can the Subaltern Speak"? Yes, the imaginary Western feminist modernity concocted by Nancy Lindisfarne (Tapper) and Jonathan Neale inside a nomadic black canvas tent is out of place in pre-industrial Afghanistan. A brief historical backdrop for the presence of Nancy Tapper (Lindisfarne) and Jonathan Neale in Afghanistan and a general ethnographic overview of nomadic camps around urban areas in the country are provided as the framework for speaking to the contents of these photographs.

Ethnographizing the "Pashtun Couple" in Afghanistan
Nancy Lindisfarne (Tapper) and Jonathan Neale claim to have travelled and conducted "fieldwork" among Pashtun pastoral nomads in Afghanistan. During the "early 1970s" Nancy Lindisfarne conducted fieldwork "among people (she) knew best—rural Pashtuns like those who later supported the Taliban" (2008: 32). Jonathan Neal "did two years of fieldwork as an anthropologist from 1971 to 1973, and the people (he) knew best were poor pastoralists who had lost their flocks and now" (2008b) "peddled yoghurt in the city" (2008a: 218). These peddlers were "proud of their nomad and Pushtun heritage" (Neale 2008a: 219). During her travels in Afghanistan Nancy Tapper (Lindisfarne) visited Kabul for various lengths of time during 1968, 1970, 1971, and 1972. Foreign scholars were required to visit Kabul in order to obtain official government clearance, permission and bureaucratic and cultural facilitation (e. g. assistants, translators) for

their research projects. The process required several weeks of residence in the city. While conducting research, Neale lived in a "rented house" (2008a: 220) somewhere in Kabul during "summer 1972" (2002: 31). Nancy Tapper acknowledges her presence in Kabul during the summer months of 1971 and 1972 but I cannot find information about the specific time and location of her residency in the city.

Nancy Lindisfarne (Tapper) and Jonathan Neale claim to have conducted a joint demographic survey in villages and/or nomadic camps somewhere in the "outskirts of Kabul" (Neale 2002: 31) during the summer months of early 1970s. Here is what they write about the results of their joint demographic survey:

"When many people talk of the family they also assume that in most class societies, throughout most of history, there was a sharp division of labour between men who were responsible for the work of production, and women who were responsible for the work of reproduction and the care of the workforce. This assumption is simply mistaken. Let us take an example in anticipation of our discussion of Afghanistan in Part Three. *In the early 1970s each of us lived in Afghanistan*. The gendered division of labour *we saw* there was typical of peasant societies and many rural class societies. *In the several villages we knew well, perhaps one out of 50 households was* rich enough to protect women and men from heavy labouring work by hiring servants and sharecroppers**.** In such house-holds women were pleased to be able to dress discreetly and wear long veils. In the other households, women worked both indoors and outdoors, as did most men. Among these poorer families women wore less cumber-some head scarves, and they and their men folk felt cruelly oppressed.

Childrearing too was shared work, and not necessarily done at home. When babies were very small, they stayed with their mothers as the women worked. But in the villages we knew, infant and maternal mortality was shockingly high, and it was not unusual for infants to be fostered and grow up with their "milk siblings". When a little older, babies went everywhere with an older brother or sister or cousin who looked after them. Pashtun fathers spent far more time with

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their children than British fathers do now. Childcare was collective and kindly. Children played everywhere because all adults always had an eye on them, and would intervene if trouble looked likely.

For the Pashtun women and men we knew, surviving as a household was the collective concern. Women and men pulled together to provide clean water, food and warmth for themselves and their children. For the poor, women's work and men's work were not strongly marked, apart from some conventional tasks—women milked and men ploughed. But even that division of labour would be altered in the face of necessity.

In *a Pashtun village* it was only the relatively wealthy who could afford a stronger gendered division of labour. But this came at a price. Rich women were far more tightly controlled in the name of family privilege, or "honour". The dominant ideology included the idea that if a man could not control the women of his household, he lacked "honour" and "ate shame". Then a powerful household might take advantage of another household's weakness, and steal their animals and land, or seduce the household's daughter. That sexual shame made everyone in the weaker household even more vulnerable to violence and hunger. A system of class inequality was experienced as weakness and a loss of personal gendered honour. That's what gender did. This particular pattern of gendered inequality is also found in other countries. But the more general point we are making is that Afghanistan was a class society, but there was no separate sphere of reproduction and childcare. This is true far more widely". (Lindisfarne and Neale 2013b: 18-19, emphasis added).

Based on their researches about the family, Lindisfarne and Neale state: "Most commonly, people talk about the family as if it resembles their family. This is understandable. Yet consider the range of things individuals in different countries have said to us at one time or another" (2013b: 17). They identify eight "things" stated by "people who were living in families in capitalist societies, and all of them were talking about sentiments they considered completely normal" (2013b: 18). The

exception was "*the Afghan man who loved his father*" and who had apparently stated "a man always loves his father more than anyone else" (2013b: 17, n. 41, emphasis added). (Could this man be Shin Gul, Jonathan Neale's friend? See below). According to Lindisfarne and Neale this man apparently lived during the "1970 (when) Afghan politics and economics were dominated by big landlords who lived in forts in the countryside" (2013b, n. 41). "[F]orts in the countryside" were common in southern and eastern Afghanistan, not in northern Afghanistan, the region where Nancy Laindisfarne (Tapper) claims to have conducted research.

Based on their demographic survey Lindisfarne and Neale collectively conclude that "[*i*]*n the several villages (including 'a Pahstun village'* and *the Pashtun women and men) we knew well, perhaps one out of 50 households was rich enough to protect women and men from heavy labouring work by hiring servants and sharecroppers*" (2013b: 18, brackets and italicized emphasis added). Although information about the specific location and economy (pastoral, agricultural or mixed) of these "households" is not provided, Neale's reference (2008a: 218) to "yoghurt peddlers in the city" living in a "camp by the animal market on the edge of town", and reference to his visit to the "TB sanatorium in Kabul" (2002: 31) and "TB hospital" (2008a:2) with the nomads situates their research site in nomadic camps in an area adjacent to *nakhas* (local reference for the animal market in Kabul), south of *Khaer Khana* pass, and north of *'Ali Abad*—site of Kabul University and the TB sanatorium—the only such facility in Afghanistan during the 1970s.

The joint demographic survey by Lindisfarne and Neale in Afghanistan was focused on inter-gender relations of power, especially those surrounding and embedded in marriage among Pashtun pastoral nomads. On the basis of their fieldwork they have individually produced an extensive volume of ethnographic and political texts about Afghanistan. Neale narrates the results of his research in several compact essays (1981, 1988, 2002, 2008a). His "forthcoming book, *Poverty and Sexual Politics in Afghanistan*" (Neale 2001: 30, note 6) is yet to be published. Lindisfarne's findings and generalizations about relations of power surrounding marriage among Pashtuns are narrated

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in her 1979 doctoral thesis ("Marriage and social organization among Durrani Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan") converted to the 1991 *Bartered Brides: Politics, gender and marriage in an Afghan tribal society* and several subsidiary journal articles and book chapters. The ideological orientation and the substance of the published writings of Lindisfarne and Neale on the subject of inter-gender relations among Pashtun nomads in Afghanistan are strikingly similar. Both authors (especially Lindisfarne) rely heavily on quantitative and metric data in support of their common understandings and conclusions about marriage and gender inequality among Pashtun pastoral nomads in Afghanistan. In reviewing Nancy Tapper's 1991 book, a prominent Western woman ethnographer of Pashtun women observes that it "reads like a grammar of rules, a myriad of general cultural facts charted onto tables and figures" (Grima 1992: 201)—much like what a demographic survey might generate.

During the fieldwork of Nancy Lindisfarne (Tapper) and Jonathan Neale in Afghanistan, the rural outskirts of towns and cities of the country were dotted with clusters of nomadic camps and agricultural villages. Adjacent to and mixed with these camps and villages were settlements of a variety of tent-dwelling peripatetic and itinerant communities, locally called "*Jat*" (gypsy). The *Jat* communities "subsisted primarily from the sale of more or less specialized goods and services to villagers, townspeople and sometimes pastoral nomads" (Rao 1986: 254). One such service was prostitution. In these settings it was not uncommon to find individuals, households or other social networks engaged in pimping and prostitution (Olesen 1994: 19, 44, 245; Rao 1981, 1982: 30-31, 1986: 238-239). Asta Olesen provides photographs of a "camp of itinerant prostitutes north of Pul-I Khumri" (1994: 28), a city in northern Afghanistan. Although concentrated in gypsy communities, pimping and prostitution were also available in some non-gypsy households. Nancy Tapper (1991: 238) notes the presence of "male and female prostitutes" in the "camps of gypsies" as well as other ethnic groups where she claims to have conducted research. (In Afghanistan camps of gypsies were located near large urban areas like Kabul or Pul-i Khumri. Nancy Tapper claims to have conducted research in a small rural village more than ten miles north of

the city of Saripul). She has published the English translation of a claimed tape-recorded local narrative of pimping, prostitution and extramarital sex among the pastoral nomads in the area where she claims to have conducted research (1991: 236-239). However, the recorder, narrator, language, spatial and temporal location of this recording are not specified).

In discussing marriage, Neale states that among the poor nomads he studied near Kabul "the bride price for a pretty young woman remained as high as among rich nomads because a family's vending income was now enhanced by a wife attracting customers by flirting with truck drivers and other men on the street" (2008a: 218). For the women of the camps studied by Neale, "[t]here are infinite opportunities for flirting at the well, or for rumours that a woman was flirting at the well. There are opportunities for the landlord's son to look boldly at peasant girls as they work in the fields, opportunities for lewd remarks on city streets" (1981: 6). Elsewhere he states: "….men often have affairs with other men's wives and daughters. It is wrong: it is also daring, romantic, exciting and a poke in the eye for the other man. Women pursue these affairs for the same reasons, and because it is a poke in the eye for their husbands" (2001: 6). Jonathan Neale vividly narrates his intimate interactions with members of these groups living in the outskirts of the city of Kabul during his fieldwork in Afghanistan (2008a: 218-222). He describes his friendly, somewhat intimate, relationship with a young boy named Shin Gul, a member of one of these tent dwelling households (2008a: 221). Shin Gul was "a teenage boy, so proud to have his picture taken astride his father's bicycle" (Neale 2008a: 218). Neale must have been the photographer of this scene. Shin Gul, whom Neal "liked a lot" (2008a: 219), shared with Neale a "secret picture" of his "beautiful" prospective wife named "Pkhe", a woman who was "old enough to marry" (Neale 2008a: 219). (Who took this picture; for what purpose?; perhaps for vending Pkhe as a prostitute?! The nomads did not have cameras!) The likely Pashtu phonetic rendition of Pkhe is *Pakha* which stands for the feminine version of the masculine adjective *Pokh* meaning ripe, mature, ready, cooked—an implausible proper name (or nickname) for a girl or woman in Afghanistan. The label was probably invented by a pimp for marketing Pkhe, as a ripe body or

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mature woman, for sexual or erotic interaction with men. Pkhe must have been on intimate terms with Jonathan Neale. She had once "confided" in him that she "did not fancy Shin Gul at all and spoke of him (Shin Gul) dismissively" because he was "poor and gauche" (Neale 2008a: 219). Neale also knew about Shin Gul's "younger sister of about eleven, a beautiful, laughing child, a desirable future wife" (2008a: 218). According to Neale, one of Shin Gul's uncles "would crawl through the alleys of the camp at night on his belly, sneaking towards his lovers" (2008a: 219). Neal and his wife, Liz, were once invited by Shin Gul and his father to visit their tent where they were served tea (Neale 2008a: 219). Neale "managed to get one of Shin Gul's cousins into the TB hospital" in Kabul (2008a: 221). Neal also "went to visit a friend from a poor nomad family in the TB sanatorium in Kabul" (2002: 31).

The account of prostitution among pastoral nomads by Nancy Tapper (1991: 236-239) has a number of structural and behavioral features in common with Jonathan Neale's description and analysis of prostitution and pimping in nomadic camps near Kabul. Both accounts portray prostitution as a practical and pragmatic alternative for poor nomads. Jonathan Neale's friends Shin Gul (as pimp) and Pkhe (his future wife as prostitute) have their close counterparts among the people described in Nancy Tapper's narrative of prostitution. "Majid" and his wife "Tajbibi" are the recruiters and peddlers of prostitutes and facilitators of prostitution in Nancy Tapper's text (1991: 236-239). It is likely that Nancy Tapper's and Jonathan Neale's accounts of prostitution are derived from their joint demographic survey in villages and nomadic (and gypsy) camps near the city of Kabul.

Nancy Tapper claims to have conducted research during the early 1970s in a fictive rural Pashtun village ("Sinjit" [Farsi, jujube]—an implausible morphemic construct for domestic space—neighborhood, village, district, town or city) in northern Afghanistan located (in a map drawn by her) about 20 kilometers north of the town of Saripul and approximately 30 miles south of the city of Sheberghan. Forty years ago—during the time of Nancy Tapper's visits to Afghanistan—this was a very isolated and thinly populated rural area at a significant

distance from a town or a large urban environment. The presence of a publicly known brothel in such a remote rural area would have been highly unlikely. The brothel and prostitution activity discussed by Nancy Tapper (1991: 236-239) is likely to have been located in or near the site of the demographic survey she and Jonathan Neale conducted near the city of Kabul. Throughout her book *Bartered Brides*, including the story about the brothel, Nancy Tapper regularly refers to "us"— objective case of the first person plural pronoun. It may be that the second person in this dyad is Jonathan Neale, Nancy Tapper's research partner during their demographic research near Kabul. If the reference to "Saripul" in Jozjan province in northern Afghanistan were overlooked in Nancy Tapper's *Bartered Brides* the largely quantitative narratives in the book could easily be situated in the Pashtun nomadic camps around Kabul in the context of the Tapper-Neale joint demographic survey. However, in both accounts prostitution is portrayed as a track for liberated and powerful women and the rejection of male domination. Nancy Tapper (1991) and Jonathan Neale (2001) depict prostitutes as powerful and aggressive women and poor men, especially their pimps, as "weak" and socially despised.

Simulating pornography by the "Other" in Afghanistan
It is by now clear that the location near the city of Kabul where Nancy Lindisfarne (Tapper) and Jonathan Neale conducted their demographic survey among poor nomads and peripatetic groups who, like other such communities trapped in the lower tiers of class hierarchies, exploited every opportunity to acquire means with which to address their basic survival needs. One such opportunity required the rejection of traditional upper-class standards for inter-gender and sexual relations. This rejection must have been reinforced when the poor nomads and *Jats* found themselves on a supportive, intimate, and informal social and political page with an Anglo-American "feminist" and an "anti-capitalist activist" of those days. To the poor nomads and *Jats* in the outskirts of Kabul, Nancy Tapper and Jonathan Neale were a bundle of contradictions—on the one hand they were *kharijis* and *kafer*s (foreigners and non-believers); on the other, they were influential, rich, admired, envied, and sympathetic enablers who approved of and probably participated in their rejection of bourgeoisie "goody two

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shoes" standards for traditional inter-gender behavior. It is very probable that it is in this pseudo-modern, liberal, and sexually charged atmosphere, somewhere near Kabul, in which a "Pashtun couple" had posed to "have their picture taken" by an Anglo-American ethnographer.

The man and woman posing to be photographed are sitting during daylight inside a black canvas tent which probably belonged to the households of Shin Gul, Pkhe, or one of the "50 households" surveyed by Nancy Tapper and Jonathan Neale during summer 1971 or 1972 in the outskirts of Kabul. The survey must have included the households of Shin Gul and Pkhe with whom Jonathan Neale had friendly and intimate relations. The subjects of the photographs, the photographic process, and the photographer (Nancy Tapper) are in the public view— they are being watched intensely by three local men whose images can clearly be seen in the background of the 1991 version of these staged photographs. In the 2013 AT version the image of the third onlooker is clipped; only two local observers can be seen in the background.

The "Pashtun" man in the photographs is dressed in unruffled *shalwar-kamees* (local shirt and bloomers), white turban, and a loose fitting jacket the collar of which is ruffled by the woman's left hand around the man's neck. It was not unusual for Western researchers in Afghanistan to wear local dress. Nancy Tapper and her husband claim to have worn local clothes when they were travelling in Afghanistan (1979: 17; 1991:7) during the early 1970s. The woman in the photographs is dressed in, what was considered in the 1970s, the "national" (*meli*) dress for upper class urban women in Afghanistan. The outfit consisted of a heavily embroidered (with gold-color thread) and, occasionally bejeweled, one piece black dress, red bloomers, and green scarf. The colors of this outfit represented the colors of the flag of Afghanistan. The *meli* outfit for women was first introduced and popularized in Afghanistan by the Kabuli political elite during the late 1950s in conjunction with the "Pashtunistan" affair. In the context of the mythical Pashtun domination of Afghanistan, the tri-colors of its flag worn by women was constructed into a symbol of Afghan nationalism especially among well to do urban Pashtuns and non-

Pashtuns in the country. (Ironically, this expensive garment was mass produced in Peshawar, Pakistan). Under ordinary conditions this costly three-piece dress would not be found among the poor farmers and nomads of Afghanistan unless they had the means with which to acquire this expensive garment and were interacting, for material gain, with an urban or urbanized social environment. Thus, based on their clothes alone, the "Pashtun couple" in these photographs is situated in the higher tiers of the local social class hierarchy making their presence starkly out of place inside a nomadic black canvas tent containing visible material and symbolic effects of poverty and other lower class features.

The rings on the fingers of the "Pashtun couple" in these photographs contradict the rules and customs for wearing jewelry on the hands of men and women in Afghanistan. Specifically, the ring on the right little (pinky) finger of the man in these photographs blatantly contradict rules of wearing jewelry on hands in Afghanistan. In the popular and elite cultures of Afghanistan, one will not find a woman wearing rings on her right index finger and on her left thumb and index finger. For ethnographic illustrations of these customs and rules for wearing rings on fingers in Afghanistan, see the profusely illustrated ethnographies produced by the Danish Nomad Research project in Afghanistan (Ferdinand 2006; Frederiksen 1996; Olesen 1994; Pedersen 1994) and representations of Afghan men and women in numerous other ethnographic and popular sources which cannot be listed in this limited space.

The man and woman in these photographs are bare footed. A woman in Afghanistan exposing her uncovered feet to public view is violating several important rules for the proper presentation of self. These rules are grounded in various Islamic protocols and local culture. Except for some locations in its modern urban population, married woman in Afghanistan part their hair in the middle of the front part of the head. The woman in these photographs has bangs hanging over her forehead. She is an unmarried woman. For ethnographic illustrations of this rule see especially Ferdinand (2006: 88). This symbolic marker of status is

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also noted in a colonial historical source (MacKenzie: 1850: 70, note 26).

A modicum of informed familiarity with the proxemics (Hall 1969: 1) of the popular culture of Afghanistan—that is the local "common sense" (Herzfeld 2001)—renders the overall disposition, demeanor, and the interaction in space of the "married…Pashtun couple" captured in these photographs implausible and out of place. A reflexive interaction by the producers of these photographs with "the locally dominant version of common sense (or) local hegemony" (Herzfeld 2001: 2284) would make them think and "feel foolish". The articulation of "intimate distance" (Hall 1969: 116-119) in public view by the man and woman in these photographs bluntly violate local standards for social interaction between an Afghan man and a woman, married or unmarried. The relaxed and confident disposition of the man, his closed-mouth smile and open mouth laughter, directed at the woman, are forms of the presentation of self that are unavailable in the popular culture of Afghanistan. The smooth and smoothly shaved face of the man in these photographs is out of place in Afghanistan, especially in rural Afghanistan.

The erotic touching, flirting, frolicking, and aggressive demeanor of the woman in two of these photographs—wide open mouth exposing all her teeth, raised knees (risking exposure of her crotch), her left arm stretched out and wrapped around the neck of the man, and tightly holding his right hand pressing it over her right shoulder with her right hand are profound contradictions of public inter-gender tactile interaction in Afghanistan. The woman's left hand resting near the crotch of the man and the man's right hand gripping the left thigh of the woman are forms of pornographic tactile behavior (especially in public view) that are starkly out of place in Afghanistan and the surrounding regions and even in Euro-America. The right hand of the man gripping the right shoulder of the woman, in a hugging posture, contradicts conventions of inter-gender tactile behavior in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan (and the surrounding culture areas) these forms of interactive tactility between a man and a woman in public view produce the symbolic effect of pornography, pollution and "dirt as a matter of

out of place" (Douglas 1966: 35). This defiling symbolic effect of touch would be intensified if the "Pashtun couple" is unmarried, if the woman is having her minstrel cycle, and if the body of the participants is not ritually clean. The hysterical laughter on the face of this "Pashtun" woman in public view would be locally judged as an indicator of moral corruption, insanity or madness.

The articulation of the staring eyes on the face of the man (bottom photograph in the stack) is out of place in Afghanistan. A local onlooker would find strange, abnormal, and alarming, the radical shift (apparently in the span of a few seconds) in the woman's disposition from hysterical laughter (in the top photograph) to a scolded, subdued, and pacified demeanor in the bottom photograph. The inter-gender proxemics contained in these photographs produce the social effect of dishonor and shame on the "Pashtun couple" individually and collectively and on the larger kinship and other social groups to which they belong. In the photograph on the top of the stack, the man appears to be intoxicated. Local common sense would assign this facial configuration to a *charsi*, *bangi*, or *nesha*, a person who is respectively intoxicated with marijuana, opium, or alcohol.

It is beyond the scope of this article to produce a somatological analysis of the morphology of the two faces in these three photographs. I am not an expert in the study of the human face but am familiar with some of the academic literature dealing with the effect of aging on the morphology of the human face (e. g. Coleman and Grover 2006; Ramanathan and Chellappa 2009). Familiarity with the physical anthropology of Afghanistan (Debets 1970 [including facial photographs of 97 men by Louis Dupree]), thousands of photographs of faces in ethnographic and popular literature, and knowledge about the physiognomy of the population of Afghanistan and Euro-America, produces a convincing argument in support of situating the face of the man in these photographs in Western European population. The man's face also offers a stark contrast to the face of a Pashtun man photographed by Nancy Tapper in Afghanistan during the early 1970s and published, not in her 1991 book, but in three editions of a popular

textbook about the cultural anthropology of the Middle East and Central Asia (Eickelman 1989: 252; 1998: 244; 2002: 237).

Who is this liberated and feminized couple facing Nancy Tapper's camera in these photographs inside a nomadic black canvas tent near Kabul? Given the numerous cultural and physical contradictions outlined above, the man and woman in these photographs (Lindisfarne and Neale 2013a: 16) are not a "married…Pashtun couple" in Afghanistan. There are several moving and still photographs of Jonathan Neale, including his full face, available on the internet. (See Jonathan Neale, "Stop Global Warming: Change the World", Conterfire.org, September 18, 2009). In my view, without doubt, the man in the photographs (Lindisfarne and Neale 2013a: 16) is Jonathan Neale. The morphology of Neale's face in the 2009 photographs— overall shape, cheeks, mouth, nose, eyes, eyebrows, forehead, ears, skin color (and how these parts are collectively configured)—bears a stark likeness to the face of the man in Nancy Lindisfarne's photographs taken in a nomadic camp near Kabul during the early 1970s. We have European "imperial eyes" at both ends of Nancy Lindisfarne's camera lens.

If the two tattoo-like marks—one on the forehead and one on the chin—of the woman in these photographs and the jewelry affixed to her right nostril are removed, the physical format of her face would be quite "normal" in a European Caucasian population. It is possible that the woman is Jonathan Neale's wife. But given the apparent permanency of these marks on her face and the ethnographic notes by Jonathan Neale referred to in this essay, it is plausible to assume that the woman sitting next to the man in these photographs is "Pkhe", Shin Gul's future wife, who at one time had shared intimate personal information about her future husband with Jonathan Neale. Pkhe, a member of a poor nomadic household, had experience in posing for the camera (as noted above) so that her photograph could be vended by her pimp to find customers for her sexual services in exchange for needed resources. As the prospective wife of Shin Gul, a poor Pashtun nomad, Pkhe was well served by participating in these flirting and frolicking proxemics so that when she got married, her husband's family's

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"vending income….would be enhanced by a wife attracting customers by flirting with truck drivers and other men on the street" (Neale 2008a: 218). Pkhe's erotic tactile interactions with Jonathan Neale reflect their declared intimacy and may have been meant as "a poke in the eye" of Shin Gul (her fiancé) whom she had once dismissed as "poor and gauche" in Neale's ear. Being poor, it is unlikely that Pkhe's wardrobe included the national dress of Afghanistan and the expensive rings placed on her fingers. Somehow, she must have been induced to put these upper class cultural artifacts on her body and be photographed while participating in flirting and frolicking proxemics with a powerful outsider in exchange for some material reward. But Pkhe had no idea her picture would be converted to ethnographic, academic and political capital and vended as the wife of Jonathan Neale, a *khariji kafer*, simulating a "Pashtun" man. Moreover, the image of Pkhe, the girl engaged to Shin Gul, stored in these photographs bears a strong resemblance to the face of "an engaged girl" printed on the cover of the paperback edition of Nancy Tapper's 1991 *Bartered Brides*.

Conclusion
The photographs of what appears to be Pkhe and the Anglo-American ethnographer flirting with her inside a nomadic black canvas tent near Kabul capture an instance of hegemonic intervention in which the cultural and physical identities of the Other in Afghanistan are imperially imposed and marketed as the copy-righted private property of Nancy Lindisfarne (Lindisfarne and Neale 2013a: 16). The energy for speaking to this violent imperial imposition of Western feminist pseudo-modernity on pre-industrial Muslim Afghanistan by a pair of Anglo-American ethnographers is drawn from the emergent academic, political and moral consciousness in which "Other-fucking in its vulgar forms is drawing to a close" (Sanjek 1990: 41) in anthropology including, hopefully, the anthropology of Afghanistan. Whether the concocting of a "Pashtun couple" by Nancy Tapper (1991: 135) and Nancy Lindusfare and Jonathan Neale (2013a: 16) qualifies as a "scandal" is not for this writer to decide. The central objective of this essay is to stimulate a renewed anthropological consciousness and discourse about the moral standards and professional ethical protocols governing the link between the audience of ethnographic texts and the

true empirically verifiable cultural, political, and social location(s) of the information from which knowledge about the Other is constructed in ethnographic texts. To my knowledge, in the only critical review of Nancy Tapper's popular *Bartered Brides*, Benedicte Grima (1992: 201) may have been thinking about the need for such a link when she wrote: "More disturbing is the lack of mention of informants. It seems that a work dealing with gender would at least specify whether the voice behind quoted statements and opinions is male or female….the book's greatest shortcoming (is) the lack of any feminine voice". The cooked up representations of a "Pashtun couple" discussed in this essay are an example of a disturbing fictitious ethnography in which not only is the true voice of the Other subject absent but where the border between the observer and observed is violently removed by the power of the camera and pen of the Anglo-American ethnographer.

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Islamic Revivalism & Human Rights Violation:
The Friday Sermon Texts As Collective Religious Hatred

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Abstract

This paper shows at micro level to what extent the religious establishments in Malaysia are committed to protect Islamic revivalism in the country. Following this, Othman Mustapha, the Director of Department of Islamic Development Malaysia claims recent demand of human rights by certain quarters undermine the status of Islam in Malaysia. The highlights on the Friday sermon texts prepared by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, Federal Territory Religious Department, Selangor State Religious Department, and the Trengganu State Religious Department clearly shows the existence of human rights violations within the scope of freedom of religion. Using Rabat Plan of Action as parameter, two relatively frequent targets in the Friday sermons are Christian and Shi'ite minorities. Based on existing examples, Friday sermons in Malaysia has failed to act as conduit of knowledge or to nurture affection in public or contemplation of religious duties but on the contrary has become a medium of libel and collective religious

hatred. It is therefore a vehicle for human rights violations committed by the government itself.

Keywords: Malaysia, Religious Hatred, Islam, Christian and Shi'ite minorities, Human Rights Violation**.**

Preamble

Pew Research Center in the Pew's Government Restriction Index report expresses symptoms of constraints on religious practice in Malaysia rose to 7.6 in 2012. Among the issues raised were the use of the word Allah by Christians and pressure on the Shi'ite community[1]. However, from the government's side, the authorities denied the existence of constraints on religious practice. In a report in conjunction with Wesak Day in May 2014, the Deputy Prime Minister pointed out as an example that the religious minorities in Malaysia fully enjoy freedom of religion.

He said in some countries the minority are always oppressed and their rights taken away by the majority but "this does not happen in Malaysia". Muhyiddin added the rights and freedom of minority groups are always protected under the Constitution and the country's laws. "We have been using this formula (tolerance and understanding) since independence. It is a sign of the government's ability in developing the nation," Muhyiddin said[2].

Since there exist two contradicting claims, a study based on human rights discipline needs to be prepared to deal with this. The study will focus on the Friday sermon texts prepared by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, Federal Territory Religious Department, Selangor Religious Department, and the Trengganu Religious Department to observe, and to highlight whether there exists violation of human rights within the scope of freedom of religion.

Content study as manifests in Friday sermons are not new. For instance, J. Emanuelsson studies the content of eight Islamic Friday-sermons, held at Chalmers Technical University in Gothenburg Sweden in spring 2010. In order to analyse and understand the mind of Chalmers Islamiska Förening (Chalmers Islamic community) as organizer of the

Friday prayers, these sermons are examined. He observes, the sermons presented discourses, discussions and descriptions of global Islamic revivalist-movements and how it related to local Muslim community in Sweden[3]. From here, the authority can evaluate any values that are inviolable without having to restrict freedom of religion, and freedom of expression.

In this paper, I adhere to the term religion according to international standards that includes faith, guidance on good and evil or moral beliefs, which includes theistic, non-theistic or atheistic[4].

The State should recognize the freedom of religion and belief. If for any religious or ideological reasons, a government refuses to recognize a certain teaching as religion, the government remains responsible for recognizing it as a faith or belief. A religious minority is bound by the solidarity among its members to maintain the culture, traditions, religion or language. Therefore the political and militant objective of a religion is not included in this case[5].

Before continuing the discussion, the question of the position of religious freedom in the context of human rights will be discussed first.

Religious freedom: A Nuisance?
While religious freedom is an immense issue in the arena of human rights, it is still the most neglected part of the human rights movement internationally and locally.

There are at least 28 human rights instruments at the international level which gives provision to the freedom of religion, however, there are no specific covenant for freedom of religion.

In 1976, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted as an agreement related to freedom of religion. Article 27 states that religious minorities have the right to practice their religion; 'In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group,

to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language'[6]. Subsequently also in 1978, an initiative was carried to continue to protect religious minorities that gave way to the 'Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1992[7]. But without a specific covenant, the issue of religious freedom remained neglected and discriminated against.

At the local level, on average the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 (ICCPR) was simply rejected. For instance, a delegation of the Joint Islamic Organizations in the Universal Periodic Review (MuslimUPro) to Geneva, Switzerland in 2013 expressed their worry towards the international pressure on Malaysia to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976. The biggest reason for their worry is that ICCPR agreement will allow religious freedom for minority groups and it will allow freedom to change religion.

For the record, until this article is written the ICCPR is signed by 167 countries. At the UPR session on October 24, 2013, Palestine (an Islamic territory) and Sierra Leone (OIC member) has expressed the view that Malaysia should promptly sign the international agreement[8]. In addition to Palestine, other countries urging Malaysia to sign the ICCPR were Slovakia, Ukraine, the Netherlands, Australia, Hungary, Japan, and Switzerland. Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen and Afghanistan are among Muslim countries that have signed the ICCPR. Among the Muslim countries that have not signed the ICCPR are Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

In 1962, on the advice of the United Nations Security Council, an effort was put forth to make religious freedom a reality. Since the progress was slow, in 1972, the United Nations recommended for a draft declaration to be submitted in advance. On 25 November 1981 after long and tiring lobbying, Commission on Human Rights prepared the draft and it was adopted without a vote. However it is not a covenant. The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of

Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 1981 draft is the most important and key international instrument so far that allows the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief[9]. His role is not only to monitor and record the actions of governments that violate the rights to freedom of religion but also to provide him facilities in conducting and providing the infrastructure for dialogue between government and religious minorities. Reports prepared by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief is once again not something that must be complied with as the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief in 1981 is not a binding legal instrument.

There are three reasons outlined by Nazila Ghanea-Hercock on why religious freedom is still failing to be appointed as a covenant. First, the issues that cause disagreements between the countries members of the United Nations. These issues, among others, is to change beliefs (religion), and the rights of children to change their religion. Second, allegations of human rights being a product of secularism and thus cannot protect religions. Religious groups (not necessarily Islam) find it difficult to accept the non-religious (atheist) to also enjoy protection and freedom of religion or even placed in the same category. Third, there is no basic consensus among most religious groups to resolve issues such as 'coercion in religion'.[10]

Because of the obstacles mentioned above; harassment, violation and spreading of collective hatred against religion run without control. This situation also applies, for example, in Malaysia.

Methodology and Theoretical Considerations
On March 11, 2014, Heiner Bielefeidt, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief presented his annual report. The theme of his report at the 25th session was collective religious hatred. The Special Rapporteur stressed that collective religious hatred is not a natural thing, but is something that can be avoided. According to him, collective religious hatred occur because of fear or anxiety. The feeling is the opposite to love and compassion which should be fostered by religion and its followers. Based on his observations of the reports and

complaints involving freedom of religion coming from the country members of the United Nations, he expressed that collective religious hatred is manifested due to political situation and it can be avoided. According to Bielefeidt, there are three reasons for collective religious hatred being widespread[11]:

a.   The outbreak of corruption is the main cause of collective religious hatred. In a country with low corruption level, public institutions work to help society and religion. Conversely, due to bribery or corruption being rooted, public institutions often fail to play their proper role and function. Therefore people prefer to rely on their own religious communities. This leads to proper communication between the institutions and communities being disrupted: "in a country in which people experience corruption as affecting all sectors of societal life, they can hardly develop a reasonable trust in the fair functioning of public institutions".

 b. A climate of political authoritarianism causes the spread of collective religious hatred. The reason being, the political climate is not healthy, not providing enough space for dialogue which therefore results in the closure of space for human interaction. Following that, counter arguments and counter-response cannot not take place. In an authoritative political climate, the government will blame minorities for something, or in other words the religious minorities suffer labelling, paranoia and become scapegoated: "rumours and gossip which remain unchecked by any counter-evidence and counterarguments can easily escalate into fully fledged conspiracy theories against unwelcomed religious competitors or other religious groups. This increases the likelihood of religious hatred becoming an influential factor in social and political life. Moreover, when attempting to curb public criticism of their own political performance, authoritarian Governments may easily succumb to the temptation to blame existing problems and obvious failures on political belief or religious minorities, thus further contributing to an atmosphere of paranoia and scapegoating".

c. Narrow concept of political identity is also one of the causes of collective religious hatred. There are governments who use religion to

establish or assert a national identity mould. In this case religion is tempered as an element of national unity, or used as a definition for a single culture or identity. As a result, the minorities who are excluded from the certain religion will suffer isolation, perceived as threat to the nation's unity and stability, accused as traitors or disloyal and finally as enemies of the state: "however, utilizing religion for the purposes of fostering national identity politics harbours serious risks of increased discrimination against members of religious minorities, as well as hostility towards those perceived as not belonging to the mainstream national-religious identity. Besides being viewed as religiously different, members of minorities, or individuals with dissenting religious views, may thus additionally be suspected of undermining national unity and endangering the future development of the nation".

Next in the report, Heiner Bielefeidt as the Special Rapporteur, outlines several approaches to overcome collective religious hatred. He calls everyone to respect everyone else who has the right to freedom of religion. At the federal level, a strong sense of trust should be built. This requires an infrastructure that is essentially 'respect', the key word in human rights. A country has the right to have an official religion but should make no room for discrimination. Heiner Bielefeidt also stresses that a strong sense of trust can only take place between the government and religious minorities with the terms of the occurrence of prompt communication. In this case the communication means:

i) among all inter and intra religious groups; ii) religious minority outreach efforts by the government are ongoing; iii) allowing public debate about religious issues, which are not unilateral, also running smoothly and even nurtured.

In this context, it means that if a Sunni group is allowed to campaign, tour, and conduct seminar series on the menace of Shias; the religious minority also needs to be empowered and given space to give an on par response. Likewise, Christians should be allowed to argue in public space to explain their rights to use the word Allah. In this case, the government only needs to monitor the situation of the public debate so that it may not affect stability.

Human rights do not accept the excuse of 'threat to national security' arbitrarily as the communication mentioned here is a two-way communication process where government agencies have sufficient access to approach religious minorities in the event of a crisis caused by collective religious hatred becoming rampant; and religious minorities also know who they can contact and rely to when rampant collective religious hatred develops into seeds of disaster.

In this case, Bielefeidt stresses that the government plays the role of parents who pacify, manage and play an impartial role when children argue over their rights. Government also cannot make 'the protection of public safety' as an excuse to avoid the occurrence of healthy communication between government and religious minorities as collective religious hatred have symptoms that are clearly visible.

A clear criteria of the symptoms in the movement promoting collective religious hatred is 'it is advertised openly by those who do it'. Thus the 'government must close the gap between early warning and early action' without the need for delay. The communication mentioned above, can only occur when there is a 'culture of free public discourse'. Friday sermons that demonize, promote hatred, and spread slander is an example of how collective religious hatred is manifested actively and even openly.

In human rights, precaution is justified, however, smooth and frank communication must still be allowed to take place. Precautions must be defined and known and enforced without any intention to discriminate or that which may lead to discrimination.

In his report, Heiner Bielefeidt as Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief refers Rabat Plan of Action 2013 to identify the types of speech, conduct, action that can be considered sowing or causing discrimination, violence and hatred which are serious enough to be taken precautions.

Rabat Plan of Action 2013 also provides guidelines and policies for government and civil society in preventing collective religious hatred.

As a plan, it also describes what is not reasonably be considered as 'freedom of expression' and can be regarded as collective religious hatred. The guide describes collective religious hatred as involving;

i. Context; for example just by doing an in-depth analysis of the context of a speech alone its social and political background can be determined, and whether it is directed at target groups such as Christians, or Shias.

ii. Speaker; position of the individual expressing the hate speech is essential to be identified. In particular, whether the individual speakers represent any other religious group, or what his status in society is.

iii. Intent; in this case, intention and not negligence or recklessness should be given focus. In other words seditious elements, and active invitation can be determined by the relationship between object and subject of the speech and the public. If it is done on the basis of negligence or ignorance then it cannot be argued, as a collective religious hatred.

iv. Content or form; analysis of the content and form of speech is also very critical in determining if it is in fact a violation of human rights. The content of the speech should be determined whether it smells of provocation, whether it is direct and whether the arguments are thorough or not.

v. Extent of the Speech; meanwhile the extent of speech is also emphasized. In this context whether the speech is done in public, and also the size of the audience whether it is small or large, the means of dissemination whether the speech was disseminated through one single leaflet or through broadcasting in the mainstream media or internet, also if the statement or publication was widely accessible to the general public.

vi. Potential risks; finally, incitement and defamations cultivating collective religious hatred is determined based on the potential risks that may occur because of the speech or broadcast involved. In this case

the hate speech is usually direct and indeed meant to cause damage to the target group[12].

At the same time, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Organisation states that social dialogues should be fostered provided that no religious group should parade and accentuate their religious identity. Educational institutions also must serve to provide the above communication.

From here, I would like to show how Friday sermons in Malaysia become vehicle of human rights violation in the name of Islamic revivalism. However before moving to that direction I would like to introduce the body or entity that speaks for Islam in Malaysia, and how they do it.

Defending Islamic Revivalism

According to Amini Amir Abdullah who observes the response of non-Muslims towards Islamic revivalism in Malaysia, a specific call or phenomenon to translate Islam in daily life consists of first, a desire or move to implement Islam; second, looking for solutions as offered by Islam, and third; thwarting or quashing any 'bad elements' that considered as interjecting Islam:

> Islamic revivalism literally means a new birth of Islam or the phenomenon describes the rebirth of the importance of Islam or it simply means Islam revives so as to regenerate the awareness of the essence of Islamic teachings. To describe the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism, it might be assumed that there is a rising, a motion or movement on the part of Muslims. There is a desire to take Islam in a state of sensibility and free it from mental bondage and stagnation. There are also efforts to remove bad elements which restrain Muslims from becoming awake. Islamic revivalism is hence a religious phenomenon resulting from the rise of Muslim awareness of Islam and a return to Islam as a way of life solving their worldly difficulties in all aspects of life from psychological to governmental problems. As a result, Muslims become more attached to Islam as a defence and a solution in whatever crisis they face[13].

However who speaks for Islam? Who got to decide what to implement, or who owns the definition of 'bad elements' that considered a disturbance for Islamic revivalism? For instance in 2014, Malaysia's Home Ministry barred Islamic scholar Ulil Abshar Abdalla of Indonesia from entering the country with an excuse that he 'may mislead Muslims with his brand of liberalism'[14]. In the same year, Malaysia's Home Ministry banned my novel *Perempuan nan Bercinta* citing me propagating Shi'ism in the fiction[15]. In both cases, the Home Ministry took actions by the advice of JAKIM. In 1996 and 2006, The National Fatwa Council declared that Muslims in Malaysia must adhere to the practices of the Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Shafie sect) of Islam and surely, 'Shi'ism' and 'liberalism' are not considered as part of it[16].

In Malaysia, three entities speak for Islam. First, the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) and other religious authorities at the state level in the country. JAKIM is the Malay abbreviation for Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia. Before JAKIM was established on 1st January 1997, Bahagian Hal Ehwal Agama Islam or the Islamic Affairs Division (BAHEIS) was responsible to dealt with, or to protect the purity of faith and the teachings of Islam in Malaysia. JAKIM is trusted 'with reasons to mobilize the development and progress of Muslims in Malaysia'[17]. Other than JAKIM, the religion of Islam is also put under the jurisdiction of the States. Each state, as well as the Federal Territories have their own Islamic Religious Council, Mufti, Syariah courts and religious administrative officers as well as their own administration of justice officers. Each state has its own relevant Syariah laws and can act on their own. For instance, in context of this paper, Selangor Religious Council without hesitation cites the Malaysian Christians as a long fought enemy, and claim them act as a counter-agent to stop Islamic revivalism in this country. In a book published by them and copies were distributed for free, the Christians are subjected in a hate publication that is direct and meant to cause damage to the target group.

> Titik penting seterusnya gerakan Kristian di Malaysia ialah penubuhan Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM) yang disahkan pendaftarannya pada Januari 1986. Objektif CFM ialah menjaga

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kepentingan masyarakat Kristian di Malaysia. Penubuhan CFM ini berjaya menyatukan keseluruhan mazhab besar gereja di negara ini yang berjumlah 40 buah mazhab. Apa yang tersirat di sebalik penubuhan ini, pihak Kristian akan mempunyai front atau kumpulan pendesak yg kukuh; untuk menghadapi umat Islam di Malaysia dan suara mereka lebih mendatangkan impak. Gerakan dakyah ini terus bergerak tanpa henti dari zaman Portugis, zaman penjajahan Belanda, British sehinggalah ke zaman pasca kemerdekaan. Walaupun mengambil masa yang lama, usaha mereka yang berterusan kini membuahkan hasil. Bangsa Melayu Muslim yang suatu ketika dahulu pernah diiktiraf oleh Paderi Joseph Harry Haines dalam kajiannya sebagai bangsa yang paling susah untuk dimurtadkan menjadi penganut Kristian, sehingga kini terus menjadi sasaran bertubi-tubi dari segenap sudut agenda kristianisasi. Adakah umat Islam khususnya bangsa Melayu di Malaysia masih mampu bertahan dengan asakan hebat ini? Atau longlai terpaku di penjuru dan pasrah menerima takdir[18]?

(My translation: The next important step for the Christian movement in Malaysia was the establishment of the Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM) under legal registration in January 1986. The objective of CFM is to safeguard the interests of Christian community in Malaysia. This successful establishment of CFM has unify the whole denominations of church in this country, amounting to 40 sects. The indirect message behind the establishment of this, is that the Christians are now a front and can function stronger as a pressure group in order to confront the Muslims in Malaysia thus making their voices more impact. This propaganda movement continues relentlessly from the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British until the post-independence era. Although taking a long time, their continuing efforts are bearing fruit. Malay Muslims that were once recognized by Father Joseph Harry Haines in his study as the most difficult race to renounce Islam and convert to Christians, are until now continues to be subjected to a barrage of all facets of Christianization agenda. Are Muslims especially the Malays in Malaysia still be able to survive this great force? Or incapacitated and glued in the corner thus resigned to his fate?)

The above paragraph taken from the book 'Agenda Kristian Satu Sorotan' (The Christian Agenda: An Outlook) is written in a simplistic

way, thus without facts and references, with specific objectives to raise Muslims awareness regarding Christianization in Malaysia. Second, in a dedicated chapter entitled; 'Pendedahan Agenda Kristian', other than claiming Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM) was formed to face Muslims in Malaysia, the Christians are also linked to the colonial powers, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British, and how their tireless efforts to make Muslims leave their religion are now showing good results. The specific line; 'adakah umat Islam khususnya bangsa Melayu di Malaysia masih mampu bertahan dengan asakan hebat ini? Atau longlai terpaku di penjuru dan pasrah menerima takdir?' is without doubt a provocation, a direct incitement and defamation. According to Amini Amiir Abdullah, this step is justify to protect Islamic revivalism in Malaysia. Reflecting the same tone as Selangor Religious Council, the writer believes the Christians are all out in targeting Muslims especially in the Islamic revivalism era:

> The main purpose of the protection given to the Muslims in terms of prohibiting propagation of other religions is to protect the Muslim's faith. The main focus is on Christian missionaries although it cannot be denied that it is applicable to others. This is because in this world, the most obvious and active missionary religion is Christianity. Historically, since the 16th century the Christian missionaries under the encouragement of the British have had full freedom to propagate Christianity in Malaysia. Christianity came to Malaysia in relation to colonialism. One of the serious efforts to establish Christian missionary work among the Malays began in 1875. Foreign missionaries played a vital role in this mission of proselytization especially from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Hundreds of missionary groups were established under various names. Financial and personnel support was received from various parts of the world. In the word of one Christian, "...in colonial times, it was natural to look elsewhere for help - to London, or New York, or Canterbury." This is also true at the present time[19].

I will further go into details of this Christianophobia in the next sub-topic.

Second, the Islamic Religious Councils stated above is head by the state respective Sultans, and they were assisted by the Religious Council. It is important to understand that in the state's administration, all leaders including the Sultan himself are allowed and 'capable of possessing knowledge and credibility in administering the country based on Islamic requirements[20]'. Two examples how the Malay rulers speaks for Islam can be presented here. First, during the anti-Shia campaign in Malaysia in 2013, The King, Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Tuanku Abdul Halim Mu'adzam Shah, calls all government quarters to pool their resources to address the spread of the Syiah ideology in the country[21]. Second, it is reported that the Selangor Ruler has 'made a decision and decreed that the word 'Allah' is a sacred word specific to Muslims and is strictly forbidden to use by any non-Muslim religion in Selangor as stated in a fatwa and gazetted on 18 February 2010'. According to the report, Selangor Ruler also instructed the Selangor Islamic Affairs Department (JAIS) 'to take firm action against all groups, including non-Muslims, who continued to question the state fatwa'[22]. This example further illustrates how religious edicts or fatwas are now affecting the non-Muslim thus violates their rights. While it is common to relate the Allah word with the Christians, many tend to forget that Sikhs also use Allah as it is in their holy scriptures. In fact as Islamic revivalism is justified, 'the monopoly over the word Allah from the cultural and religious perspective' is taking place[23].

Third, famous religious figures are also regarded as the representative or the voice of Islam. They are frequently sought to assist member of community in finding religious answers or current issues. Highly regarded in the society, these religious scholars are also known for their close relationship with the Malay rulers:

> The history of Islam in Malaya before independence was always associated with the relation between ulama (Muslim scholars) and sultan (king/ruler). The emergence of ulama is a great blessing in the history of Islam in Malaya. Ulama was the most influential group in the community and with deep understanding of the revealed knowledge, they applied the knowledge and spread among Muslim community. Specifically they include ulama of al-kalam (theology),

al-fiqh (legal), al-tafsir (exegesis) and tasawwuf (spiritual). They were normally highly educated in the revealed knowledge and wise in clarifying questions and issues of the current society. In the history of Islam in Malaya, the ulama had been highly respected by the king or formally known as sultan[24].

For example, in a newspaper interview, Nazmi Karim, a self-acclaimed researcher of Syrian conflict and member of an NGO name Muslim Care claims Iran, therefore the Shi'ites, were responsible for the huge number of death in Syria during the conflict. Calling the Shi'ites as dajal (the false messiah), najis (feces), Jews, and murderer; Nazmi as one of the famous Muslim preacher and often invited to give religious lessons in mosques had set up a false narrative to stigmatize the local Shi'ites in Malaysia[25].

It is common for Muslims in Malaysia to turn their head to these preachers in order to get information about current issues as clerics are highly regarded in Malay society.

These three interwoven partners are considered powerful voices in determining the direction of Islam, thus Islamic revivalism are in their hands. One of JAKIM tasks is preparing Friday sermons for National Mosque in Kuala Lumpur, Putra Mosque and Tunku Mizan Zainal Abidin Mosque in Putrajaya. Other mosques are welcome to read sermons provided by them, although Islamic Religious Councils at the state level are also preparing their own Friday sermons. These sermons are written by a unit namely Jawatankuasa Penyediaan Teks Khutbah whom meet every month to stock bank of sermons[26]. In certain independence mosques such as Masjid Rusila in Marang Trengganu or Masjid Pulau Melaka in Kelantan that are administered by Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), local religious figures gave their own edition of sermons.

Friday Sermon text: Between Tolerance and intolerance
Muslims perform Friday prayers in congregation, replacing the noon prayers on that day. The command to perform Friday prayers is based on verse 9 of surah Al-Jumu'ah, the translation reads; 'O ye who believe!

When the call is proclaimed to prayer on Friday (the Day of Assembly), hasten earnestly to the Remembrance of Allah, and leave off business (and traffic): That is best for you if ye but knew!. 'This prayer consists of two components, the Friday sermon and next the two raka'ahs (units) of prayers led by an Imam. In other words, Friday sermons will be heard by and read to the Friday prayers audience from all walks of life.

Friday sermon has the function of knowledge and is a form of communication. The essence of the sermon is a weekly message to Muslims and is often taken entirely by the audience and is considered as recommendations that are not denied or disputed.

For the Jema'ah (congregation), a Friday Sermon is a mechanism to make themselves well-informed about issues related to religious, social, economic and even political affairs. It is also a mechanism for them to "have a communication" with Allah through the scriptures delivered in the sermon. The adoption of that mechanism may result in two consequences. First, the jama'ah should equip themselves with a communication system that they could decode a sermon text. Second, their fanatical emotion may make the jama'ah rely much on what is presented in a sermon that they tend to comply with the proposals directed rather than refuse them. They tend to accept the proposals rather than reject them, and they tend to acknowledge the propositions rather than contradict them. For the khatib, on the other hand, a Friday Sermon is a mechanism to disseminate the divine truths—either from the quran, hadiths, Ijma', or qiyas, and to convey the rights and responsibilities of Islam followers in respect to religious, social, economic and even political affairs[27].

According to Mohd Fadzilah Kamsah, Friday sermons play vital role in upholding Islamic revivalism in Malaysia[28]. This means that the Friday sermon has its own position and power in influencing the Malaysian Muslims to accept, or reject something. It is rarely disputed, and the filling of Friday sermons therefore becomes a powerful medium to bring people to righteousness, truth, and can also become a medium for libel, fraud and spreading hatred.

On October 16, 2009 or 27 Shawwal 1430 H, a Friday sermon prepared by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia titled 'Tolerance towards Non-Muslims is a part of the Islamic Da'wah (Propaganda)' was presented at the pulpits of the mosques throughout Malaysia. The content of the Friday sermon warns Muslims in Malaysia;

1. To respect the non-Muslim communities, and Muslims are 'forbidden from ridiculing or mocking them, because they will avenge the insult'. The next sermon stressed, 'this is the concept of tolerance that Islam teaches '.

2. Muslims are also urged to "respect and protect the rights of other faiths'. In this case, according to the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia in the sermon, 'the most important lesson' in the concept of tolerance in Islam is that Muslims do justice to them (the non-Muslims) despite the differences in beliefs[29].

Next, the Friday sermon that was read during the month of Shawal (the celebration of the Eid) addressed the crowd, "In this festive month of Shawal we find some Muslims holding open house invitations. Hence, the Pulpit urge the members of the Friday prayers, let us together take this opportunity to foster better relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims'.

However the tolerant approach suggested by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) got a new interpretation, in 2014, when JAKIM explained that the call to promote tolerance should 'not exceed beyond the agreed terms'. In a Friday sermon titled "Religious Harmony" dated February 7, 2014 or 7 Rabiul'akhir 1435H, Muslims in Malaysia were reminded that;

1. There are those who transgress. Therefore inciting religious unrest. Jakim stressed that 'the attitude of going beyond limitations is actually a catalyst for mental disorder and disintegration of society and so will weaken the country's socio-political stability'. The text did not mention any religious group, however;

2. The next sermon outlined that the '82nd Discourse of the Fatwa Committee of the National Fatwa Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia meeting held on 5th to 7th May 2008 has been debating on the issue of Appeal to Use of the Word of Allah by non-Muslims. The discourse decided that the word Allah is a holy word which is exclusive to Islam and Muslims and it cannot be used or made equal to religions other than Islam '. Jakim hence explained, they celebrate the effort to prevent the use of the word 'Allah' in accordance with the legal provisions enshrined in the Federal Constitution '[30]. Connecting this point to the previous one, it becomes obvious that the allegation of 'transgressors' is addressed to the minority Christians.

The demonization of non-Muslims by the Islamic Religious Department, particularly Christians is not new. In 2012, the Friday sermon entitled "Caution, Valentine Trap'' dated February 10, 2012 or 17 Rabi'ulawal 1433 H, Jakim insisted that the Valentine's Day is forbidden to be celebrated by Muslims;

1. The Sermon addresses to the crowd, the 'Creed Review Panel (PKA) and Shariah Review Panel (PKS) of Department of Islamic Development Malaysia' along with '71st meeting of National Fatwa Committee Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia held on 22 to 24 November 2005 ' have established the practice of' Valentine's Day has never been recommended by Islam ' and thus contradicts the teachings of Islam.

2. Muslims are advised to cultivate the 'anti Valentine's Day in the hearts and minds' approach [31.]

Although JAKIM did not mention the Christians or accused them as 'agents of deception', the Federal Territory Islamic Religious Department (JAWI) takes a bolder approach in which the content of its sermon blamed the Christians following this Valentine's Day celebration. The sermon written in Jawi script explains that 'the date of February 14 is celebrated each year by Christians to celebrate victory' of Muslims' defeat in Andalusia, which later the very day was named as Valentine's Day. Thus, the JAWI sermon asked its audience 'is it right

for the Muslims who believe that true religion with Allah is Islam, to celebrate the defeat in the hands of Christians? Should we worship and celebrate the declaration of an arrogant Christian priest? Is there no other figure in Islam that we may adore and emulate? [32]'

Apart from stigmatizing and spreading hatred against Christians, Islamic Religious Department also targets Muslim minorities like Shiites. It appears on the Friday sermon dated 29 November 2013, or 25 Muharram 1435 H, where the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia offers a Friday sermon entitled "The Shiite Virus". The content of the Friday sermon warns Muslims in Malaysia;

1. In order to comply with the decision of the National Fatwa Council's Special Discourse in 1996, which stipulates that Muslims in this country cannot be adhering to teachings besides that of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jama'ah in the aspects of faith, morals and sharia. Besides limiting Islam to only one sect, the religious authorities proceeded to encourage people to participate and perform stigmatization and human rights violations, in which;

2. Muslims are also urged to 'make a report to the religious authorities in their respective places' if they 'suspect, realize or witness for themselves the existence of any party that seeks to spread the teachings of the Shiite faith'. The Friday sermon goes on to explain any efforts to curb the Shiite doctrine is to 'maintain the sanctity of religion' and therefore is a 'jihad'[33].

In addition, the Friday sermon urged Muslims to 'wake up with courage and unite in one row, one creed, one intention and determination to preserve the sanctity of the faith' from Shiite's poisonous teachings and misguided view, considering the Shiites allows the act of sodomy, among other teachings[34].

The allegation that the Shiites allow the act of sodomy however has not been supported by any evidence. In fact, for instance, Iran, a predominantly Shia country is among the countries which are

reprimanded by Western human rights bodies for imposing harsh penalties against individuals practicing sodomy[35].

In the sermon titled "The Shia Deception", prepared by the Selangor Islamic Religious Department dated June 20, 2014, the Department has stated, among the deception of the Shias is that they believe that the current Quran is incomplete[36]. This sermon is a serious form of demonization, given that at the same time, one should not forget that a total of ten Shiite Qaris (Quran reciters) from Iran and Iraq has won the International Quran Recital Competition (Tilawah) organized by the Department of Islamic Development of Malaysia since 1961. The allegations in the Selangor sermon appeared to be confusing to this minority group, because if the Shia doctrine is to 'deny and reject al-Quran' then what is the position of the ten aforementioned recital champions? What, for instance, is the position of 2009 Tilawah champion from Iraq, namely Osama Abdul Hamza who is a muezzin in Haram Imam Hussein, Karbala? Or what is the position of the 2006 Tilawah champion, Hossein Saeid Rostami Tabrizy? If the Friday sermon wants to believe that the Shias 'deny and reject the existing al-Quran' then why the Qaris of Shia faiths are allowed to compete in the International Quran Recital Competition organized by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia? In 2012, Amin Pouya of Iran finished second in the Festival in the said competition[37]. Not only that, Malaysia has also sent a reciter to participate in Quran recital competition organized by these Shi'ite Iranians. Malaysia also participated in the 'Tehran's 29th international competitions in Holy Qur'an recitation and memorization' at the Milad Tower, Tehran from 17 to 22 June 2012[38]. Thus, the allegations of the Selangor Religious Department in the Friday sermon should be taken seriously as a demonization and creating misperception.

The Islamic Religious Department of Trengganu sermon dated 23 September 2011, entitled "Together we avoid the Shiite heresy" correlating the Shias with bloodshed, strife and violence, was quoted:

> Death and destruction to property, resulting from such sectarian differences are not merely conjecture, but it has happened and

always will happen again in countries that have different followers of these two streams. Just look at what happened between the Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan and Iraq. Every day, we see on television, how both sides are killing each other and planting bombs in conflicting mosques. If this happens in our country, perhaps mosques in our place at a later time will be divided into Sunni mosques and Shiite mosques and at that time, we would no longer be preoccupied in Friday prayers and other prayers as we will be worried by bomb threats from the rivals. Therefore, avoid this dangerous Shiite teachings before the misfortunes of fighting, killings and civil war befall upon us[39]..

The examples given from the sermons above are adequate to prove how the Friday sermons have been used as a tool to commit serious violation of human rights.

Careful readings of the sermons show that those which are offending the Christians are often written with more caution. However, the Friday sermons demonizing Shias are more blatant. Generally, Friday sermons attacking the Shias are licensed by the fatwa of the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia dated May 5, 1996. Due to the situation where adherents of Shiite creed are not given the opportunity to defend themselves, it can be assumed that the sermons demonizing Shiite teachings, spreading falsehoods about the practice of Shi'ism is done with the intention to incite the dominant groups into secluding, hating and avoiding them. Finally, at the end of the sermon, confusion over who actually are the adherents of Shiism is spread and strengthened so that they are despised by the society due to the misconceptions presented.

As previously explain, Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence was developed through series of workshops attended by experts. It was designed to be a practical steps using legislation, jurisprudence and executive policies to achieve the implementation of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which reads:

Article 20:

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

One can easily relate the six factors to determine expressions that could be criminally prohibited from the above textual discussions of the Friday sermons. Religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence are glaringly obvious in the Friday sermons. These sermons were made in the socio-political context and disseminated widely to incite. The speakers are also standing in relation to the speeches target audience. This mean they are intended, and the incitements are not those cases arising from negligence or recklessness. Furthermore, analysing the content and form of the sermons, the level of provocation and arguments deployed are designed to thwart and quash Shi'ites and Christians as 'bad elements' that considered as interjecting true Islam. Examining the extent of the sermons, especially prepared by JAKIM that will be read at National Mosque, one can say the level of publicity and magnitude are beyond reach in the society. Perhaps the only factor that left aside is the last one, the likelihood that the sermons would incite harm. However, although there are no serious risks yet cause from the incitement done in the sermons, I would like to emphasize that human rights violation did occur and committed by the government agencies themselves. These Friday sermons are violations of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which unfortunately not ratify by Malaysia until now.

In 2014, Heiner Bielefeidt has reprimanded Malaysia several times on the issue of the use of the word Allah by Christians. In a media statement, Heiner Bielefeldt, as an official of the United Nations Organization declared that religious freedom is the right of every human being and not to be determined by the government. Therefore the government has no right to shape, define or impose one authority in interpreting religious sources, including the definition involving religious teachings.

Freedom of religion or belief is a right of human beings, not a right of the State," the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, stressed in a news release. "It cannot be the business of the State to shape or reshape religious traditions, nor can the State claim any binding authority in the interpretation of religious sources or in the definition of the tenets of faith[40].

For the first time, the discrimination against Shia community in Malaysia is brought into attention. The Special Rapporteur sent a formal request to understand the human rights violations through what is known as the formal communication to the Malaysian government. Three cases have been raised in the formal communication. First, the incidence involving the arrest of more than 100 Shiite adherents in Perak[41]. Second, the incident where a Shiite religious teacher was arrested during a religious ceremony on April 21 2014. Thirdly, the ban on a novel alleged to be spreading Shiite propaganda on April 9 2014[42]. The concern and request by the Special Rapporteur, Heiner Bielefeidt was not entertained by the Malaysian government. Accordingly, the formal communication was disclosed and it is now accessible to the public.

The growing extremism by Malaysian religious authorities are worrying. In fact, in 2015, Malaysian police counter-terrorism director Ayub Khan Mydin admitted that 'there are sympathisers of the terrorist group Islamic State (IS) in Islamic agencies and NGOs in the country'. He further explains that Malaysian 'Islamic authorities are silent towards the terrorists because some of its rank and files sympathise with the groups struggle'[43]. It is important to note that similar hatred and demonization against the Christians and Shiites as conducted by the terrorist group Islamic State (IS) in the Levant are among glaring similarities. The tendencies to discriminate minorities have been shown earlier in this paper.

Conclusion
It is believe that, in order to protect and defend Islamic revivalism from declining, bad elements that threaten Islam as religion should be taken care. Fatwas are given to regulate Muslims and becoming a significant

policing and legislative vehicle. Friday sermons are among others, the effective tool to remind the Muslims about bad elements, and to propagate the fatwas. In Malaysia, Friday sermons are prepared by religious establishments at federal and state level. At the beginning of this paper it is stated that there are two conflicting claims on the constraints of religious practice in Malaysia. The highlights on the Friday sermon texts prepared by the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, Federal Territory Religious Department, Selangor State Religious Department, and the Trengganu State Religious Department clearly shows the existence of human rights violations within the scope of freedom of religion. Two relatively frequent targets in the Friday sermons are Christian and Shiite minorities. Using Rabat Plan of Action as parameter, this paper conclude these Friday sermons accommodate collective religious hatred. As suggested by United Nation official, to rectify the situation the government should strive to eradicate the endemic corruption in the country, put an end to the authoritative political approach and stop interpreting identity politics in a narrow perspective. Based on existing examples, Friday sermons in Malaysia has failed to act as conduit of knowledge or to nurture affection in public or contemplation of religious duties but on the contrary has become a medium of libel and collective religious hatred. It is therefore a vehicle for human rights violations committed by the government itself. Human rights violation are justified in the name of Islamic revivalism.

Endnotes

[1] See Zurairi AR, 'Study: Malaysia's curbs on religion "very high" and worsening', Malay Mail Online, January 15, 2014, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/study-malaysias-curbs-on-religion-very-high-and-worsening.
[2] See Haikal Jalil, 'DPM: Appreciate religious freedom', The Sun Daily, May 12, 2014, The Sun Daily, http://www.thesundaily.my/news/1043673.
[3] Jimmy Emanuelsson, Islam på universitetet En innehållsanalys av islamisk predikan på Chalmers. Religionsvetenskap examensarbete för kandidatexamen (Gothenburg Sweden: University in Gothenburg, 2010),

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The Shiite Dilemma in Malaysia Revisited

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Abstract

Recently the "influence and spread of Shiism" has become one of the most important political and religious propagandas in Malaysia. Country's government is using its full capacity of Media, culture and advertising power to orchestrate witch-hunting against Shiism as an idea and Shiites as a minority group. Analyzing the content of the media discourses in Malaysia and considering the political and religious leader's inclinations on this issue ranging from Kings to elites like Mahathir Mohamed show that with some intentions behind it, Shiism has turned from a domestic issue into a security crisis for Malaysia's high level politics and public opinion. This article is a comparative analysis between a similar security crisis in 1969 and how the process of "Crisis building" in Malaysia roots in the crisis of legitimacy of the sovereignty. Furthermore the authors have attempted to draw a possible outlook on the future of Shiite

community in Malaysia. In other words, we have been trying to analyze the situation based on multiple dynamic movements which are ongoing in the context under investigation with reference to theological and theopolitical factors in the Malaysian sociocultural setting.

Keywords: Shiism, Malaysian Shiites, Legitimacy Crisis, Security Dilemmas

Introduction

Is Shiism a security hazard in Malaysia? Do Shiites pose a danger to the fabric of Malaysian society? Does Shiism as a school within Islam cause problem to the religious unity of Muslims in Malaysia? There are many questions which need to be asked and great many answers needed to be given by Malaysian authorities who have suppressed the Shiite community in the past ten years under the pretext of security issues. But here we are not going to focus on all these questions as this would require another research strategy which falls outside the parameters of my essay. However we have tried to look at different scenarios which have led to stigmatization of the Shiite community in one of the most moderate Muslim countries which bragged for long time for her solid multicultural societal fabric and pluralistic sense of coexistence between religions and races since her independence in 1957 from brutal rule of the British Empire in 18th century. (Osborne, 2000. 9)

The Crisis of May 1969: second parliamentary elections in Malaysia

On 10th of May 1969, when the second parliamentary election in Malaysia was held, the Umno party (local Malay ruling party in Malaysia) lost the absolute majority of the parliament seats by 95 seats (66%) against 49 seats (34%). Therefore the government was formed but only 49 percent (10 percent reduction) of the voters voted for Umno and 51 percent (10 percent increase) voted for the opposition coalition, which showed a sharp decline in the popularity of the rulers at that time.(Grotz, 2001)

Losing the absolute majority in the election was the biggest wakeup call for the ruling party, because statistic showed that even Malay

community (60 percent of Malaysia's population at the time) had not voted for Umno and that was a disastrous political failure.

The poor result during the election made the Umno leaders to realize that having the majority of Malay population in the country is not sufficient to maintain the political power in the country, but what significantly matters, is to keep this majority united and integrated hence, automatically remain in power by holding the Malay votes. Therefore the most important conclusion of the 1969's election for Umno was defining an essential need of having a consistent and unified Malay majority. (Mueller, 2014)

In a normal social circumstance, it is almost impossible to have an absolutely united majority. Therefore there was need for a new "Reason" in order to unify the majority's opinion. However Malaysia is an advanced society from a political and cultural aspect hence, such 'reason' couldn't be civilization discourse or a cultural dialogue. As a result the missing key was creating an enemy or a possible threat to the Malay ethnic, at the time being, there was an actual enemy threatening the Malay community and government could easily use it as the monster they were looking for.

Mahathir Mohamad, the discoverer of "Malay Dilemma": the threat of Communism

Needless to argue that Communism as a sociopolitical phenomenon has a very interesting history in Malaysia which needs to be studied in depth. But here we are not going to focus on this phenomenon per se but this is going to function as a model of crisis image building in the context of Malaysia which has proven effective to counter the so-called undesirable groups in the context of Malay culture. Now let us go to the incident of 1969 in Malaysia.

Only three days after the election, on 13 May 1969, the unprecedented war and violence swept across Kuala Lumpur between Malays on the one side and Chinese on the other side. Huge groups of Malay attacked and destroyed Chinese neighborhoods in Kula Lumpur. For the first time after Malaysia's independence in 1957 the government announced

the state of emergency and martial law. Malaysian official said 200 people were killed during the fights, however, foreign media reported almost 800 people were killed and more than 1000 were found wounded and still many other disappeared. (Time, 2007) A British journalist later published pictures of hundreds corpses floating on Kuala Lumpur river.

The 13th May crisis and the Chinese massacre were justified though; on the global level with the fear of the spread of communism and on the national level with the fear of Chinese overtaking the economy from Malay hands. Interestingly the Communist party was harshly suppressed in order for the government to make the communist threat look like as a serious security question which needs to be treated urgently with an iron hand policy.

A year after the crisis, in 1970, "Mahathir Mohamad," a young politician who had lost his seat in the parliamentary election and was ambitious to take the power, published a very controversial book entitled "Malay Dilemma". He not only justified the Chinese massacre but also painted a very dark and blur picture of the future of the Malay community. (Musa, 1999)

Mahathir's book which was published in Singapore was based on a few principles:
A: The Malay race is the indigenous people (bumiputras) of Malaysia.
B: The sole national language is the Malay language and all other races are compelled to learn it.
C: The tolerance and non-confrontational nature of the Malays has allowed them to be subjugated in their own land by the other races with the collusion of the British.
D: A program of affirmative action is required to correct Malaysian Chinese hegemony in business.

Based on these four principles Mahathir Mohamad concluded that the Malay ethnic need to take over the power, wealth and knowledge sources as real owners of the country and identity factors as language

need to be recognized among the other Malaysian ethnic in order for the Malay Dilemma to be solved.

During the 10 years after the publication of Malay Dilemma, Mahathir established the concept of Bumi Putra against the threat of communism and Chinese domination of the economy with the help of his advisors. A program called 'Malaysian new economic policy' was the main outcome of his propaganda, the very same program which became very popular among Malays, was heavily biased in favor of Malays, received the parliament votes and eventually made him the prime minister of Malaysia.

Mahathir allocated many political, economic, social and cultural privileges for Malay ethnic in comparison with Chinese and Hindus from the Malaysian new economic policy such as: Positions like Kings, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minsters of defense, Foreign Affairs and Chief Minister of States could only belonged to Malays, Malay monopoly of all resources including oil and gas, ownership of major industries and factories, cultivation of palm, ownership of public universities, Military and also social benefits and privileges like free education, priority in employment, ownership of lands, loans etc.

Political analysts believe that these social, political and economic advantages are the main reason of keeping the Malay community united and coherent against other ethnics and also the main reason for continuous victories of Mahathir Mohamad in holding the countries power for 20 years.

Malaysia in the second millennium: disruption of the balance of power, wealth and population
At the beginning of the second millennium, Malaysia as well as the other countries was affected by the current of the globalization, therefore, faced many cultural and political changes. Even with the Mahathir's policies for political and economic status of the country to remain stable, still the ethnical distribution of the population and also distribution of wealth and power and also the status of the country at

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the international level were altered. Eventually all of these reasons forced Mahathir to leave the power.

For instance nowadays China has become so powerful both at local and international level that should be considered as one of the most important opponents of United States; obviously China supports the Chinese Community in Malaysia. Continuous financial crisis in Malaysia decreased the Malaysia's influence and power in Southeast Asia in comparison with Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore, especially comparing to Mahathir's time. On the other hand, the Arab spring in the MENA region influenced Malaysia's political position at the international level. However most importantly the spread of Salafist and Wahhabite trends among the traditional Malay society should be addressed and discussed. This is a question which has the potential to tear apart the homogeneity of Malays in a context where other races and religions could pose real dangers to the fabric of Malaysia as a nation-state.

In domestic affair, the new generation of Malays do not identify themselves limited to sharing of language of race. Today Malays form only 51 percent of the whole population in Malaysia and they are not the absolute majority any more. The two elections in 2008 and 2013 have shown that Malay community is no longer a coherent public in terms of voting. Moreover the Bumi Putra theory racial discrimination programs do not meet the expectation of Malay Intellectuals and even the younger generation. Reduction in popularity of Malay sovereignty on one hand and The Chinese tsunami –prime minister of Malaysia used this term in 2013 for addressing how Chinese elites are turning away from the government—are threatening Malay ruling power on Malaysia.

According to the result of the 2013 parliamentary electionthe Umno party could only take 133 seats (59%) against the opposition party taking 89 seats (40.1 %) which indicate a shard decrease in the popularity of the ruling party. Such legitimacy crisis is very similar to the situation in 1969. Factors such as increasing the price of fuel by the government, elimination of subsidies and social insecurity in the urban

life etc. put Malay sovereignty into a much more complex Malay dilemma. (Star, 2013)

Mahathir Mohamad and the second Dilemma: Shiism even more dangerous than Communism!

Once again the only way out of this crisis is to somehow make the fragile Malay majority united. However this time the situation is totally different; first there is no way to unite the ruling and opposition party due to the massive public dissatisfaction, and second the Chinese ethnic are much more powerful comparing to 1969 and they are hugely supported by China.

However, Mahathir Mohamad is still a great politician leader and his voice goes long way among Malaysians. In order to keep the sources of power and wealth in the hands of Malay, with the help of his many lobbies, he and his companions opened their way in the current government by taking positions as deputy prime minister, ministry of defense etc. There is no doubt that Mahathir is an ambitious person and still has the thirst for power, however, his age doesn't allow him to enter the field of the power again hence, he follows his goals through his son Mukhriz Mahathir who has become the chief minister of the state of Kedah ever since 2013.

Given the situation, same political leaders as 1969 searched the archive of security issues in the country and create the 'threat of Shiism' as a new trend to recreate a unity among Muslim Malays. After many years and out of a blue, ministry of home affair announced that there are 250 thousands Shiite living in Malaysia. Mukhriz Mahathir dug an old fatwa from the national fatwa council of Malaysia in 1996 saying 'Shiite is an illegitimate and misguided sect of Islam', and widely mediatized it from every possible media channel. Everyday there is published news in Malaysia media about arresting Shiites across the country, police collecting Shiite book from houses and mosques, discovering Shiite terrorists group inside and outside the country, rise of the influence of Iranian Shiism among Malaysia, university seminars and conferences on the virus of Shiism. Suddenly the grandest Malay muftis indicate Shiism is even more threatening than communism, the

kings alarm people on the rise of Shiism and Mahathir Mohamad warn people on the rising influence of Iranian Shiites in Malaysian religious affairs. Even there are propagandas about Shiite doctrine is in favor of Sodomy and Marriage with incest. In November 2013 the department of Islamic development in Malaysia (JAKIM), stated that fighting Shiism is an act of JIHAD. (Bernama, 2013)

The repetition of such stories and the whole new Shiite scenario cannot be just a coincidence. It can be predicted that discrimination against the Shiite community and the whole propaganda against Shiism will continue at least until the next Malaysian election. However, the real threat is the probability of a second 13th May massacre this time against Malaysian Shiites, and this probability is what the global society needs to be worried about and start to act on it. Of course, we are not very optimistic about the international community as far as the security of the Shiite community in Malaysia is concerned as current attitude of the world community against Shiites elsewhere demonstrates the *politics of reluctancy*. We think Iran along with other members of OIC should play a more engaging politics in these kinds of matters. In other words, religious scholars and intellectuals should be more engaged in debates and constructive dialogs as the lack of dialog and the absence of engagement could prove destructive in the long run for all parties. There is no secret that extremism looms large in our world and the Muslim world is more vulnerable in comparison to other global actors. The dilemma of Malaysia is not the Shiite minority but the Wahhabization of the Sunnites who do not realize that Islamization is different than Arabization – and what certain groups of politicians and religious scholars are pursuing in Malaysia is 1) Wahhabization of the Malay Sunnism and 2) Arabization of Malay Islam. Mahathir Mohamed and his advisors should realize the dangers of these kinds of policies for the future of Malaysia as a nation state as ignoring this fact would backfire in a dangerous manner in the Malay Archipelago. To cooperate with Saudi Arabia in containing Iran is one thing as far as geopolitical calculations are concerned but *wahhabizing* the Sunnite religious order in Malaysia is totally a different matter which goes beyond geopolitical rivalries. This is what we call theopolitics rather

than geopolitics which stigmatize the other and legitimize genocidal acts based on a deviant interpretation of religious canons.

Conclusion

The question of Shiism in Malaysia has turned into one of the most difficult challenges before Malaysian state and I think this cannot be solved if we look at political dimensions alone. Although the question has appeared in a political fashion but its roots are cultural and deeply related to the Arabization politics of Wahhabite currents in the Malaysian society. In other words, today the Shiites are the targets but this shall not be limited to them alone in the long run. This is to argue, the politics of exclusion shall be continued and hit hard the very multicultural fabric of Malaysia as a nation if the Wahhabization of Sunnism is not stopped theologically and politically. This is something which needs to be attended by Malaysian intellectuals, scholars, politicians and religious leaders. There is historical evidence that Shiism was considered by Malay Ulema as one of the legitimate denomination in Islam along the other four schools of Hanafite, Shafaite, Hanbalite, and Malekite denomination and this postmodern anti-Shiite witch hunting is not of Malay origin. For instance, Ayatullah Marashi Najafi got an *Ijaza* (permission to narrate hadiths) from a renowned Malay scholar in 1940 and there was no indication in the *Ijaza* that Malay Sunnis should not follow a Shiite scholar on the questions of prophetic traditions and also there was no sign that a Sunnite scholar in Malaysia should oppose to issue permission for a Shiite scholar. This is to argue that these current questions on the deviancy of Shiism has not theological ground but related to geopolitics and regional rivalries between different actors in the world of Islam and within the Malaysian political context. To put it in sociological terms, the politics of Shiite stigmatization may be rewarding temporarily for certain groups in Malaysia but one should rest assured that each politicking has its own limits and hazards which could in the long run backfire. Based on my own fieldworks in Malaysia I have come to discern discontent among Malaysian elites who are against stigmatization politics and policies orchestrated by the government and religious muftis vis-à-vis Shiites which have drawn Malaysia into a deep political swamp with no delightful future in horizon.

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King and Kingship in Israel
A Historical -Textual Analysis

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Abstract

Based on the Old Tastement, Institution of kingship has an important role in the political history of Israerlites. The structure of the government varied from time to time, but a king, plutocrat, or an oligarchic body always headed the administration. The Old Testament verified the emergance of monarch in ancient Hebrew communities[1]. Nevertheless, scholars hold two different positions on the nature of the Hebrew monarchy. The first view maintains the divinity of kingship; the second asserts that the kingship is a manmade institution for security purposes, especially community protection against external aggression. In this paper, I will discuss the revelant history of Hebrews, the notion of kingship, and the structure of government and administration in Ancient Israel in Old Testament.

Keywords: King, Kingship, Political Thought, Political Theory, Israel, Old Testament, State and Government

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King and Kingship in Israel
A Historical -Textual Analysis
The inquiry into the political history of the Ancient Near East reveals the presence of a central government and a substantial bureaucracy in Canaan from around the second millennium BC onward.[1] The structure of that government varied from time to time, but a king, plutocrat, or an oligarchic body always headed the administration. The Old Testament on its part verified the emerge of monarch in ancient Hebrew communities. Nevertheless, scholars depending on the Old Testament, maintain two different views on the nature of the Hebrew monarchy. The first view maintains the divinity of kingship; the second asserts that the kingship is a manmade institution for security purposes, especially community protection against external aggression. This section briefly discussed the revelant history of Hebrews, the notion of kingship, and the structure of government and administration in Ancient Israel.[2]

The History of Hebrews
According to the Bible, the Hebrews' ancestors can be traced back to the Abraham (originally known as Abram) who lived in Ur in southern Mesopotamia. Abraham story indicates that he had a pastoral life with substantial herds and flocks in Ur. Later, accompanied with his wife, Sarah, and his nephew Lot, Abraham decided to migrate to Canaan, an ancient name for the part of Palestine in the west of the Jordan River. In Canaan, Isaac was born. Isaac, in return, fathered Jacob. A sever famine in Canaan forced Jacob and his sons to move to Egypt, where his son, Joseph, held an important governmental position. Hebrews call this historical event the "Sojourn."[3]

Eventually, the Hebrews lost their fortune when the Hyksos, the Egyptian Pharaoh from Phoenicia or Hittites, succeeded by a native king. The new king, who was alien to Joseph and his patronage to Egypt, put the Hebrews in a weak position. The king attempted to develop Egyptian economy, construct royal cities of Pithom and Raamses, and renovate his palace by Hebrews' labor force. During this period, the position of Hebrews was reduced to a mere labor force and serfdom until they made their great escape from Egypt (the Exodus)

under the leadership of Moses (Hebrew Moseh) between 1400s to 1200s BC. The Exodus had an important impact in their socio-political history, the political culture and national conciseness, and the myths and epics of Hebrews on one hand and left a deep psychological impression on them as a chosen people of God. Hebrews commemorate Exodus in the spring festival of the Passover.[4]

After wandering in Sinai for forty years, the Hebrews moved to Canaan under the leadership of the disciple of Moses, Joshua. Moses died and Joshua took his position to lead Hebrews in their battle with enemies. Jashua was the servant of God and God promised him his support as long as he keeps his faith and respects the Divine Law. In the Old Testament we read that:

No one will be able to stand up against you all the days of your life. As I was with Moses, so I will be with you; I will never leave you nor forsake you. Be strong and courageous, because you will lead these people to inherit the land I swore to their forefathers to give them. Be strong and very courageous. Be careful to obey all the law my servant Moses gave you; do not turn from it to the right or to the left, that you may be successful wherever you go. Do not let this Book of the Law depart from your mouth; meditate on it day and night, so that you may be careful to do everything written in it. Then you will be prosperous and successful. Have I not commanded you? Be strong and courageous. Do not be terrified; do not be discouraged, for the Lord your God will be with you wherever you go.[5]

We learn from the Old Testament that Joshua led the Hebrew tribes across the Jordan River. In Canaan, Hebrews joined early Hebrews who did not accompany Jacob in his migration to Egypt or who had fled from Egypt before Exodus. These Early Hebrews established scattered villages in the central hill country and mainly maintained a society of farmers and herders. Later, the Hebrews captured the city of Jericho and established their authority over Canaan after a five-year long battle and massive destruction. Hebrews subjugated Canaan, exterminated the

inhabitants, and managed the eventual fall of many massively fortified cities.[6]

According to the Old Testament, from the time of the conquest of Canaan until just before the establishment of the monarchy, the Hebrew tribes were ruled by the wise and pious elders that are known as judges. Those judges held important administerative position and managed legal conflict between people during peace time. In addition, judges were tribal heroes and charismatic military leaders in times of war. The leadership of judges was note the less limited to their own local tribes and they did not exercise leadership over a unified coalition of the twelve tribes. The absence of unity among Hebrew tribes made the organizational structure of administration weak, notably at times of external aggression (not excluding Philistines threat). The Hebrews were so powerless that they could not protect the Ark of Covenant and the Philistines took it to their own city as the trophy of war, despite the Hebrews' belief that the Ark was so sacred that an unauthorized individual who touched it, even accidentally, would be punished by death.[7]

The History of Hebrews' Kingship
Hebrews blame the absence of a strong administration for their suffering and defeats in the wars against enemies. This shortcoming led the Hebrews to believe in monarchy as the best political system that can protect them, so they asked Samuel to assign them a king. The Old Testament states that:

> So all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at Ramah. They said to him, "You are old, and your sons do not walk in your ways; now appoint a king to lead us, such as all the other nations have." But when they said, "Give us a king to lead us," this displeased Samuel; so he prayed to the Lord. And the Lord told him: Listen to Them. . . .[8]

Consequently, Samuel chose Saul, a proven fighter and warlike from the small tribe of Benjamin, as the first king of the Hebrews in 1026 BC. The authority of Saul was limited to the central hill country and his

own tribe of Judah. He devoted much of his reign to contain the Philistines' aggressions in the west and those of various desert tribes in the east. In addition, Saul had to secure his power from internal plots by disenchanted elites and ambitious warriors. The king was unable to contain the Philistinians and attempts to bring solidarity among his people were in vain. Saul thus suffered a catastrophic defeat by the Philistinians and lost of his sons in the battle. In addition, he encountered a palace rebellion that forced him to abandon the throne and ended his life by falling upon his own sword in 1004 BC.[9]

Saul's fourth son, Ishbaal, succeeded him, but the leadership was contested by his people. Later, Ishbaal was murdered by two of his officers and David took his position. David united both the northern and southern tribes for the first time in the history of the Hebrews and made the ancient Canaanite city the capital of his united kingdom. David also built a palace in the new capital and housed his court and harem in the palace. He exalted Jerusalem as a religious center, and brought the Ark of Covenant in to Jerusalem with much singing and celebration and enshrined it in a tent-like sanctuary. Regardless of his intention as a faithful leader or sole realist politician, David united the southern and northern tribes which solidified his reign.[10]

David chose his young son, Solomon , as his successor. Solomon seized power and slaughter his potential rivals to security his throne. According to Biblical traditions, he managed the construction of a palace that was lavishly decorated with wood, ivory, bronze, and gold. In addition, he integrated a costly temple to his palace for keeping the Ark of the Covenant. The integration of palace and temple resembles the tight relation between state and religion and the king as an incarnation of deity. The lavish life style and larish design of temple came at the expense of the Hebrews, who had to work in foreign nations to pay for the national debts. In addition, Solomon imposed heavy tax on merchants for trading with outsiders. The burden of debts, high taxes , and collected customs on goods made the country weak and vulnerable to internal uprisings and external aggressions.[11]

During the reign of Solomon, the Hebrews expanded their trade with neibouring countries and Canaan became a valuable intersection for trade routes passing through Egypt, Arabia and Mesopotamia. Trade was not limited to land, though with the assistance of his foreign allies, the Phinicians crews, the fledgling fleet of trading ships and small coast-hugging vessels flew along the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.[12]

According to the Old Testament, Solomon also fortified many cities, divided the realm into twelve administrative districts to mute the old tribal frontiers, and imposed ruinous taxes to pay for his excessive building projects. He further conscripted many subjects into his standing army, which was furnished with large numbers of chariots and horses purchased abroad. The king also made countless individuals perform forced tabor four months every year. His extravagant schemes imposed undue sacrifices upon his people, especially in the agricultural north, now seething with resentment against the southern capital of Jerusalem. In addition, Phoenicia was a major source of both copper and iron for the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Based on the contract between Solomon and the Phoenician, the Hebrews had to work as slaves in these mine refineries for the repayment of trade deficit.[13]

Solomon died and his son, Jeroboam I, succeeded him around 924 BC. The Hebrews expected that the new king would bring them a relief from their excessive tax burdens and forced labor. They sent their delegation to Jeroboam I for reduction of taxes and cease of pressuer, but his response was disdainful and arrogant. He told them "My father made your yoke heavy, but I will add to your yoke; my father chastised you with whips, but I wilt chastise you with scorpions."[14]

The dissatisfaction with the new king made the situation ripe for Jeroboam, who was refuge in Egypt after unsuccessfully plotting against Solomon, to fasten popular resurgence against Rehoboam. In this power struggle, The Hebrew kingdom was divided into two rival kingdoms. Jeroboam I took over ten northern tribes, and constituted the kingdom of Israel, and chose Shechem the capital. On the other hand, Rehoboam maintained only the southern tribes of Judah and Benjamin,

known as the kingdom of Judah, and chose Jerusalem as the capital. The separation of the Hebrews' united kingdom put both kingdoms in a weak position and made them vulnerable to external aggressions.[15]

In respect to the kingdom of Israel, Jeroboam died and his son took over in 904 BC. The death of Jeroboam was the beginning of a series of bloody endings for the kings of Israel and chronic plots for the throne. Jeroboam's son lost his life and left the country in chaos. After a period of civil war, Omri, a military commander, gained upper hand and established the Omride dynasty about 885 BC. The Old Testament states that the Omride policy was not according to the Covenant and that the kingdom wad doom to failure. At the time, both Israel and Judah were characterized by syncretism and polytheism. The references in 1-2 Kings to the sinful ways of the kings of Israel reflect the attitude of a much later age when the official Yahweh cult extolled a rigorous obedience to the national deity.[16]

Ancient Hebrews Political and Social Structure:
In the second millennium, Palestine and Transjordan were occupied by a mixture of Semite people who had a pastoral and nomad life, except a small portion who lived in a few tiny cities including Shechem, Dothan, Tell al-Far'a (biblical Tirzah), Hepher, and Jerusalem. When the Hebrews migrated in the Leavant, they settled in prepherial locations until they invaded Canaan. At the end of the second millennium, the number of settlements and villages notably increased. The population growth in conjunction with the expansion of settlements led to the emerge of an advanced form of administration and bureaucracy in Canaan, Transjordan, and Palistain. The institution of twelve tribes headed by chiefs or judges was an attempt to consolidate the religio-political unity among Hebrews which became the major bases of Hebrews monarch.[17] In the Old Testament states:

> So the Philistines were subdued and did not invade Israelite territory again. Throughout Samuel's lifetime, the hand of the Lord was against the Philistines. The towns from Ekron to Gath that the Philistines had captured from Israel were restored to her, and Israel delivered the neighboring territory from the power of the Philistines.

And there was peace between Israel and the Amorites. Samuel continued as judge over Israel all the days of his life. From year to year he went on a circuit from Bethel to Gilgal to Mizpah, judging Israel in all those places. But he always went back to Ramah, where his home was, and there he also judged Israel. And he built an altar there to the Lord.[18]

The Nature of Kingship in Israel

The Old Testament provides two different views about the emergence of kingship in Hebrew society. Kingship was experienced in different nations in the Near East, including Cannan, Transjordan, Phoenicia, and Assyria. The Hebrews found the kingship desirable and feasible as they found that monarchy is more effective in eliminating conflicts between individuals and clans and bringing unity in the tribes. Hence, the Hebrews found kingship to be a more reliable and efficient political model of administration for the well being of the community. Therefore, The phenomenon of kingship in ancient Israel is a foreign intrusion incompatible with the Yahwistic one; the kingship is a manmade institution. The biblical writer is advocating that Yahweh should be the sole ruler (theocracy), a concept that most probably arose in the time after the kingdom of Judah had ceased to exist. This idea probably accomodated well with those circles responsible for the reconstruction of the post exilic society. The Old Testament we reads:

Then all the elders of Israel gathered themselves together, and came to Samuel unto Ramah, And said unto him, Behold, thou art old, and thy sons walk not in thy ways: now make us a king to judge us like all the nations. But the thing displeased Samuel, when they said, Give us a king to judge us. And Samuel prayed unto the Lord. And the Lord said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee: for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them.[19]

Preston asserts that Hebrews used the presence of worthless sons of Samuel as their excuse for asking a king. But, Samuel refused them. Then, Hebrews presents the real reason:

> When that day comes, you will cry out for relief from the king you have chosen, and the Lord will not answer you in that day. But the people refused to listen to Samuel. "No!" they said. "We want a king over us. Then we will be like all the other nations, with a king to lead us and to go out before us and fight our battles.[20]

In addition, there are a number of references in the Old Testament that mentions the life under the reign of monarch, is disgusting. For example God told Samuel to explain to people how the life under monarch is look like. Samuel told them:

This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: He will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and some shall run before his chariots. And he will appoint him captains over thousands, and captains over fifties; and will set them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war, and instruments of his chariots. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers, and to his servants. And he will take your menservants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall have chosen you; and the Lord will not hear you in that day.[21]

In contrast, the second view claims that God himself realizes the dispensability of the kingship and the office of kingship initiated by God. As we can read in the Book of Samuel that: "When Samuel heard all that the people said, he repeated it before the Lord. The Lord

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answered, Listen to them and give them a king."[22] Therefore, monarchy is a royal theocracy; king charged with divine grace, whereby God rules through his king. As we can read in the Book of Samuel that:

> Blessed are those who have learned to acclaim you, who walk in the light of your presence, O Lord. They rejoice in your name all day long; they exult in your righteousness. For you are their glory and strength, and by your favor you exalt our horn. Indeed, our shield belongs to the Lord, our king to the Holy One of Israel.[23]

The Divinity of King (The Ideology of Kingship In israel)
Hebrews argue that the king and his power is according to divine will. In the Old Testament, king is not physically divine, but there are several references that imply that the king belonged to the divine sphere. The Bible shed some light on the divine theory of kingship and the religious foundation of kingship. First, the king is called the son of his god. The Old Testament states that:

> I have installed my King on Zion, my holy hill. I will proclaim the decree of the Lord: He said to me, You are my Son ; today I have become your Father.[24]

The divine choice is a major factor in accession to throne, and a man is king by the grace of God, not only because God made a covenant with the dynasty of David, but because his choice was exercised at each accession. By this, the selection of Solomon as a king and not either of his brothers is because it came specifically to him directly from God.[25] As David told to Israeli officials in an assembly in Jerusalem:

> Listen to me, my brothers and my people. . . the Lord, the God of Israel, chose me from my whole family to be king over Israel forever. He chose Judah as leader, and from the house of Judah he chose my family, and from my father's sons he was pleased to make me king over all Israel. Of all my sons--and the Lord has given me many--he has chosen my son Solomon to sit on the throne of the kingdom of the Lord over Israel. He said to me: `Solomon your son is the one who will build my house and my courts, for I have chosen him to be my son, and I will be his father.[26]

Third, the burial of dead kings in the temple area projects that the king is holly and holds a special relation with god. The rules and Laws about the house of God emphasis that the throne of God is located in Temple and an unbeliever does not allowed inside the temple. In the Old Testament is mentioned that:

> The glory of the Lord entered the temple through the gate facing east. Then the Spirit lifted me up and brought me into the inner court, and the glory of the Lord filled the temple. While the man was standing beside me, I heard someone speaking to me from inside the temple. He said: "Son of man, this is the place of my throne and the place for the soles of my feet. This is where I will live among the Israelites forever., . . .[27] Then the man brought me back to the outer gate of the sanctuary, the one facing east, and it was shut. The Lord said to me, "This gate is to remain shut. It must not be opened; no one may enter through it. It is to remain shut because the Lord, the God of Israel, has entered through it. 3 The prince himself is the only one who may sit inside the gateway to eat in the presence of the Lord. He is to enter by way of the portico of the gateway and go out the same way." Then the man brought me by way of the north gate to the front of the temple. I looked and saw the glory of the Lord filling the temple of the Lord, and I fell facedown. The Lord said to me, "Son of man, look carefully, listen closely and give attention to everything I tell you concerning all the regulations regarding the temple of the Lord. Give attention to the entrance of the temple and all the exits of the sanctuary.[28]

Fourth, stability and order are according to divine order and chaos is disguised. The kingship would bring long life and order, in contrast, the absence of kingship would mean chaos and bring disaster to community. When Israel had no king; everyone did based on his own will and whelm. For example, Danites destroyed the city of Laish with its people because rgese was not any power to contain their aggression. The Old Testament recount the event as follows:

> In those days Israel had no king. And in those days the tribe of the Danites was seeking a place of their own where they might settle,

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because they had not yet come into an inheritance among the tribes of Israel. So the Danites spies [find the land of Laish feasible and desirable] They [told their leaders] Come on, let's attack them! We have seen that the land is very good. Aren't you going to do something? Don't hesitate to go there and take it over. When you get there, you will find an unsuspecting people and a spacious land that God has put into your hands, a land that lacks nothing whatever. The six hundred Danites, armed for battle . . . went on to Laish, against a peaceful and unsuspecting people. They attacked them with the sword and burned down their city. There was no one to rescue them.[29]

On the other hand, king brings prosperity and justice to the nation. The Old Testament states that:

> Endow the king with your justice, O God, the royal son with your righteousness. He will judge your people in righteousness, your afflicted ones with justice. The mountains will bring prosperity to the people, the hills the fruit of righteousness. He will defend the afflicted among the people and save the children of the needy; he will crush the oppressor. He will endure as long as the sun, as long as the moon, through all generations. He will be like rain falling on a mown field, like showers watering the earth.[30]

Fifth, the king is the servant of God and bestows him with his love, strength, and covenant. As in case of king David, The Old Testament states:

> I have found David my servant; with my sacred oil I have anointed him. My hand will sustain him; surely my arm will strengthen him. No enemy will subject him to tribute; no wicked man will oppress him. I will crush his foes before him and strike down his adversaries. My faithful love will be with him, and through my name his horn will be exalted. I will set his hand over the sea, his right hand over the rivers. He will call out to me, `You are my Father, my God, the Rock my Savior.' I will also appoint him my firstborn, the most exalted of the kings of the earth. I will maintain my love to him forever, and my covenant with him will never fail. I will establish his line forever, his throne as long as the heavens endure.[31]

Fifth, the king is even addressed as "God". As in the Old Testament we read:

> My heart is stirred by a noble theme as I recite my verses for the king; my tongue is the pen of a skillful writer. You are the most excellent of men and your lips have been anointed with grace, since God has blessed you forever. Gird your sword upon your side, O mighty one; clothe yourself with splendor and majesty. . . Your throne, O God, will last for ever and ever; a scepter of justice will be the scepter of your kingdom.[32]

Sixth, God himself anointed the new king. As we read about Cyrus that:

> This is what the Lord says to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I take hold of to subdue nations before him and to strip kings of their armor, to open doors before him so that gates will not be shut: I will go before you and will level the mountains [1] ; I will break down gates of bronze and cut through bars of iron. I will give you the treasures of darkness, riches stored in secret places, so that you may know that I am the Lord, the God of Israel, who summons you by name. For the sake of Jacob my servant, of Israel my chosen, I summon you by name and bestow on you a title of honor, though you do not acknowledge me. I am the Lord, and there is no other; apart from me there is no God. I will strengthen you, though you have not acknowledged me. [33]

Seventh, the divinity of kings has also been utilized by the prophets. As the Old Testament refers to a child with wonderful name becomes leader, counselor, Mighty God, eternal father, and the Prince of Peace. We read in rhe Old Testament that:

> For to us a child is born, to us a son is given, and the government will be on his shoulders. And he will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there will be no end. He will reign on David's throne and over his kingdom, establishing and upholding it with justice and righteousness from that time on and forever. The zeal of the Lord Almighty will accomplish this.[34]

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The Succession

The succession of king is based on hereditary. Yet, one can not rule out other possibilities. Generally speaking, there are four ways to succeed to the throne. First, the king select his son as his successor. The son is not necessarily the oldest son. Second, a prince inherit the throne after the death of the king. Third, a rebellious prince or officer ascend the throne in a coup d' etat. Fourth, the prophet choose and anoint the king. In any case the king claims divine support to legitimize his power, for it was believed that the choice was anchored in the divine will.[35] The Old Testament states that:

> But I am a worm, and no man; a reproach of men, and despised of the people. All they that see me laugh me to scorn: they shoot out the lip, they shake the head, saying, He trusted on the Lord that he would deliver him: let him deliver him, seeing he delighted in him. But thou art he that took me out of the womb: thou didst make me hope when I was upon my mother's breasts. I was cast upon thee from the womb: thou art my God from my mother's belly.[36]

The Old Testament provides more details about the succession to the throne.[37] First, the notion of Divine choice is not limited to Hebrew kings but extended to other kings too. The Grace of God is emphasized about Cyrus in the Old Testament for God says that: "who says of Cyrus, He is my shepherd and will accomplish all that I please; he will say of Jerusalem, Let it be rebuilt," and of the temple, "Let its foundations be laid." [38]

Second, the king can choose his son as his successor, but he is not bound to select his eldest son. For example, Adonias, the eldest son of David, hope to be king and this idea supported by whole party. In spite of public support, David turned down this request and chose Solomon, the younger son, as the king. When David was aged and weak in bed his son, Adonijah whose mother was Haggith, put himself forward and asserted he would be king. But he said to a group of people including Bathsheba, the mother of Solomon, and Nathan the prophet who were in favor of the kingship of Solomon.[39] David made the final decision as the Old Testament states:

> The King David "Call in Bathsheba." So she came into the king's presence and stood before him. The king then took an oath: "As surely as the Lord lives, who has delivered me out of every trouble, I will surely carry out today what I swore to you by the Lord, the God of Israel: Solomon your son shall be king after me, and he will sit on my throne in my place.[40]

Third, we learn from the case of Solomon that he was anointed king while his father, David, was present This indicates that a person may be anointed king during the lifetime of the former king.[41]

Fourth, sometimes, the king does not have a son. In this situation his brother has chance to become king. For example, Ahaziah died and had no son to succeed him. Therefore, his brother, Joram, sat on the throne.[42]

Fifth, the enthronement of women is unusual and women are excluded from kingship. In the kingdom of Israel, during the Divided Monarchy, women did not have chance to become king, but in the kingdom of Judah, Athaliah on the death of her son was throwned king for seven years. Her reign was regarded, however, as a unlawful and was terminated by a revolution.[43] The Old Testament states:

> When Athaliah the mother of Ahaziah saw that her son was dead, she proceeded to destroy the whole royal family [to secure her rule over the land, but Joash son of Ahaziah survived from this episode and rescued by a palace servent]. . . In the seventh year of [Athaliah reign] Jehoiada, the priest sent for the commanders of units of a hundred, the Carites and the guards and had them brought to him at the temple of the Lord. He made a covenant with them and put them under oath at the temple of the Lord. Then he showed them the [grown] king's son, [Joash]. Jehoiada brought out the king's son and put the crown on him . . . 15Jehoiada the priest ordered the commanders of units . . . [to] Bring her out between the ranks and put to the sword anyone who follows her . . . and there she was put to death.[44]

Qualifications of King

The Old Testament states qualifications of king such as valor, wisdom, righteousness, God fear, justice, caring, support of needys, out spoken against wick, and beautiful appearance:

> The Spirit of the Lord will rest on him [the king] the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the Spirit of counsel and of power, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord. And he will delight in the fear of the Lord. He will not judge by what he sees with his eyes, or decide by what he hears with his ears; but with righteousness he will judge the needy, with justice he will give decisions for the poor of the earth. He will strike the earth with the rod of his mouth; with the breath of his lips he will slay the wicked. Righteousness will be his belt and faithfulness the sash around his waist.[45]

Among these qualifications, the wisdom and valor are two important qualifications that made the king competent to pronounce judgment and to lead his army in the battlefield. Under the leadership of this monarch, the Old Testament asserts, the security and safety of all individuals are secured and the wellbeing of the population is granted. The Old Testament states that:

> At Gibeon the Lord appeared to Solomon during the night in a dream, and God said, "Ask for whatever you want me to give you." Solomon answered . . . O Lord my God, you have made your servant king in place of my father David. But I am only a little child and do not know how to carry out my duties. Your servant is here among the people you have chosen, a great people, too numerous to count or number. So give your servant a discerning heart to govern your people and to distinguish between right and wrong. For who is able to govern this great people of yours?" The Lord was pleased that Solomon had asked for this. So God said to him, "Since you have asked for this and not for long life or wealth for yourself, nor have asked for the death of your enemies but for discernment in administering justice, I will do what you have asked. I will give you a wise and discerning heart, so that there will never have been anyone like you, nor will there ever be. I will give you what you

have not asked for--both riches and honor--so that in your lifetime you will have no equal among kings.[46]

The major theme in these verses is wisdom that brings justice, but it does not rule out any legitimate qualifications such as wealth and power. In looking of David as the successor of Saul, Samuel keeps in mind not to look for appearance. Because God told him that:

> "Do not consider his appearance or his height, for I have rejected him." [So, Samuel realized that] The LORD does not look at the things man looks at. Man looks at the outward appearance, but the Lord looks at the heart. . . . [Neverless, he found David] ruddy, with a fine appearance and handsome features.[47]

It seems that the appearance is a plus for the king as in the Old Testament we read about Saul that:

> There was a Benjamite, a man of standing, whose name was Kish . . . had a son named Saul, an impressive young man without equal among the Israelites--a head taller than any of the others.[48]

In sum, the most important qualifications of the king are wisdom, valor, and healtyly body.

The Coronation and Enthronement:
The Old Testament mentions the enthronement of Solomon, the son and successor of David, and the enthronement of Joas who put an end to the usurpation of Athaliah. About the enthronement of Solomon, David told Zadok the priest, Nathan the prophet and Benaiah the son of Jehoiada that:

> Take your Lord's servants with you and set Solomon my son on my own mule and take him down to Gihon. There have Zadok the priest and Nathan the prophet anoient him king over Israel. Blow the trumpet and shout, `Long live King Solomon! Then you are to go up with him, and he is to come and sit on my throne and reign in my place. I have appointed him ruler over Israel and Judah. So Zadok the priest, Nathan the prophet, Benaiah son of Jehoiada, the

Kerethites and the Pelethites went down and put Solomon on King David's mule and escorted him to Gihon. Zadok the priest took the horn of oil from the sacred tent and anointed Solomon. Then they sounded the trumpet and all the people shouted, "Long live King Solomon!" And all the people went up after him, playing flutes and rejoicing greatly, so that the ground shook with the sound. . . Also, the royal officials have come to congratulate our Lord King David, saying, `May your God make Solomon's name more famous than yours and his throne greater than yours!' And the king bowed in worship on his bed and said, `Praise be to the Lord, the God of Israel, who has allowed my eyes to see a successor on my throne today.[49]

The second record is about Joash who became king at age seven. The enthronement ceremony is projected as follow:

Jehoiada [the priest] brought out the king's son and put the crown on him; he presented him with a copy of the covenant and proclaimed him king. They anointed him, and the people clapped their hands and shouted, "Long live the king!" When Athaliah [the usurper king] heard the noise . . . she went to the people at the temple of the Lord. She looked and there was the king, standing by the pillar, as the custom was. The officers and the trumpeters were beside the king, and all the people of the land were rejoicing and blowing trumpets . . . Jehoiada then made a covenant between the Lord and the king and people that they would be the Lord's people. He also made a covenant between the king and the people . . . Then Jehoiada took with him the commanders of hundreds, the Carites, the guards and all the people of the land, and together they brought the king down from the temple of the Lord and went into the palace . . . The king then took his place on the royal throne, and all the people of the land rejoiced.[50]

According to the afor mention texts, the enthronement ceremony has two parts, the first part takes place in sanctuary and the second part in palace. The service in sanctuary was custom as we read in the Old Testament about Athaliah that she "looked and there was the king, standing by the pillar, as the custom was" it appears that it was usual to

have this ceremony in that palace. In the sanctuary/temple, the king is anointed by the priest or prophet and the public watches this ritual. The king receives insignia, which could be crown, scepter, and a copy of law and covenant. Then, they blow the trumpet to indicate acclamation of the sovereign. Afterward, people who are witness in the ceremony testify and offer their homage and shout "long live the king". The first phase of ceremony ends here and the king moves toward the palace and people follow him and joyfully support his kingship. The second phase of the ceremony takes palace in the palace where the king sits on throne. In the palace, the royal officials, political elites, and high rank military staff congratulate and extend their loyalty to the new king.

The Duties of King
The king is the viceroy of god and administer the deity's territory, the nation. The king is the commander-in-chief, the supreme judge, and high priest of national cult. In other words, he is the top of the hierarchic pyramid administration.

Military Task: The Hebrews kings were the military commander because of following reasons. First, the Hebrews attempt to contain military aggression of their neigbors. The institution of monarchy is created to protect the Hebrews from any external threat. As we learn that the Hebrew elders went to Samuel and asked him to assign them a king to protect them and fight for them. In addition valor and strength are must for a qualified king. The implication of these qualifications are mostly in battlefield with external aggression and control internal security. Third, the Old Testament discusses the military accomplishment of Hebrew kings in detail. These reasons support the idea that the king in Israel in commander in chief.

Cultic Duties: The king has a significant authority in national cult and is supreme priest. He is the vice-regent of god, constructs temple, and conducts certain rituals of the cult, such as sacrifices, offerings, and burning incense. He also designates the high rank national priests, and participate in cult processions. Kings usually attempt to hold their important position in the cultic state, because the national cult and its

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priests have been a major governmental tool for directing and teaching the political orientation of subjects and for legitimizing the ruling elites. Due to this vital role, government allocates a part of their incomes to the temples and sanctuaries.

Jury Duties: In the Biblical tradition, only God is lawgiver and final judge and the king implements the law of God. The Old Testament states that: "the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king; it is he who will save us."[51] As the judicial power of king is concern, the king is the head of the nation's legal system and supreme judge. A number of authorities in national and local level manage conflict among people, but the king is responsible for any wrong doing in the country. As in the Old Testament states that "David reigned over all Israel, doing what was just and right for all his people."[52]

As the population grows and the cities expanded, a more advanced judiciary system was required. Solomon built the throne hall, the Hall of Justice, where he was to judge among people.[53] He appointed judges to settle quarrel and help every man to assist every man to obtain his right. We nead to bear in mind that the major cases or appeals go directly to king. The Old Testament states that: "the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king; it is he who will save us." [54]

Administrative Duties: The king is the head of the executive branch and his palace is the center of bureaucracy. Through a complex government apparatus including judges, tax collectors, military officers, priests, and local governers, the king extends his authority all over the country in order to protect and control it. The construction and expasion of cities, the extensive building projects, an organized tax system, well trained military personnel, expansion of trade with overseas, and establishment of sexurity are among the major tools available to the king. The Old Testament does not give us a complete structure of the bureaucracy nor a full list of employees but it gives us a broad idea about the administration during the reign of David and Solomon.

State apparatus and Bureaucracy

The institution of monarchy is foreign to Hebrews political system, but was created because of collective will of public at the end of patriarchal society. The monarchy created based on the political system of foreign countries and the tribal-patriarchal customs. As we read in the Old Testament that people asked Samuel to set up for them a king to judge them like other nations.[55] Indeed, in the form and structure of kingship in Israel, the historical events, the local conditions, and external environment have significant impact. As the influence of other countries concern, there is debate among scholars about how and on which pattern the organization of the kingdom in Israel was established. Students in Ancient Near East history have different idea and several nations are suggested including Egypt, Assyria, Mesopotamia, and/or Canaan. But, the extent of their influence in Israel kingship is disputed.[56]

Hebrews built their monarchy based on a central authority to order affairs and execute them. This government necessarily needs a group of personnel to implement orders, to maintain a trustworthy relation between individual members of community, to bring harmony in the entire society, and to monitor the execution of laws based on right procedure. During the reign of Saul, the territory of his monarch was limited to Benjamin tribes, but Hebrews expanded their settlements in different directions which required a more advanced bureaucracy associated with hierarchy in center and with dependent personnel in local divisions to manage mutual relation between rulers and subjects.

In the Hebrews monarchy, king is the head of political system, but there are a number of high rank officials who help him in public administration at both local and national level. These people form the bureaucracy of government and fill different positions in various capacities. The division of districts varied time to time, but at the time of, However, the grand vizier (called the one who sets over the house), the recorder, the chancellor, the chief general, and the chief tax-collector are the most common.

Bureaucracy and Administration at the time of Saul: The security and territorial integrity of Israel against any external aggression as well as internal insurgent were Saul's major concerns during his kingship. So, the strength of army and the expansion of military staff were his primary task. For example, in one occasion, to contain the Ammonites aggression, he organized more than three hundred thousand men from Israel and thirty thousand men from Judah. As in the Old Testament states:

The next day Saul separated his men into three divisions; during the last watch of the night they broke into the camp of the Ammonites and slaughtered them until the heat of the day. Those who survived were scattered, so that no two of them were left together. The people then said to Samuel, "Who was it that asked, `Shall Saul reign over us?' Bring these men to us and we will put them to death. But Saul said, "No one shall be put to death today, for this day the LORD has rescued Israel. Then Samuel said to the people, "Come, let us go to Gilgal and there reaffirm the kingship. So all the people went to Gilgal and confirmed Saul as king in the presence of the Lord. There they sacrificed fellowship offerings before the Lord, and Saul and all the Israelites held a great celebration.[57]

Saul is the supreme leader of the nation and has the final say in political affairs and officials acting on his behalf. Within the political sphere, he is the highest authority, and all are subjected to his order. He uses forces when it is required to establish his authority. Saul is considered sacrosanct, the supreme priest of national religion. He appoints the high rank priests.[58]

Saul chose Gibean as the capital of his government and a number of people worked in his court in different capacities is the royal house. The high rank members of the bureaucracy include, the management of the royal household, the grant political advisors, the high rank military comanders, the personell of economic affairs, the priests for ritualistic purposes, and the judges and court employees. In addition, Saul deployed his envoyes to different areas with guidelines as a task force or messenger, or spy.[59]

Bureaucracy and Administration at the time of David

David attempts to protect Hebrews from external aggression and defeats Phalestines and annexes their territory and defends it in fights against the Arameans. He expanded Hebrews sovereignty and for the first time united the Hebrews in his United Monarchy. He moved the center of his government from Hebron in to Jerusalem. In Hebron, the government consists of the king and the members of his royal household. The major official in his administration are the military commanders and officers, the head of local government and villages, police forces, judges, messengers within nation and political envoys to overseas.

David changed the capital from Hebron in to Jerusalem and expanded the bureaucracy and diversified the political organization of his monarchy. The military personnel recruited as the special guards for the containment of any potential palace rebellion (appearently after the Absalom rebellion), the position as the servant to prince created, the existence of a standing military force, the civilian and military work in seperate departments, the civilian positions as advisors and recorders, priests, and secretaries created, the minister of forced labor which vanished the form of recruitment based on kinship, and consolidate power under the authority of sole David. In the former administration and the new one, David is the supreme leader and any political action or decision must be approved by him.

According to the Old Testament, Davis , who supervised all the affairs of Yahweh and the king on United Monarchy put Levites in charge of secular affairs as civil servants or judges, and police forces. He relinquished autonomous tribes and united the Hebrews under his soverignty. The members of his administration are:

David summoned all the officials of Israel to assemble at Jerusalem: the officers over the tribes, the commanders of the divisions in the service of the king, the commanders of thousands and commanders of hundreds, and the officials in charge of all the property and livestock belonging to

the king and his sons, together with the palace officials, the mighty men and all the brave warriors.[60]

Or we know other members of his staff as follows:

> David reigned over all Israel, doing what was just and right for all his people. Joab son of Zeruiah was over the army; Jehoshaphat son of Ahilud was recorder; Zadok son of Ahitub and Ahimelech son of Abiathar were priests; Seraiah was secretary; Benaiah son of Jehoiada was over the Kerethites and Pelethites; and David's sons were royal advisers.[61]

The political organization and public administration of Israel glorified during the time David, especially in that second decade of his reign. We know that Hebrews were inexperienced in an expanded state and they should based their bureaucracy on Egyptians, Mesopotamian, Assyrian, or Canaanites. On what pattern, David established his kingdom is disputed and any discussion is beyond the scope of my research. The high rank official s in this period are:

> This is the list of the Israelites--heads of families, commanders of thousands and commanders of hundreds, and their officers, who served the king in all that concerned the army divisions that were on duty month by month throughout the year. Each division consisted of 24,000 men. . . . Azmaveth son of Adiel was in charge of the royal storehouses. [Jonathan] was in charge of the storehouses in the outlying districts, in the towns, the villages and the watchtowers. [Ezri] was in charge of the field workers who farmed the land. Shimei the Ramathite was in charge of the vineyards. [Zabdi] was in charge of the produce of the vineyards for the wine vats. [Baal-Hanan] was in charge of the olive and sycamore-fig trees in the western foothills. Joash was in charge of the supplies of olive oil. Shitrai was in charge of the herds grazing in Sharon. [Shaphat] was in charge of the herds in the valleys. [Obil] was in charge of the camels. [Jehdeiah] was in charge of the donkeys. [Jaziz] was in charge of the flocks. All these were the officials in charge of King David's property. Jonathan, David's uncle, was a counselor, a man of insight and a scribe. [Jehiel] Hacmoni took care of the king's sons.

[Ahithophel] was the king's counselor. [Hushai] was the king's friend. [Ahithophel] was the commander of the royal army.[62]

According to above mention verses, during the reign of David the high rank official are as follows: (1) Governor who is in charge of administration and supervise the execution of public works or various assignments, (2) the person who is over the burden the actual enlistment of the levy and arrangement for its employment, or he was also supervising their work , (3) Governor of the City who is in charge of local administration (4) The Son of the King, apparently minor rank official, (5) Sdri a minor official who served as a messenger on various occasions. (6) Na'ar (= boy) a butler who owner of seal and fiscal servant. (7) They Who See the Face of-the King(their function are not clear), (8) judges who work on the appeal court, (9)Soteror officers, (10) Tax Collectors, (11-12) The Men Who Toured and the Pedlar which refer to government official who were dealing with imports and exports in the country, (13) Agent (his function is not clear) (14) Sar who is high rank official, (15) Servant of the King an elite official position dealing with priest and senior officials, (16) Ndgid or the cheifs of tribes, and (17) Appointee who hold a governmental position.

The administration under Solomon
During the reign of Solomon, the heads of the twelve tribes keep their authority. Their designation was based on patronymic rule, at least for certain families, which served the king from father to son. There is a tight relation between the local and central government and a member of ministerial cabinet is in supervision of tribes and collection of payments and tribute to the Palace. The two capitals, Jerusalem and Samaria, each had a governor who has the title of s'ar; the chief of the town. The name of master of the palace who is appointed by the king and the Elders who are in chage of local affairs which also settled local disputes appeared in the Old Testament.

Solomon there were twelve district governors, who provided for the needs of the court. The palace also had several employees and positions such as cup-bearers, keepers of the wardrobe, doorkeepers, charioteers,

lifeguards, and all sorts of servants (sarisim), including the eunuchs, who guarded the harem.

There are a number of high rank officials who help the king in his tasks at both local and national level. These people form the bureaucracy of government and fill different positions in various capacities. They are called administrators, officers, priests, local governors, palace officials, merchants, and tax collectors.

The King in the Psalms
There are , Gunkel asserts, different types of religious poetry in Psalms. He believes personal psychological, social conditions, and historical events give rise to different form of Psalms such as communal prayer due to communal disaster, personal petitions due to personal petitions, hymns of thanksgiving for national salvation, and hymns for mourning or divine worship. In addition, Weinfeld discusses about the various types of psalms which, although usually found in the Book of Psalms as follows: (1) The Hymn, (2) Communal and public Prayers of Thanksgiving, (3) Zion Hymns and Temple Hymns, (4) Royal Psalms, (5) Communal Petitions, (6) Psalms of Enthronement, and (7) Psalms of the Individual.

Among the various forms of Psalms, the royal and enthronement Psalms are related to our subject of study in kingship in Israel. In the Royal Psalms, the main subject is the request to God in the name of king, or it poet addresses the king, king speaks about king himself, and the prophetic promise and blessing to the king in the name of God. I discuss the royal psalms according to following subtitles:

First, the Psalm is about the king and honor him with symbols of royalty as we read in the Old Testament that:

1Psalm 2
Why do the nations conspire and the peoples plot in vain? The kings of the earth take their stand and the rulers gather together against the Lord

and against his Anointed One. "Let us break their chains," they say, "and throw off their fetters." The One enthroned in heaven laughs; the Lord scoffs at them. Then he rebukes them in his anger and terrifies them in his wrath, saying, "I have installed my King on Zion, my holy hill." I will proclaim the decree of the Lord: He said to me, "You are my Son; today I have become your Father. Ask of me, and I will make the nations your inheritance, the ends of the earth your possession. You will rule them with an iron scepter; you will dash them to pieces like pottery." Therefore, you kings, be wise; be warned, you rulers of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry and you be destroyed in your way, for his wrath can flare up in a moment. Blessed are all who take refuge in him.[63]

We learn from this Psalm that: 1) king owns divine grace and selected by God, 2) People must obey the king and any rebellion against king is dome to failure, 3) God protects king from his enemies, and 4) bless is to followers of king.

Second, the psalm is about attribution of the king such as his beauty and heroism. A we read from the Old Testament that:

My heart is stirred by a noble theme as I recite my verses for the king; my tongue is the pen of a skillful writer. You are the most excellent of men and your lips have been anointed with grace, since God has blessed you forever. Gird your sword upon your side, O mighty one; clothe yourself with plendor and majesty. In your majesty ride forth victoriously in behalf of truth, humility and righteousness; let your right hand display awesome deeds. Let your sharp arrows pierce the hearts of the king's enemies; let the nations fall beneath your feet. Your throne, O God, will last for ever and ever; a scepter of justice will be the scepter of your kingdom. You love ighteousness and hate wickedness; therefore God, your God, has set you above your companions by anointing you with the oil of joy. All your robes are fragrant with myrrh and aloes and cassia; from palaces adorned with ivory the music of the strings makes you glad.[64]

The major themes of this psalm are as follows; 1) the king is the most excellent man, 2) he carries the grace of bless of God, 3) he is protective of righteousness, 4) he is powerful, 5) he is harsh against enemies of God and his own.

The third group of Psalms are about the victory of king over his enemies as we read in the Old Testament that:

The Lord says to my Lord: "Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet." The Lord will extend your mighty scepter from Zion; you will rule in the midst of your enemies. Your troops will be willing on your day of battle. Arrayed in holy majesty, from the womb of the dawn you will receive the dew of your youth. The Lord has sworn and will not change his mind: "You are a priest forever, in the order of Melchizedek." The Lord is at your right hand; he will crush kings on the day of his wrath. He will judge the nations, heaping up the dead and crushing the rulers of the whole earth.[65]

In sum, in this psalm God is the support of king and victory is with him.

Fourth, it is about the prosperity of his nation as we read in the Psalms that:

> I will sing of the Lord's great love forever; with my mouth I will make your faithfulness known through all generations. I will declare that your love stands firm forever, that you established your faithfulness in heaven itself. You said, "I have made a covenant with my chosen one, I have sworn to David my servant, I will establish your line forever and make your throne firm through all generations. . . Indeed, our shield belongs to the Lord, our king to the Holy One of Israel. Once you spoke in a vision, to your faithful people you said: "I have bestowed strength on a warrior; I have exalted a young man from among the people. I have found David my servant; with my sacred oil I have anointed him. My hand will sustain him; surely my arm will strengthen him. No enemy will subject him to tribute; no wicked man will oppress him. I will crush his foes before him and strike down his adversaries. My faithful love will be with him, and through my name his horn will be exalted. I

will set his hand over the sea, his right hand over the rivers. He will call out to me, `You are my Father, my God, the Rock my Savior.' I will also appoint him my firstborn, the most exalted of the kings of the earth. 28I will maintain my love to him forever, and my covenant with him will never fail. I will establish his line forever, his throne as long as the heavens endure.[66]

The psalm projects the following ideas: 1) that glory, kingship, power of the king davis is from God; 2) His victory over his enemies is promised, David owns grace, and God's promised him bless.

Fifth, it is about the justice and righteousness of king as weread from The Old Testament that:

Endow the king with your justice, O God, the royal son with your righteousness. He will judge your people in righteousness, your afflicted ones with justice. The mountains will bring prosperity to the people, the hills the fruit of righteousness. He will defend the afflicted among the people and save the children of the needy; he will crush the oppressor. He will endure [2] as long as the sun, as long as the moon, through all generations. He will be like rain falling on a mown field, like showers watering the earth. In his days the righteous will flourish; prosperity will abound till the moon is no more.[67]

In this psalm, the king is blessed with righteousness from God, and in return, brings prosperity, justice, and wellbeing of subjects.

Wisdom Literature in the Old Testament

There are several reference to wisdom in the Old Testament and a whole section of Bible allocated to this Them. The major themes of this genre are educational instruction for the students as well as the assimilate truth and morality in the form of proverbs. The Old Testament states:

The proverbs of Solomon son of David, king of Israel: for attaining wisdom and discipline; for understanding words of insight; for

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acquiring a disciplined and prudent life, doing what is right and just and fair; for giving prudence to the simple, knowledge and discretion to the young let the wise listen and add to their learning, and let the discerning get guidance-- for understanding proverbs and parables, the sayings and riddles of the wise. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge, but fools despise wisdom and discipline. Listen, my son, to your father's instruction and do not forsake your mother's teaching. They will be a garland to grace your head and a chain to adorn your neck.[68]

CONCLUSION

The political history of the Ancient Near East shows the presence of a central government and bureaucracy in Canaan from around the second millennium BC. Although, the structure of that government varied from time to time, but a king or an oligarchic body was in charge of this administration. The Old Testament as a histoical document verified the emerge of monarch in ancient Hebrew communities. Biblical scholars maintain two different views on the nature of the Hebrew monarchy. The first view maintains the divinity of kingship; the second asserts that the kingship is a manmade institution for security purposes, especially community protection against external aggression.

Endnotes

[1] As the etymological analyses of the term "Hebrew" ('ibri) is concern, the term is related to a root, meaning "to go over" or "to go across"therefore, Hebrews refer to people who move from place to place; a nomad and a wanderer. Hebrews at a times created their own settlements and at other times attacked established communities. Second view asserts that Hebrew drives from the word Eber and refere to people who are descended from Shem, one of Noah's sons, through Eber. Hebrews chose the name of Israel based on the Old Testament story about Jocob and his victory over angle in a night wrestling which is called Israel after this victory. Third views believes that the best that can be said is that the Hebrews of the Bible appear to be one branch of the Northwest Semitic group, related linguistically to Canaanites, Edomites and Moabites, who moved from a semi-nomadic existence to settled life in the Bronze Age. In this writing, I use Hebrews and Israelites interchangably and refer to people

of Old Testament who lived in Mesopotamia and Egypt before moving to Canaan and ocupies some portion of Canaan and established a monarch for a few centuries. The Hebrew invasion of Canaan, taking place forty years later or about 1400 B.C In the Bible the word Hebrew becomes an ethnic term used interchangeably with Israelite. THE Hebrews entered a land with its own highly developed culture. During the Late Bronze and Early Iron Ages, Canaan was dotted with strong, walled, industrial and trade centers surrounded by orchards, vineyards, grain fields and pasture land. Wool and flax were woven and dyed with the rich purple obtained from the Murex shellfish. Wine, dried fruits, grain and milk products were also produced. Minerals from the Wadi Arabah were smelted and fashioned into ornaments, tools and weapons for sale and exchange. The rich lived in magnificent villas built around central courts; the poor dwelt in hovels massed together. Slaves captured in battle, and the poor who sold their families and themselves to meet debts, contributed to the power and wealth of the few.

[1] Palestine is a land-bridge between Africa and Asia where becomes the focal point of wandering peoples, tradesmen, and armies from . The Ancient Empires such as Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians have political, cutural, and economic influence in the region. The human habitation can be found in Palestine dating to the Paleolithic period, or Old Stone Age, which lasted hundreds of thousands of years of Palestine.

[2] The Old Testament is the major source for the study of the ancient history of the Hebrews, including the Creation and early life of man; the flood and the story of Noah; the life of Abraham who migrates to Canaan; the exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt under the leadership of Moses; and the wandering period in Sinai, the life of the Hebrews during the Patriarchs period, United Monarchy, Divided Monarchy, destruction of the first temple (Babylonian Exile), destruction of the second temple, and the Hellenistic period. The Old Testament, however, is difficult to use as a straightforward historical source. Like many mythical accounts of the past, it was not intended to provide a critical historical study; rather, details the interaction of Hebrew people with their god, Yahweh, who had chosen them to work out his divine plan. It is a complex, ideologically landen compilation, within which stories were refashioned to emphasize particular lessons from the past (Garbini 19860.

[3] . For more information on this issue see: Margaret Warker (ed.), *Ancient Israel in Egypt and the Exodus*. Washington, DC, Biblical Archaeology Society. 2012; Jack R. Riggs, The Length of Issrael's Sojourn in Egypt. *Grace Theological Journal* 12.1 (Winter, 1971) 18-35.; Valley Bible Church, History of Old TestamentIsrael Period-The Sojourn in Egypt. *www.valleybible.net*. Last visited; 4/2015.

[4] Exodu*s*.:12&13.

[5] Joshua 1-11.

[6] The opponents of this theory assert that the Hebrews themselves were essentially Canaanite. They claim that some of Canaanite proffered to stay in their homeland when Jacob decided to move into Egypt. In addition, prior to Exodus, some Hebrews

left Egypt and settled in Canaan and established scattered villages in the central hill country shortly after 1250 BC, becoming what archaeologists might term early Hebrews, mainly a society of farmers and herders.

[7]. 2 Sam. 6:6-7.

[8]. 1Samuel 8:1-5.

[9]. 1 Samuel 8. And Williams and Norgate. *The history of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature : with an appendix on the Hebrew chronology*. London: Norman and Son Printer.

[10]. 1 Samuel 31 - 2 Kings 25.

[11]. 1 Kings 1:1-2

[12]. 1 Kings 1

[13] . 1 Kings 1

[14] I Kings 12:14.

[15]. I *Kings* 12:1–17

[16]. I Kings: 14.

[17] Sasson *Civilization in Ancient Near East*. Vol. 1. (Macmillan, New York, 1995) . pp.587.

[18] 1Samuel 7:13-17.

[19]. Judges 8:4-7

[20] . 1 Samuel 8:18

[21] Judges 8:11-18

[22]. 1Samuel 8:21-22.

[23]. Psalms 89:15-18.

[24]. Psalms 2:6-7.

[25] Ronald De Vaux, Ancient Israel, (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,Michigan:1997) Pp.100.

[26] 1 Chronicles 28: 5-6

[27] Ezekiel 43:6-7

[28] Ezekiel 44:1-5

[29] Judges 17:6 & 18:1-24.

[30] Psalms 72:1-6.

[31] Psalms 89:20-29.

[32] Psalm 45:6-7.

[33] Isaiah 45: 1-6.

[34] Isaiah 9:6-7.

[35] Ronald De Vaux, 1997, 101-102.

[36] Psalms 22:7-10

[37] The succession of king is based on hereditary. Yet, one can not rule out other possibilities. Generally speaking, there are four ways to succeed to the throne. First, the king select his son as his successor. The son is not necessarily the oldest son. Second, a prince inherited the throne after the death of the king. Third, a rebellious prince or officer ascends the throne in a coup d' etat. Fourth, the prophet choses and

anoint the king. In any case the king claims divine support to legitimize his power, for it was believed that the choice was anchored in the divine will.

[38] Is 45:1-3.
[39] Ronald De Vaux, 1997, 101-102.
[40] I King 1: 28-39.
[41] Ronald De Vaux, 1997, 101-102.
[42] Ronald De Vaux, 1997, 101-102.
[43] Ronald De Vaux, 1997, 101-102.
[44] 2 Kings 11
[45] . Isaiah 11:5
[46] 1Kings 3:5-13.
[47] 1Samuel 9:7-12
[48] 1Samuel:9:1-2.
[49] . *1 Kings 1*:8
[50] . *2 Chronicles 23:12*
[51] . Ronald De Vaux, Ancient Israel.Pp. 311-321.
[52] . Ronald De Vaux, Ancient Israel.Pp.150-155.
[53] 1King7:7. *1 Kings 3,1 Kings 6-12*.
[54] .Isaiah 33:22.
[55] I Sam. 8: 5.
[56] De Vaux, Ancient Israel. Pp.131-142.
[57] I Samuel 11:8-12.
[58] . 1 Kgs 4:1–6
[59] 1 Kgs 4:1–6.
[60] 1Chronicles 28.
[61] 2Samuel 8:15-18.
[62] 1 Chronicles 27:1-
[63] Psalms2:1-12.
[64] Psalms 45:1-8.
[65] Psalms 110:1-6.
[66] Psalms 89:1-30.
[67] Psalms72:1-6.
[68] Wisdoms 1:1-.

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Shiite Studies in Israel
Challenges and Future Strategies for Security of Shiite Geoculture

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Abstract

In this paper the author has done research on the state of Shiite studies as an academic field of inquiry at Israeli universities. It is argued that Iran needs to take into consideration researches carried out by Israeli academics not solely for scientific significance of these research-findings but for geopolitical importance of these modes of researches-which could have impact upon geocultural strategies of Iran in the Shiite geostrategical cosmos. Of course, one needs to take into consideration multifarious factors which have impeded the institutionalization of academic fields of studies along these lines in Iranian universities both in terms of knowledge production and intelligence securitization.

Keywords: Israel, Shiism, Geopolitics, Geocultural Depth, Shiite Cosmos

Introduction

Political geography of broad areas of the Middle East, Western Asia, Central Asia, Caucasus, Great Eurasian Landmass and the Indian subcontinent is subject to enormous metamorphoses—the areas which have formerly been dominated by the Russian (the former Soviet Union), British, and the American empires respectively. In Order to understand these colossal transformations we would like to focus on the question of Shiism in this vast part of the world. Of course we should not disregard the current role of Turkey in the region which could be the focus of any study on Shiism too. The internal changes in Turkish Politics have regional and religious consequences which should be taken into serious consideration. For instance the Islamist party's coming to office based on the notions professed by Ahmet Davutoğlu who focused on jurisdiction and influence of the former territories of the Ottoman Empire rather than the European Union is of great significance in understanding the emerging geo-Culture of religious conflicts in this vast region. That is why *Shiism* is considered of paramount importance from historical, political, theological, and *kalam* aspects. Of course, this is essential to note that *theological* issues should not be taken to mean that they are important *per se* or their association with philosophy and mysticism is our sole preoccupation. Rather, the probable upcoming changes of landscapes that may happen as a result of Shiite theology are a moot point. The cause of such issues can be traced back to the converging power established by existing similarities among different sects. For instance, it was not before almost two years ago that academic institutions around the world drew upon the importance of northern Yemeni Zaidi Shiites as potent arms of the Iranian geopolitical policies (albeit, security theorists and experts were cognizant of this since years ago). Presently, however, there is a compelling convergence established by a group of elements and factors in terms of Shiite viewpoints, Zaidi Shiites, Twelver Shiites, Ismaili Shiites, and different cultural worlds such as Turkish Shiites, Iranian Shiites, Arabic Shiites, and Indo-Pakistani Shiites despite all standing disagreements one may discern among them as such. These have provoked Turks to assume a new approach to Shiite studies. On the other hand, Israel has a special concern as far as Shiism is concerned due to clear-cut reasons. The presence of Iran and Shiite groups in

Lebanon; current incidents in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Eastern Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, The Republic of Azerbaijan, southern Russia, northern Caucasus, and Georgia; and the presence of Shiites in Turkey, Central Asia, and northern Africa have changed the role of Shiism as being wrongly considered as an absolutely Iranian phenomenon. (Miri, 2013) Although Shiism and Iran were virtually interchangeable until almost two decades ago, today it seems that Shiism is not confined to the political borders of Iran. In fact, notwithstanding Shiism as a question has not yet become an international issue but it is impossible to disregard it as a constructive force in the world of Islam now. Noteworthy is the point that such regions as northern Yemen, areas in Iraq, Southern Shores of Mediterranean Sea, The Indian Subcontinent, etc., where today Shiism could be visibly seen have been part of the greater Iranian cultural Continent – and this geocultural depth allows Iran to play a vital role in her geocultural Spheres. (Miri, 2014) This has conferred a geopolitical dimension to the issues of *Iran* and *Shiism*. And, that is why Israel seems to devote significant attention to Shiite studies, not just as an academic question but as a matter of geopolitical significance.

It appears that Turks and Israelis have reached a convergence in their studies on issues related to Iraq and different streams among Iraqi Shiites. For instance, incidents that occurred in Shiite Iraq and Najaf— which led to a disagreement between Najaf Seminary and Qom Seminary in *kalam*, jurisprudence, governance, and politics—are of paramount importance for both Turks and Israelis, who have carried out in-depth studies on disagreements between Najaf and Qom Seminaries. This can make a significant impact on the future of Shiite authority in the Arab world, since Arabism, as a nationalistic ideology, possesses the capacity to challenge the idea of Shiite cosmopolitanism. This challenging issue has not yet been conceptualized by the geocultural architects of anti-systemic Bloc who are concerned about the future of "resistance" in the global senses of the term.

Israeli Studies of Shiism
The largest Shiite studies center was established in Israel around six years ago in 2009, which was given a small-scale attention by various

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Iranian media and news agencies. This, so to speak failed to provoke academics, who seemed unable to realize the significance of the establishment of such a center for the Iranian academic society, Iran's national interests, and geo-cultural and geopolitical approaches thereof.

According to my examinations, studies in this regard have been either non-existent very scarce or if there are any then they have been conducted confidentially or classified secretly. Of course, it should be noted that studies on Israeli issues may face systematic obstacles in Iran. Here there are numerous obstacles: Israelis easily enter Iran with Canadian, Irish, and other passports, which enable them to conduct fieldworks and whenever they talk about issues related to Iran, they do so based on solid evidence. A glance at their works (or publicly available analyses) in such diversified areas such as *kalam*, Sufi Orders, mystical sects in Shiism, etc., demonstrates their thorough investigations. For example, they have carried out studies on the disagreements among scholars, roots of such disputes, and their reciprocal impacts on the spheres of interests of Ulemas since 19th century on to the present time.

These issues may not appear as important by Iranian academics. Israelis, in contrast, have found that *spheres of influence* of a religious scholar are of great importance, as influence of an Iraq-based religious scholar may readily extend to Tanzania, Iran, Azerbaijan, and other regions of the world. Undoubtedly, these spheres generate financial resources, and Shiite authority networks can change the types of their activities in different modes and forms depending on distinct contexts of activities. In other words, financial networks are not solely limited to money transfer, but they will also change geo-cultural paradigms and impact on conceptual styles by transforming sociopolitical modalities in different geocultural contexts. For instance, a religious authority who deals with the African audience is obliged to take into account cultural delicacies of different African regions, just like the Shiite authority in Iran has made several adaptations with the Iranian cultural subtleties. A great number of challenges will definitely arise in case such subtleties are brushed aside. Israeli academics who understand the geo-strategical consequences of these delicate issues have focused on such delicacies

and conducted in-depth studies thereon that are inaccessible to Iranian researchers; if they are available at e-shops, they are not directly sent to Iran; and, if they are available as E-books in online databases, they are blocked and thus inaccessible for the Iranian scholars.

The position taken by Iran toward Israel is another obstacle in the way to carry out such studies. Visible here is a sort of Israel-phobia, whereby studies that refer to such topics are often dismissed as dealing with a very sensitive thus of security risk for those who dare to study these kinds of issues. Firm believers in the saying 'Don't make a rod for your own back,' many academics prefer to focus on other topics. This is, however, important both from academic and national-interest aspects, as well as geo-cultural and geopolitical ones, with obvious associations being rendered with studies on Shiism in the near future, since there are connections between Shiite movements and the incidents occurring in Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain, Turkey, Caucasus, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Russia, and, in the near future, eastern part of Saudi Arabia not mentioning Afghanistan, the subcontinent India, Africa and Southeast Asia (e.g. Malaysia and Indonesia). Israeli foreign policy makers and security designers make attempts to simulate, trying to discover areas of disagreements and also change them into conflicting currents. In fact, the ongoing transformations which are happening in the region can be either *for* or *against* Israel. For example, one could assume that DAESH is a Sunni group inspired by al-Qaeda's ideas, which is concocted by the US, British and Israeli intelligence services; but this is not the whole story due to the fact that there are other sociological aspects which have made the emergence of terrorist groups culturally possible in the world of Islam. In other words, if we don't take into consideration all factors then we may not be able to have a comprehensive picture before us. It seems that the establishment of a large center on Shiite studies could not only be explained by reference to academic concerns, since there are intimate relationships among academics and different ministries in all countries. Therefore, such centers are founded on political, security, geopolitical, and geo-cultural grounds aimed at operationalizing containment policies and limiting global capacities of the 'counter-hegemonic axis.'

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Semi-Eurocentric Structures of Iranian Academia

There are numerous internal impediments in Iran for the establishment of an academic climate which could operate sensitively to geocultural aspirations. There is, unhappily, a lack of deep thought on different issues in Iran among the geocultural scholars —the claim which is testified after a glance at structure of major universities in Iran. There have, conventionally, been some scholars who undertake to establish in the Iranian universities new disciplines in which they are beforehand graduated from US, French, German, British, and other universities around the globe. Obviously, needs of the Iranian society and its civilizational scopes are not taken into consideration in the slightest degree, with possible impacts and threats of the new disciplines being hardly regarded at all. Therefore, the discipline of *Israeli studies* would be introduced into and copied by the Iranian universities only when it is already presented by other universities in the western world. This would be beyond exaggeration to indicate that Iranian humanities are a product of a wide-scope translation project, in which little creativity is lodged. Many years ago when I wished to continue my studies in the discipline of *Religious Studies* in Sweden, the registrar said that acquisition of a classical language is a pre-requirement for me as each religion is associated with a classical language.

To study the discipline of *Religious Studies*, thus, one must learn Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit, Avesta, ancient Greek, Pali, or any other classical languages. Iranian universities, in reality, lack such a structure in their human sciences. Now and then it is argued that Iranian humanities are westernized and west-oriented, if this was the case then students were taught to think about different issues in serious fashions. On the contrary the project of humanities is based on translations and this would make a serious engagement next to impossible. Needless to argue that an examination of Judaism needs a full mastery over Hebrew or Aramaic languages as without such a mastery we will not be able to anticipate geopolitical aspiration of Israeli geostrategists. In other words, we have only applied a caricature of the West in our academic communities. On the other hand, Iranian researchers confront a strict inaccessibility to resources, where internet censorship has confined the areas on which we can carry out studies. Under such circumstances,

researchers grow inclined to draw upon quick-return issues on which there are no steadfast problems. Simply put, large-scale geo-cultural theories cannot be generated in Iran, and this is to argue that if this problem is not rectified fundamentally then the military-intelligence strategies are doomed to failure as these strategies need to be founded upon sound geocultural visions. In other words, the 'hardware' advances in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen cannot be sustained if we do not institutionalize them through sound geocultural policies and strategies.

Bahai Vision of the World and Israelite Approaches to Shiism

Euro-centrism is not just an idea, but it has turned into a 'mental state' and a 'social form of reality'. This lookout serves as a barrier toward creation of academic creativities. In Iran, it is not easy to study the forms of mentalities held by Israeli security/geo-political architects due to imposed restrictions on academic activities in various different forms. A very interesting point I have found in my studies is that there seems to be a close relationship among scholars at Tel Aviv University, Israel-based Moshe Dayan Center, and some other research institutes, to Baha'ism. In the face of it, this is clear enough as Baha'is are living in Israel so a relationship between them should not come as a surprise. This is, however, noteworthy that they have conducted the best academic studies on Shiism, as they had to refer to the history of Shiism and its evolution and transformation in order to provide evidence for their religious claims and the construction of their distinct theological identity. In academic areas, we need to produce a separated field for investigation of this phenomenon, as it makes a direct impact on the competition of Shiite 'geo-culture,' as a cosmopolitan idea, and 'Baha'ism,' as the competing cosmopolitan idea, in the regions which are not within the borders of Islamicate Societies such as Scandinavia, the North Pole, Siberian regions of Russia, Latin America, and parts of Africa and Americas.

Political Theology and the Possibility of Shiite Zionism

Currently, Political Theology constitutes one of the fields of *kalam* that deals with religious ideas which have strong bearings on political issues and is not confined to conventional theological concerns. Political

theology works on problematiques which may emerge in the context of religious politics and could possibly influence our understanding as far as the events in the world of Shiism is concerned.

Just half a century ago, those who would express that a movement called Christian Zionism would be generated in scientific or political literatures could be ridiculed, since a conglomeration of Christianity and Zionism was perceived as impossible Experts would argue that there were fundamental disputes between Christians and Jews, and vice versa. How could there be rapprochement between Christians and Jews, particularly those radical ones known as Zionists? However it is undeniable that between these two seemingly different groups one cannot only discern 'theological coalition' but also 'geopolitical cooperation' which transformed the American foreign policy for more than 8 years during the Bush-administration. The consequences of theo-politics are visible at a global level today. For instance Benjamin Netanyahu's intentions to influence the US Congress should not solely be analyzed on political grounds. On the contrary, the politics of Zionist right-wings in Israel could only be understood if we take into consideration the theological foundations which made possible the birth of a postmodern geopolitical coalition between Zionists and right-wing Christians in US.
In other words is it possible to conceptualize forms of alliances between certain groups of Shias and Zionist Jews in terms of Shiite Zionism? To put it otherwise, how can one relate Zionist ideas to some Shiite groups or trends? Isn't this concept an oxymoron?

Back to the Zionist Christian issue; what are the factors wielding such a convergence? One of the reasons may be traced back to Christians' belief in return of the Messiah. They believe that Jesus Christ can only come back when certain events occur in Jerusalem. Zionists' actions, according to their beliefs, accelerate such events. To accelerate this process, thus, there should be a convergence between Christians and Zionists in various regards including financial aspects. But, what is the relationship between this belief and the Shiite world[1]? Are there any grounds for such events among Shiites? In other words, can the Shiite world have the potential to give birth to such beliefs? A glance at the

contemporary Shiite world demonstrates that whenever the Islamic world has been in a weak position, imperialist geo-cultural architects have embarked on establishment of 'parallel pseudo-religious streams' among Muslims. Wahhabism, Qadianism, and Baha'ism are just a few instances of such so-called religious isms. Simply put, some of such ways of thinking are also witnessed in Iran and popular among certain groups of Shias; many believe that the *promised redeemer* would not arrive before some special incidents such as worldwide corruption, inefficiency, and injustice are materialized. Consequently, if such crises are allowed to happen, the coming of Messiah would be facilitated. The Hojjatiyeh school of thought, specifically those ideas promoted by Ayatullah Halabi, is a classical representative of this line of thought on Messianism. Once this kind of interpretation is allowed to enter into political stage, this ideology shall found theological as well as political bases of a deviant ideology which one may term as, Shiite Zionism, at national, regional, and global levels. In other words, when relationships among theological beliefs and political currents are established, dialectical impacts are brought into existence, which deserve to be given thorough examinations. Undeniably, Israeli academicians have conducted in-depth studies on such simulations, performing parallel projects on the 'axis of resistance' and its geopolitical spheres of influence.

Bahai Historiography, Shiite Zionism and Zionist Academia
To talk about Shiite Zionism is not an easy task as this may suggest that we are trying to construct a fake concept. By this concept we mean certain tendencies among Shiite intellectuals who seem to favor theological orientations which are compatible with political aspirations of Zionist architects of Israeli foreign policy in issues of security, geopolitics and geoculture. Of course, I would like to suggest another important factor which plays a significant role in the constitution of Shiite Zionism, i.e. the element of Baha'ism in American universities – which seem to establish a latent connection between Baha'i historiography of Shiism and Zionist aspirations in security matters. For each of these elements, I have chosen few scholars who should not be treated as *individual academics* but types of scholarships – which have made up the backbones of Israeli scholarship on Shiism. I have

taken Fouad Ajami as an interesting type for a Shiite-Zionist modality. Abbas Amanat as an interesting type for Bahai historiography in relation to Shiite Zionism and six Israeli academics who have been actively working on Shiism and its futuristic trajectories in terms of geopolitics, geoculture, security studies and the new worlds or order in the Heartland of the greater Shiite world which goes beyond the political borders of Iran.

Fouad Ajami

He was a MacArthur Fellowship winning, Lebanese-born of Shiite Muslim ancestry American university professor and writer on Middle Eastern issues. He was a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

Ajami was born in Arnoun, a rocky hamlet in the south of Lebanon. His Shiite family had come to Arnoun from Tabriz, Iran in the 1850s. In Arabic, the word 'Ajami' means 'non-Arab'; or 'non-Arabic-speaker', specifically 'Persian', 'Persian speaker.' In 'The Fate of Nonalignment,' an essay in the Winter 1980/81 issue of the journal *Foreign Affairs*, Ajami outlined how the Third world has fared in a context of nonalignment in post Cold war politics. In 1980, he accepted an offer from Johns Hopkins University to become director of Middle East Studies at their international relations graduate program in Washington, D.C.: the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He held an endowed chair as the Majid Khadduri professor. A year after arriving at SAIS, Ajami published his first book, The Arab Predicament, which analyzed what Ajami described as an intellectual and political crisis that swept the Arab world following its defeat by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War. Subsequently, Ajami has written several other books: The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey (1998), Beirut: City of Regrets (1988), and The Vanished Imam: Musa Al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (1986). In The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey, Ajami surveyed the intellectual landscape in the Arab world and Iran, in what was in some ways an autobiography as well as a sequel to "The Arab Predicament." (1992) On Middle Eastern politics, he wrote of "a world where triumph rarely comes with mercy or moderation." On Pan-

Arabism, he described the ideology as "Sunni dominion dressed in secular garb".The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, The Arabs and The Iraqis in Iraq (2006), is about the American invasion of Iraq.

He is one of the first Lebanese Shiite Zionists and master of many Shiism experts who presently assume important seats at the Israeli universities on the Shiite studies. Fouad Ajami can be regarded as one of the architects of Shiite Zionism.

Abbas Amanat
Working currently at the Harvard University, Abbas Amanat is one of the greatest Iranian experts on Shiism. He has played a key role in establishment and organization of new Shiism studies centers particularly at the Tel Aviv University as the largest Shiism studies center in Israel.

He received his B.A. from Tehran University in 1971 and D.Phil. from Oxford University in 1981. His principal publications include Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shiism (2009). I see in his intellectual biography a trend by which the rise of Baha'ism is rendered as a logical continuation of apocalyptic Shiism, on the one hand, and a geopolitical marriage of Baha'ism and Zionism, on the other hand. This is to argue that Amanat is not only a researcher but he exemplifies a security-inspired research programme- which is of great significance in Israeli academia. In other words, he is a connecting ring of the Harvard University and Shiism studies in Israel. He is a classical paradigm which should be studied carefully by critical students of security studies, Shiite studies and future studies of geoculture in Iran. (Amanat, 2005)

Martin Seth Kramer
Kramer is one of the experts on Shiism who has carried out sophisticated studies on security issues in its geopolitical dimensions associated with the Shiite world, especially Iran and its impacts on Israel's interests of formation of Shiite groups in the region. As an Israeli mastermind, Kramer was a student and coworker of Fouad Ajami.

He is an American-Israeli scholar of the Middle East at Shalem College in Jerusalem. His focus is on Islam and Arab politics. Kramer began his undergraduate degree under Itamar Rabinovich in Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University and completed his B.A. in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University. He earned his Ph.D. at Princeton as well, under Fouad Ajami, L. Carl Brown, Charles Issawi, and Bernard Lewis, who directed his thesis. He also received a History M.A. from Columbia University

Martin Kramer is the President of Shalem College in Jerusalem. During a 25-year career at Tel Aviv University, Kramer directed the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies; taught as a visiting professor at Brandeis University, the University of Chicago, Cornell University, Georgetown University, and Johns Hopkins University. He has served as a visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Harvard University's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. He is a past editor of the Middle East Forum's Middle East Quarterly. He is also an architect of new Middle Eastern studies. In his latest capacity as an architect of the new Middle East, Kramer has been trying to convince the architects of Israeli foreign policy to get closer to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf countries against Iran. Because he believes firmly in the possibility of sectarian conflicts as preemptive weapon against Iran which could safeguard the security of Israel for time to come. (Kramer, 1980; 1985; 1987; 1991; 1999; 2001, 2003; 2004)

Elisheva Machlis
Elisheva Machlis has a PhD from the University of Cambridge and an MA from Tel Aviv University. She recently concluded a two-year post-doctoral fellowship in the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. During her fellowship, she studied the modern trends within Shi'i thought beginning in the first half of the twentieth century, looking into the unique scholarship produced in the Shi'i Arab world and its relationship with Islamic revolutionary thought in Iran. She has also researched general trends within modern Islamic thought and the

relationship between globalization and culture in the contemporary Muslim world.

Machlis is chiefly concerned with the idea of *Shiite Protestantism*. How social networks and media are able to produce the required capacities? In other words, she is one of the leading scholars who are concerned with the idea of 'geocultural containment' of Iran in the Arab world, in general, and the 'Shiite World' in particular. (Machlis, 2009)

Meir Litvak
Litvak is an interesting case to be studied as he is concerned with the Shiite revolutionary thought and the idea of revolution among Palestinians. As suggested by Litvak, who is one of the prominent students of Abbas Amanat, contemporary history of Shiite thought is deeply entangled with the Palestine issue and anti-Zionism currents. In other words, military and intelligence mechanisms are inadequate to fight against Iran, for which 'soft' geo-cultural instruments should be employed for containment purposes. Litvak's scientific biography can be a good contribution for us to understand geo-scientific strategies adopted by Israel against Shiism.

Litvak organized a joint conference on 'Shiism: Theology, Law and Culture' in June 2010 on behalf of the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University's Nehemia Levtzion Center, where he presented a paper on 'The Freedom Debate in Iran: from Khomeini to Khatami'.

He delivered a paper, 'Iranian anti-Semitism: Continuities and Changes,' at a conference on 'Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity' held by the Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism in August 2010.

Litvak is a second-year recipient of a research grant from the Israel Science Foundation for his on-going research on 'Isfahan and Mashhad: From Reza Shah to Mossaddeq, 1921-1953'. He also participated in a simulation exercise organized by Tel Aviv University, 'The Middle East: A Strategic-Operative Game of Roles,' where he

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played the role of Iran's president Ahmadinejad (May 2010). By looking at his scientific trajectories it is possible to assume that he is one of the most instrumental 'academic informants' at Israeli university context –where issues and concerns of 'intelligence' and 'knowledge' come across each other within the paradigm of security strategies. (Litvak, 1998; 2005; 2006; 2013; 2014) In other words, we need to study the connections between 'intelligence' and 'academic knowledge' on Shiism at Israeli universities as a geopolitically significant field of inquiry.

Brandon Friedman

Friedman believes that the best uses should be made of the 'Iranophobia' leverage as well as contemporary and historical anti-Iranian sentiments to prevent an Iranian and Shiite groups' infiltration into the region. For instance, cultural elements, which have given rise to a Persian/Arabian Gulf naming dispute, are able to promote Israel's objectives and Zionism's geo-cultural strategies within the Islamicate world.

Brandon Friedman is a research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is also the managing editor of the Dayan Center's journal, Bustan: The Middle East Book Review.

Brandon works on the political history of the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula. His PhD focused on the political relations between the rulers of the Persian Gulf littoral during the period of British military withdrawal from the region (1968 to 1971). Brandon also researches and writes about the nexus between strategy, nuclear proliferation, and deterrence in the Middle East.

Brandon delivered a public lecture entitled 'Muscle Flexing, Quiet Diplomacy, and Iran's Nuclear Program,' at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on 27 February 2012.

He was also a participant and discussant in the 2012 Herzliya Conference, Round Table Session: "Strategy and Deterrence in the Arab and Muslim World," at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya on 1 February 2012. In brief one could argue that he is one of the great masterminds behind the 'strategy of Iranophobia' in the Arab World- which has enabled Israel to come closer to the Arab World- and acuquire a better image among the Arab public opinions. (Friedman, 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b)

Rachel Kantz Feder
Rachel Kantz Feder, MA (Tel Aviv University), is a researcher at Tel Aviv University's Graduate School of History in Middle Eastern and African Studies.

Rachel Kantz Feder delivered a lecture, "Shi'is as a Factor in the Construction of Peace and State-building in post-Saddam Iraq: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Trends and Forces," in November 2010 at an international conference, Peace Operations and State Building: International Initiatives and Local Perceptions and Responses, convened by Sciences-Po and Tel Aviv University. Throughout 2010 she presented papers on various aspects of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's intellectual and political activism in Iraq. She delivered lectures at the international conference, Where   are   the Intellectuals?

Culture Identity   and   Community in   the   Modern Middle   East, convened by the Center for Advanced Studies of the Arab World, the University of Edinburgh, Scotland; at the international conference, The Shi'a: Theology, Law and Culture, convened by the Center for Iranian Studies of Tel Aviv University and The Nehemia Levtzion Center for Islamic Studies of Hebrew University, and at the 34th annual conference of Middle East & Islamic Studies Association of Israel.

She well knows that the Shiite thought is the only factor in organization of Iraq and Levant as the root of this governance-building aspiration is the paradigm created by 'political Islam' that has a visible interrelationship with Iran. The nodal-point in Feder's studies is identification of civilization-making elements of Shiism and Islamism,

since any trend toward institution-building within the Islamic world would pose a great geopolitical hazard for Israel. (Feder, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014)

Micha'el Tanchum

Tanchum (Ph.d. Harvard) is a fellow at the Hebrew University's Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace where he was awarded a grant for the completion of his book on Islamist movements and their effects on the democratic development of five of the largest Muslim-majority societies in the world: Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, and Turkey. Tanchum's article 'The Constitutional Consequences of the Failure of Intra-Religious Accommodation in Pakistan: Implications for Religious Liberty in a Religious Nationalist State' appears in the Journal of Law, Religion, and State 2:1 (May, 2013). He has also contributed a chapter to the book The Nation State and Religion: The Resurgence of Faith (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2013) entitled 'Sunni Sectarian Agitation as Means of Contesting the Nation-State in Pakistan: Implications for Islam and Liberal Democracy.' His chapter 'On the Legal and Constitutional Establishment of Islamist Extremism in Indonesia: Implications for Human Rights and Civil Society in Emerging Muslim Democracies,' appeared in a book on Religion and Human Rights in late 2013. Other articles by Tanchum include: 'Al-Qa'ida's West African Advance: Nigeria's Boko Haram, Mali's Touareg, and the Spread of Salafi Jihadism,' Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs VI:2 (May 2012) and 'Al-Qa'ida's New West African Map: Ancar Dine, Boko Haram and Jihadism in the Trans-Sahara,' Tel Aviv Notes, Vol 6., No. 3, (2012). Tanchum also teaches about Islam, law, and state in the Middle East and Asia at the Tel Aviv University School of Law.

His main concern is "mysticism in the Islamic world." If Israeli academic studies could discover ways to penetrate into Sufi orders or even create semi-orders in the Muslim World, then geo-cultural capacities of Islamic mysticism would be employed against itself. The rise of "Dubious Mystic Groups" is one of the fruits of such studies that is at the service of Israeli intelligence agencies- and the Tanchumian

model plays a vital role in counter- intelligence activities against the geocultural possibilities of Irfan at a global level. (Tanchum, 2014)

Conclusion

What was put forward in this article was not a finished project; rather, it is an attempt to bring up discussions which could be analyzed by research centers and universities. In other words, we cannot resolve disagreements between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah or it could not be argued that whether their disagreements are of political or ideological/theological nature. Similarities and differences in viewpoints held by Imam Musa Sadr and Imam Khomeini as well as those by Javad Mughniyeh, as a theologically-oriented philosopher, and the differences between him and Imam Musa Sadr constitute a building block in Martin Kramer's arguments and it should be realized that these issues have not only academic significance in Israel but they occupy geopolitical importance for Israeli Strategists. In other words, it is important to note that these kinds of issues examined in Israel are not exclusively academic, rather they have different geopolitical, theopolitical and geocultural aspects that are employed by Israelis in their simulations and examinations aimed at investigating their impacts on their own interests and the interests of their regional rivals and enemies.

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The Spectacle of Terror in the French Republic: Competing Performances

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Abstract

This article argues that the radical attack on Charlie Hebdo meant to execute a memorable "performance of terror" and deliver a strong message to the Judeo-Christian Western world. The attackers, who chose martyrdom for their grand finale, had no interest in drawing attention to the chronic national crisis of French Muslims, the latter who have yet to be integrated as French citizens with equal rights and equal responsibilities. Instead, the attackers understood their own struggle in global and religious terms, a clash of civilizations and a war between good and evil. This performance of radical terror, however, was just one show among many. Like the French Muslim jihadists, Charlie Hebdo, the French political establishment, and several international state representatives have created the illusion of an existential clash between free speech and barbarism, secularism and radical religion, good and evil, Islam and the West. Their grandiose performances of terror erase French Muslims and, for years to come, will undermine their struggle against countless forms of formal discriminatory policies and practices. Caught between

competing performances of terror, the most marginalized sectors of the French society will continue to suffer in silence.

Keywords: Freedom of Speech, laïcité, Performance of Terror, Clash of Civilizations, Intellectuals.

1. Introduction

Major news anchors reported the action second by second. They replayed video footage of two hooded gunmen executing a French police officer followed by reports of other connected attacks and images of deployed French counter-terrorism units. The unfolding drama quickly created an atmosphere of panic, even in places far away from where the incident of Charlie Hebdo took place. The sequence of events also gave birth to a global support movement. Among the vast crowds coming out in French cities, over 40 international state high officials marched alongside President François Hollande ostensibly to defend freedom of speech, express their unity in the fight against Islamic radicalism and demonstrate readiness to crack down on global Jihad. This fast-paced sequence of events left little room for reason or reflective thinking in France and other locations in Europe.

Emotions, understandably, were riding high. After all, the hideous attacks sought more than just reaping the lives of the cartoonists for lampooning Islam, mocking its symbols, and ridiculing its followers. The attacks on Charlie Hebdo meant to execute a memorable "performance of terror." The objective was to send a strong message to the French Republic and the rest of the Judeo-Christian Western world. The attackers, who chose martyrdom for their grand finale, had no interest in drawing attention to the chronic national crisis of French Muslims who struggle to be seen and heard. France has yet to integrate them as citizens with equal rights and equal responsibilities. Instead, the attackers understood their own struggle in global and religious terms, a clash of civilizations and a war between good and evil. Their grandiose performance of terror obscured French Muslims and, for years to come, will undermine their struggle against countless forms of formal discriminatory policies and practices.

2. Core Claims

This performance of radical terror, however, was just one show among many. The latest ones veil their cruelty under marketable names: freedom of speech, counter terrorism, and global security. The other performances, which contribute to the systematic marginalization of the arguably most vulnerable ethno-religious group in French society, are rarely formally acknowledged as such. And although many of these performances took place on the French national stage, the involved parties seem determined to frame what was happening in the context of the global war on terror as if the agreed upon policy is to use the tragic incidents to increase authoritarian state powers, relieve the establishment from accountability, perpetuate the status quo, and strip French Muslims of their right to exist even as a minoritized community. Like the jihadists, I further contend, Charlie Hebdo, the French political establishment, and several heads of state have created the illusion of an existential clash between free speech and barbarism, secularism and radical religion, good and evil, Islam and the West. Caught between competing performances of terror, the most marginalized sectors of the French society will continue to suffer silently.

2.1. Charlie Hebdo: False Prophets

Charlie Hebdo became the bastion of French liberty and *the* symbol of freedom of speech immediately after the January 2015 attacks. The history of the magazine, however, underscores the complexity of the French situation. It points to a sophisticated breed of state hypocrisy and it therefore raises legitimate questions about the limits of freedom of speech. Founded in 1969, the magazine was called Hara-Kiri Hebdo. In the following year, it faced a serious challenge from the French political establishment for ridiculing the deceased former French President Charles de Gaulle. "The country's interior minister," writes Oliver Duggan, "swiftly banned Hara-Kiri Hebdo, forcing the group to change their name."[1] Failing to attract enough readers to cover its operational expenses, the magazine closed its doors from 1981 to 1991. Since 1991, the magazine gradually has focused its satire on the trouble with Islam and the related objection to freedom of speech; consequently, it "tripled its usual sales and the politicians whose predecessors had once forced Hebdo to close came rushing to its

defence." [2] This newly-found appeal among French politicians, including President François Hollande, possibly has to do with the French hyper-anxiety over, and institutionalized prejudice towards, French Muslims and visible signs of religiosity among French Catholics and Jews. The magazine has been in harmony with the political establishment on the issues of laïcité or French secularism and the discourse of respectable racism or the set of commonplace racist policies and practices seen as politically correct as long as they are directed at French Muslims. However, to evade charges of racial and religious vilifications of French Muslims, the magazine has constantly argued for its professional and constitutional right to ridicule the worldwide phenomenon of Islamic extremism.

Read in the context of formal French hostility towards French Muslims of North African descent, the magazine's satirical representations of Islam, however, not only infringe on their religious and cultural character, but they also veil the harsh realities under which French Muslims live. After all, satirical representations operate within the national domain. They are influenced by, and inform, the general public mood. Satirical art does not operate in a vacuum. On this ground, satirical art is a powerful tool of critique, *if* used ethically. An intellectual, the artist has a moral obligation and especially so in locales where prejudice and racism penetrate the institutional, societal, and moral fabrics of one's nation. This obligation, according to the late Edward Said, "is not to consolidate authority, but to understand, interpret, and question it." To Said, "the intellectual vocation essentially is somehow to alleviate human suffering and not to celebrate what in effect does not need celebrating, whether that's the state or the patria or any of these basically triumphalist agents in . . . society."[3]

Artists who do not speak truth to power and do not help set the record straight by pushing normative boundaries to a point of break are fake intellectuals. Artists, satirists, academics, and other intellectuals are "individuals with a vocation for the art of representing" (Said 13);[4] however, they are "*of* their time, herded along by the mass politics" (21).[5] But they are "capable of resisting those [representations] only by

disputing the . . . trends of thought that maintain the status quo." Intellectuals ought to speak *to*, but not *for*, power. To destabilize normalized images and to disrupt dominant narratives, intellectuals must advance "alternative versions in which, to the best of one's ability, the intellectual tries to tell the truth" (Said 22).[6] To fulfill these expectations, intellectuals ought to give voice to the voiceless, the oppressed, and the persecuted, those who are silenced by the might of the sword or the belligerence of the word. These are not romantic ideals.

Indeed, there are responsible intellectuals who question the status quo especially when voices for reason and justice are hushed. The accomplished graphic artist Joe Sacco engaged with the Charlie Hebdo incident in the form of satirical cartoon. In his response, Sacco exposes the limits of freedom of speech and draws attention to the responsibility of the artist—a responsibility to contextualize and historicize his narrative. Sacco interrogates the romanticized status official France bestowed upon Charlie Hebdo. "Though tweaking the noses of Muslims might be as permissible as it is now believed to be dangerous," Sacco writes, "it has never struck me as anything other than a vapid way to use the pen."[7] Sacco objects to Charlie Hebdo arguing for an absolute freedom of speech to vilify the marginalized while ironically dismissing "a cartoonist—Maurice Sinet . . . –-for allegedly writing anti-Semitic column." Standing against this hypocritically oppressive artistic philosophy, Sacco reminds his fellow journalists and artists that absolute freedom of expression is a myth. This myth is as problematic as lampooning Muslims on the ground of tectonic contemporary conditions shaped by Western imperialism and state-organized terror. Indeed, context and historical facts seem to have no currency for Charlie Hebdo. Satirical art communicates serious messages about real life people and their everyday challenges. It is by default political. Artists who cannot recognize that "lines on paper are a weapon" are false prophets. They produce *performances of terror*. Like sharp knives, their oppressive representations unremorsefully cut the throats of those who dwell in the margins. It is a given that "satire is meant to cut to the bone. But whose bone? What exactly is the target? And why?"[8] These ethical questions, sadly, carry no weight for Charlie Hebdo and other mainstream French artists.

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2.2 The French Establishment: A Home-made Terror

Likewise, these questions have no currency for the French government. The French political establishment conveniently took the attacks to be acts of global jihadi terror directed at the French freedom of speech. Not only did the political establishment willfully ignore the French nationality of the attackers, but it also went to reassert the sacred French tradition of free speech by embracing the "Je Suis Charlie" slogan. Instead of the pre-attack standard circulation of about 60,000 copies, the government aided in the printing of five million copies of the first issue of Charlie Hebdo after the attacks. In fact, the "magazine's distributors said its print run had been lifted to 7 million copies."[9] President Hollande, a strong believer in the French concept of freedom of speech, thinks it is "the [French] culture [of secularism] that the terrorists want to put an end to because it is insolent, because it is disrespectful, because it is free, it's human."[10] In this imagined cultural clash, a civilized secular "us" versus barbaric religious "them" dichotomy, Hollande believes, more secular satire will combat jihadist Islam. Therefore, the first post-attack issue of the magazine stayed faithful to the tradition of satirizing Islam. The published issue featured the Prophet on its cover. In a sense, the French establishment has decided to combat terror with terror and violence with violence.

As expected, the new issue drew violent protesters out on the streets in some Muslim countries. In response to the demonstrations outside France, Hollande expressed his dismay at the protesters for failing to understand the importance of freedom of speech for the French Republic: "There are tensions abroad where people don't understand our attachment to the freedom of speech. . . . We've seen the protests, and I would say that in France all beliefs are respected." To tell the truth, Hollande should have said, "all beliefs are" *respected as long as they confine themselves to the private domain until the believers eventually disappear or seek radicalism somewhere else because the Republic, overtaken by ultranationalists, does not want them*. Hollande zealously sanctifies secular French values especially freedom of speech—or the right of the state and its apparatuses to terrorize marginalized segments of the French society—, yet he does not recognize religious beliefs and immigrant cultural identities as worthy

of mutual respect. It seems like there are superior secular and inferior religious values. Alluding to the angry protests in Niger, Algeria, and Pakistan, Hollande asserts that France "supported these countries in the fight against terrorism" and "I still want to express my solidarity" towards these countries, "but at the same time France has principles and values, in particular freedom of expression."[11]

Instead of taking some responsibility for the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, the French political establishment continues to pin what happened on global terrorism, thus erasing the Frenchness of the jihadis. It willfully ignores the horrors Western, including French, colonialisms have brought upon countries like Niger, Congo, Algeria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. In fact, colonial burden is not a mere matter of historical heritage. Since 2003, France has aligned itself with the U.S.-led war on terror. France has been militarily involved in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. However, the radicalized French Algerian attackers, says Tariq Ali, "were a pure product of French society. Unemployed, long-haired, into drugs, alienated till they saw footage of US torture and killings in Iraq."[12] The attacks point to a home-made French problem. Contemporary economic, societal, cultural, and political harsh realities indeed increase the rift between French Muslims and the French establishment. According to Vaiju Naravane, French suburbs are scarred by "desolation, deprivation, violence, and poverty." In these centers of collective misery, "[y]outh unemployment is over 40 percent, four times the national average; the school dropout rate as high as 36 percent. A majority of France's six million Muslims live in the suburbs, the rich, inner-city neighborhoods of large towns being beyond their reach." These impoverished French Muslims are "North African Arab or Blacks from France's former colonies, and they live jammed together, isolated and cut off from the rest of the country," Naravane writes.[13] It should not be a surprise that living under such abject circumstances could direct certain French Muslim youth towards jihadi terrorism.

After all, these French suburbs, according to author and film maker Mehdi Lalloui, are populated by the wretched of the earth. They "have been marked by racism and condescension born out of colonial

superiority." Speaking to Naravane, Lalloui shares his own experience in one of France's deprived suburbs:

> My parents are Algerian and my father came here to work in the factories around Paris. When I was growing up, my teachers said: you are not apt to go to university. You will train as an electrician. And that's what I did. But later, on my own, I went to university, became an author and filmmaker. The ambitions of several kids in the banlieus are crushed this way. Many fail because the French system tries to fit them into a mould—culturally, intellectually and even politically. They fail, become dropouts and are then tempted by organised crime and the ideology of radical Islam that appears to give them a purpose in life. Those who succeed academically get away from these ghettos as soon as possible. So these areas go from bad to worse where the state is completely absent and where policemen dare not enter. [14]

Dynamics of the exclusion and othering of French Muslims are evident in the statement. Sadly, these serious issues have been constantly pushed under the rug. They will be further "pushed beneath the carpet so long as life in the rest of the country can continue unaffected," says sociologist Annie Faure.[15] There is neither the economic capability nor the political will to treat the festering problem of the French suburbs. Even the tragedy of Charlie Hebdo which should have been an opportunity for the political establishment to unite the nation and re-imagine a France inclusive of all its citizens was sadly instead turned into an international publicity fare—a sickening political farce.

2.3 International Heads of State: State-sponsored Terror
The third performance of terror materialized on January 11, 2015: In Paris, numerous world leaders marched with President Hollande in solidarity. Their message was to express support for freedom of speech, denounce terrorism, and stand in unity with France against global terror. Among these state officials was the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, British Prime Minister David Cameron, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Bahraini Foreign Minister Khaled Bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, Gabon President Ali Bongo Ondimba, King Abdullah of Jordan, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Turkish Prime

Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and the U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder. These alleged supporters of freedom of speech have in fact suppressed free speech, persecuted journalists, and shut down media outlets in stark violation of the freedom of the press. Outraged by the hypocrisy "of leaders from countries where journalists and bloggers are systematically persecuted," Reporters Without Borders issued a formal statement to denounce the "presence of [these] 'predators' in [the] Paris march."[16]

Indeed, hypocrisy, violence, and opportunism are common characteristics the present leaders and state representatives share. For example, the Israeli acts of terror in the Gaza Strip last year took the lives of seven Palestinian journalists.[17] In Israel, liberal journalists like Gideon Livy found it difficult to freely express their opinions, especially during Operation Protective Edge. In fact, Livy had to hire bodyguards after death threats were made on his life from Israeli ultranationalists. Hoping to attract the votes of more Israelis, including ultranationalists, Prime Minister Netanyahu joined the Paris Charlie Hebdo March although the French government advised against it.[18] His presence was opportunistic and his case was by no means exceptional. Jeremy Scahill is, therefore, right to call the display of world leaders a "circus of hypocrisy" because "[e]very single one of those heads of state or representatives of governments there have waged their own wars against journalists."[19] Although the display of these actors of state-sponsored terror was an insult to the pure concept of freedom of speech, their presence in Paris posed a more serious problem. Their presence internationalized a home-made French problem. Therefore, it absolved the French political establishment of any responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo tragic event, aided in its effort to silence French Muslims, and created the illusion of a clash of civilizations.

3. Conclusion
So far, opportunistic ultranationalists, both religious and secular, have used the Charlie Hebdo tragedy to advance their agendas or pursue short-sighted objectives. To serve their interests, they have all performed acts of terror. According to their deformed worldviews, there is room on the stage of history for *only* one actor. All

manifestations of unsanctioned difference must be forced into unconditional submission. Yet, each player righteously claims moral superiority. Caught between state-sponsored and rogue performances of terror, French Muslims, among other minoritized sectors of the French society, will continue to suffer in silence until the rogue currents dissipate and the so-called clash of civilizations loses its purchase power. To speed up the process, intellectuals should condemn all performances of terror, including those executed by the state and its apparatuses. Intellectuals ought to speak to, but not for, power.

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Islamism vs Post-Islamism

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Abstract

In this article the author has looked at the question of Gulen Movement in Azerbaijan. It is argued that the dynamism of Shiism has disabled the advancement of Gulen Movement in despite of linguistic similarities between Turkey and Azerbaijan. It seems Shiites in this Caucasian republic prefer the traditional religious ties with Iran and these historical ties have worked against the missionary activities of proponents of Gulen Movement. In other words, when assessing geopolitical affiliations one should not forget denominational backgrounds as they count as much as other indices in calculating the dynamism of political changes.

Keywords: Islamism, Gulen Movement, Shiism, Sunnism, Post-Islamism

Introduction

After becoming independent in 1991 post-Soviet Azerbaijan has been passing through the process of Islamic revival, which featured domestically grown as well as imported Islamic activism. About 99.2%

of the population of Azerbaijan is nominally Muslim (Pew Research Center 2009). The Muslim population is structured into the 70% Shia and 30% Sunni, according to the official sources and the US Department of State reports (Religious Freedom Report 2009); or the 85% Shia and 15% Sunni according to the Pew Research Center (2009). Shias are adherents of orthodox *Ithna Ashari*, i.e. the Twelve Imam school of Shia Islam. Traditionally, villages around the Baku, Lankaran and Nakhchivan regions are strongholds of Shiism.

From the first years of independence with the majority of ethnically Shia population Azerbaijan became the subject to Iranian religious influence through both formal (state-run) and informal channels, which applied purely Islamist agenda, always under suspicion of the Azerbaijani authorities. A Turkish network of Gülen has been another active actor. However, the movement promoted its ideology rather as a secondary background factor hidden by the façade of secular educational, media, social and business institutions.

Thus the controversies of this social movement/network raised lots of questions like what it is that makes Gülen Movement in the region so different from the other locally operating pro-Iranian Islamic movements?

In this regard a social movement theory approach may help us explore how the movement trying to utilize the limited opportunity spaces in the country with underdeveloped democratic institutions and political culture and integrate into the local rules of the game as compared to more direct, purely Islamist approach of pro-Iranian Shia movements from the Islamism vs. Post-Islamism perspective.

Theoretical framework: Islamism vs. post-Islamism
According to Olivier Roy Islamism is a revolutionary ideology of bringing about a change from above through the establishment of an Islamic state (Roy 2004). Islamism is about Islamic revival and search for the explicitly Islamic answer to the challenges of the modernity and the crises of the Muslim nations. This is mostly possible through

establishing (or reviving) some kind of Islamic state and introduction of Islamic law.

According to Tibi (2008) there is institutional and militant Islamism. The former is a category that primarily applies democratic means for the Islamist ends, while the latter is contrarily opts for military means and uses terror in its repertoire of contention. Sometimes though these two may go along together or substitute one another at certain periods of time (e.g. Hamas movement in Palestine, Hizbullah in Lebanon, etc.)

Thus Islamism is about creating an Islamic order, Islamization of public institutions and social structure. The term has created a lot of confusion and ambiguity, giving birth to a new trend – 'post-Islamism'. Post-Islamism' is a relatively new term within the Islamism studies. Initially developed within the French school of thought appearing in the works of Khusrokhavar (1994) and Roy (1994), Schulze (1998) and Kepel (2002), it was applied by Asef Bayat (1996) who used the term to explain the emergence of new trends in the Islamist discourse in Iran after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Later Bayat further developed and expanded it into an operational framework for the study of Islamism and Muslim societies (2007, 2013). Indeed with the naked eye one can observe the post-Islamist turn within Islamic social movements as well at the civil society and state levels.

Initially the word post-Islamism was used "primarily as an historical rather than an analytical category" (Bayat 2007: 17) and it was seen as one dimension of Islamism. Once Islamist revolutionary project had reached a dead end and impasse, or in Roy's terms after the failure of political Islam it was natural reaction of Islamists to change in direction of de-Islamization. This approach is criticized by Bayat for the bad conceptualization of post-Islamism as purely historical category rather than analytical (2007). And indeed the emergence of post-Islamism is not the result Islamist failure, with both coexisting and developing in parallel at the moment.

For Bayat post-Islamism is "both a condition and a project" (Bayat 2013, p. 8). Condition is social and political one, under which Islamism after various experimentations as ideology and project is wasted and

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undermined even in the eyes of its own supporters; while a project implies an intellectual-ideological project, "a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains," in light of those changing conditions (ibid., p. 8). However, condition does not mean any particular end after each Islamism dies and post-Islamism is born. The above-mentioned "experimentation" remains open and dynamic with no dead-end.

Thus it is not a strategic or ideological shift rather than tactical or cultural one. Some scholars argue that Muslims now more and more adopt individualistic and quietist inclination combining both religiosity and pro-capitalist consumption lifestyles, which does not imply a rejection of Islamic activism (Mandaville 2014). There are still Islamic causes and ideals they want to fight for by getting involved in collective action. What is different is "nature and modalities of that collective action" (ibid. p. 34). Thus post-Islamist social movement unlike Islamist ones frame their aspirations and projects in terms of advocacy and social-political marketing rather than explicitly and openly political terms. The former do not state openly objectives for achieving formal political power and change the society from the above. The social movement theory can also help us understand this shift, especially in the context of so-called opportunity spaces. Opportunity spaces refer to "fora of social interactions that create new possibilities for augmenting networks of shared meaning and associational life" (Yavuz 2004: p. 24), which include 'civic and political forums, electronic and print media, and cyberspace and the market' (ibid: p. 24). Thus shrinking opportunity spaces as a result of restrictive policies may cause Islamist movements reconsider their modes of operations, rhetoric or even framing in general and move towards post-Islamism, giving up their state-oriented focus and becoming more society-oriented.

This is to some extent the case of post-Islamist Gülen movement versus pro-Iranian Islamist movement in Azerbaijan that is we are going to explore in the paragraphs to follow.

Theoretical framework: the social movement theory
Islamic activism can be structured into three major dimensions, specifically studied in the framework of the social movement theory:

1) ideology and contention
2) resource mobilization
3) framing

These dimensions reflect accordingly three major elements of social-political activism: grievance (issue), resources and frame. Grievance is about perceived wrong, issues that have to be addressed, but currently are not. This reflects ideological bases of the movement and its ways of dealing with the perceived wrong, namely what Tilly calls repertoire of contention (Tilly 2002). Actions and tools that belong to common repertoires of contention include, but are not limited to: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, petitions, statements to and in public media, strikes, boycotts, education and raising public awareness. Resources are about tools of power like people, organization, funding, leadership and connections (allies). Framing implies the form of communicating with the target groups and formulating public messages. Framing is how the movement's leadership tries to define the issue for the public, identify an opportunity for the target audience and formulate calls to action.

Analysis of any Islamic social movement based on these three elements is helpful in understanding the degree of Islamism of the movement and whether it is actually Islamist or post-Islamist. Methodologically Islamic social movements' classification by Yavuz (2004) is the tool that reflects the results of such analysis we could. This classification divides Islamic movements into 4 categories. Yavuz's typology is of 'ideal type'. It demonstrates main features of their change strategy and helps understand the movements in question within their prevalent diversity. However, in practice, interactions among them are manifold. Accordingly movements can be society-oriented or state-centered. The former are divided into everyday life based movements or inward

contemplative movements; while the latter are either reformist-revolutionary or militant-revolutionary.

Society-oriented Islamic movements pursue the desired change from below applying a bottom-up approach. They believe that Muslim societies are ill with moral degradation, social and individual corruption. Society-oriented Islamic movements can be sub-divided into:

1) *Everyday life based* movements, which are "concerned with influencing society and individuals and use both modern and traditional communications networks to develop new arguments for the construction of new imagined identities and worldviews" (Yavuz 2004: 276).

2) *Inward contemplative movements* persuade its activists to disengage and withdraw from socio-political system and "focus on individuals as the object of change through cultivating the inner self as the inner space in order to construct a reinvigorated Islamic consciousness along very traditional lines" (ibid: 276).

State-centered Islamic movements/approaches consider corrupt political systems, governmental structures and state officials the causes of all ills of Muslim societies. For them the only way out, is to make sure states are governed by pious and knowledgeable Muslims and according to the Islamic law. So the struggle for these Islamists is about the efforts for control of state power and governmental resources but through mainly legitimate channels like establishing political parties, elections, mass protests, political propaganda, etc. This approach can be further divided into:

1) *Reformist-revolutionary movements,* which use legal and democratic processes in the hope of effecting change from above. The movements utilize their educational, political and social networks for promotion and recruitment.

2) *Militant-revolutionary movements,* which reject the existing system and use violence, confrontation and militancy at any stage. They also employ political agitation and protest. These movements consider democracy and democratic institutions and tools as un-Islamic and reject them as a result.

This paper will apply Yavuz typology in comparison of the Gülen movement and pro-Iranian social movements in Azerbaijan after we get familiarized with the profiles of both.

The Gülen Movement: a brief profile
The Gülen movement is an international informal network of institutions and individuals following Turkish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gülen. Gülen himself is a follower of Said Nursi – founder of Nurcular movement in post-Ottoman Turkey. Although not being directly involved in the Turkish politics Said Nursi had a huge influence on the religious thought in secularist Turkey, opposed it and its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was arrested and imprisoned in 1935 for 11 years being considered dangerous for the state Balci 2003). Another factor that made Kemalist Turkish state cautious about Nursi and his movement is its semi-secret, highly conspired network of obedient followers replicated a hierarchical Sufi order structure, which could not be tolerated by radically secularist regime. Nursi's philosophy and teachings are collected in "Risaleyi-Nur" book. Nursi's followers known as *Nur Talebeleri* ('the followers of (Nur) Light' in Turkish) constituted a hierarchical network that later became known as the Nurcu movement (Aliyev 2012).

After the death of Nursi his closest disciples in Turkish cities organized courses on his "Risaleyi-I Nur". The movement got split into six identical structurally separate lines (branches), led by disciples of Nursi - Mustafa Sungur, Mehmet Kurdoglu, etc. In the 1950 Turkish Grand National Assembly (parliament) passed a resolution on the rehabilitation of the literary heritage of Said Nursi, after which his works were published officially and translated into other languages, while the followers of the movement were legalized (ibid.).

In 1970s, Nursi's ideas on more role of Islam in Turkey got actively preached by imam of a mosque in Izmir, Gülen Haci Effendi. For his religious activity Gülen was repeatedly brought under criminal and administrative liability by the authorities (ibid.).

Active missionary work of Gülen was the impetus for the creation around him of a strong, vertically structured organization of the devoted followers, focused on the legacy of Nursi as well as Gülen's written works. A model of "Risaleyi-iNur" under his supervision since the early 1970s has a number of characteristics that make it different from the direct followers of Nursi, headed by Mustafa Sungur. These characteristics are a clear hierarchy, strict discipline, the presence of the secret statutes, focus on the media and business institutions (Davidov 2009, Şık 2011, Keskin 2012, Balci 2003 and others).

Such "market-oriented post-Islamism" of the Gülen Movement, stressed out by Keskin (2012), has resulted in the movement's huge financial resources feeding its social activities and political power both in Turkey and abroad. Total capital of the Gülen community from the mid-1980s reached now more than $50 billion and comprising about 30% of the Turkish economy (Davidov 2009). There is a branched network in 115 countries around the globe featuring over 500 businesses, 6 universities, over 700 schools, 14 journals, circulation newspaper Zaman ("Time"), global Samanyolu TV channel (STV in short) and two radio channels.

The Gülen movement is arguably the largest Sunni community in Turkey (Tuğal 2013). At present, the movement is present in 65 countries (Davidov 2009). It owns over 500 secular educational institutions abroad. According to the High Command of the Armed Forces of Turkey, the number of Gülen's followers reaches 4 million people (Davidov 2009).

Some researchers claim that the network is comprised of semi-underground cells as a result of the long track of pressure from the government (Davidov 2009, Şık 2011). According to Davidov this led to the formation of a sort of intelligence service, responsible for

collecting information on political, economic, confessional and other areas in the regions and countries where there are Turkic-speaking peoples, applying the methods of the conspiracy, providing for penetration and further promotion of its adherents to the authorities and management of both Turkey and the CIS (Davidov 2009).

The Gülen movement is a multi-level, well-structured organization. Thus, the structure of the typical Turkish city-level cell usually consists of the following levels: "shagirdlar" (students) - "uy imams" (five) - "semt imams" (Association of fives on the basis of the urban district or educational institution) - "bolge imams" (head of district level.) The freshmen are recruited and controlled on local level by "abi"s (brothers) or "abla"s (sisters). Each new member instructed about the need to maintain the confidentiality of their membership.

After the collapse of the USSR, the movement paid special attention to Muslim republics of the CIS republics, located in the region of Central Eurasia (Yunus 2012). The presence of the movement starting with schools in Azerbaijan was supported by the former president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev in early 1990s. Although, several times Turkish government expressed its displeasure from the existence of the elements of Gülen movement in Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev did not see them as a threat to the state. So, it could be said that with the support of Heydar Aliyev the Gülen movement took a significant role in the social and educational life of Azerbaijan. Dissemination of Gülen-Nursi ideas only occur through implicit contacts among students and instructors, through businesses, but not openly.

The major institution in Azerbaijan has an education company CAĞ ÖYRETİM A.Ş., which ran Qafqaz University, schools and preparatory courses throughout the country. There is also business association TÜSİAB, individual businesses and media outlets like Xazar TV&radio, Burc FM radio, Zaman newspaper, etc.
Until recently the Gülen schools did not have any serious problems with the government. They have been working on long-term goals investing in young generation – future political, business, social, academic and professional leaders of the country. They solve literally

all problems their students may face - from education to employment and accommodation. Upon completion of studies, the Gülen followers can get a job in Turkish companies which are more or less linked to the overall structure. (Yunus 2012).

After the deterioration of the relations between AKP and the Gülen Movement in Turkey since late 2013, there has been some pressure on the movement activities in Azerbaijan too. The Azerbaijani media was reporting about the so called "Erdogan dossier" that has been passed over to President Ilham Aliyev, where hidden activities and agenda of the movement as well as its representatives in the highest echelons are revealed. As a result, some high-ranked officials, whose names are said to be among those mentioned in the dossier, have been removed from their positions (Sultanova 2014). In the meantime, Qafqaz University and all other educational institutions of the movement's CAĞ Öyretim joined Azerbaijan International Education Center, owned by Azerbaijan's state oil company SOCAR (Taştekin 2014). Later all Gülen educational institutions except for Qafqaz University have been shut down completely as a result of growing external pressure (Erdogan factor) and domestic rivals using the externalities as an opportunity to get rid of the Gülen's domination on the education market.

Pro-Iranian Shia movements in Azerbaijan

The Shia activism in Azerbaijan includes the following groups:

• The Spiritual Board of the Caucasus Muslims (SBCM) and Sheikh-ul-Islam Allashukur Pashazada
• "Modernist" and "independent" Shia preachers and activists Haji Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, Haji Shahin Hasanov, Haji Elshan Mustafaoglu, etc.
• Azerbaijan Islamic Party
• Tradionalist pro-Iranian groups (Jeferi Heyeti, Islamazeri.com)

SBCM is the only one of the Boards tracing their institutional beginning to the Soviet Union that succeeded in surviving and developing after the Gorbachev reforms and the collapse of the USSR (Aliyev 2004). During the post-Soviet transition, however, the SBCM

was not the only Shiite actor in Islamic revival. It has been challenged by such "competitors" as "independent" popular and recognized Shiite Islamist leaders, , e.g. Haji Ilqar Ibrahimoglu, Imam of Djuma Mosque, Azerbaijani representative of the International Religious Liberty Association and human rights defender. The other independent Islamists are Haci Shahin Hasanov, Haji Elshan Mustafaoglu, Hazji Zulfuqar, etc.

Islamic party of Azerbaijan is another actor. This party is a pro-Iranian political party, officially registered in 1992. In 1996 leaders of the party were arrested under the espionage charges for Iran and sending young people to IRI for military training. Their main ideology of the party is anti-Turkism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Americanism. The part is in open opposition to the current government with many of its leaders and activists imprisoned.

The Shia Islam as practiced by devout Shias (not ethnic ones) in Azerbaijan is highly dominated and monopolized by the Iranian official doctrine based on a political principle of Wilayeti-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) introduced by late Ayatollah Khomeini. The principle holds that fuqaha (jurists) have guardianship over people. There is disagreement over how encompassing guardianship should be. One interpretation - *Limited Guardianship of the Jurist* - holds that guardianship should be limited to non-litigious matters including religious endowments, judicial matters and the property for which no specific person is responsible. Another - *Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist* - holds that guardianship should cover all issues for which the Prophet and Shia Imam would have responsibility, including political power over a country.

The Iranian political system is based on the second interpretation, where the Supreme Leader is not only the head of the state, but also Waliyi-Amr of all Muslims. At the moment it is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The opposite "quietist" school of thought is based mainly in Najaf, Iraq and its main representative is Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who by his personal example seeks to keep religion out of the political sphere to the extent possible, which should be the case until

the return of the Imam of the Age, expected by the humankind according to the Shia creed. There are also representatives of this school of through in Iran, all in opposition, of course, and not welcome by the official establishment. They are called "ziddi-wilayet" and perceived by followers of the Absolute Guardianship and its reflection in the institute of Waliyi-Amr – Supreme Leader institute as a kind of "incorrect Shias".

Ayatollah Khamenei has the biggest number of followers (muqallids) in Azerbaijan. Other popular ayatollahs with the biggest number of followers are late Lankarani and Mekarem Shirazi, who are also a part of the official Iranian clerical establishment. There are also some followers of late Ayatollah Fadhlallah from Lebanon, oppositionary Iranian cleric Shirazi and other fuqaha, but they are very small in numbers. Ayatollah Sistani, who is said to be followed by about 70% of all religious Shias in the world, also has presence, but it is limited and challenged by official Iranian circles, actually, supported by the Azerbaijani authorities. Most likely the authorities have preferred to deal with one center of influence over the country's religious Shias – the official Iranian one, because it is backed by another state and easier to counteract through formal and informal state channels compared to dealing with various non-governmental religious organizations of multiple countries.

There are several Iranian organizations operating in Azerbaijan, such as, 'Imdad imam Khomeini'; 'Ahli Beyt World Assembly' and 'Al- Hoda'. The main features of these organizations were that they were funded from Iranian sources and aimed to promote Shiism in Azerbaijan. For example, they support building local madrassas (religious schools), Arabic, Farsi and Quran Reading courses, translating and distributing religious literature, charity, organizing pilgrimage, etc. The Iranian government informally coordinates these missioner activities under the name of Iranian Cultural Centre (ICC) in Baku.

In general, the level of Iranian influence and the degree or 'pro-Iranianness' are demonstrated in the table below:

Category	Average Iranian influence	Ideology
SBCM and Sheikh-ul-Islam Allashukur Pashazada	Low	Pro-governmental
"Modernist" and "independent" Shia preachers and activists	Moderate	Islamism/post-Islamism
Azerbaijan Islamic Party	High	Islamism
Tradionalist pro-Iranian groups (Jeferi Heyeti, Islamazeri.com)	High	Islamism

The second category being the most heterogeneous in terms of ideologies and tactics does includes ranging from low to high levels of the Iranian influence and for that reasons this influence is labeled as Moderate on average.

When speaking about Shia Islamism as opposed to the Gülen's post-Islamism we should remove SCM, because it is not a social movement, but rather semi-governmental organization, responsible for Islamic affairs in the country.

Islamism vs. post-Islamism: between accommodation and integration

Islam-state relations in the post-Soviet space has not yet got released from the Soviet legacy of "militant" atheism and state's aspirations for the direct control over religious activity despite formal antireligious elements in the elite and religious radicals blended with foreign influences and/or their perceptions, Islam is a part of discourse and an organizational framework for social mobilization. As a result, this discourse, as evaluated by Yavuz for the case of Turkey that can be used also for the case of Azerbaijan, is "…a debate about the boundary of state and society, top-down vs. bottom-up modernity, and the public and private." (Yavuz 2004, p. 273)

The current political structure implies being extremely cautious about Islamic activism and limited opportunity spaces for its development and mobilization. Response from Islamic social movements is also

different depending on actual opportunity space access, goals, strategies and tactics to expand them for each group. Using Islamic social movements' classification by Yavuz (2004) we could group some known Islamic movements into 4 categories, as seen in Table 1.

**Typology of Islamic social movements in Azerbaijan
(based on Yavuz 2004, p. 274).**

		Actions, strategies and means	
		Legitimate	Illegitimate
Goals	**Vertical** State-centric elite-based vanguard movement from above	**Reformist** Participation in the hope of controlling the state or shaping policies through forming their own Islamic party or in alliance with other parties. Target: education, legal system, social welfare Outcome: Accommodation Examples: Independent Shia groups in Azerbaijan, Islamic Party of Azerbaijan	**Revolutionary** Rejects the system and uses violence and intimidation Target: state Outcome: Confrontation Examples: radical Salafi groups (e.g. The Forest Brothers)
	Horizontal Society-centric associational from below identity-oriented	**Societal** Groups using the media and communications networks to develop discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identity; seek to use market to create heaven on earth; use associational networks to empower community Target: Media, economy, (private) education Outcome: Integration Examples: Gülen movement	**Spiritual/Inward** Withdraws from political life to promote self-purification and self-consciousness Target: Religious consciousness Outcome: Withdrawal Examples: non-Gülen Turkish groups, conformist Salafi communities

Based on the matrix above we can summarize that everyday life based society-oriented Islamic movements is the case of the Gülen movement in Azerbaijan. Partly some Shia – not-pro-Iranian movements use this approach. *Inward contemplative* society-oriented Islamic *movements'* approach can be said to be applied by Nurcu and Naqshbandiyya Turkish groups as well as 'peaceful' Salafis n Azerbaijan. Going further with our analysis we see that r*eformist-revolutionary s*tate-centered Islamic *movements* is the case of pro-Iranian Islamists like Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, Jeferi Heyeti community, etc.; while m*ilitant-revolutionary movements, s*tate-centered Islamic is the case of militant and al-Qaida affiliated Salafi/Wahhabi groups that operate in Azerbaijan. Thus the object of our paper is everyday life based society-oriented and reformist-revolutionary state-centered movement types. Comparing them based on three elements of the social movement theory: ideology and contention, resource mobilization as well as framing will help clarify the differences.

Ideology and contention
In terms of ideology and contention the Gülen movement and pro-Iranian Islamists are on the opposite sides of Islamic activism spectrum. As summarized by Tuğal, "the Gülen community is based on some of the central themes of the Said Nursi line, including scientific (some would say positivistic) understanding of Islam, a silent (rather than armed and public) struggle against the Left, support for the center right (rather than an independent Islamic political party), a synthesis of the Sufi and textualistic elements of Islam, and an overall strategy that focuses on the individual rather than state. However, this community has significantly shifted toward the center when compared with other Nurcu groups, especially by supporting cooperation between Turkey and the West and dialogue among religions. The community is Turkish nationalist." (Tuğal 2013: p. 126). In other words, the movement is more conservative and nationalist rather than Islamist. Furthermore, Tuğal and other authors do not consider it even post-Islamist at all (Tuğal 2013, Yılmaz 2013)

The pro-Iranian movements are based mainly on the above-mentioned political version of Shia Islam – wilayati-faqih. They purely Islamist, in

political opposition to the current regime, but not violent. The local mouthpiece of the Iranian-style Islamism – www.islamazeri.com looks very much like an Azerbaijani version of Iranian official governmental web-site. News from Iran, Iranian perspective on the global and regional events and developments, religious rulings by the pro-governmental clerics and many other indicators of the mood of Islamic Republic can be seen there. However, as reformist-revolutionary social movements they do not use terror as a repertoire of contention.

Resource mobilization

Any independent (not to mention Islamist) social-political activism in Azerbaijan at present operated under the restricted opportunity space conditions that complicated resource mobilization and requires flexibility in terms of operations and fundraising as well as more informal (sometimes even undercover) networks. It is natural that in such conditions a lot of funding for Islamists comes from abroad.

In case of the pro-Iranian Shia groups in Azerbaijan resource mobilization is implemented through mainly through classic Islamist ways - specific mosques, madrassas (religious schools), public events and Internet. Funding is maintained through religious taxes and donations. The most important religious tax is khoms, which makes up 20% of the net annual profit of each individual and is the obligatory for Shia Muslims. This tax is collected by religious scholars (ayatollahs) through their representatives. About 90% of all *khoms* money collected by "licensed" Iranian representatives is sent to Iran and distributed there. Remaining 10% spent locally on Iranian educated clerics involved in education and other religious activities, madrassas, etc. Funding of non-political projects, events, education, public religious awareness and charity is done through the Cultural Center of IRI and Administrative Office of the Representative of the Supreme Leader Hojjat-ul-Islam Ojaqnejat or other official Iranian humanitarian organizations, legally operating on the territory of Azerbaijan.

Political projects and activities are also funded by various organizations and individuals residing in Iran for example organizations like *Dar Rahe Hagh* Cultural Institute. Due to the scrutinized control and

monitoring over all formal financial transactions related to Iran and its residents, money is delivered to Azerbaijani activists through alternative channels demonstrated in the figure below.

Clearly such funding is more sophisticated and limits the amounts available for the recipients. Thus Shia groups have thus limited access to the foreign funding and local funding is limited per se. As a result these groups do not have enough capacity to accomplish huge national projects but rather some local actions and small one-time public events with the limited outreach (conferences, demonstrations, etc) or small-scale religious education. They are not capable of addressing serious and strategic tasks on the national level should such tasks arise.

In case of the Gülen movement resources are mobilized through purely 'secular" vehicles - businesses, business association (TUSIAB), media structures, educational institutions (including student networks and dormitories) and social projects. Formal religious institutions are not used by the Gülenists at all. Closing down of the schools and Araz courses have significantly affected the resource base of the movement

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in the country and its reorganization in the light of the latest challenges could be expected. In general the movement's actual networks could be summarized as in the figure below:

All network institutions are mutually supportive and cooperative. Moreover, all members of the network are required by their 'elder' brothers/sisters in network, and especially those who stay in student dormitories or *ishik evleri* (big apartments or houses leased to students and other members on very discounted rates) to buy from shops, eat in places that are part of the network as well as watch only *STV* or *Xazar TV*, *Xazar* radio or *Burc FM* radio, read periodicals and publications by Zaman (Turkan and Telmanqizi 2009). Thus strict organizational hierarchy and centralized planning and supervision are an important element of the Gülen movement unlike the case of disbursed Shia Islamist movements in Azerbaijan.

From the beginning of the group's operations in Azerbaijan it was evident that it especially targets either current elite's children through their involvement in the education institutions, or future technocratic, business and political elite, a part of which these institutions' alumni would be.

Framing
Unlike independent and pro-Iranian Shia activists in Azerbaijan with huge political rhetoric and aspirations, some other Turkish and even

Nurcu activists, who get involved in direct religious propaganda, the Gülen movement has always positioned itself as a purely societal social movement choosing integration over accommodation, confrontation or withdrawal. Of course, there might be some speculations about it being a part of tactics rather than strategy. The movement has some elements of reformist type because there are partly elite-based and quite hierarchical. In Azerbaijan, however, unlike in Turkey the movement has not made any attempts to openly influence and get involved in the political process at the moment. Given the rationality of its leaders, it can be understood. Having done so, the movement will risk to everything it has gained so far and it will be an act of suicide for them. The movement's opponents actually claim that the whole activity of the group is about participation in the hope of controlling the state or shaping policies with the goal to "accommodate" and not "integrate" in the long run. The Gülen movement could also apply *taqiyya* - dissimulation under threat, persecution, or compulsion permissible by the creed of Islam, in its operations (Aliyev 2012).

The same 'taqiyya' approach maybe also assigned to some 'reformist' Shia movements like DEVAMM/Icheri Sheher Juma community led by Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, which avoid being positioned as openly pro-Iranian with, since 'any active associations and interaction with Iran and transnational Shiite groups will likely result in official crackdown and outlawing' (De Cordier 2014: p. 12). These Shia communities have chosen to move towards post-Islamism as a matter of a condition (limited opportunity spaces), but not a project, since ideologically they follow mainstream Shia creed, some (like in case of DEVAMM) directly following the official Iranian Shiism and the Supreme Leader of Iran – Ayatollah Khamenei.

Conclusion
The Gülen movement has been the most successful and efficient Islam-based social movement in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Even despite the current drawback in Azerbaijan it still could achieve more than any other Islamic movement. The movement utilized all those existing opportunity spaces available for such activism and its peculiarity is in its outer –'non-religiosity' and visible integration into the existing

status-quo and rules of the game. One of the most evident indicators of the movement's success is its owning TV and radio channels, which is unprecedented achievement in contemporary Azerbaijan, where the group not directly affiliated with the ruling elite and having both foreign and religious roots, is allowed to run its own media holding. Thus business activities, charity, lobbying abroad, and, the most important, successful education model have turned it into a 'friend" rather 'alien', something that other Islamic activists can't be praised for. The Gülen movement's post-Islamist nature should be considered an important success factor in this regard.

On the contrary, unhidden Islamism of Shia activists have undermined their social acceptance and achievements, limited to the religious audience only.

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