By: Vali Kouzehgar Kaleji

International Peace Studies Center (IPSC)

Khalid Rahman is Director General of the Islamabad-based think-tank, the Institute of Policy Studies. The Institute’s main areas of research include Pakistani society, domestic political scene, the economic perspective, Faith and Society and the global and regional geo-political situation. As Director General of the Institute, Khalid Rahman has over twenty five years’ experience of research, training and management. He has conducted over 500 seminars and roundtables organized by the Institute.  He has been involved in organizing both the research and training programs of the Institute. His main research contribution has been on the national and regional politics which includes an active focus on Pakistan-China Relations. He has more than 20 publications (written/Edited) and a number of papers to his credit. He is also editor of the IPS Journal ‘Policy Perspectives’. As a trainer, he frequently conducts courses both in and outside institute. He is also on the boards of a number of social and development organizations.

Key words: Pakistan, Iran, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Pakistan Peoples Party, US-Pakistan, Sanction against Iran.

IPSC: Current months has seen Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises. The Supreme Court of  Pakistan on Thursday ordered Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to appear in court on February 13 for a formal indictment on contempt charges. What’s your analysis about reasons of this event?  And what are its consequences on political situation in Pakistan?

Rahman: The issue may be seen from two perspectives: technical and political. From technical point of view, the Prime Minister has committed the contempt of court by disobeying its orders, and therefore it appears that he would be indicted for it; the indictment would not only cause the Prime Minister to be declared as ineligible for the membership of the Parliament but would also confiscate his position as Prime Minister. In the meantime, it is probable that the PM would try to delay the case by submitting another review petition to the court; it is also likely that he would turn around the tables by resigning from his position. In any case, however, the PPP government would have to write, sooner or later, the letter to the Swiss Courts, as per the court orders.On the other hand, if seen from the political perspective, one has to accept that the Supreme Court has avoided taking any absolute step so far against the government, despite the government’s continuous noncompliance with the court orders. With this in view, it is difficult to determine whether Supreme Court would go for indicting the Prime Minister or would still abstain from taking a definite step in order to shun the chances of any break down.

IPSC: A separate court case against the government – the so-called Memogate affair involving an alleged plot by Zardari’s government to seek U.S. help reining in the Pakistani military – fizzled last month after the star witness, American businessman Mansoor Ijaz, decided not to travel to Pakistan to testify, citing security fears. But the court has continued its pursuit of the Swiss case. What’s your opinion about implications of this issue on Zardari’s government?

Rahman: Regarding the “Memo gate” Scandal, it is now an established fact that a memo was written by Ijaz Mansoor and it was against the national interest of Pakistan, and therein, he had some sort of communication with Hussain Haqqani, the ex-Pakistani Ambassador to US. ‘What nature of contact it was’ and ‘who was originally at the back of it’ are the real issues in the case, whereupon Supreme Court is trying to discern some truths. On the other hand, the way the government handled the entire situation i.e. by trying to evade this case, has caused the nation to sense the  involvement of government in the whole matter, and thus its role therein is being questioned. However presently, the legal state of the memo case is taking a different turn since Mansoor Ijaz has refused to come to Pakistan to appear before the court, wherein his witness and the submission of evidences might have led the case to take some definite shape. Therefore, it seems that for the time being, the government has become successful in putting off the memo case.

IPSC: The Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kiyani planed to take the army back to its professional roots, which did not include political participations. But some Pakistani Politician such as Nawaz warned that if economic conditions worsen, and the country implodes around Kayani, his hand may be forced to intervene in the political process. What’s your analysis in this regard? Will army com back to power with cap date?

Rahman: General Kayani’s refrain from any direct interference in the political and governmental matters has led him to successfully restore the repute and reverence of the military among the nation. However it is a fact that the incompetence, inefficiency, corruption, and poor-performance of the current political government has roused great restlessness among the nation which in earlier days could have tempted the military leadership to take over. Despite that the majority of the public, all political leadership, civil society and a large circle of opinion-makers are not at all in favor of any kind of military interference in governmental matters. Also the profound engagements of the military in the security related issues do not allow it to go for some other adventure. The courts, in contrast to the past, also do not seem to be in mood to support the military take over; same is the situation in the international circles. Thus seeing in this whole context, it is almost next to impossible that the military would try to take over.

IPSC: The courts and the military appear determined to end the rule of the coalition government led by the Pakistan Peoples Party before it completes its term in February 2013, a struggle over power that has paralyzed the government and distracted it from other pressing issues, including the sinking economy. What’s your prediction about the political future of PPP?

Rahman:It would not be appropriate to say that the courts and the military are determined to topple the PPP government. Instead, in my opinion, no civil government in Pakistan has ever before got such a favorable environment to work in – ‘friendly’ opposition and no direct threat from military – as the PPP government has been gifted with. But unfortunately, despite all this, it has lost most of its public support — which is the real strength of any political government – owing to its poor performance and the large-scale corruption. As to the cases in the court, they are of a legal nature, which should thus be taken by the government on legal basis; but instead, it is trying to counter these cases politically, which is the real fault on part of the government. So far, the court has been handling the situation peacefully while avoiding giving any final verdict against the government; but in case, the court goes for taking any obdurate step, not only the government along with all its institutions, but also the military would be bound to acknowledge and obey the court’s verdict, in light of the constitution. However, all the serious-minded people in the country are desirous to avoid any such situation, and wish that PPP government would complete its term that may cause the democracy and the electoral process to flourish in the country.

IPSC: In this situation, what’s your analysis about role and place of  Pakistan Muslim League (N) led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif ?

Rahman: There is no doubt that a large number of people in Pakistan, particularly in Punjab, support Pakistan Muslim League (N). However PML (N), in capacity of the second biggest political party of the country and the opposition party in the parliament, has fairly disappointed the public, in general, who were looking forward to it to play an effective role by putting enough pressure in making better the performance of government and in giving relief to the public. Besides, the performance of the Punjab government is though better than that of the Federal government, it is however not that ideal. In the political field and in election campaign also, PML (N) is facing grave challenges to retain its real strength in view of the drift of right-wing voters towards the emerging political power, such as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf.

IPSC: Musharraf, who has been living abroad since he resigned in disgrace in 2008, has said he plans to return to Pakistan this month, despite possible arrest, in order to participate in a parliamentary election due by 2013.What does Pervez Musharraf want? Do you agree with opinion that there is “no chance” for Musharraf to stage a come back?

Rahman:In fact, Musharraf didn’t enjoy any considerable support at public level even during his ten-year rule in the country, His real strength was the support from Army; while at international level, some world powers also supported him for their own vested interests. It is strange that now he is showing keenness to take part in politics – which is impossible without the support of public – a major section of which, belonging to any school of thought, considers Musharraf as essentially responsible for the present crises of Pakistan. In such a hostile atmosphere for Musharraf in the country, it is also not possible for the military to go out of the way to ensure his security. Hence, the potential role of Musharraf seems to me not more than a mere occasional media presence.

IPSC: American-Pakistani relations took a turn for the worse in late November 2011 when a NATO air attack killed 26 Pakistani soldiers in strikes against two military bases. Do you think this matter can change US-Pakistan alliance?

Rahman: The May 2nd operation that killed Osama bin Laden (and earlier the CIA agent Ramond Davis case) had triggered a situation full of mistrust between Pakistan and US. The impact of the events created an environment wherein substantial discussions on security and stability issues were overshadowed by the discussion on U.S. operations and operatives in Pakistan. The relations between the two, in this background, seem to have gone at an all-time low in the aftermath of U.S. and the NATO cross-border attack killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, while the hot exchanges were also reported repeatedly from both sides in the aftermath of this attack.

Rahman: Thus the current phase once again represented two realities of U.S.-Pakistan relations: one of fragile friendship, and the other of increasing disbelief and contempt. As a matter of fact, Pak-U.S. relationship fluctuates between the immediate and the long-term range of issues. On one hand, the relationship is under a constant scrutiny of the day-to-day talking points, situation and tactics on ground, or internal controversies; on the other hand, there are long term issues that have remained largely unresolved. Talks are going on between the two but irrespective of what happens in the talks regarding the current Afghanistan situation, the enduring problems are not expected to be over as the U.S. would continue to ask Pakistan to review its strategic policy whereas Pakistan would continue to point out contradictions in American attitude. At present the U.S agenda in the region is highly unpopular in Pakistan, however U.S. has been constantly ignoring the fact that it should not expect a government to deliver on issues which do not carry a sizable support in the masses.

IPSC: As you know, US and EU imposed different sanctions against Iran. So Iran has reacted to growing international pressure by threatening to block naval traffic across the Strait of Hormuz, threatening a vital international oil route in the Persian Gulf that led to increase tensions between Iran and Western and Arab Countries. What’s your analysis about consequences of this issue? What’s your opinion about Pakistan Perspective and role in current situation?

Rahman: The efforts by America and its allies to pressurize Iran on various fronts is not something new, and it is expected to continue so in future; the economic sanctions on Iran should also be seen in the same connection. However, Iran has always countered these challenges very effectively, the major factor behind which is the harmony between its leadership and the public; and if Iran sustains this internal harmony, the impact of world sanctions would gradually sink to nothingness. In my opinion, the disunity among the Muslim World stands out as the main reason why a Muslim country like Iran is being so pressurized by America and its allies. This needs to be thus seriously addressed by all, including Iran, particularly in view of the changing world scenario where the balance of power is being transformed. As to the Pakistani people’s outlook over Iran issue, they understand the tactics being played by the US leadership very well, and this is why the majority of them tend to have the feelings of sympathy and cooperation with Iran, and are seriously desirous that the government of Pakistan would strengthen its ties with Iran, while shunning any kind of pressure.

IPSC: Thanks for your responses and cooperation.

By: Vali Kouzehgar Kaleji

International Peace Studies Center (IPSC)

Bilgehan Alagoz holds a full-time faculty position as a lecturer at Institute for Middle East Studies of Marmara University, Istanbul. She was a visiting fellow at Middle East Studies Program of the University of Wisconsin-Madison during Fall 2008. She holds a BA degree in International Relations from Istanbul University and an MA degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Marmara University. She is expected to gain her doctoral degree by the end of Spring 2012 with her dissertation entitled “US Persian Gulf Policy and Its Implications on Iranian Foreign Policy: Turkish-Iranian Relations During Ahmadinejad Period”. Her areas of interest are Turkish-Iranian Relations, Iranian Foreign Policy, Middle East Politics and Persian Gulf Studies.

IPSC: After the AKP came to power in 2002, it  train of Iran-Turkey relations is moving fast ahead thanks to measures by the two sides and will not move back. But there are some challenges that have influenced bilateral relations. I would like to concentrate on them. As you know, US and EU imposed different sanctions against Iran. Sanctions commonly bar nuclear missile and certain military exports to Iran; investments in oil, gas and petrochemicals; exports of refined petroleum products; business dealings with the Iranian Republican Guard Corps; banking and insurance transactions, including with the Central Bank of Iran; and shipping. In this situation, what’s your opinion about Turkish role and policy toward Iran?

Alagoz: It is certain that we are facing tough times ahead regarding Iran’s relations with the international community.  For many years, there had been a division among US and European countries about how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program but now it seems that they stand as one by adopting new rounds of sanctions against Iran. Actually for the United States, sanctions policy against Iran is not a new subject. During the Clinton Administration US had adopted a similar policy as part of its Dual Containment Policy. At those years contrary to US, EU had preferred to keep diplomatic channels with Iran through its policy which was named as Constructive Dialogue. But this time we are at the edge of a new process: There is a trilateral structure, namely on one side there is UN Security Council Resolutions, on other side US Decisions and on the third side there is EU decisions. At this point Turkey’s position is very clear. Unlike the EU and the US, Turkey remains opposed to the new U.S.-led measures. Of course as all of the UN members, Turkey is bound with the Security Council Resolutions, but last year as the non-permanent member of the Security Council, Turkey voted against the fourth round of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. Because Turkey believes that there is still a room for a diplomatic solution regarding Iran’s nuclear program. That’s why along with Brazil, Turkey negotiated a deal with Iran just before the last round of UN Resolutions to send some of its low-enriched uranium abroad in exchange for access to fuel for a medical reactor. However, for Turkey it is not easy to pursue these efforts while US and EU are acting together. Turkey has deep institutional relations with both of the parties. Therefore, Turkey is respectful to US and EU, but also expects the same attitude from them. In addition to this, there are other factors that affect Turkey’s concerns about the sanctions. Iran has emerged as a major oil and natural gas provider to Turkey, which is entirely dependent on imported energy. Under these circumstances it is almost impossible for Turkey to freeze its ties with Iran. It would directly affect Turkey’s economy. I still believe that as a result of Turkey’s intensive diplomatic efforts there can be reconciliation between Iran and the international community.

IPSC: Iran has reacted to growing international pressure by threatening to block naval traffic across the Strait of Hormuz, threatening a vital international oil route in the Persian Gulf.  led to increase tensions between Iran and Western and Arab Countries. What’s your analysis about consequences of this issue? Can Turkey play a mediator role in current situation? 

Alagoz: This is another tough issue regarding Iran’s relations with the international community. Actually, recent tensions in the Persian Gulf remind me of the Cold War escalation of early 1960’s. There is already a tendency among experts of the region in analyzing the situation in the Persian Gulf with reference to Cold War by naming the situation as “A New Cold War”. As you may remember, during the early years of the Cold War, the parties adopted an escalation policy and relied on threats. But in the meantime the parties refrained from direct military action. We witness the similar attitudes regarding the Strait of Hormuz.  As a response to US and European sanctions Iran threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is the vital link between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It is also one of the most strategic chokepoints in the world when it comes to oil transit. If economic sanctions sufficiently pressure Iran to retaliate by closing down the Strait, nearly 20 per cent of worldwide oil trade would be impacted, resulting in a massive spike in global energy costs. For this reason, closing the Strait is consequential not only for Iran but also for the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and the United States. According to my view, the parties will not pursue the escalation policy which might result in with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. As far as the vulnerability in the global economy is concerned, none of the parties would take this kind of risk that would directly affect the global economy. We actually had a similar experience during the Iran-Iraq War. At those years, there was a dispute between the US and Iran which was named as the Tanker War, but even at that time Iran did not prefer to close the Strait. I believe that both Iran and other regional countries will act rational. At this point, Turkey also has an important role as the unique country which has good relations with Iran, Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and the United States.  In this context, Turkey’s High Level Strategic Dialogue with (P)GCC is noteworthy. Recently at the High Level Strategic Dialogue Fourth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Istanbul, on 28 January, Turkey and (P)GCC has confirmed determination to enhance their cooperation in all fields. In this vein, Turkey has a constructive role between Iran and (P)GCC which is an important opportunity for all of the parties. Similarly, through NATO’s Istanbul Initiative Turkey can be a mediator between Iran and the United States in terms of the recent tensions in the Persian Gulf.

IPSC:  Tehran, Ankara, and Damascus are three important capital cities in the Middle East, and their relations have been influenced by many factors recent developments in the region. The issue of hosting the Syrian opposition in Turkey has raised many questions in the mind of Iranian officials regarding this trilateral relationship. How are the relations between Iran and Turkey, these two strategic allies, influenced by their different positions on Syria?

Alagoz: Elected in 2002 and reelected in 2007, the AKP government determined a neighborhood policy called zero problems foreign policy, which had a vision of minimizing issues with neighboring regions while avoiding involvement in international confrontations. As part of this new foreign policy concept, Turkey aimed to put a balance at regional level which created closer relations with both Iran and Syria. However, the recent developments in Syria carry the potential to bring about far-reaching ramifications for peace and stability in the Middle East. Turkey sincerely wishes that the events evolve in a better direction and thus encourages the Syrian authorities to undertake a swift reform program that addresses the needs and demands of Syrian citizens. Turkey has also made it clear that she is ready to provide whatever contribution and support needed in the reform process. On the other hand, Turkey opposes international military intervention in Syria. I believe that Iranian government will come to the similar conclusion with Turkey.

IPSC:  Turkey has agreed to host a radar system as part of NATO’s missile defense, a decision that Iran has criticized. How could this influence Iran-Turley relations?

Alagoz: As I previously mentioned Turkey has institutional relationships. As a member of NATO  Turkey is bound with its principles. Thus, Iran should perceive Turkey’s decision to host NATO’s early-warning radar system within this framework. Turkey has expressed in many occasion that she does not perceive Iran as a threat to region. I think this is already enough to see to what extent Turkey pays attention on Iran’s perception. At this point, I am sure that Iran will understand Turkey’s relations with other countries and institutions and I believe that Turkey’s engagement with the West is an opportunity and also a guarantee for Iran to have a dialogue with the international community.

IPSC:  In spite of aforementioned challenges, what are main opportunities in Iran-Turkey bilateral relations? And how two neighboring countries  them ?

Alagoz: As two important states of the Middle East, Turkey and Iran have always been influential for each other. The relations between the two countries have been determined by historical, geographic, strategic, and cultural factors. Both of the countries are aware of the importance of the bilateral relations. In this context, Turkey and Iran cooperates with each other in very critical issues. The relations between the two countries have been characterized by several concerns. The security issue, namely the growing Kurdish terrorist/separatist activities in both countries, has been the most important factor in setting up relations. The situation in Iraq is also another important factor that urges two countries to have closer relations. Following the US withdrawal from Iraq, both Iran and Turkey have continued to make an effort to inspire confidence in one another. In addition to these areas of collaboration, there is still a great potential between the two countries. At this point, Iran should get benefit  from Turkish entrepreneurs and create opportunities for mutual projects. I quickly remember the problems that Turkish GSM operator Turkcell and construction firm TAV faced when they tried to invest in Iran. Tourism is another potential that is due to advance. Both Iran and Turkey should motivate tourism operators for the development of tourism between the two countries.

IPSC: Thanks for your responses and cooperation.

Alagoz: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my views about Turkish-Iranian relations and the challenges that have influenced the bilateral relations.

Mohammad Sadegh Jokar

International Peace Studies Centre (IPSC) 

Abstract

This article tries to answer two questions; why is it that radical Islamists, or, as I prefer to call them, neo-fundamentalists,[1] engage in violent actions against the West? And why, contrary to the beliefs of classical Islamists, do they commit indiscriminate terror against civilians in their fight against the West?

In order to answer these questions, we analyzed the letters, statements, and guidelines of top Al-Qaeda leaders, as they are members of one of the most distinct and well-organized radical Islamic groups. 

This article is divided into three sections: section one considers the views of these radical groups, as well as their attitudes towards other political groups. Section two examines the ways in which these groups interact with the West. And section three concludes with offering policy implications and possible outcomes.  

This study attempts to show how radical Islamist groups perceive the West, and in particular the US, as a “crusader, [the] occupier of Islamic Land, and the supporter of Israel.” This perception has caused a hostile relationship with West. These groups’ employ strict translations of concepts such as Jihad and the logic of “an eye for an eye”; as a result, they use military tactics to confront the invaders.

Keywords

Islamists, jihad, terrorism, United States, Zionism

Introduction:

The Western approach to Islam is marked by Orientalist attitudes, and by the West’s own experience of religion. As Edward Said has said, Orientalism is at the root of the West’s misunderstanding of Islamic fundamentalism: the East and the West are viewed as fundamentally opposed to one another, and the East is believed to embody a range of negative characteristics. This arrogant attitude represents the West as developed, democratic and modern, in contrast to the backward, despotic and traditional East. Islamism is further understood to be in opposition to all aspects of modernism.

In this dichotomy of science and religion, which reflects Europe’s own history, any religious perspective is understood to be contrary to modernity, democracy, tolerance, and even spirituality. This view is exemplified in research done by the Faculty of Arts and Science at the University of Chicago. The “Fundamentalism Project”[2] classifies fundamentalism as a reaction to modernism, an interpretation common to fundamentalism studies. According to this viewpoint, fundamentalism is seen as a residue of the Dark Ages, at war with enlightenment, development, freedom and modern wisdom. In this context, there is no difference between fundamentalisms of different religions (Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, etc); all of them are perceived in opposition to modernism.[3] This viewpoint results in a misunderstanding of Islamic neo-fundamentalist movements, and precludes the opportunity to communicate effectively with these groups.

This misunderstanding of Islamic societies has caused many Western scholars to produce flawed research. Jill Copple, for instance, considers the Taleban’s coming to power in Afghanistan, Khatami’s election in Iran, and Erbakan’s in Turkey in the 1990’s, to be similar signs of Islamic resurgence. This interpretation fails to take into account the important differences between national political contexts.[4]

When this approach influences foreign policy, and US interactions with Islamic movements, the West is presented as innocent of any wrong-doing, unjustly attacked by irrational Islamist groups.[5] This dominant view has been criticized by some researchers, who argue that Western intervention in Islamic territories has pushed Islamic movements towards militarism and radicalization.[6]

In fact, the terrorist activities of Islamic groups have a “strategic logic”; they are not merely a series of erratic reactions against modernism. This brings us to the key question addressed by this article: why is the neo-fundamentalist approach to the West confrontational? Why do they use terror against civilians as their means of combat?

This article understands the aggressive policy of the US in Middle East as the cause of the militarization of the Islamists’ political protests; it argues that the violence of neo-fundamentalists is the result of the US and Israel violence in the region. 

This article is divided into three sections. The first section tries to show how Islamist radical groups define themselves and the “other” (the West). The second section explores the rationale behind these groups’ interactions with the West, and the third section attempts to articulate some policy implications.

Section One: Neo-Fundamentalists Perceptions of US Activities

Neo-fundamentalist views of US activities are divided into two historical stages. In stage one, during the Soviet attack on Afghanistan, the US was seen as an infidel country, offering aid in the fight against atheist Russians.

From the 1991 Gulf War onwards (in which, according to Bin Laden, King Fahad of Saudi Arabia committed treason by inviting the US forces), neo-fundamentalists formed a new image of US activities. This new picture caused a new reaction in confronting the USA.  

1-1  The First Stage: Working with Infidels to Fight Other Infidels.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which happened after the Iranian revolution, threatened key US interests in the Middle East. According to Stephen Zunes, Americans tried to use the Islamists’ capabilities to fight the Soviets. They began to give the “freedom fighters Mujahidin”[7] military, educational and logistic aid. But what was the neo-fundamentalist perception of the US, and how did this shape their relationship with that country?

1-1-1     Theological Justifications for Working with the US

During this period, Islamist groups differed on the subject of whether it was permissible to work with infidels. Some believed that taking help from Western countries in the war in Afghanistan was forbidden. They referred to the words of the Prophet Mohammad; for example, they quoted a paragraph in a book called Sahih Moslem, which states that, in the Badr war, the Prophet asked one of the infidels to leave his army, and he further rejected the service of infidels.[8] But the others argued that in some cases, the service of infidels had been accepted; for example, in the book of Alnavai it is said that in the Honain war, the Prophet borrowed a shield from an infidel.[9] Finally, the views of Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) ultimately prevailed; he legitimized cooperation with infidels in time of war. However, Azzam outlined a set of conditions:

1-    Islamic authorities must be the leaders of the war, and the Muslims must be more powerful than their allies.  

2-    The infidels must have a favorable view of the Muslims, and there must be no chance of treason.

3-     Muslim must be in need of the infidels’ assistance. 

Azzam strengthened his argument by quoting scholars from the four main sects of Islam on the question of accepting infidels’ assistance in a war against other infidels.

For the Hanafi School, he quoted Mohammad bin Hasan, who said that it is acceptable to ask for the help of infidels, if Muslims have the upper hand.

For the Maleki School, he quoted Ibn Ghasem, who said that Muslims can ask for the infidels’ help, on the condition that they will serve the Muslims.

For the Shafei School, he quoted Alramli, who cited the view that an Imam or Muslim ruler can enjoy the infidels’ assistance as long as the infidels in question have a favorable view of Muslims, or if the Muslims in question are small in numbers.

For the Hanbali School, he quoted Ibn Ghadim as saying that the founder of that school, Ahmad bin Hanbal, permitted Muslims to take assistance from infidels. For him, the infidels could even benefit financially and materially from the war, as long as they were assisting Muslims in repelling infidel armies from Islamic lands.[10] 

At this stage, the neo-fundamentalists were inclined to cooperate with the US in their fight against the Russian invaders. The neo-fundamentalists perceived themselves as having the upper hand in that fight. At this stage, the cooperation between the US and the neo-fundamentalists was so intense that, according to Stephen Zunes, many Al-Qaeda terrorists were trained by CIA agents.[11]  

1-2       The Second Stage in Neo-Fundamentalists’ Perceptions: the US as an Aggressive Enemy

This stage began when King Fahad of Saudi Arabia invited US troops to that country in August 6, 1990, and in the 1991 Gulf War that followed. During this stage, the neo-fundamentalists considered the US to be the leader of “Global Crusaders” that planned to destroy Islam. This outlook was confirmed by the attack on Iraq by allied forces led by the US, and by the following sanctions against Iraq, the presence of American troops in the Arabian peninsula (in the land of holy mosques), the military intervention in Sudan, and American support for Israel. This viewpoint has various aspects:

1-2-1     The “Zionist” Conspiracy

Unlike the classical fundamentalist view of Western colonialism as the ultimate enemy, the neo-fundamentalists believe that there is a coalition between “Zionists” and “Crusaders” to destroy the real Islam. They argue that throughout history, Christianity and Judaism have wanted to weaken and destroy Islam, and that this attempt continues today.

Taghiyedin Alnabehani, the founder of the Altahrir Party (a fundamentalist group), believed that the defeat of the Christians in the historical crusades caused a deep hatred of the Islamic world, which led Christians to attempt to occupy Islamic territories after the First World War. He believed that war against Islam is ongoing, and that European countries have poisoned the minds of youth, and have distorted the history and values of Muslims.[12] This is why the Altahrir Party favors jihad against “American Crusaders” and their “Zionist” ally: because they are both believed to be at war with Islam. The party issued a statement on June 2001, announcing that “the war against the leader of infidels (US) and its assistants, Britain and etc. has started. This is a state of war, and all Muslims are standing against infidels. Jews and Americans have entered the Central Asian countries to fight terrorism and they must get out of these countries.”[13]

In one of his religious edicts, and calling Muslims to Jihad, Bin Laden makes the following statement:

1-    The US has now occupied most of the holy lands in the Islamic world. It has occupied the land of the two holy mosques (Saudi Arabia), it has plundered its wealth, and, with military presence, has harassed Saudi Arabia’s neighbors. Continuous assaults against the people of Iraq have been staged from Saudi bases.

2-    In spite of inflicting one million casualties on the people of Iraq, the Zionists still want to expand the war to other Islamic countries.

3-    Although its main motives for imposing war on the Islamic world are religious and economic, the US also want to divert attention from Israel and the occupation of Jerusalem. This is clear in their attempts to disintegrate Iraq and other Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Egypt.[14] Bin Laden further claims that the Americans want Iraq to be divided into 3 regions: the Kurds in north, the Shiites in South, and the Sunnis in the center. This is in line with the Zionist scheme for “Great Israel.”[15]

Further, Bin Laden’s followers have reached the conclusion that the US also wants Saudi Arabia to be divided into a few small regions: the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the oil-rich eastern region, and the northern region, which will be annexed to Israel.[16]

To neo-fundamentalists, Australia invaded Indonesia as a result of the alliance between the Crusaders and the Jews. When the Taliban in Afghanistan kidnapped 22 Koreans and killed two of them, they justified it by announcing that the Koreans were Christian missionaries. One of the conditions for setting the hostages free was that Korean forces must leave the crusaders’ alliance, and must stop sending missionaries to Afghanistan.[17] 

The neo-fundamentalists believe that the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, the Indonesia incidents, and above all, Israel’s massacre of Palestinians, is a joint Crusader-Jewish conspiracy to destroy Islam.

 1-2-2- The Shiite Conspiracy, and the Expansion of Secularism in Muslim Countries

Neo-fundamentalists have a hostile attitude toward Shiites. To them, Shiites are worse than Jews and Crusaders. The Al-Qaeda view of Shiites is as follows: “we consider Shiites as idolaters and worst creatures of God.”[18] This is also a common view among the official Saudi clergy. Abdulrahman Albarak, lecturer at Mohammad bin Saud University, believes that the Shiites are not even Muslims, and that those Shiites who live under Sunni rule, and who try rule to practice their fate freely, should be met with jihad.[19]

When the Shiites in Saudi Arabia complained to King Abdullah of the harsh repression they faced, the Sunni clergy reacted fervently. Al Ahvaii, a top Saudi clergy and a member of the Internal League of Saudi Clergies, warned that there would be two consequences to any move to give the Shiites more freedom: 1- Shiite sovereignty or 2- the establishment of a secular state in Saudi Arabia. According to Al Ahvaii, all through Islamic history, Shiites have allied themselves with the enemies of the Sunnis. In the thirteenth century, Shiites united with Mongols and killed the Abbasid caliph; today it is said that they are busy conspiring with Americans against Islam.[20] Yousof Al Aviri (the Al-Qaeda provocateur in Saudi Arabia who was killed in 2004 in a clash with Saudi forces) believed that Shiites had a long term plan to control strategic locations in the region, and would declare themselves to be the fifth Islamic faith in Sunni countries. To Al Aviri, the threat of Shiites is no less than that posed by Jews and Christians.[21]  

Neo-fundamentalists believe that Shiites and Sunni reformists have united to bring change to the political structure of Saudi Arabia, and to establish a secular state there. According to Abdul Rahman Al Najdi, the Taliban spokesperson in 2002, Iraqi Shiites and Americans have united to force Saudis to implement reforms, and to allow Shiites to infiltrate the Saudi political structure. Neo-fundamentalists believe that at present there are two hostile alliances; Zionist-Crusaders and Shiite-Crusaders, and that the latter alliance has grown stronger since the US invasion of Iraq. The sign of this alliance is the negotiations between the US and Iran for authority over the Iraq Sunni population, and over other Sunni countries in the region. Therefore, contrary to Iran and US who wish to see a stable Shiite government in Iraq, neo-fundamentalists want to overthrow the Shiite government of Iraq.

1-2-2     US Support For Corrupt Regimes

Al-Qaeda believes that the US assists corrupt Middle Eastern regimes in their efforts to destroy Islam. In a cassette tape published on January 30, 2005, Ayman Al Zawahiri spoke of the three pillars of Al-Qaeda ideology:

1-    Liberating Islamic lands

2-    Supporting political governance based on Quranic teachings

3-    Liberating the Islamic lands from all monarchies. [22]

They believe that any government is corrupt that is founded on human law rather than on the law of Allah. Such governments, Al Qaida believes, are used as tools by the US in their efforts to control Islamic territories. Such corrupt regimes must be replaced by an Islamic caliphate. In the 2005 tape, the list of these regimes included the Saudi monarchy, Mosharaf’s military government in Pakistan, the puppet regime headed by Karzai in Afghanistan, Mobarak’s government in Egypt, and Libya’s Ghaddafi: all these are illegitimate and must be overthrown. These governments permitted Americans to enter Islamic lands, and jailed devoted Muslim clergies. These pro-US governments are thus composed of infidels, and it is just to kill these rulers. According to Zunes, the real problem of the US policy in the Middle East is the support given to autocratic governments which, in turn, has caused the expansion of neo-fundamentalist Islam.[23]

Section 2: The Combat Tactics of Radical Islamists

2-1 Defensive Jihad

Although the neo-fundamentalists have revived many Salafi concepts, they have modified these ideas as well. Their emphasis on defensive jihad (in contrast to aggressive jihad) is one example of this. Neo-fundamentalists’ conception of Jihad is a reaction to what they call the infidels’ invasion of Islamic Lands.

From the sixth Al-Qaeda official statement:

“All the incidents that happened after the New York and Washington attacks: killing Germans in Tunisia, French men in Karachi, bombing a super tanker in Yemen, killing marines in Filka Kuwait, British and Australian citizens killed in Bali blast, Moscow blasts, and all other periodic operations around the world were in response to Crusaders’ war against Islam.”[24]  

In his January 9, 2006 statement, Bin Laden announced:

“Let me tell you that we do not have anything to lose and we are not scared of you. You have occupied our land, betrayed our dignity, insulted our honor, and spilled the blood of our loved ones. You have plundered our riches, destroyed our homes and made us refugees with no security. We want to inflict the same on you.” [25]

Stressing the defensive jihad approach in his October 30, 2005 statement:

“Swear to God, we did not plan to attack the Twin Towers. But after what the American-Israeli coalition did to Lebanon and Palestine, we took it into consideration.”[26]

It is clear that in spite of the dualistic worldview of good and evil, and contrary to Salafi views, this is a strategy of defensive Jihad.

1-2- The Strategy of “Balance of Terror” and Operations inside US and its allies

In an interview with Tayseer Allouni, Bin Laden named his strategy “Balanced Terror,” and stated:

“They kill us and we are forced to kill them in order to have a balance of terror. This is the only time in recent history that a balance has been reached between Muslims and Americans.” [27]

Then he continued to say that the war will be extended to the US mainland, and will be continued until victory is achieved. This shift, from attacking US interests (as in the 1990s) to attacking the US directly is a sign of Bin Laden’s intentions to use US democratic values against itself.

In an interview with John Miller, Bin Laden announced:

“Instead of attacking the US interests abroad, Muslims have decided to fight the US in its own territories. This will continue until Americans choose a government that is more responsible to them and protects their interests.”[28]  

In the same interview Bin Laden also said:

“I tell the American people to get rid of their treacherous government. Your government is an agent of Israel and this is clear with the Clinton government.”[29]

1-3- Suicide Attacks Against Civilians

In a call to the Iraqi people, Bin Laden states that the use of suicide attacks is key in thwarting the actions of the US and its allies.[30] Bin Laden considered attacking civilians to be both logical and religiously justifiable. He gave two reasons for his belief: a) The principal of retaliation b) Governments represent people, and a cruel state is the agent of a cruel people.

a) The principle of retaliation: Bin Laden listed the activities of the US and Israeli governments: “are our civilians and children not innocent and is their blood worthless? Whenever we kill a civilian all the world cries out, but who is saying our blood is not sacred and theirs is? Who will talk in praise of the people killed in our land? More than a million children are killed in Iraq, and continue to be killed; but why we cannot hear the sound of anyone protesting. [31]

b) To Bin Laden, the US government is the representative of the American people.

Therefore, the American people are directly responsible for everything their government

does. In a letter to the people of Palestine, Al Qaida announced, “the people of American

must make no mistake: we are watching them, and the American political system is a part

of them and belongs to them, as Jewish people in Palestine are part of America. I, sheikh

Osama, swear to God that the people of America will not enjoy a happy moment until we

feel security in Palestine.” [32]

In this statement, Bin Laden explains his efforts to influence public opinion in the US, in order to bring an end to its aggressive policy towards the Islamic World.

Bin Laden also develops religious justifications for his attacks on civilians. Although he mentions the Prophet’s words which forbid the massacre of women and children, he insists that these words are not absolute. He quotes the sayings of earlier Islamic scholars (Ibn Ghayem, Shokani, and Qartobi) to the effect that, if infidels have killed your women and children, you should not fail to do the same to them, especially if it might prevent them from doing it again. To Bin Laden this is religious law, and those who say otherwise have no knowledge of Islam. [33]

However, Bin Laden’s teacher, Abdullah Azam, offered a more comprehensive analysis of the question of whether it is permissible to kill women and civilians in times of war; he stated that Islamic scholars have responded to this question in two ways.

The Maleki School holds that the killing of women and children is never permitted.

The Shafei and Hanafi schools maintain that the killing of women and children is not allowed, unless they either engage in combat, or are indistinguishable from those who are engaged in combat.

In Hokkam Soltanieh, Mavardi says: “Killing women and children, as long as they do not fight, is not allowed, because this has been banned by the Prophet.”  

In Almabsoot, Alsorkhi says, “Attacking the infidel’s castles will not be stopped due to the presence of women and children or even Muslim slaves dwelling in them.”

Ibn Taymiyeh also believes that the presence of human shields (for instance, captured Muslims) should not keep Muslims from attacking the infidels, especially if not attacking might lead to the defeat of Muslims. Some scholars believe that even a ceasefire agreement should not keep Muslims from mounting an attack.[34]

In view of Bin Laden’s and Ayman Al Zawahiri’s speech and actions, it seems that the neo-fundamentalists hold the second position on the question of whether it is permissible to kill civilians.

Based on the image the neo-fundamentalists have of America and its actions, they have announced Jihad against that country. This struggle has two dimensions: 1- The destruction of the “Zionist-Crusader” alliance by attacking its allies and interests around the world; and 2- Attacking America inside its own frontiers.[35] This is what we have seen in the expansion of the attacks on the US and its allies, which have become increasingly common, and increasingly complex.

The number of terrorist attacks against the US and Europe has increased dramatically since the end of the 1990s. These attacks, which used to target US and European interests internationally, have become direct hits inside the borders of these countries. The main goal of these attacks, as Bin Laden put it, was a “Balance in Terror” in order to force the US out of Islamic countries.[36] The table below shows the terrorist attacks of the 1980s, the 1990s, and the early 2000s; it shows a dramatic increase in numbers. In the 1980s there were only six major attacks, while during and after the 1990s, this number increased to 31.

Terrorist Attacks in the 1980s[37]

Casualties	Place of Attack	Date
63 deaths	US embassy in Beirut	April1983
241 deaths	Marine Camp	October 1983
5 deaths	US embassy in Kuwait	December 1983
Dean of Beirut University	Beirut	January 1983
18 deaths	Air base in Spain	April 1983
16 deaths	US embassy in Beirut	September 1984

Terrorist Attacks in the 1990s and 2000s [38]

Description and casualties	Place of attack	Date
World Trade Centre, 6 deaths and 1000 injured	New York, US	February 26, 1993
Small bomb in Philippine airline, killing one Japanese merchant and wounding 10	The Philippines	December 11, 1994
Paris metro and a Jewish school in Lyon	Paris and Lyon, France	July 29, 1994
Military Base bombing	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	November 13, 1995
A tourist site, 9 Germans Killed	Cairo, Egypt	September 18, 1997
A tourist site, 70 killed	Luxor, Egypt	December 17, 1997
US embassies, 200 deaths and thousands injured	Nairobi, Kenya; Darussalam, Tanzania	December 7, 1997
US ship Cole, 17 killed and 39 injured	Yemen	October 12, 2000
World Trade Centre, more than 3000 killed	Washington, New York, US	September 11, 2001
Car bomb, 21 deaths	Tunisia	April 11, 2002
French engineers bus attacked	Karachi, Pakistan	May 8, 2002
US consulate, 12 killed and 51 injured	Karachi, Pakistan	July 14, 2002
French oil tanker, 1 killed	Yemen	October 10, 2002
A club in Bali, 202 killed including 26 British	Bali, Indonesia	October 12, 2002
Israel hotel, 12 killed	Mombasa, Kenya	November 28, 2001
Residential building, 30 killed	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	May 12, 2003
Spanish club, 45 killed and 100 injured	Casablanca, Morocco	May 16, 2003
Marriot hotel, 12 killed and 100 injured	Indonesia	August, 5, 2003
Residential bldg, 17 killed and 80 injured	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	November 8, 2003
Car bomb	Islam Abad, Turkey	November 15, 2003
Car bomb, British consulate and bank, 60 killed	Islamabad, Turkey	November 20, 2003
199 killed	Madrid, Spain	March 11, 2004
6 foreign workers and 1 Saudi killed	Yenbo, Saudi Arabia	May 1, 2004
4 oil rig platform	Alkhobar, Saudi Arabia	May 30, 2004
Car bomb, Australian Embassy, 9 killed and 100 injured	Jakarta, Indonesia	September 8, 2004
Hilton hotel in Taba, bombing in Sinai, 30 killed	Egypt	September 8, 2004
Marriot hotel, 7 injured	Islamabad, Pakistan	October 28, 2004
A theater, 1 killed and 12 injured	Doha, Qatar	March 19, 2005
Cairo market, 2 French and 1 US killed, and 17 injured	Cairo, Egypt	April 7, 2005
Tourist bus burned, 8 injured	Cairo, Egypt	April 30, 2005
Metro and bus blast, 52 killed and 700 injured	London, Britain	July 7, 2005
46 cases of terrorist activity by radical jihadist groups[39]	United States	Between 2001 and 2009

Conclusion:

In this article we have tried to demonstrate that: 1- terrorism is not an intrinsic part of Islam; and 2- Western and especially US actions in Islamic territories, and support for Israel, has contributed to a hostile attitude on the part of Muslim fundamentalists. This has caused a reaction against the US and its allies (who are believed to have formed a “Zionist-Crusader Alliance”). This reaction has been justified as a religious act of jihad. Fundamentalists justify their violence and military activities with reference to the military violence of the US and Israel, and in particular the deaths of civilians caused by these armies. Thus the neo-fundamentalists describe their actions as “balanced terror.” Until the US and its allies end their violent military presence in Islamic territories, the violent reaction of the Islamist neo-fundamentalists will continue.

After analyzing Al Qaida suicide actors from 1995 to 2004, political scientist Robert Pape concludes that two thirds of them come from countries in which the US has a military presence. In another article, he draws the conclusion that these terrorist activities are not religious, but in fact pursue a unique strategic goal: forcing modern democracies to change their policies and end their military presence in Islamic territories. “The goal of more than 95 per cent of terrorist activities is the expulsion of invaders.”[40]

In criticizing the view that Islam is the root cause of terrorist activities, Pape states, “the argument that Islam is the reason behind terror attacks is incorrect. If this was true, then we should have had the majority of these attacks committed by Iran which has a Muslim population three times bigger than Iraq and Saudi Arabia. But in fact we do not see any Iranian Muslim among the terrorists.”[41] 

Pape concluded that, as the presence of the US in the Middle East increases, terrorist activities likewise increase. In his view, there was no terrorist activity in Iraq, prior to the US invasion. However, there were 20 attacks in 2003, 40 in 2004, 50 in 2005, and 65 in 2006. Since 2002, Al Qaida has executed attacks that are fewer in number but more significant in impact, all over the world. These 15 major operations are the equivalent of all their operations pre- 2001. The reason for this is the US military presence in Islamic territories. These territories are holy to the neo-fundamentalists, and must be defended. According to Pape, in 1996 Bin Laden predicted that Iraq would be invaded by the US. George W. Bush made this a reality, and consequently, Bin Laden become more certain of the eventual disintegration of Saudi Arabia at the hands of the US.[42] From this point of view, Bush strengthened the neo-fundamentalists’ view that they are engaged in a war against Crusaders.  

Pape sees the presence of the US in the Middle East as the root cause of anti-Americanism. Similarly, in a Carnegie Foundation seminar on anti-Americanism, Alexander Randos pointed out that “the main reason for anti-Americanism is the cultural differences between the US, with its capitalist-Christian identity, and Islamic groups. According to Randos, US is the cultural “other” of terrorist groups. With the aggressive acts of the US in Islamic territories, its military presence in the Middle East, its support of Israel, and its fight against Islamists, this alien is considered to be an enemy by fundamentalists.[43]

Ivan Crustof also believes that anti-Americanism is a conceptual and cognitive problem that has been embedded in the minds of terrorist groups over a long period of time. It takes different forms in different societies, and reflects the ideological framework of each context in which it is found.[44] The US is caught between the need to reduce anti-Americanism, and the need to secure its interests. It is believed that America’s interests require a US military presence in the Middle East, and the provision of support to the region’s authoritarian regimes, as well as to Israel. This in return strengthens the notion of “America as enemy” in the minds of neo-fundamentalists, and thus contributes to the growth of anti-Americanism.

As Pape suggests, the US military presence in the region is seen by neo-fundamentalists as the actions of an enemy; this leads to terrorism. US actions in response to the Arab-Israel conflict, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Sudan, in Saudi Arabia and in Indonesia have all contributed to this situation. Maybe Bin Laden’s words should be heard once again:

““Swear to God, we did not plan to attack the Twin Towers. But after what the American-Israeli coalition did to Lebanon and Palestine, we took it into consideration.”[45]

[13] Statement From Hizb Ut Thrir. America And Britain Declare War Against Islam And Muslims, Internet, <http://www.khalifah.com/home/category.pho.ducument2428&tagID=3>

[14] World Islamic Front Statement, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders", Internet,<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>

[15] Miller, John(1998) Talking with Terror’s Banker", an ABC News interview with Usama bin-Laden, May 28, 1998.Internet,

[22] Christopher M. Blancchard  (2004) Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, at<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/index.htm>

[25] Usama bin-Laden, (1996) “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" Translated by Gary Hunt.

 At:< http://www.homelandsecurityus.net/osama%20posts/declaration_of_war_against_the_a.htm >

Tahmoures Gholami

International Peace Studies Centre – IPSC

Abstract:

2011 began with the turmoil of the Arab Spring in the Middle East. These events altered circumstances in the region, and forced the United States, the world power with the most influence in the Middle East, to pursue a new course of action. US policy in this region also focused on the continuation of its wars with extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and on finding a solution for Iraq. In 2011, the US was also concerned with human rights in Iran, as well as the country’s nuclear issue. In this article, I will specifically discuss three important and noteworthy issues in the Middle East in 2011, as they pertained to the United States.

Keywords: The United States of America, The Middle East, The Arab Spring, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan.

Introduction:

Due to its position in the hierarchy of global powers, the United States of America is deeply involved in world events. The Middle East was one of the areas defined by the US as a field of interest after WWII, and especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf subsystem in particular, have always played a key role in the American presidents’ doctrines, and in National Security bills. This is a result of the region’s strategical, political and economical importance. However, this position became much more significant after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a trend which was only heightened after 9/11. In 2011, the Middle East received a degree of US attention that went far beyond that received by any other region in the world. The basis of this interest lay in a series of important developments (and high degree turmoil) that unraveled in the Middle East during 2011, widely referred to as “The Arab Spring.”

The United States’ interest in and attention towards the Middle East can be broken down into the following categories:

1. Issues related to the United States’ war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its fight with terrorism in Pakistan.

2. Issues related to the turmoil in Arab countries and the United States’ policies in this regard.

3. Iran

The first issue discussed here is the United States’ economic crisis and the movement known as Occupy Wall Street which resulted from this financial crisis.  The economic crisis at home, and Middle East tensions abroad, made 2011 a difficult year for the United States.

Internal Economic Crisis and the Occupy Wall Street Movement:

The US economic crisis was a financial crisis, which, in its early stages, resulted from the government’s inability to control and restrain events, leading to instability, and the continuance of serious problems. The financial crisis involved a social dimension: the Occupy Wall Street movement, which signified the dissatisfaction felt by many Americans, critiqued widespread injustice and the persistent economic disparity in the United States. The financial crisis, which had weakened the economic situation of the country since 2007, led thinkers like Zbigniew Berginski to warn of the likelihood of future social unrest, even before the Occupy Wall Street movement. This financial crisis, and government attempts to control it, will be further discussed below, as will the social aspect of this crisis— the Occupy Wall Street Movement – and its grounds.

The United States Financial Crisis:

The financial crisis in the US, which also destabilized the financial institutions of other countries, came to a head at the end of September 2008. However, the crisis really began in mid-2007, as a result of the downfall of the subprime mortgage market. That collapse resulted in the bankruptcy of financial institutions in the mortgage market, including large investment banks such as Lehman Brothers.

The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy announcement, which came on September 14, 2008, swiftly initiated the bankruptcy of other banks. Stock exchange prices and financial assets hit an extreme low on September 15. The crisis and its aftermath led to the unemployment of 6.2 million Americans in 2008; the unemployment rate was at its highest in 40 years. The crisis also had an impact worldwide; by late September 2008, the financial institutions of other developed countries had suffered in similar ways.

Many economists believe that extremely risky policies adopted by financial institutions caused the financial crises in recent decades. Previous financial crises have been explained as the result of the governments’ irresponsible policies. For instance, many believe that weak regulations played a key role in motivating major financial institutions to adopt extremely risky policies. The regulation of the financial system in the US is weak and insufficient; most analysts consider the system that regulates the US financial markets to be old-fashioned and inefficient.

In addition to the weakness of US financial regulations, another important factor that encouraged American financial institutions to take high risks were the new possibilities generated by financial innovations. Such innovations allowed financial institutions to transfer their individual risks to the other members (or sectors) of the market. It was in this context that a crucial gap emerged between necessary risks and system risks.

There were two important actions taken in the US to control the crisis. The first was the Paulson Plan, designed to rescue critical institutions, that was presented to congress in September 19, 2008. Based on the law, the American government was authorized to spend up to 700 billion dollars to help the “distressed assets” program. The second action was a policy of fiscal expansion in the form of the Obama Stimulus Plan. The cost of the economic stimulus package was estimated to be $787 billion at the time of its passage. The Act included direct spending in infrastructure, education, health, energy, federal tax incentives, and expansion of unemployment benefits, as well as other social welfare provisions. Other measures were also taken at the international level, and in the framework of the European Union and the G20, to control the crisis.

The Occupy Wall Street Movement:

America’s national financial crisis resulted in increasing pressure on American society and its people, which led to the emergence of the Occupy Wall Street Movement – a mass protest against unemployment and injustice that condemned American financial institutions for the crisis. In order to fully understand the source of this crisis, it is necessary to examine the history of wealth distribution in the US. After World War II, the US enjoyed the most flourishing economy worldwide. It possessed a huge amount of the globe’s wealth. In such a position –with the presence of giant multinational companies, huge factories, and highly developed technology – American people expected prosperity, and a high standard of living, to continue. But that has not been the case.

Based on confirmed data, America has the largest gap between rich and poor citizens of all the developed countries in the world. The gap between the rich – the one percent – and the rest of Americans – the remaining 99 percent – has reached an unprecedented size. For the first time in American history, the one percent owns more than 70 percent of the country’s assets.  In other words, the assets and wealth of America’s 400 wealthiest people is equal to the wealth of the other 155 million.[1]

Between 1980 and 2006, the income and revenue of the one percent tripled, while the income of the remaining 90 percent increased by only 20 percent. According to Robert Freeman, a well-known American economist, between 2002 and 2006, three quarters of America’s economic growth benefited the one percent. The taxes received from 400 of the wealthiest American citizens were 17% of their earnings, a significant decrease from the 26% percent they paid in 1992.The income of the one percent grew 700 % between 1980 and 2007, while the revenue growth of the middle class was only 20 % during the same period.

Based on the analysis done by “The McClatchy Newspaper,” presently more than 16 million Americans live in absolute poverty, with an annual income of less than $9,000. The rate of all Americans who live in absolute poverty has increased from 29 percent in 1975 to 43 percent in 2005, and it is still growing. Over the past two decades, Americans have experienced the highest increase in poverty of all the 31 developed countries in the world.[2]

 With the unprecedented gap between the rich and the poor, never before seen in the history of America, the middle class that made the US a global superpower is now on the decline.  But in spite of the recent economic recession, American companies have earned unprecedented profits. 2009 was a year of comparatively low profits and bonuses, yet executives were able to earn more than $150 billion in both. That amount is certainly earned from the taxes paid by ordinary people; if these resources were used to create jobs, it  would be possible to allocate annual salaries equal to $30,000 for 5 million people.[3]

Corporate executives receive the highest salaries. Executives’ salaries have increased by 250% since 1970, while ordinary workers’ salaries have increased by only 26%. Managers of large companies earn 500 times more than regular employees. Today, workers work longer hours, and produce higher profits for companies, but what they receive is rapidly being reduced.[4] The profit that they make goes directly into the pockets of the rich and the economic elites. While 68.2 million Americans struggle to put food on the table, and while 90% of the population is experiencing a decline in income, the revenue of American billionaires is at an all-time high. The bottom 20% does not have any assets or wealth, and their debt is higher than their level of income. The middle class has an average total value of $60,000; however, this pales in comparison to the average assets of the one percent, estimated at $12.5 million.[5]

In short, since 2011:                        

• 1.3 million People have become poor.

• 1.4 million People have been deprived of health care.

• More than 2 million jobs have been lost in the private sector.

• A 6.5 trillion dollar budget surplus has transformed into over a $1 trillion deficit.

• Economic growth rate has fallen to nearly one percent, which is unprecedented in the last 50 years.[6]

The huge gap between the rich and the poor in America is not an accident and it has not happened overnight. This process is a result of the government’s economic policies over several decades. It results from measures taken by the wealthy class and big banks that use their assets and influences to persuade politicians to implement policies that exploit 99.9 percent of the population, in order to increase the interests and benefits of the one percent. Some experts have named these actions “financial terrorism.”

Some scholars believe that “Fascism has transformed; therefore, there is no need to shed blood and force people to work in labor camps. You can do all that through more peaceful means, by the use of economic policies, while sitting in your Jacuzzi or your private jet, separating yourself from the world around you.” This statement is not mere hyperbole. As we digest the fact that trillions of dollars benefit about one-tenth of the one percent of the rich, while the majority of people live in poverty, one may very well conclude that a so-called new “feudal and fascist” government is indeed in power in America today. Their wealth has never been as great as it is now. Meanwhile, politicians act as puppets, implementing policies that reduce standard of living of the poor and the middle class, while benefiting themselves.[7]

Experts believe that the crisis that has currently plagued America is the result of the actions of the one percent – to be specific, by the richest one-tenth of that one percent. These are the ones who profit most from this crisis. For example, in the first quarter of 2011, US companies recorded profit growth at 31%, while they also received tax cuts of 31%. The richest one-tenth of the one percent is regularly able to receive financial aids and easy loans to increase their profits and continue their production overseas (where they often avoid paying taxes). Furthermore, this group manages to affect the legislative process of the country, by persuading Congress to pass bills and bylaws in their favor. Some of the most complex pieces of tax legislation have been supported by such wealthy figures in America. Such laws allow the one-tenth of the one percent to increase their wealth, protect it, and influence the country’s policies, legislation and law-making processes. The real wealth and power belongs to the one-tenth of the one percent. 99.9% of the rest of the population do not possess sufficient knowledge of the financial system; nor do they participate in its processes.

Experts believe that even after the financial crisis, major banks and financial institutions continued to benefit from billions of dollars in tax breaks and other financial aid. As a result, the annual profit of Wall Street executives peaked in the midst of the economic crisis, reaching a record of $145 billion dollars in 2009. That figure rose to $150 billion dollars the following year. According to official statistics, companies such as Cigna, Humana, United Health, WellPoint and Aetna received around $200 million dollars in financial aid in 2009; in the same year, their profits also increased by 39%. [8]

Among these corporations, Oil companies that are primarily owned by Wall Street banks, also benefit from war and crisis. Five large oil companies in America reached an unprecedented record of $36 billion profit in the first quarter of the last year. These companies also receive an annual tax cut of $6 billion. Statistics and figures demonstrate how these wealthy individuals have managed to influence America’s political processes. In 1995, 400 of richest Americans paid 30% of their revenue as their income tax to the government, but that amount dropped down to about 18 percent in 2010.[9]

The current crisis of capitalism differs greatly from previous recessions due to its broad social impact. The Occupy Wall Street Movement, the social dimension of the current crisis, not only includes the usual determined opponents of capitalism; it gathers people from a range social groups and classes. Social injustice in the United States is not limited to any particular group or movement: it is an epidemic. The wide range of injustices that led to this movement makes it possible to call Occupy Wall Street a social movement.

United States and the Middle East:

2011 began with the turmoil of the Arab Spring in the Middle East. These events altered circumstances in the region, and forced the United States, the world power with the most influence in the Middle East, to pursue a new course of action. US policy in this region also focused on the continuation of its wars with extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and on finding a solution for Iraq. In 2011, the US was also concentrated on Iran: human rights, the country’s nuclear abilities, and terrorism being the three key issues which, according to Brzezinski, would lead to war.

Accordingly, we will discuss the three important and noteworthy issues relevant to US policy in the Middle East specifically in 2011.

Continuing the War Against Terrorism in Afghanistan and Its Penetration into Pakistan:

After the September 11 attacks, the United States targeted Afghanistan in its war with fundamentalists and, according to the US, with terrorist groups. During the presidency of George W. Bush, the war continued on and off (at times intense, at times slow and sluggish), fought by America and its NATO allies. Different aspects of the reconstruction of Afghanistan were also considered. Beginning in Obama’s presidency, it was announced that the United States’ “war on terror” would centre on Pakistan. Thus began America’s military operations in and around Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. At certain times, these military operations were conducted with the consent of the government of Pakistan; at other times, they were conducted without this consent. With Bin Laden hiding in Pakistan and finally discovered there by the United States, the US became more determined to shift its main focus to Pakistan in the fight against terrorism. However, this does not mean that all troops are to leave Afghanistan. While the US emphasizes the evacuation of NATO troops from Afghanistan by 2014, it has signed a strategic alliance pact (a treaty) based on its long-term national interests in Afghanistan.

With the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, the Obama administration signed a security pact with that country, at which point it was agreed that some American forces would remain in Iraq for military training-related matters. The United States was working to end the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the result of this was Washington’s success in concluding strategic security treaties with Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Revolutions of the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring brought many changes and challenges to the leaders of the region. Consequently, the United States worked to change its policies to suit the new circumstances in the Middle East in general, and to specifically address the crisis in each of the countries involved. In early 2011, the United States concluded that support for the challenged rulers, and resistance to the passionate demands of the people, would result in negative consequences for America. Therefore, Washington asked Hosni Mobark to leave office, called on the leaders of Bahrain to engage in internal reform, invited the Yemeni government to respect the rights of the people, and supported the opposition in Syria by imposing pressure on the Syrian government. Offering support to the people was one aspect of the US policies. The other aspect was crisis management. As much as White House officials were not interested in resisting the passionate demands of the Arab nations, they were not prepared to stand back either, since such passion and excitement might lead to negative consequences for American interests in the region. Thus, the United States’ main policy in relation to the Arab Spring was to manage and control the situation in order to prevent outbursts that might result in unforeseeable and permanent change.

In Egypt, the United States seized control of the situation through the Egyptian military, in order to keep the changes gradual, rather than sudden and revolutionary. In Yemen, it entrusted the management of the country’s situation to the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf). However, while expressing dissatisfaction towards Abdullah Saleh, for civilian deaths in Yemen, the US did not impose much pressure on him to leave power. In Bahrain, too, though the US initially called for reforms, its preferred policy was to manage the situation rather than help change it. Washington entrusted the Saudi government in that regard, which then sent its military forces to Bahrain to control the situation. Since the United States had never trusted Gaddafi, the US welcomed the involvement of European countries in Libya and, with their support, followed through on a policy of change. In order to escape the negative consequences of conflict with Syria, in that country the US assigned responsibility to the Arab League and to Turkey. Thus, America took responsibility for managing developments in Egypt by itself, entrusted the management of changes in Yemen to the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, in Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, in Libya to the European Union, and in Syria to Turkey and the Arab League. The main purpose of these policies was to prevent rapid, unexpected and explosive changes.

The United States and Iran

The United States paid special attention to Iran in 2011. Though Washington has never stopped putting political and economical pressure on Tehran, its actions against that country in 2011 – which were accompanied by the total support of America’s Western, Arabic and Asian allies – surpassed previous pressures both quantitatively and qualitatively. The second half of 2011 marked the peak of the United States’ political and economic actions against Iran. The United States took four basic measures against Iran this year:

1) The US and its allies imposed strong sanctions against Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical industries. The United States took direct aim at these industries in full awareness of Iran’s economic dependence on oil and gas. Prior to 2011, European governments had recognized “D’Amato Law” as an America’s domestic law in relation to the prohibition of investment in Iranian oil and gas industries, and they refused to accept the law. But in 2011 they not only supported a boycott of the Iranian oil and gas industry alongside America, they were even quicker to put it into action. In addition to sanctions against Iran’s oil and gas industry, the US and its allies are presently discussing sanctions against Iran’s oil exports as well.

2) America and its allies imposed financial sanctions against Iran, and especially against the Central Bank of Iran. The purpose of this action was to create problems for Iranian exports and imports and foreign trades. This sanction plan has been approved by the US Congress and only needs to be signed by the country’s president. Financial sanctions against Iran by Britain resulted in tensions between Iran and the United Kingdom.

3) The United States, supported by its allies, plans to apply sanctions against Iranian political and military officials, as well as against public and private companies associated with the country’s nuclear plans. This kind of sanction has no historical precedent.

4). The fourth measure taken by the United States against Iran is in the field of information technology and virtual space. Since the beginning of Obama’s administration, the US Foreign Relations Department has repeatedly stated that Internet freedom and free access to the net (virtual space) are of primary importance, and are at the center of its foreign policy. The US is engaged in designing and distributing these “liberating technologies,” and is currently conducting the “internet in a suitcase” project in relation to Iran and other countries with which it is on unfavorable terms.

Bibliography

http://www.asriran.com/

http://www.tabnak.ir/

http://www.farsnews.com/

http://www.mashreghnews.ir/

http://kurdpress.com/fa/

http://irna.ir/

http://www.reuters.com/

http://www.nytimes.com/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/

Notes

By Vali Kouzehgar Kaleji

International Peace Studies Center (IPSC)

Dr. Mitat Çelikpala is Associate Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University, İstanbul. He was born in Ankara on 19 October 1969. He graduated from Middle East Technical University Dep. of Political Science and Public Administration. He received his MA and PhD on International Relations from Bilkent University. His areas of expertise are the Caucasus, North Caucasian Diaspora, people and security in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions and Turkish-Russian relations. In addition to Kadir Has University, he is lecturing in Turkish War College and Turkish National Security Academy on Turkish foreign policy, politics, history and security in the Caucasus and Central Asia and Turkish political structure and life. Dr. Celikpala is serving as Academic Adviser to NATO’s Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (DATR) and National Security Academy. He is the board member of Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Strategic Research Centre and Turkish Armed Forces Strategic Research Centre. He has several numbers of published academic articles and media coverage and analyses on above mentioned areas. In this interview, Dr. Çelikpala will answer to IPSC questions regarding development in the South Caucasus specially role of Iran and Turkey in this strategic region.

IPSC: After the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey has in recent years experienced a transformation in domestic policy and in foreign policy at the same time. In your perspective, what are the main transformations in Turkish foreign policy toward South Caucasus during AKP authority?

-As far as the Caucasus has concerned, I do not see any fundamental change in Turkish foreign policy thinking and making. Turkey’s main priorities are territorial integrity of all Caucasian states, peaceful solution to all conflicts, increasing cooperation economic and commercial relations, establishing energy links. There are the same priorities both before and after AKP rule. Thus, I may say that there is no watershed transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy in the Caucasus but continuation. Georgia is still an important partner for Turkey and Azerbaijan is the key for Turkey’s policies in the Caucasus. Armenia is also still the other I the Caucasus. 

IPSC: Turkey and Armenia, neighbors sundered by a century of bitterness over the claim of mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks and Nagorno Gharabagh conflict. But in spite of these challenges, two countries normalized their bilateral relation since 2008. What’s your analysis from process of normalization of this relation?

- Both parties were tried for normalization but the relations are not normalized. They signed two protocols just after the August War of Russia and Georgia but the imagined result is not achieved. Border is still closed, issues are still on the table, 2015 (100^th anniversary of 1915 events) is coming, Nagorno-Karabakh is still under Armenian occupation and protocols are waiting for ratification. Moreover, the leaders from both sides are making high volume speeches and accusing the other side to break the atmosphere. Under these circumstances, it is almost impossible to reach out any solution to any problem between the parties.

IPSC: After normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations, Azerbaijan government and nation criticized Turkey’s policy. What’s your opinion about Turkey-Azerbaijan bilateral relation after this event?

- It is apparent that Azerbaijan has not really been satisfied in one way or another of the signature of protocols and normalization with Armenia. During 2009, topics that were not expressed loudly in previous periods began to be voiced: they centered around subjects like the Azerbaijani bind on Turkey’s Caucasian policy, the existence of both country’s own interests and debates about the pricing of natural gas. This situation indicates that the two parties shifted their grounds on their mutual relationship in those days. But it seems that both of the parties are recovered after 2 years negotiations. Turkey quit the normalization process and parties signed new energy agreements. Both parties has started to develop more formal relations afterwards and trying to understand the others national interests than develop more realistic friendship and cooperation.

IPSC: Following the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 and the ensuing Russian recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Caucasus situation has changed. Turkey government planed a program called “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP)” for solving problems. What’s your about this program and its real results?

- Turkey’s first reaction to the atmosphere of uncertainty and chaos that was generated by war,   had been the proposal for the formation of the CSCP, which aimed at ending the war promptly and finding solutions to the issues on the regional level. The proposal brought into agenda when Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that Turkey might attempt to constitute a “Caucasian Alliance” similar to the model in the Balkans. When Abdullah Gül announced support for this project, the process gained acceleration. The fundamental purpose of CSCP is contributing to the establishment of peace and stability in the region through dialogue. In this context, it aims to remove the tension with war-like tendencies among these countries by means of a settlement that puts economic and commercial relations to the center. It had been thought that this initiative might serve as a cooperation platform, which would bring South Caucasian countries and Russia together within the framework of OSCE principles and give priority to the establishment of security, stability prosperity in the region.

          Although CSCP proposal has officially been delivered to all of these countries, no institutionalization was achieved until spring 2010. It seems that the biggest problem haunting the search for cooperation in the Caucasus is the lack of sufficient social, political and economic institutions in the Caucasian republics. An atmosphere of distrust still prevails among Caucasian countries. During the meetings held through the Turkish initiative, the parties declared commitment to common efforts and cooperation for solving the disagreements in the region; however, the negative atmosphere created by bilateral problems prevented the formation of the CSCP. The idea for the formation of a regional platform had come up due to the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of extra-regional solution suggestions; however countries like Georgia stood aloof to the proposal due to the importance they attached to the role of non-regional political actors such as the US and the EU. On the other hand, the suggestion to institutionalize CSCP according to the principles of OSCE meant the exclusion of regional actors such as Iran from the process and put parties of the issues like Abkhazia and South Ossetia into an ambiguous position.

Moreover, Turkey’s CSCP proposal caused suspicion, even a reaction, among Western allies, with US being in the first place. The reason for this reaction rested in the suspicion that Turkey might be taking steps independent of its allies, while the allies in the West were trying to build a common stance against the RF within the framework of the EU and NATO. It should be noted that the suspicious outlook at the initial stages of the proposal were fundamentally caused by the exclusion possibilities due to the stress on regionalism and the unease generated by the fact that the first negotiations were carried out with Moscow.

The Azerbaijani perspective regarded the CSCP at a ground in which the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh issue could be discussed by taking Azerbaijan’s arguments into consideration. In addition to the prospect of discussing and solving the issue on a regional platform including Turkey and the forging of a mechanism that would prevent the spread of conflict into the broader Caucasian region was regarded as reasonable. Armenia, on the hand, showed the tendency to consider the CSCP as a mechanism that would satisfy its own expectations. The primary expectations of Armenia were the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border; the possibility to negotiate with Turkey on new grounds; the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in a satisfactory manner for Armenia; and CSCP’s being a supporting/complementary platform for the working of the AGİT Mink group. Furthermore, the expectation that CSCP would be a new and efficient mechanism in overcoming the economic and commercial damage caused by the Georgian war is also significant. When it comes to Georgia, it could be argued that it was inclined to see the CSCP as a settlement that would prevent aggressive Russian attitudes and especially help in the process of Georgia’s EU membership. However, Georgia became aliened with the CSCP as the settlement had the possibility of excluding the EU and hence not fulfilling its expectations in that respect. Even though Saakashvili declared his support for CSCP during Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Tiflis on August 14, Georgia’s overall tendency is not to take place in any common platform with Russia as long as it has not proven its trustworthiness.

         In the end, the CSCP is still standing on the table as a proposal that has not been openly rejected by any of the parties in the Caucasus, but proves that institutionalization is dependent on the solution of the region’s problems and that regional competition is the biggest obstacle for cooperation and stability. CSCP, which has been a regional settlement idea with the claim to solve the region’s problems, has become the victim of those very same problems. The parties are continuing to pursue sort of a “wait and see” policy.

IPSC: For two decades, Turkey’s Caucasian Diaspora was active in supporting Chechens in their struggle against the Russian army and in turn, the Russian administration was tolerant towards the PKK activities in Russia. Indeed, two countries had different policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan. But the new attitude of Turkish policy-makers has had a positive impact on foreign policy, allowing them to consider better relations with Russia and the possibility of cooperation to solve regional issues. What’s your opinion about impacts of new Turkey-Russia relations on developments of South Caucasus?

- Turkish Russian relations are developing since 2001 and both parties defined Eurasia as the field of cooperation/operation. Despite the fact that parties are on the different sides in some issues they prefer to look at the full side of the bottle. It is good in fact. But the basis interests are not identical. Russia supported Turkish initiatives in the region. During the RF Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s official visit to Turkey on September 2, 2008, the subject of CSCP proposal was also addressed along with matters of bilateral cooperation. At the joint press conference with Ali Babacan, Lavrov stated that CSCP is an embodiment of common sense since it dwells on prompting the countries of the region to solve their own problems and defined it as a settlement that would increase regional stability and decrease any potential for conflict. The “exclusion” of non-regional actors, primarily the US, is at the basis of Russia’s quick and positive response. Against the backdrop of positively developing relations between Russia and Turkey, the CSCP was perceived in the Caucasus as a settlement that would ensure the influential position of Russia in the region.

       Leaders of both countries coming together regularly and evaluating the issues. But utmost the interests are different and this is a potential for any regional disagreements. Turkey wants to change the region in line with her interests on the other hand Russia wants to keep the regional balance with her.

IPSC: After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in November 2002, there was a marked rise in political and economic relations with Iran. But it seems to Turkey and Iran has been remain as a rival in South Caucasus. For example, Ankara had no attention to role of Iran in Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). What’s you analysis in this regard? How can Iran and turkey cooperate in South Caucasus?

- Both parties are on different sides. Turkey do not see Iran as a partner in the Caucasus because of different reasons: Iran-Armenia relations, US sanctions, Iran’s attitude towards Azerbaijan and energy game. These are uncompromising points. Under current conditions, I do not see any prospect of cooperation between Iran and Turkey in the Caucasus.

IPSC: And finally, what’s your suggestion for cooperation between main players of South Caucasus including  three countries of the region, Russia, Turkey, Iran, EU and the United States? If it’s possible according to different goals and interest?

- No I do not see any change of position in the existing camps in the Caucasus. Turkey is furthering its cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Armenia is still the other for both Azerbaijan and Turkey. The US seems alienated itself from the region and the EU is struggling with its own serious problems. Thus Russia and Turkey are the main poles for the Caucasian states/nations. Iran is offering almost nothing to those actors under current developments.

IPSC: Thanks for your kindness and cooperation.   

International Peace Studies Center (IPSC)

PRZEMYSŁAW OSIEWICZ – born in 1979, graduated in political science in the field of international relations from Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. Currently an Assist. Prof. at AMU Poznan and an expert at the Sobieski Institute in Warsaw. He has a PhD in political science. His doctoral thesis was dedicated to Plans and Initiatives for a Peaceful Settlement of the Cyprus Question: Legal and Political Aspects. Previous studies/guest researcher: Södertörns Högskola (Stockholm, Sweden); Eastern Mediterranean University (Famagusta, Cyprus); Chinese Culture University (Taipei, Taiwan); National Taipei University (Taiwan); Selcuk Universitesi (Konya, Turkey); Mersin Universitesi (Turkey), Linnaeus University (Sweden), University College Ghent (Belgium). His scientific interests involve international conflicts and disputes, unrecognized states, security of energy supplies, Greek – Turkish relations, the Cyprus question, EU – Turkey relations, Iran’s foreign policy and cross-strait relations between the mainland China and Taiwan. Cooperates  with IPIS in Tehran. In this interview, Dr. Osiewicz will answer to IPSC questions regarding development in the Poland, Economic Crisis and EU sanctions against Iran.

IPSC: As you know, parliamentary election to both the Senate and the Sejm (lower house) was held in Poland on 9 October 2011 and Civic Platform Party won 207 seats in the Polish National Assembly, meaning that Donald Franciszek Tusk, chairman of the Civic Platform, became the first Prime Minister to be re-elected since the fall of communism in Poland. What’s your analysis about this election?

- In my opinion these elections proved that all processes related to political transformation in Poland had been completed.  All changes initiated after 1989,  namely after the fall of the communist regime, resulted in a stable and predictable system which should be classified as an example of liberal democratic system. Besides, the outcome should be seen as a public acceptance of the current policy of the PO-PSL government. Thanks to good decisions and reasonable policies, so far Poland has managed to avoid consequences of the global financial crisis and probably that’s the main reason why Poles count on continuity rather than any changes. Yet it does not change the fact that the Tusk’s government will have to face some problems as well as introduce a few unpopular reforms in 2012. One of them is connected with a pension scheme.

IPSC: Komorowski was the governing Civic Platform party’s candidate in the resulting 2010 presidential election, which he won in the second round of voting on 4 July 2010. According to results of parliamentary election, what’s your opinion about  President Komorowski ‘s political situation?

- The parliamentary elections of 9 October 2011 did not change the political situation of President Bronislaw Komorowski. Although he was elected in 2010 thanks to the Civic Platform support, certainly he is not a representative of the ruling party anymore. On the contrary, he tries to become a middleman between the government and the Opposition. Undoubtedly, it is a very hard task, however, the President believes in his political vision and does his best in order to unite rather than divide political elites in Poland especially as far as tensions between the Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice Party (PIS) are concerned.

IPSC: Polish Independence Day celebrated with protests, a coalition of leftists, anarchists, pro-abortionists and Greens, and police arrested more than 120 people. What were the reasons for the protest?

- Worldwide various political groups try to exploit national holidays to present their attitude either towards historical events or towards ongoing changes. The same takes place in Poland, however, until November 2011 we had never witnessed such riots. In my opinion, it was a clash of two extreme political groups, namely nationalists and leftists, which have only marginal influence on the ongoing political and social processes in Poland. Unfortunately, the president of Warsaw allowed them to protest on the same day and in the same district what resulted in the riots. Yet it does not mean that both groups can be scorned by the government as their members are mostly young people who are potential voters. The problem is both groups have contrary visions of Poland and it will not change as differences between them are ideological. Moreover, the same phenomenon, namely the clash of leftist and nationalist groups can be observed in almost all European states. It was proved that people become more radical during crises. I would add that it is true especially in case of economic crises.

IPSC: The global economic crisis has had a profound affect on the public finances of many countries, especially those in Europe. Poland is not immune to the effects of the crisis and like all other EU countries in the last two years, Poland’s public debt has increased to dangerous levels and the budget deficit remains high. How do you think about consequences of economic crisis on economic, social and political situation in Polish society?

- As you said Poland is not immune to the effects of the current crisis, but our situation is still very good comparing to Greece, Portugal, Spain or Hungary. The best proof is that our economic growth is still very high in comparison with other European states. According to Standard & Poor’s, our rating (A) is higher than ratings of Ireland (BBB), Italy (BBB) or Portugal (BB). What is more, when the Polish parliament accepted the new budget bill for 2012 some financial experts announced that the rating of Poland may soon increase to AA. That’s the level of France or Austria. In an article published in ‘The Economist’ in 2011 its author even wondered whether anybody had informed Poles about the current crisis in Europe. His remark was related both to a relatively low level of unemployment as well as high internal consumption in Poland. All commercial centers in Poland are still full of consumers who spend their money on everything. It only proves that most of Poles have not noticed any major negative change related to their living standard. All in all, the current situation is good, however, it is not perfect. There are still many things to do in order to avoid negative consequences of the crisis in the nearest future. If the government does not introduce some unpopular reforms related to taxes or public expenditures in 2012, Poles will have to face the same problems as their friends in Hungary or Greece. Well, the problem is that nowadays everything changes so dynamically that you cannot be sure of anything. I guess that’s the price we have to pay for globalization.

IPSC: ­“I hope the Polish people, for centuries a true European people, by cultivating its values, will find its rightful place in the structures of the European Community”, Pope Jean Paul II said about Europeanization of Poland. In current situation, what’s your perspective about Poland and EU relations including their challenges and opportunists?  

- Poland has been a part of the Western civilization since 966, namely since the Baptism of Poland. The communist period (1945-1989) was just a short episode in comparison with our rich history and the role we played in Europe before 1939. Let me remind you that if King Sobieski had not defeated Kara Mustafa in the battle of Vienna in 1683, the Western Europe would have become a part of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the Cold War resulted in both political and identity divisions in Europe. It will take some time to get rid of them, however, I am very optimistic about it especially when I see young Europeans studying together and making friends across the whole continent. The best test of the ‘Polish’ Europeanization was our presidency in the EU Council in the second half of 2011. Well, the task was really hard as the Polish presidency had to cope with consequences of the economic crisis in the EU, the crisis within the euro zone and the Arab awakening. According to many EU officials, including the current President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, it was one of the best presidencies in recent years. Well, I do hope that the EU will overcome all economic difficulties. As to Pope John Paul II, he always advocated a dialogue between civilizations and therefore was respected by most of Muslims. I hope we will be able to continue his work. In my opinion almost all European leaders including Polish leaders opt for cooperation with the Islamic world rather than any confrontation. 

IPSC: As you know, US and EU imposed different sanctions against Iran. So Iran has reacted to growing international pressure by threatening to block naval traffic across the Strait of Hormuz, threatening a vital international oil route in the Persian Gulf that led to increase tensions between Iran and Western and Arab Countries. What’s your analysis about consequences of this issue? What’s your opinion about Poland perspective and role in current situation?

- I guess no side can be satisfied with the current state of affairs. Of course the EU as a sovereign international actor had right to impose such sanctions on Iran. Poland, on the basis of the EU solidarity, accepted them. Yet, at least in my opinion, it is clear that all European governments would prefer to cooperate with Iran rather than impose sanctions which put not only Iran but also some EU member states at a disadvantage. Although Poland does not import Iranian oil, it still advocates dialogue with Iranian authorities. I would like to emphasize that Poles remember how Iranians saved thousands of Polish orphans during World War II. This year we celebrate another anniversary of this event. I do hope that both sides will soon come to a negotiation table in order to find the best political solution. Once Poland was a middleman between Iraq and  the United States. In February 2012 it became a middleman between the U.S. and Syria, namely the Polish embassy represents Americans in Damascus. Who knows, maybe Poland could become a middleman between other EU member states and Iran this time? Although in fact we represent one side of the dispute, we have maintained very good relations with Iran for years. It is something we must not lose.

IPSC: Thanks for your responses and cooperation.

Number 5, July-September 2011

Seyed Abdolamir Nabavi

Institute for Social and Cultural Studies (ISCS), Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Islamic Radicalism in the Arab World, despite many years of serious and constant struggles, has been unable to attain its most important goal: the establishment of Islamic government. Accordingly, this paper examines the causes of this failure, considering the experiences of Egypt. While most experts on Islamism have focused upon the adoption of a policy of continued suppression by the Egyptian government, and on the other hand, huge Western support for the country’s political elites, and have viewed these two variables as influential in the failure of the current in question, a different hypothesis can be proposed. On this basis, although the role the aforementioned factors play in this regard cannot be denied, “ambiguities” and “simplifications” towards the political and social questions found in the radical Islamists’ thoughts have been introduced as two significant factors explaining their failure to attain power and establish a Islamic government. In this respect, the thoughts and opinions of Seyed Qutb and Mohammad Abdussalam Faraj who are among the most salient theoreticians in this movement will be studied and analyzed.

Keywords: Political Islam, Islamic Government, Seyed Qutb, Mohammad Abdussalam Faraj, Radicalism, Terrorism.

Introduction

Egypt is considered as one of the old bases of Islamism in the Arab world. Various Islamist groups have been formed in this country and proportional to their domestic conditions and also the prevailing atmosphere, they have been exerting influence on the social and political climate of the country. The most important aim of these groups, regardless of the extent of their influence, has been creating a new social and political order in this country, based on sharia. Obviously the fulfillment of this objective precipitates dismantling the incumbent political system and transforming its existing pattern of relations with Western countries and, in particular, the US.

Although the Egyptian Islamic groups have had their ups and downs in the past years, based on their approaches to achieve their set goals, they can be divided into two main currents: 1. Moderate groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest Islamic movement in Egypt, which have based their activities on the principle of “da’wa” (invitation) and gradual transformation. 2. Extremist groups such as Aljihad and Aljama’a al-Eslamiah which view “jihad” and armed struggle as the only feasible ways to attain their goals. It is quite apparent that none of these groups have achieved their goals, and the Islamists’ determined and sustained attempt, either moderate or extremist has not culminated in the establishment of an Islamic government in Egypt; neither the peaceful behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood nor the armed struggle of Aljihad and Jama’a al-Eslamiah has been efficient. In a significant transformation in the late 1990s “the ceasefire declaration” was issued by the imprisoned leaders of Aljjihad and Jama’a Aleslamiah and was endorsed by Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman who was in prison in New York at the time. According to this declaration the Islamists were requested to abstain from violence and armed attacks. Although this announcement was initially doubted and opposed by the leaders of the two groups, in 1999 Jama’a Aleslamiah officially announced that it would halt its military operations. Moreover in an interview in 2002, some of the imprisoned leaders talked about “rethinking their position” and “correcting their past blunders”. (1)

What is at issue here has been formed through focusing on the radical current based on the frustration and failure in fulfilling the objective­ – the establishment of an Islamic government. In other words, the question is why haven’t they succeeded in establishing their favorable political system and ideal government despite years of ceaseless struggle and armed activities? Interestingly, most radical groups deemed establishing an Islamic system in Egypt as the initial, and not the final step in the course of their struggle; they did not intend to merely seize the political system in Egypt, but they considered it as one stage of a lengthy far-reaching global struggle.

Many authorities on the issue of Islamism have paid heed to the failure of Islamists to attain their goals and most of them have highlighted the role of severe measures taken by Egyptian security forces and Western countries’ massive support of the government. (2) Although the significance of these two factors is not underestimated in this study, the role of another variable is underlined: “the main culpable factor in the radical Islamists’ failure to establish an Islamic system in Egypt has been the ambiguities and naiveties in their attitude towards social and political issues and the relations that govern the world. These ambiguities and naiveties could not offer an appropriate scientific method for transforming the existing relations.”

To test out this hypothesis, first the gap between the objectives and achievements is studies and afterwards the opinions and speculations of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj− as two of the important Islamic radicalism ideologue in Egypt− are reviewed.

The Gap between Objectives and Achievements

Radical Islamists have taken various measures to Islamicize the government and the society. These measures and activities, which were often violent, aimed to apply Islamic rules and principles to different aspects of people’s life, especially to their social and political life; this is because they deeply believe that “Islam is the solution”, and the only viable method to reach this goal is struggle and jihad. The common ground among the Egyptian radicals might be the point that they have seen themselves on the battleground of struggle between faith and unbelief (light and darkness) and have desired to change the relations governing the world. They have been hopeful and even assured that their struggle would eventually culminate in the victory of faith, the rule of God in the world and the realization of “utopia”.

Here the concept of “failure” should be briefly explained. This concept suggests that a movement is unsuccessful in attaining its goals and its activities and attempts do not bring about the desired results. A realistic inspection of the political arena of each country, however, reveals that no group has been capable of achieving all its objectives and generating all the favorable results. In other words, there is invariably a gap of some kind between the objectives and the intentions of a political activity and its results and achievements, because while political activists benefit from the existing means for pursuing their objectives, they have to take heed of their limitations and come to terms with the grim realities. Therefore a narrow gap between the goals and the achievements of a movement seems normal and usually expected, and it is not called “failure”. The term “failure” is most applicable when the achievements of a political activist or group are strikingly different from the expectations and predictions, and when the power and efficiency in changing the surrounding realities is gradually lost. To put it differently, what draws our attention in a particular period of time is the insignificance of achievements. However the question which may raise here is what yardsticks should be used here to measure one’s success or failure? How and by employing what criterion can we consider some given achievements significant or insignificant?

One way to measure one’s success is to carry out surveys and interviews. As we know all politicians and political activists try their best to influence public opinion and gain people’s support, this is because they largely depend on this variable to sustain their activities and maintain their ideology. Using the common method of surveying people and questioning them, we can assess one’s achievements and performance, and make the assumption that any change in the performance of political groups and activists, to a great extent, suggests their reaction to the sensitivities of public opinion. To reinforce the theoretical foundation of such a tendency we can turn to the views of authorities such as Ted Robert Gurr, who have tried to benefit from the empirical studies and quantitative research. (3) For instance, one of the most famous surveys employed by Gurr belongs to Hadley Cantril, which was conducted between the years 1957 and 1963.  This study which was carried out in 14 countries was intended to assess the difference between the real status of the interviewees and their personal aspirations.  (4) This study is evidently concerned with the concept of “relative deprivation” and consequently with the extent of public dissatisfaction and mutiny. Also it is obvious that such a study indirectly deals with the function of a political system and the capacity of the dominant ideology.

Surveys of this sort are vastly popular nowadays and the more accurate the data are, the more valid the results will be. However, the problem is that these public surveys and this field of study which is more inclined to social psychology, have their special limitations and therefore we might not be able to make use of them in answering the important question raised earlier (what  criteria can be used for assessing one’s successes and failure?). Undoubtedly, figuring out the relation between two variables of judging public opinions and noticeable changes −not tactical ones− in performances necessitates comprehensive empirical studies and simultaneous inspection of several variables, which lies outside the scope of this study. Therefore we should conduct the study differently, that is, instead of focusing on public opinion and surveying a bigger society, we ought to concentrate on assessing the political groups or activists themselves. In other words, the necessity of change is discussed from political activists’ viewpoint and not the bigger society; nevertheless once again it is assumed that an extensive change in political activists’ performance can suggest a reaction to the public opinion sensitivity and an attempt to survive. It seems that Geshunder’s elaboration on protest social movements provides us with the appropriate ground for this point of view and study priority. 

According to Geshunder’s theory when a protest social movement fails to bring about its desired changes, people’s reactions would turn out to be a change in their understanding; “in other words, when people abandon hope of changing the environment, they change themselves and adjust their own understandings to their understandings of the real world, or after developing a new understanding they foster this belief that essentially changing the system is futile and pointless.” (5) Cantril also brings up the concept of “frustration” and declares,“we get frustrated when we feel that a contradiction has unfold between the meaning we assign to a particular condition now and the meaning we used to assigned to it, the one which no longer conforms to the newly-emerged condition.” (6)

From what we discussed above it can be concluded that when political groups and activists feel frustrated with their ability to influence the external environment, and sense that they have lost “the ability to influence and change”, they might gradually abandon the political arena or start to redefine their goals or approaches. Therefore, whenever the necessity of redefining goals and approaches arises it can be concluded that most likely the desired results have not been obtained or they are not in accordance with the expectations. In such situations various interpretations of ideology and more practical and economical approaches are weighed against each other. However this competition can suggest the amount of flexibility of a movement and its ideology.

Moreover the aforesaid conclusion can be questioned, because since the external environment is permanently changing, and this change is so serious at times that redefining goals and approaches is unavoidable, transforming social and political activities is inevitable and even indispensible. To put it differently, social movements are obliged to make some changes in their performance with regard to the external changes; and essentially these changes demonstrate their practicality and flexibility. Hence changes should be regarded as reliable criteria.

Although the objection above is well-founded, it does not undermine our argument because changes are brought about in a logical sequence. If movements assess their performance as successful and satisfactory that is because they feel a less pressing necessity to adapt to the external environment, especially because the outstanding results can be highlighted as a support for the correctness of the chosen approach. When the achievements are unsatisfactory and, as Cantril puts it, when “there is a contradiction between the meaning we assign to a condition and the one we previously assigned to that condition”, fundamental changes, especially reassessing the goals, seem indispensible. The reassessment shows an attempt to overcome confusion and crisis. Therefore every change will not be regarded as a valid and reliable criterion; only those changes in politics which are “essential” and concern goals and approaches are of importance.

The kind of change is also crucial: sometimes changes are “active” and sometimes they are “passive”. Te first kind shows a will to change and the latter can be construed as a compulsion to change. In the first case, the movement enjoys more freedom of action and has a greater ability to influence the external environment, but in the second case obstacles and limitations seem more conspicuous, and the environment is more influencing than influenced.

If we appraise these two points, that is, the sequence and the kind of change, we find out that there are some stages in the course of a movement’s existence which are held as “turning points”; this means that it is indispensible for that movement to carry out some profound transformations to continue its existence and these transformations are only feasible through redefining their objectives and providing novel interpretations to fulfill the potentials of the chosen ideology. (7) To put it differently, instead of changing the world on the basis of their understanding, people embark on changing or modifying their understanding of the world. Obviously such a measure is vital to overcome frustration and regain the ability to exercise influence. Without doubt a successful movement always experiences some changes but the ability to influence the external environment causes this power to be employed better, and shaping the environment in accordance with one’s objectives will take precedence over making changes from within, that is, changing objectives or approaches. In fact, success or getting close to favorable results will render changing approaches or reassessing objectives pointless.

Now it is time to raise the question, why some movements are more successful than others? Although all movements use all their ability and potentials, why do just some of them attain their objectives? This fundamental question has served as the starting point of many discussions in social movement theories. For instance, what is at issue for Zeld and McCarthy is “how movements are made efficient and how they get involved in mobilizing more people and in a more efficient way. So their main question is why some movement are more successful than others?” (8)

To answer the above question we need to pay attention to both the internal and external spheres. By external spheres we mean the environmental opportunities and problems, like rivals’ conduct, and the limitations imposed by them and also the pros and cons of alternative thoughts and ideologies. It is quite clear that sometimes there are appropriate/inappropriate opportunities for a movement to take advantage of in operational environment which can result in the successfulness/unsuccessfulness of that movement; the conduct of the Egyptian political system in the Islamists’ shift from their internal affairs to Afghanistan’s crisis and the necessity of “jihad against unbelievers” can provide a good example for the ruling elite to benefit from. Consequently the majority of Islamist groups became, directly or indirectly, engaged in Afghanistan’s affair and, to the Egyptian government’s satisfaction, they gave priority to it over their own internal affairs. (9) The violent repression of the Egyptian Islamists by security forces can be considered as a kind of environmental limitation and should not be ignored. This sort of repression raised the cost one has to pay for anti-regime political activities.

Alongside the external factors, domestic issues can play a key role in assessing the success of a movement; for example, the nature of the thought which guides actions cannot be neglected. As we will see, what draws attention to itself in the Egyptian extremists’ thought is their surprising naivety about the social and political issues and the international relations. This naivety is quite apparent in the nature of their proposed solutions for problems, and their way of changing the existing relations. As Sayyid Qutb had hoped:

“First establish an Islamic society in which Islamic principles
and rules are enforced then you will see how Islam will rule. (10)                                            

On the other hand, the structure of a movement can have inevitable outcomes in the arena of practice. If we reexamine the theory of Zeld and McCarthy, and the theories of mobilizing sources in general, we realize that success has been essentially regarded as a function of “the degree of transparency in defining organizational objectives and the efficiency of the existing sources”. (11) Unlike some theoreticians of source mobilization, we should not exaggerate the importance of organizing, and underestimate the role of other variables and we ought to accept that the structure, the hierarchy and the internal issues of a movement clearly influence its successfulness or unsuccessfulness; this is because thoughts and ideologies are thus put into practice and they certainly move away from their pure and abstract state.

Based on what discussed so far now we can review the experiences of the radical Islamists in Egypt and analyze their failure to attain their objectives in a certain way. In this analysis we focus on the content of Islamists’ thought and its transformation due to confrontation with environmental opportunities and problems. Needless to say, radical Islamism in Egypt draws heavily on the ideas of individuals such as Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj, (12) and what is emphasized here is that from the very beginning the naïve attitude of these thinkers and their followers towards politics has played a part in their failure and their poor record of achievements. In other words, their attitude towards society and social and economic relations was somehow unsophisticated, and its inefficiency was conspicuous in its confrontation with the real world.

Perhaps evaluating radical Islamists’ record does not entail much analysis and reflection; they not only failed to establish the rule of God in the world, but also were unsuccessful in establishing an Islamic government in their own country. The transformation in their method of activity, the changes in the geographical scope of their struggle, and their relations with other groups and organizations have not been fruitful. Even their serious attempt to win people’s hearts and minds, and attract more followers has not culminated in a much impressive achievement. Undoubtedly, this failure is partly due to the Egyptian political system’s conduct. By adopting the so-called “iron fist” policy Egyptian authorities dramatically increased the costs of such activities and repressed any movement rigorously; moreover they were supported both tacitly and openly in the region and the world. For instance, in 1994 some American authorities backed the Egyptian government’s fight against terrorism and stated that, “democratic values and the respect for human rights might be sacrificed here”. (13) Clearly by adopting violent armed activities, some Islamists in the early 1980s entered an arena whose outcome was predicted well in advance. During the last two decades Egypt has been able to undermine the military power of the extremist groups and arrest most of their leaders or put them to flight. Although these groups have managed to launch some serious attacks and take the government by surprise at times, they have not been able to threaten its survival. More interesting is that the Islamist groups have intensified their efforts whenever the ruling authorities decided to create a less oppressive political atmosphere and be more lenient with the critics and opposition. (14) Although the Egyptian government’s vigorous and uninterrupted repression is grave and undeniable, it does not seem that the radicals’ failure is solely rooted in it. As a matter of fact, the main argument in this study is that the failure of these groups is mainly the outcome of the content of their thought and ideology. Therefore it can be claimed that the concepts which have directed the extremists’ conduct, have been naïve and incompatible with Egypt’s internal and external affairs. It seems that some of Zaki Milad’s ideas would be of great help here: 

                                     The contemporary Islamic thought found itself in a closed, stagnant    
                                     condition where relation with reality was treated as peripheral, and     
                                    this precipitated the loss of actual influence over reality. Some of         
                             the Islamic trends of thought totally lost touch with reality and some          
                             others adopted a confrontational and inflexible approach to them.    
                                    Thus the relation of the contemporary Islamic thought with reality      
                                     has generally involved risk and crisis. (15)

From this viewpoint it can be said that although these thoughts have managed to generate a zest for “mobilization” and “movement”, eventually they have been useful neither for “dominating” nor “managing” the world. It has paved the way for embracing thoughts which seemed less costly and more compatible with the social-cultural characteristics of people. To demonstrate this point, the ideas of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj, as two of the important Egyptian extremist theoreticians, are studied here.

Sayyid Qutb

Focusing attention on Sayid Qutb’s thought seems well-reasoned and fully justified. Although he was executed in 1966 by the government of Jamal Abd al-Naser, Sayyid Qutb’s ideas continued to dominate the thought and actions of the Egyptian jihadist groups for a long time, and his book Ma’alem fi al-Tariq (Milestones), turned into a manifest for most Islamist movements. (16)

Sayyid Qutb’s role is quite remarkable in that he managed to fill the vacuum left following the death of Hassan al-Bana, (17) and “as a militant ideologue he made the transformation of the feeble fundamentalism of the Muslim Brotherhood to the young extremism of the 1970s possible”. (18) In Dekmejian’s words he established a link between the Muslim Brotherhood on the one side, and the three extremist groups of Aljihad, al-Jama’a al-Eslamiah (al-Takfir val-Hijrah) and the Islamic Liberation Organization (the Army Academy Group), on the other. (19) In addition to Sayyid Qutb’s written works, which in a direct and persuasive manner highlighted the necessity of overthrowing ignorant governments and establishing a truly Islamic government, his death had a profound impact on the Egyptian youth. All these factors caused him to remain an ideologue for the radical activists in the following decades; moreover his works served as the theoretical basis for their activities.  It is no exaggeration to claim that his writings, along with those of Abd al-Salam Faraj, provided many of the radical Islamists in the 1980s and 90s with a conceptual framework.

Here the points highlighted by Sayyid Qutb are listed. The basic principles of his thought are as follows:

1. The social-political system dominating the contemporary Islamic and non-Islamic world is an ignorant system intermingled with sinfulness, injustice, suffering and the denial of divine guidance of Islam.
2. It is the devout Muslims’ duty to transform the ignorant society and revive Islam through invitation and combative jihad.
3. Devoted leading Muslims are responsible for turning the ignorant society into a true Islamic society.
4. The ultimate objective of the fully committed Muslims must be establishing the rule of God in the world so that all sins, sufferings and stresses are brought to an end. (20)
5. It can be said that he takes social reality as an endless vivid contrast between Islam (light) and ignorance (darkness), and to elaborate on this issue and provide a solution he offers a literal interpretation of Quranic verses and hadiths[1]. Sayyid Qutb’s description of the two worlds rules out any possibility of compromise or negotiation, and he found himself responsible for “Islamic awakening in order to establish the rule of Allah on the Earth”. (21)  What is interesting in Sayyid qutb’s ideas is that he sees human being on the verge of a precipice and in desperate need of help, and he deems the Islamic instructions and precepts as the eternal salvation:  

Now in the most critical era and at a time when we are overwhelmed
with chaos and confusion it is time for Islam and Muslims to play their role. (22)

He also simply rejects and refutes the present political and cultural systems, both eastern and western, and regards them as ignorant. Hence the Islamic state is established provided that Islamic sharia is adopted, and any society or government which is not founded on sharia is regarded as ignorant, even if Muslims live in there. For the same reason he views all the societies in the world as ignorant. Although he regarded the Egyptian government as ignorant, he tried to maintain a good relationship with religious institutions, especially al-Azhar, and strengthen his legitimacy.

The fulfillment of the above-mentioned objectives, that is, Islamic resurrection, requires that diligent and devoted Muslims commit themselves to it:

There must be a pioneer who rises amid the ignorance which
is widespread in the world. He should be able to make the right
 decision as to when to withdraw from the ignorant society and
when to develop relationship with it. (23)

 Sayyid Qutb’s “pioneer” should first and foremost grow to “spiritual maturity” so that he can embark on the battle against ignorant society and government on the next stage. What is meant by spiritual maturity is that he should be inspired by Quran, and found his thought on it; also he should start spiritual purification at the same time. Then he is responsible for bringing about transformation in society. (24) These two stages follow the lead of Prophet Muhammad in activity and promotion which should be closely followed by the leading Muslims now. According to Sayyid Qutb leading Muslims should arm themselves with thought and battle (the Holy Quran and Weapon) (25) and use invitation (da’wa) and jihad for bringing about transformation; a transformation that is aimed at making “preparations for the resurrection of people” (26) and eventually results in the sovereignty of Islamic precepts and sharia in the world. (27)

Sayyid Qutb’s thought, which was briefly outlined above, clearly contains plenty of ambiguities and contradictions. Some of these ambiguities and contradiction which have practical consequences are as follows:

1. Sayyid Quts puts a great emphasis on the concept of sharia, but does not explain how it should be implemented, and also how it should be adapted with the requirements of contemporary life and the new achievements of human beings; in other words, he holds to the assumption that “Islam is flawless” and never transcends belief. This causes his thought to possess a static quality which makes critics and reviewer of his thought maintain that what he reckons as sharia cannot adapt itself with today’s world. As Hisham Sharabi has aptly put it, from this viewpoint, the issue of modernity is resolved neither through the practical solution of dealing with it directly nor through avoiding a direct encounter. (28)
2. Sayyid Qutb’s perspective would bring about more “division” than “unity”. His description of devoted leading Muslim would not only keep out those who believe in other religions but also exclude many of the Muslims. We need to bear in mind that he believed:

A society whose laws are not based on sharia is not Islamic,
 even if its members consider themselves to be Muslim
of fervently pray, fast or go to Hajj. (29)

Without doubt his viewpoint attracts many but at the same time arouses considerable opposition and provokes great hostility from the very beginning.

1. It is not clear how to separate oneself from the ignorant society; moreover it is not clarified how should be the relation between the leading Muslims and those living under the ignorant system of life. Does separation from society mean a complete break with it or is a certain degree of relation permitted? How should the relation be and who should manage it?
2. The most prominent feature of Sayyid Qutb’s utopian state is that it is governed by Islamic sharia and eventually human beings abide by the rule of God, and not that of human. The problem is that, in essence Sayyid Qutb’s desired government is not different from the existing governments. In other words, as Sharabi has pointed out, the same patriarchic quality is retained both in society and government: (30)

As fundamentalism violently overthrows the patriarchic society
 (or perforce devastates it from within), it stubbornly returns to
authoritative patriarchy. (31)

Now it is can be asked if such a transformation can be regarded as fundamental or not. (32)

Yet more fundamental objections can be raised to Sayyid Qutb’s thought, as some were raised by his opponents and critics at that time. The points highlighted above are those which have practical implications. We can claim that these weaknesses were among those which gave rise to radical Islamists’ failure. It should be noted that as it is expected, Sayyid Qutb’s thought is not going to contain all the stages of struggle from the beginning to the end; neither is it going to answer all the possible questions precisely and in detail, but the problem is that some basic issues which are very important in determining the objective and method of struggle have remained ambiguous and this left Sayyid Qutb’s followers confused. In fact the naivety and the gaps in Sayyid Qutb’s thought permitted varying understandings and interpretations of his writings. Some people like Shokri Mustafa and his followers gave prominence to spiritual purification and separation from ignorant society and founded small interdependent groups to avoid the effects of existing relations. Some other prioritized struggle with ignorant government (groups like al-Jihad and The Islamic Liberation Organization). While the first interpretation denounced both society and government, the second trend attached more importance to overthrowing the ignorant government, and tried to obtain political power and establish an Islamic government quickly and even through violent means. However, neither of these two trends was successful in the end, a result which, we can claim, was predetermined well in advance.

The approach of Jama’a al-Eslamiah will not be discussed here; this kind of approach is important and can be studied further, however, it belonged to the 1970s, and soon turned out to be very inefficient. (33) Instead, what is of more importance here is the second interpretation, by Abd al-Salam Faraj, which was the basis for some Egyptian Islamists’ activities in the 1980 and 90s. Faraj, as Sivan has put it, became “the most eloquent expounder of doctrinal teachings for the youth in the 1980s”. (34)

Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj

Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj’s famous book Al-Faridah al-Gha’ibah (The Neglected Duty) is in some way a continuation of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas. The most prominent point underscored by him in this book is the concept of jihad which he holds as the sixth pillar of Islam. By focusing on the concept of jihad, he intends to remove the ambiguity and brevity in Sayyid Qutb’s argument and develop a practical plan for saving Islamic society. To highlight the prominence of his thought it suffices to note that his book became the constitution of the group “al-Najoun Min al-Nar” which is regarded as the immediate successor of al-Jihad. In the 1980s this group assassinated some prominent government officials, but achieved no real success in the end.

Abd al-Salam believes that the fall of Ottoman Empire in 1924 was the final phase in the weakness and decline of Islamic societies which led to the disappearance of Islamic laws and the dominance of new Tartars. He argues that all attempts to enforce Islamic laws have been futile; neither has the peaceful behavior of The New Muslim Brotherhood been effective, nor the isolationist method of Shokri Mustafa’s group, which was based on the first interpretation of Sayid Qutb’s ideas discussed above. Therefore:

1. As assigned by God and sharia it is the duty of every Muslim to make endeavor to establish an Islamic state. Fulfilling this duty is contingent on the declaration of jihad against the leaders of Islamic countries.
2. The Islamic countries’ leaders who defy Islamic laws are considered apostates, even if they claim to be Muslim.
3. Cooperating with a heathen (unbelieving) ruler, even one who claims to be a Muslim is sinful. Therefore Muslims should give up governmental positions and avoid military service.
4. Constant jihad against heathen governments is the best and the only way to abolish an ignorant society and revive Islam.
5. Armed struggle is the only acceptable form of jihad.
6. Peaceful methods such as emigration (Hijjrat) or founding parties are clear manifestations of fear and stupidity.
7. First we should wage jihad on the local enemy (non-Islamic countries).
8. Since jihad is obligatory for every Muslim (vabejeb e eini), no excuse, not even illiteracy, can be offered to evade it.
9. Refraining from jihad is the main reason for the humiliation, decline and division of Muslims.
10. The most powerful believers, who are more pious and hold God in great awe, must assume the leadership of Muslims. The leader should be elected by people, and then obeyed by them.
11. God has set five eras in the history of Islam: the eras of Prophet Muhammad(s), Caliphs, kings, dictators and the present era in which dictators will be overthrown and people will be under the supervision of a system similar to the one in Prophet’s society. (35)

Here some objections that can be made to Abd al-Salam Faraj’s ideas are discussed; the ambiguities and naivety that, in practice, prevents the fulfillment of the wills and objectives set by Faraj and those who share the same attitude, are as follows:

1. Perhaps Abd al-Salam has shown originality only in his highlighting of the concept of jihad, and thus he has somehow resolved the ambiguity in Sayyid Qutb’s ideas about establishing Islamic society and government. His other writings are not original at all and the texts he invokes “are not reliable enough to be employed is describing the contemporary Egyptian society or government”. (36) The writer is so preoccupied with prioritizing political power that he remains unaware of the realities of the Egyptian society and loses touch with them. This is what Zaki Milad has also highlighted.
2. As Gilles Kepel has put it, Faraj “pushes history aside to the benefit of reviving myth, while Muslims adjust themselves with the history Islamic societies. They may think of this history as a counterfeit copy of the original model, but the fourteen centuries passed by (including the present century), would never seem unfamiliar to them. To most Muslims referring to the era of Prophet and Rashedin Caliphs does not necessarily entail devaluing the existing order”. (37) Thus Faraj, Sayyid Qutb and Shokri Mustafa’s account of the history of Islamic societies, which is listed under headings such as the myth of deviation and the myth of utopia (38), was in direct contradiction to the interpretation of Muslims who were addressed. This contradiction was so apparent that only few people were attracted by this message. That is why in spite of widespread discontent only a limited number of people were swayed by these ideas.
3. Abd al-Salam Faraj’s book, like that of Sayyid Qutb, not only did not increase the number of adherents and advocates, but also incurred enmity. His description of the devoted Muslims and his fondness for the concept of jihad has increased the number of critics and opposition and has also failed to build any coalition with other groups and forces in order to expand its social base.
4. Although Faraj’s thought is intended to establish an Islamic government, it remains teleological in practice and leaves the attainment of result to God. In fact he does not clarify what should be done after killing the apostate ruler and replacing him with another person, and only points out that God’s interference will prevent it. I his opinion after taking a practical measure we should await public propitious reaction, as God has promised, and this teleology is so strong that that he does not outline the structure and characteristics of the Islamic government he bears in mind. He states that they are not responsible for its outcome (the establishment of Islamic government) at all. Interestingly enough, in its practical move to seize the political power (Sadat’s assassination on October 6, 1981), al-jihad had no practical plan as its next step, and had just decided to set up a religious assembly and a parliament. In comparison to Sayyid Qutb’s views, this can be regarded as a backward step because Sayyid Qutb had at least opened up some serious detailed discussion on the structure and characteristics of Islamic society and government.

As stated earlier in Sayyid Qutb’s case, Abd al-Salam is, likewise, not expected to clarify all the issues and problems of the Islamic movement and provide them with answers and solutions. Also he is not expected to set up a philosophical discussion; nevertheless as a political activist he should discuss the problems openly and clearly and outline practical ways for obtaining the objectives. But the problem is that his naivety is so extreme that from the very beginning, attaining the objective seems impossible. For instance, blind resort to teleology and God’s promise cannot be simply neglected it is also it is not clear why, based on this presumption, he theorized that “people advocate jihad and they are just awaiting an efficient leader and the signal tor starting the operation”. (39)

It is surprising that the above-mentioned point went unnoticed by some members of al-Jihad. Before Sadat’s assassination Aboud el-Zomor emphasized that that they should postpone the operation because he could detect no relation between the assassination of the president and the outbreak of a popular revolution. “He believed that it would take at least two years for the organization to both assassinate the president and take the opportunity of using it as a stepping stone to the process of establishing an Islamic government”. (40) Eventually, Abd al-Salam Faraj stated in court that Sadat’s assassination was an important lesson that should be learned by potential Pharaohs, and he had intended to give the rulers a warning at that stage. (41) To put it differently, the earnest endeavor to establish the rule of Allah on earth was reduced to establishing an Islamic government in Egypt, and this objective also turned to be an attempt to teach Sadat’s successors a salutary lesson!

Conclusion

One of the most serious problems of radical Islamists’ thought, as Zaki Milad has put it, is that it loses touch with reality and adopts an inflexible approach to it. Believing that “any significant transformation should emerge from the barrels of guns”, (42) they ignored facts like military and security capabilities of the government, the conditions of the region and the cultural and social characteristic of society and brought about their own failure in the end. According to Farhang Rajaee the problem lies in the fact that:

For Muslim combatants, in the arena of politics one cannot communicate through
 the language of Feqh and transactions and negotiate its different aspects. Politics
is the arena for stabilizing and fulfilling major Islamic principles… politics leaves
us with only one way: judging the changes and the people, and waging jihad based
on that judgment. (43)

Perhaps one could say that they could find no way other than military action, and also Abd al-Salam’s argument implies that other methods were tried but to no avail. He, like many other radical Islamists, maintains that since other approaches such as emigration, invitation, passive struggle and also peaceful political struggle have produced no impressive results, a new approach should be adopted. Also the reverberations of the Iranian revolution reinforced such a tendency. Based on the existing evidence and documents about Jama’a al-Elamiah, Hafez and Wiktorowicz argued that this group “were not born violent”, but it was due to certain circumstances that they resorted to armed struggle. (44) A relevant document from this group indicates that turning to violence was a reaction to the imprisonment and torture of Islamists and their wives and mothers. Moreover whenever government lessened its repression, Islamists inflicted less violence, a point which is underlined by Hamid Ahmadi. According to him the variable of repression and state pressure, along with some other variables, influenced the nature of Islamists’ collective action: the more repressive the government became, the more violent the Islamists’ reaction was, and whenever government created an open political climate and encouraged public participation, less violent armed confrontation took place. (45)

Although the ideas discussed above are quite well-founded, the main argument here is that the naivety and contradictions in their ideas, and as Takeyh has put it, “ideological incoherence” (46) have posed the main problems for the radicals. Their preoccupation with seizing political power and establishing an Islamic government through jihad had been so obsessive that they were not capable of developing a realistic picture of the local and international condition of Egypt. Interestingly some extremists had made up their mind well in advance and paid no heed to Abd al-Salam’s writings and eventually collected most copies of it from bookstores. Karam Zohdi, who did not have a high opinion of Faraj, declared that the book Al-Faridah al-Gha’ibah (The Neglected Duty) contained no new ideas, and only some various discussions had been collected in that. (47) Therefore the new approach (taking up armed struggle) was the informed choice of, at least, extremist leaders and had little to do with government performance, and was essentially incompatible with the realities of the Egyptian society and government: on the one hand the government’s conduct (constant repression of the extremists and occasional leniency towards minimalists), along with foreign support for these measures did not provide the extremist  with a favorable climate, and on the other hand , “pharaonic determinism of history, cultural evasion of confrontation with the power of government, and also fear of social insecurity” (48) discouraged people’s support of their armed activities. That is why two decades of armed struggle, by Jama’a al-Eslamiah and al-jihad and other groups like Alnajun Min Alnar had no clear results, but instead “mobilized people’s support for the government’s anti-Islamic plans”. (49)

Although Islamic groups’ armed struggle undermined government’s (an opponent’s) authority at times, it strengthened moderate groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (another opponent) and paved the way for their involvement in political negotiation. Today, “only a few of them believe that our power is the range of our Kalashnikovs”. (50) While the role of violent ceaseless repression by the Egyptian security forces is not denied, the main problem has its roots elsewhere. Extremists presumed that their armed struggle would generate favorable public reaction but their prediction never came true. In fact their continuous violent conduct filled the religious middle class with fear (51), and this provided the government with grounds for more repression. Public opposition rose dramatically, especially in the case of Luxor Massacre (1997), and the influential newspaper Al-Ahram stated that “if this is what they are doing to gain power, what will they do when they attain positions of power?” (52) It should be noted that the success of political groups, in any given situation, largely depends on the amount of public support they can secure.

Clearly the mounting pressure of public opinion was among the key factors which compelled Jama’a al-Eslamiah to agree to a ceasefire and stop launching attacks on civilians; it also forced al-Jihad to change the range of its struggle. It was quite evident that “violence cannot change the politicians, and despite their satisfaction with the oppression and their objections to it, the public do not support them (the Islamists).” (53) After two decades of armed struggle, the extremists not only could not change the government or even their conduct in line with their own attitude, but also lost the support of public opinion completely.

 support for the government’ other groups like Alnajun Min Alnar had no delist  with a favorable climate, and on te other hand

Notes

1. Interviews with the imprisoned leaders were published on June 21 and 28, 2002 in Al-Mosavar and were later made into a book in September 2002. See: Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid, “The Other Face of the Islamic Movement” Working Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No.33, p.16.

Karam Zohdi had another interview with Al-Mosavar which was published in two parts on July 15 and 16, 2003. In this interview he publicly called Sadat and the security forces killed in the clashes, ‘martyrs’. See: International Crisis Group (ICG), “Islamism in North Africa II: Egypt’s Opportunity”, Cairo and Brussels, April 20, 2004, p.8.

2. For example see: Gilles Kepel, the Prophet and Pharaoh (New Islamic Movements in Egypt), translated into Persian By Hamid Ahmadi, Tehran: Kayhan Publications,1366, and: Gilles Kepel,  Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam, translated by Anthony F. Roberts, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002, chapters 4 and 12.

3. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, translated into Persian by Ali Morshedi Zad, Institute for Strategic Studies,1377.

4. Ibid., pp. 109-116, quoted from: Hadley Cantril, “Sinitio, ergo Sum: Motivation Reconsidered, Journal of Psychology, LXV, January, 1967, pp. 91-107.

5. Stan Taylor, Social Sciences and Revolution, New York: St. Martin Press,1984, p.53.

6. Ted Robert Gurr, ibid., p.52 Quoted from: Hadley Cantril, Op.cit., p.99.

7. Basically “the more powerful people get, the less they are affected by social realities (structure) and the more they influence the structure”. See: Rahman Qahreman Pour, “khatami and the Process of structure-Agent Interaction”, Bardasht e Aval, No. 10, Mehr 1382, p.54.

8. See: Ron Eeyrman and Andrew Jamison, Social Movement: A Cognitive Approach, University Park, P.A.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991, pp.13-24.

9. To read more on this, see: Muhammad Salah, “the Untold Story of Islamic Radical Movements”, part one, translated into Persian by Sayyid Mahmoud Bojnourdi, Middle East Studies Quarterly, No.28, winter 1380.

10. Sayyid Qutb, What Do We Say?, translated into Persian by Sayyid Hadi Khosroshahi, Tehran: Islamic Culture Promotion Center,1370, p.48.

11. Ron Eeyrman and Andrew Jamison, op.cit.

According to McAdams and others, the institutional theories or the mobilization of resources are divided into two groups of the mobilization of resources or organizational type (Zeld and McCarthy and Obershall’s attitudes), and the political process or political contradiction type (McAdam and Tily’s attitudes). The first group place emphasis on organization and establishment in social movements. To read more see: Homeira Moshirzadeh, A Theoretical Introduction to Social Movements, Tehran: Imam Khomeini and Enqelab Eslami Institute, 1381, pp.143-159, Keith Nash, Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalization, Politics, and Power, translated into Persian by Mohammad Taqi Delforouz, Tehran: Kavir Publications, 1380, pp.144-162.

12. A subject that can be expanded and analyzed further is how profound the extremists of the two countries are influenced by the leftist and third-world ideas at this time. Many analysts have rightly pointed out that ideas of extremist ideologues towards government and society and their analysis of the existing political-social relations is affected by the leftist third world tendencies. For instance see: Mehrdad Mashayekhi, “The Metamorphosis of Basics of Politics and Intellectuality in Iran”, Aban 8, 1382, at www.iran-emrooz.de.

He has highlighted these qualities as belonging to the political climate of Iran at the beginning of Iranian Revolution; however they seem applicable in other cases.

13. Robert H. Pelletreau, “Recent Events in the Middle East”, Statement before the Subcommittee, Washington DC: June 14,1994, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 5, No,25, June,1994,  p. 411.

14. According to Hamid Ahmadi, repression and coercion have been among the variables which facilitate violent collective action in Middle East Islamic countries: nevertheless political reforms and encouragement of public participation have reduced violent collective actions. To read more see: Hamid Ahmadi, “the Future of Islamic Movements in the Middle East,” Middle East Studies Quarterly, No, 14-15, summer and fall 1377, p. 75.

15. Zaki Milad, “Changes and the Course of Contemporary Islamic Thought”, translated into Persian by Muhammad Jom’e Amini, Political Science Quarterly, No.18, summer 1381, p.230.

16. Gilles Kepel, Op.cit., p.35.

17. Ibid., p.35.

18. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World, translated into Persian by Hamid Ahmadi, Tehran: Kayhan Publications,1377, p.165.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p.166-167.

21.  Ibid., pp.168.

22. Cited in: Gilles Kepel, Op.cit., p.43.

23. Ibid., p.45.

24. Ibid., p.54.

25. Ibid., p.57.

26. Ibid., p.45.

27. To learn more about the other aspects and features of Sayyid Qutb’s attitude see: Sirous (Rouholla) Souzangar, Political Ideas of Sayyyid Qutb, Tehran: Islamic Revolution Documents Center Publications, 1383.

28. Hisham Sharabi, Neo-Patriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, translated into Persian by Ahmad Movaseqqi, Tehran: Kavir Publications, 1380, p. 223.

29. Cited in: Gilles Kepel, the Prophet and Pharaoh (New Islamic Movements in Egypt), Op.cit., p.65.

30. Hisham Sharabi, Op.cit., p.230.

31. Ibid., p.38.

32. In their study of the experience of Islamists in Algeria, Kazemi and Norton pointed out that, “following the catastrophe of Algeria, the middle classes of Arab countries got less interested in democracy. A large group of the people in the region shared the belief that the main challenge is between two different kinds of authoritarianism, and not Islamic autocracy and democracy”. See: Farhad Kazemi and Augustus Richard Norton, “The Political challenges to Middle East Governments in 21^st Century” in New Frontiers in Middle East Security, edited by Lenore G. Martin, translated into Persian by Qadir Nasri, Tehran: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1383, p.168.

33. To read more see: Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Op.cit., pp. 84-85.

34. Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medival Theology and Modern Polities, New Havan: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 127.

35. In summarizing Abd al_Salam Faraj’s ideas, the following sources have been used:

David C. Rapport, “Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example Islam” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Edited by Walter Reich, Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, PP. 103-130, John L. Esposito, Unholy War, Terror in the Name of Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.62-64; Johannes Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan, 1989.

36. Gilles Kepel, the Prophet and Pharaoh (New Islamic Movements in Egypt), Op.cit., p.239.

37. Ibid., p.279.

38. An interesting theoretical discussion was generated by Lover about these myths, see: Robert H. Lauer, Perspectives on Social Change, translated into Persian by Kavoos Seyed Emami, Tehran: Center for Academic Publication, 1373.

39. Mokhtar Hoseini and et al., The Strategic Assessment of Egypt, Vol. 1, Tehran: Abrare moasere Tehran, p.243.

40. Gilles Kepel, the Prophet and Pharaoh (New Islamic Movements in Egypt), Op.cit., p.259; also see: David C. Rapport, Op. cit.

41. David C. Rapport, Op. cit.

42. Robert H. Lauer, Op.cit., p.142.

43. Farhang Rajaee, Contemporary Political Thought in the Arab World. Tehran: Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, 1381, p.150.

44. Mohammd M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz , Bloomington: Indiana University Press,2004, p. 79.

45. Hamid Ahmadi, “ The Future of Islamic Movements in the Middle east: Developing a Theoretical Framework”, Middle Esat Quarterly, No. 14-15, 1377 p. 84-87.

46. Ray Takeyh, “Reality Bites: Is Islamism Dead?” The Review, July, 2002, p.6, at: www.aijac.org.au2001/267/essay.html.

47. Gilles Kepel, the Prophet and Pharaoh (New Islamic Movements in Egypt), Op.cit., p.234.

48. Hrair Dekmejian, Op.cit., p.332.

49. Ray Takeyh, Op.cit, p. 30.

50. Immanuel Sivan, “Why Radical Muslims Aren’t taking over Governments”, MERIA, Vol.2, No.2, May 1998, p. 3, at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998

51. Gilles Kepel, “the Ups and Downs of Political Islam in an Interview with Gilles Kepel”, Goftego Quaterly, No. 29, 1379, p.152. (Persian)

52. Ray Takeyh, Op.cit., p.30.

53. Ridwan al-Sayyid, “ Islamism and Reformative Renaissance”, translated into Persian by Majid Moradi, Pegah Houzeh, No. 91, Esfand 17, 1381, p.20.

Number 4, April-June 2011

The fourth volume of Just Peace Diplomacy Journal, an International Journal for Peace and Security Studies has been published by the International Peace Studies Centre (IPSC) in the UK and Middle East.

To order a hard copy of the journal email info@peace-ipsc.org. To view the electronic version of the journal, click on the article names below. 

English Articles

Middle East Uprisings: Impact on US Regional Influence
Shireen T. Hunter

Islamic Awakening and the Spread of Spirit of Democracy in the Middle East
Ibrahim Motaghi

Islamic Radicalism and Failure to Establish the Ideal Government
Seyed Abdolamir Nabavi

The Geopolitics of Crisis in Central Asia and Caucasia: An Iranian Perspective
Kafkazli Seyed Javad

Syria Crisis; Regional Origins and International Implications
Dr. Mehrdad Navabakhsh Dr. Tahere Torabi

The United States’ New Approach toward Afghanistan
Yaser Miri

مقالات فارسی

بررسی و ارزیابی توافق سازمان های فلسطینی فتح و حماس

دکتر حسین علایی

بیداری اسلامی و گسترش روح دموکراتیک در خاورمیانه

دکتر ایراهیم متقی

الگوی مدیریت سیستم پشتیبان در اعزام نیروی نظامی عربستان به بحرین

دکتر عباس مصلی‌نژاد

دیالکتیک منازعه و کنترل منطقه ای امریکا در آسیای جنوب غربی

دکتر زهر پوستینچی

دوگانگی تعاملی (مفهومی و عملیاتی) نقش رهبر در سازمانهای دهشت¬افکنِ (تروریستی) هویتی: (تحلیلی بر نقش کشته شدن بن لادن بر تداوم/عدم تداوم حیات عملیاتی سازمان القاعده)

محمد صادق جوکار

خاورمیانه جدید و تغییر موازنه قدرت

مصاحبه با دکتر سید سلمان صفوی، رئيس مركز بين المللي مطالعات صلح – لندن

Dr. Tahere Torabi[2]

Abstract

This problem exists in terms of dealing with the government’s immediate behaviour of killing protesters, as well as what to do with a government that has never been an ally of the United States, and has increasingly problematic regional behaviour. The goal of the United States has been, and will continue to be, to break the resistance axis of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. Previously, we had thought that would be achievable via a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. Now, policymakers have to consider that they’re going to have to deal with a different government in Damascus, eventually, and that a Sunni-led government in Damascus would create that break.

Some in the Syrian protest movement and in the West, including American officials, allege that Iran is actively helping Assad retain the post held by him or his late father for more than four decades. The White House late last month imposed new sanctions on Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guard, alleging Iranian involvement in and support of the government crackdown.

However Iran strenuously denies providing material support or advice to Syria and has called for peaceful dialogue and reform there. If Iran is involved, that could further indebt Assad to Tehran, complicating efforts by the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia to coax Damascus to loosen its ties with Iran and the Islamist militant groups Hezbollah and Hamas.¹

This is a dilemma for the United States because it is accepted in Washington that the government is on a downward trajectory–that the Syria government faces a fundamental dilemma: that the reforms and changes that would be necessary would involve power-sharing between the minority Alawite government in Damascus, which is led by the Assads, and the Sunni majority in the country. Those political changes Bashar is not capable of, especially now that he is so reliant on the generals and the security chiefs that are Alawites, and the military and the army, for suppressing the revolt. What to do about that is a matter of debate. And that’s what’s currently going on in Washington–to try to understand that if something is broken in Syria, and the government is on a downward trajectory, what should Washington do?

Introduction

The Syrian revolt against the Baath Party government started with a small demonstration in the Al-Hariqa quarter of Damascus. The demonstration lasted for about half an hour before being dispersed by security forces who arrested many of the participants. The demonstration sparked a rapid succession of protests in different parts of Syria in the weeks that followed.

The southern city of Dar’a; Latakia and Baniyas in the north; and Duma in Rif Dimashq were the most prominent sites of protest. In these places, the popular movement involved in the revolts faced tremendous violence from the security services, leading to the deaths of approximately three hundred Syrians in one month of protests. However, neither the violence of the security apparatuses nor the official media narrative of foreign terrorist and Salafi agitation succeeded in quelling or confining the revolt.²

There is no doubt that Friday, 15 April, marked a turning point in the Syrian revolt, whether in terms of the number of participants involved in public demonstrations, or in terms of the spread of the demonstrations throughout the country, to include cities with Kurdish, Druze and Christian majorities.

This may have prompted President Bashar al-Assad to try to contain the situation by delivering two speeches to the People’s Council (parliament) and the Council of Ministers, announcing the lifting of the state of emergency and a dissolving of the state security courts, as well as offering vague promises about future reforms. On Thursday, 21 April , he approved cabinet’s decision to abolish both the state of emergency and state security courts. Leaked reports, however, indicate that he had issued orders to suppress popular demonstrations that Syrian activists had announced for the next day. This is indeed what happened. Friday, 22 April, was a memorable day in the Syrian revolt.

1- The Nature of Social Movement in the Arab World

As the winds of Arab revolt began to blow late last December, and even after the fall of the Mubarak government in Egypt, few people had predicted that a popular movement would emerge so rapidly in Syria. The popular movement in Syria did indeed erupt, spreading to almost all parts of Syria in the demonstrations of Friday, 22 April. The next Friday (29 April) witnessed demonstrations in many parts of the country, wrecking the Syrian government’s hopes of containing the revolt by deploying troops and stepping-up its campaign of repression in Dar’a and Rif Dimashq.³

As with Egypt, it cannot be said that there is one party or political movement that is behind the revolt, nor is there a particular individual leading it. What is clear is that Syrians of all classes have participated in the demonstrations, and that the number of Syrian academics and political and civil organisations supporting the popular demands is both large and diverse. Even the Kurdish majority areas, marked in the past few years by separatist tendencies, abandoned their national-sectarian demands and raised the banners of freedom and dignity that were being carried in other Syrian cities. It is not yet clear whether Alawite-majority areas are siding with the popular movement, but Syrian Alawite leaders, known for their opposition to the government, have not hesitated in declaring their support for the people and their demands.

From the outset, Syrians have been conscious of the sensitivity around ethnic and sectarian diversity. As such, slogans emphasising the unity of the land and people, – and stressing the non-sectarian nature of the movement’s demands – were popularised. Although the size of the movement in Damascus and Aleppo was smaller than in cities like Dar’a, Baniyas, Homs and the town of Rif Dimashq, the protest movements that emerged in Syria’s two largest cities indicated that demonstrations were not confined to specific social classes – a phenomenon similar to that of the Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. A single representative body that can speak on its behalf, or that clearly formulates and develops the demands of the revolt, has not yet emerged in the Syrian movement.⁴

2- The Causes of Syria Crisis Escalation

The protests in Syria are not entirely indigenous even if people have legitimate grievances. A much larger game is underway that has little to do with the rights of the people. The US, Israel and Saudi Arabia as well as exiled Syrian politicians are all involved in undermining the government of President Bashar al-Assad for their own nefarious ends. This is not to argue that Assad is a democrat or that he does not rule with an iron fist. Syria’s importance lies elsewhere: unlike governments in the rest of the Muslim East, it is not an American-Zionist puppet. In fact, it is part of the resistance alliance that includes Islamic Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas against US-Zionist aggression. Add to that the US-Zionist agents in Lebanon whose machinations to undermine Hizbullah have been frustrated by the steadfastness of the resistance movement, and the picture begins to get clearer.

With the protests ongoing, what is clear is that the Syrian people will refuse to go back to the situation that existed prior to the revolt. President Assad’s vague and restricted statements have neither appeared to be convincing to the people, nor have they managed to reassert his credibility. It also does not appear that that the Syrian people are ready to accept the government’s conflicting accounts of what is happening in the country as these accounts have lacked both logical coherence and convincing evidence.

There is no doubt that the increasing number of imprisoned, wounded and killed are indicative of the government’s lack of commitment regarding the long overdue and promise reforms. Furthermore, even if the government does undertake radical and comprehensive reforms with a clear timetable, it is no longer certain that it will be successful in containing the popular movement; the brutality of the government’s repression may have gone too far in the sense that the population may no longer consent to the government remaining in power – regardless of the reform measures it takes.

The government faces a dilemma that is only being exacerbated by its means of dealing with the revolt. It is clear that since Friday, 22 April, the government has resorted to the ‘Hama (the ‘Hama option’, as it is sometimes called – a reference to the 1982 crackdown by Syrian forces in the town of Hama⁵). option’ in dealing with the demonstrations; that is, letting loose troops loyal to the government on the city of Dar’a – that has since become a symbol of the revolt – regardless of the number of people killed and the devastation wrought upon the city. Through such action the government believes it can teach other Syrian cities a lesson in a manner that would quell the popular movement, just as it did in the early eighties.

The problem for the government is that what Syria is now witnessing is not analogous to ‘Hama’ in the sense that the international and regional contexts, as well as the size, facets and demands of the Syrian revolt today, are entirely different from those that the government faced in the late seventies and early eighties. If the government sees force as the solution, it will not only need to suppress Dar’a, but perhaps all Syrian cities involved in the revolt before it can be assured of a return to a pre-revolt state of affairs. Such an option, however, has become untenable⁶.

On the other hand, neither the nature of the ruling Syrian elite, nor the government’s record of responding to opposition, suggest that the Syrian revolt will be able to achieve its goals as quickly as the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, or with relatively limited loss of life from the ranks of the revolutionaries. The Syrian ruling elite is defending highly complex political, economic and religious interests, both regionally and locally, and has witnessed for itself the fate of those overthrown in Tunisia and Egypt. As such, the ruling elite will go to extreme lengths to ensure a maintenance of the status quo in Syria.

The position of the Syrian armed forces only adds to the complexity of the situation. The Syrian military is divided in terms of leadership and role, as well as in terms of loyalty to the government. As such, the possibility that the Syrian armed forces will take a unified position or play a unified role, as in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases, is unlikely. What is likely is that the government will enjoy unwavering loyalty from a considerable number of units in the armed forces⁷.

3- The Pattern of Management Crisis of Syria

During the first few weeks of the revolts, aside from being ignored by the government and having to face the usual repression through arrests of active opposition members, the movement received little attention from the government. With a rising death toll and the realisation of the breadth of the movement’s base, President Assad then attempted to contain the situation by offering some concessions of a political and social nature at the end of March and beginning of April.

a- Increase of Salary System

The government increased the salaries of public employees, conferred Syrian citizenship to thousands of Kurds who were denied this right for decades, and dismissed the cabinet. The president then delivered a speech to the People’s Council in which he promised to take steps towards political reform, such as looking into lifting the state of emergency and considering possible constitutional amendments. President Assad asserted that these measures had been adopted at the local conference of the Baath Party six years earlier, but due to changes in the government’s priorities, the implementation of these reforms had been delayed.

In the president’s second public appearance, Assad issued instructions and recommendations to the new government to prepare for the decision to lift the state of emergency. He spoke about issues of limited significance, such as the ways ministers and public servants should treat citizens, and the need to confront corruption. However, he did not speak directly to the Syrian people, and did not apologise to the people for the rising death toll. He also stressed that Syria was facing an externally driven plot. He attempted to appear as a confident leader, able to govern in the face of a crisis that he was about to end⁸.

b- Caused the Protests as Terrorist Group

As the protest movement grew, so did the level of violence employed by the government’s security apparatuses to suppress the demonstrations. By mid-April, Syrian human rights organisations had published the names of more than two hundred people killed by the government’s forces. In several of the cities that witnessed popular demonstrations, the presence of armed civilian groups was noticeable. The government sometimes described these groups as paid terrorist groups from Jordan or the Future Movement, a Lebanese political movement. However, sectors aligned to the demonstrators described them as groups linked to the government’s security services.

c- Fire Against Protests

It is clear that the Syria government has adopted a policy of promising future reforms of a limited and ambiguous nature, accompanied by a wide-scale crackdown that extends to all centres of popular opposition.

Several sources have suggested that, in order to justify its repressive measures, in a manner reminiscent of the Egyptian and Yemeni governments’ responses to their revolutions, the government resorted to arming certain groups (possibly of non-Syrian origin) to attack both protesters and military units. That these armed groups enjoyed unrestricted mobility is atypical for a country like Syria. That these groups completely avoided demonstrations that took place in support of the government, and usually stationed themselves atop government buildings, clearly indicates that they were linked to the government and its apparatuses⁹.

It was noted that during the demonstrations on Friday, 15 April, which had been preceded by President Assad’s directive not to use force against demonstrators, not a single person was killed, whether from the military or the protesters. On the day that the president sought to avoid the use of force, even if it was just for a single day, the armed groups were nowhere to be seen.

4- Arab World’s Attitudes toward Syria Evolution

Most Arab states have ignored events in Syria; something that can be seen by the absence of the Syrian issue from statements issued by the League of Arab States. It is likely that the Arab states that would like to see government change in Damascus, and even those that are ambivalent towards such a change, are not yet fully confident that such change is possible. The caution characterising the official Arab position, however, has not prevented most of the Arab media, even Saudi-owned media outlets, from devoting a great deal of coverage to the protests in Syria.

Arab countries that have expressed sympathy with the Syrian government are by and large those that are themselves either facing mass revolts, or expect to, such as Libya, Yemen and Algeria. There are also indications that the ruling Shiite political forces in Iraq are as concerned about developments in Syria as their Iranian neighbours¹⁰.

5- Great Powers’ Reaction toward Syria Crisis

At an unofficial level, there seems to be confusion in the Arab political arena regarding the Syrian situation. Arab movements and personalities known for their opposition to the Syrian government have stepped up their criticism and condemnation of the government’s policies, declaring unequivocal support for the popular movement. Those that have been known for their solidarity with Syria’s support for the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance and its opposition to US policies appear to be divided into two main camps.

• The first of these includes those who see the Syrian revolt as similar to those of the other popular Arab revolutions in countries like Tunisia and Egypt. This camp sees the support of the popular movement and the condemnation of the Assad government’s repressive response as necessary.
• The second camp includes those who believe that the Syrian case is different from Egypt and Tunisia. They hold that what is necessary is to stand in solidarity with the government, while simultaneously calling on it to implement political reforms¹¹.

There was no concrete reaction by western powers and international organisations about developments in Syria throughout the second half of March. On the contrary, remarks from Washington and Paris confirmed that a western intervention in Syria akin to that in Libya would not take place. It seemed as if western powers fear the uncertainty that may result from government change in Syria. What we can tell from the US president’s remarks is that the United States seeks to drive a wedge between Iran and Syria, and to affect the latter’s policy of supporting resistance forces in the region.

a- China and Russia’s Attitude Toward Syria Crisis

With the escalation of the Syrian revolt, the government’s policy of Control, repression and the rising number of casualties, western states have taken punitive measures against Syrian officials, and intensified official statements condemning the government’s policy of repression, without declaring support for government change. Russia, however, appears to be more sympathetic to the Assad government, and opposes any external interference. Both Russia and China have played a major role in preventing the UN Security Council from issuing a presidential statement condemning the Syrian government’s repressive actions, even though a presidential statement is the weakest form of action that can be taken by the Council. By the end of April, the only action taken at an international level was a resolution issued by the UN Human Rights Council. However, by early May the European Union and the US had imposed sanctions on certain senior Syrian officials¹².

b- U.S. Attitude Toward Syria Evolution

This analysis suggests that Western powers should not fear more assertive action in support of anti-government protestors in Syria. Still, compared to the situation in Egypt or Libya, for example, the international community has found it exceedingly difficult to say even that Asad has lost the moral authority to govern his country. Perhaps governments around the world are wary of taking on another political campaign because they worry that it may become a slippery slope: despite their intentions, the political steps could evolve into a military campaign. Such a campaign would be inappropriate for many reasons, not least of which is that the West lacks the will and resources for a war against a fourth Muslim country. At the same time, it is important to recognize that in the case of Syria, such a campaign may not be necessary to achieve the desired results.

Indeed, Washington and other administrations should not underestimate the power that political statements, moral judgments, economic sanctions, and efforts at diplomatic isolation can have on Asad’s hold on power. As is likely to be case with the new U.S. sanctions on Asad, his family, and his closest advisors, such measures can have a powerful impact on the situation inside the country. Much work will be needed in response to Syria’s vicious human rights abuses and flagrant violations of international conventions. Unfortunately, Arab states and some European countries are divided on the issue, and this absence of unity makes it difficult to claim full legitimacy for tough measures against Asad¹³.

The key to change lies in the clarity of the message broadcast to Syria. The men around Asad, the officers commanding the army, the Sunni merchant class, and the courageous protestors all need to know that the best choice is that “Asad should go.” And international support for taking a chance on the “devil we don’t know” will help empower Syrians to make that change.

c- NATO Attitude Toward Syria Crisis

The military operation to destabilize Syria and the propaganda campaign that came with it have been orchestrated by a coalition of states under US coordination, in exactly the same way that NATO coordinates its member and non-member states to bombard and stigmatize Libya. As indicated above, the mercenary forces have been provided with the compliments of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was forced to knock on several doors, including in Pakistan and Malaysia, seeking to boost his personal army deployed in Manama and Tripoli. As an example, we can cite the installation of an ad hoc telecommunications center on the premises of the Ministry of Telecommunications in Lebanon.

Syria is not Libya and the outcome was reversed. Indeed, whereas Libya is a state that was created by the colonial powers which united Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan by force, Syria is a historical country which was reduced to its simplest form by those same powers. Therefore, while Libya is spontaneously at the mercy of centrifugal forces, Syria attracts centripetal forces bent on reconstructing Greater Syria (comprising Jordan, occupied Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus and part of Iraq). Syria’s population today cannot but repudiate any plan to partition the country.

Far from arousing the population against the “government”, this blood bath triggered a national outpouring for President Bashar al-Assad. Aware that they are being drawn into a civil war by design, the Syrians are standing shoulder to shoulder. The overall number of anti-government protest rallies garnered between 150 000 and 200 000 people out of a population of 22 million inhabitants. By contrast, the pro-government drew crowds the likes of which the country had never seen before¹⁴.

At that point, the Western-Saudi strategy needed to be revised. Realizing that military action would fall short of plunging the country into chaos in the near term, Washington decided to undermine Syrian society in the middle term. The rationale is that the policies of the Al-Assad government have been forging a middle class (the true mainstay of a democracy) and that it would be feasible to turn this class against him. In that case, an economic collapse of the country would have to be engineered.

Now, Syria’s main resource is oil, even if its production cannot compare in volume with that of its rich neighbors. To market the oil, Syria must have assets deposited in Western banks to serve as guarantee during the transactions. It would be enough to freeze them in order to pull the country down. Hence, the expediency of tarnishing its image to mold western public opinion into accepting the “sanctions against the government.”

6- Syria Crisis Effects on Region

In Lebanon, there is a deadlock in regards to the formation of a Lebanese government. Michel Sleiman, who holds the presidency in Lebanon, and the new Lebanese prime minister have been delaying the formation of the cabinet in a political row with Michel Aoun, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement. It may be possible that the formation of a new Lebanese cabinet is being delayed deliberately to keep Lebanon neutralized on the foreign policy front¹⁵.

The U.N. Security Council and several U.N. bodies are all being used by the U.S. and the E.U. to put pressure on Lebanon. U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon himself is a U.S. puppet who has done everything to legitimize U.S. and NATO aggression to the point where Moscow openly accused him of treachery for secret dealings with NATO in 2008. It is in this context that the U.N. is being used as a forum for insidious attempts to internationalize the domestic issue of the weapons of the Lebanese Resistance and to disarm it. Despite the fact that U.N. Resolution 1559 is no longer relevant, the Special Representative for the Implementation of Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen, still remains active and issues reports against Hezbollah.

The envoys of the U.N. to Lebanon resemble colonial figures making uninvited edicts in Beirut and working as agents of Washington, Brussels, and Tel Aviv. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which has an entire division in the U.S. State Department dedicated to it, is also a loaded political weapon that Washington is itching to use against Lebanon and Syria. An international tribunal was formed for the slaying of the late Rafik Al-Hariri.

Hariri at the time of his murder had no official state position, but an international tribunal has been created for his case alone. On the other hand the international community has taken no interest in forming any type of tribunals to investigate the murder and assassinations of the thousands of other people killed in Lebanon. What does this say about the STL and the justice being sought?

The events in Syria are also tied to Iran, the longstanding strategic ally of Damascus. It is not by chance that Senator Lieberman was demanding publicly that the Obama Administration and NATO attack Syria and Iran like Libya. It is also not coincidental that Iran was included in the sanctions against Syria¹⁶.

There is a strong correlation between war in Southwest Asia and increased talk at the official level about Palestinian statehood. Hopes of Palestinian statehood have always been used twice to discharge pressure in the Arab World built from rising tensions from war preparations against Iraq. The first time was by George H. Bush Sr. and the second time by George W. Bush Jr., who was praised for being the first U.S. president to seriously talk about a Palestinian state.

Even as he flip-flops on his position, Obama now is talking about a Palestinian state too. Moreover, rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah has taken place as the count-down towards international recognition of Palestinian statehood begins. The Israelis have also released frozen funds to the Palestinians, which they refused to do before due to Hamas.

The rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas has also served to tie the hands of Hamas. Hamas will have to be careful not to effectively become a junior partner in governing the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Hamas must now modify its behaviour to continue its partnership in a unity government with Fatah, which will undemocratically be imposed as the senior partner the Palestinian Authority. In a manner of speaking, Hamas is being domesticated indirectly by Israel and Washington.

a- Iran and Syria Evolution

Obviously a destabilized Syria potentially throws the Iranian military base idea out the window. A destabilized Syria has big implications for Lebanon and for Hezbollah. Syria has been the Lebanese overlord for decades. Today we learn, for example, that Hezbollah has been offering support to the Shia in Bahrain who are rebelling against their Sunni king¹⁷.

As I indicated above, Iran has also been helpful to Hamas, even though Hamas is a Sunni Muslim movement. All of those relationships could be in jeopardy soon. And that has broad, potentially very positive, implications for Israel, whose prime minister is in Moscow today arguing for a tougher Russian stand on Iran’s nuclear program. And in the zero sum game of the Middle East, what’s good for Israel is bad for Syria and Iran.

That’s why you are seeing Bashar Assad shooting at his own people now. Sure he has promised increased freedoms for discontented citizens and increased pay and benefits for state workers, but his military action suggests he knows the protesters will not be bought off by such blandishments.

b- Turkey and Containing Syria

There is one other important player that must be talked about. This player is Turkey. Washington and the E.U. have pushed Turkey to be more active in the Arab World. This has blossomed through Ankara’s neo-Ottomanism policy. This is why Turkey has been posturing itself as a champion of Palestine and launched an Arabic-language channel like Iran and Russia.

Ankara, however, has been playing an ominous role. Turkey is a partner in the NATO war on Libya. The position of the Turkish government has become clear with its betrayal of Tripoli. Ankara has also been working with Qatar to corner the Syrian government. The Turkish government has been pressuring Damascus to change its policies to please Washington and appears to possibly even have a role in the protests inside Syria with the Al-Sauds, the Hariri minority camp in Lebanon, and Qatar. Turkey is even hosting opposition meetings and providing them support¹⁸.

Only last weekend, Gul’s key advisor Ersat Hurmuzlu told Saudi Arabia’s al-Arabya television that Assad had less than a week to meet the demands of the protesters, failing which “it wouldn’t be possible to offer any cover for the leadership in Syria because there is the danger … that we had always been afraid of, and that is foreign intervention.” By Monday, Hurmuzlu had retracted.

“We are not redesigning others’ houses. It is Syria’s own problem,” he clarified. Obviously, the Saudis are muddying the waters for Ankara. The Saudi media have been highly critical of Assad and openly call for government change. The Asharq Alawsat carried a pungent commentary on Monday:

The problem with Syria today is that everybody is looking at what is happening there as if it is the conclusion of [what is happening on] the Arab scene, and that the same pattern exists for each country. Many believe that the Syrians are “copying” the Tunisians, the Egyptians, and others, and this is simply not true. The size and depth of the Syrian opposition within the country is greater than everybody thinks. The demands that are being called for today by the Syrians have been in place ever since 2000.

Therefore what is happening in Syria is not the same as what happened in other parts of the region; it is a genuine movement … Syrians are demonstrating and shouting, “We don’t love you [Assad], we don’t love you, leave us alone and your party too!”

Again, the European voice has been strident, too. British Foreign Secretary William Hague said:

I hope our Turkish colleagues will bring every possible pressure to bear on the Assad government with a very clear message that they are losing legitimacy and that Assad should reform or step aside. And I hope they will be very clear and very bold about that.

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe outstripped Hague: “Some believe there’s still time for him [Assad] to change his ways and commit to a [reform] process. For my part, I doubt it. I think the point of no return has been reached.” But Turkey grasps too well the nuances of European diplomacy to know what such gratuitous advice means¹⁹.

United States President Barack Obama phoned Erdogan on Monday following Assad’s speech. The White House statement said, The leaders agreed that the Syrian government must end the use of violence now and promptly enact meaningful reforms that respect the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people.

But Erdogan’s office merely said he and Obama agreed to monitor developments in Syria closely. It claimed that the conversation was wide-ranging and covered the situation in Libya and the imperative need of a Middle East process as well.

Conclusion

The efforts to overthrow the Syrian government have a lot in common with what has been undertaken in Libya. However, the results are substantially different owing to each country’s social and political background. The project to break up these two States simultaneously was initially brought up by John Bolton on 6 May 2002 when he was serving as Undersecretary of State in the Bush administration. It’s implementation by the Obama administration nine years down the line – in the context of the Arab Awakening – is not without problems.

The revolutionaries and the government in Syria and in the rest of the Middle East have in common that both lack a thorough plan and a productive attitude. The government’s plans have proven hollow promises. The opposition seems to lack the vision for a focused future perspective as well.

Because of this shared lack of vision, both the government and the opposition hide ever more in their deeply rooted sectarian and religious camps; and the possibility that the revolts will lead from bad to worse grows larger by the day. Meanwhile the call for freedom heard at Tahrir square is deteriorating into a state of anarchy in which armed gangs kill policemen, after having done the same to innocent Alawites, who happen to belong to the sect president Bashar al-Assad belongs to. The army is rolling in with heavy gear and has effectively called a siege on northwest Syria²⁰.

Turkey is viewed in Washington and Brussels as the key to bringing the Iranians and the Arabs into line. The Turkish government has been parading itself as a member of the Resistance Bloc with the endorsement of Iran and Syria. U.S strategists project that it will be Turkey which domesticates Iran and Syria for Washington. Turkey also serves as a means of integrating the Arab and Iranian economies with the economy of the European Union. In this regard Ankara has been pushing for a free-trade zone in Southwest Asia and getting the Iranians and Syrians to open up their economies to it²¹.

Bibliography

1- Thierry Meyssan (2011) The Plan to Destabilize Syria, voltairenet.org, 19 June.

2- Dean Reynolds (2011) Syria unrest presents dilemma for Iran, in CBS News, March 25.

3- Borzou Daragahi (2011) Some see the hand of Iran in Syria’s crackdown, Los Angeles Times, May 10.

4- Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya (2011) War with Syria, Iran and Lebanon in the Works? Voltairenet.org, June 17.

5- Michael Provence ( 2005) The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism, Austin: University of Texas Press.

6- Ruben Elsinga (2011) The Syrian Revolt and the fate of my friend Amjad Baiazy, in www.rubenelsinga.wordpress.com, June 17.

7- Amos Yadlin and Robert Satloff, Syria: The Case for ‘The Devil We Don’t Know’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 19, 2011.

8- AlJazeera (2011) The Syrian Revolution: Possibilities for what lies ahead, Afro-Middle East Centre, May11.

9- Andrew Tabler (2011) The Degrading of Syria’s Regime, Council on Foreign Relations, June 14.

10- Alessandro Bacci (2011) Syria: Facebook Is Again Directly Accessible Without Proxy Servers, in daoonline.info, February 20.

11- Daniel Marx (2011) Syria: A turning point for the Arab Spring? In Observatorio Electoral, May 18.

12- Michael Weiss and Hannah Stuart (2011) The Syrian opposition: Political analysis with original, Foreign Policy, May 04.

13- Syria Opposition Urges Army Troops to Join Revolt (2011) The Daily Star, 27 May.

14- Katherine Zoepf (2011) Long Repressed in Syria, an Internal Opposition takes shape, New York Times, April 27.

15- Anthony Shadid (2011) Syrian Elite to Fight Protests to the End, New York Times, May 10.

16- Interview with Lucia Annunziata of In Mezz’Ora (2011) US Faces a Challenge in Trying to Punish Syria, New York Times, April 25.

17- US and EU say they plan new steps on Syria (2011) Reuters, May

18- Turkey PM calls Assad to press for reform (2011) Hurriyet, May

19- Franco Bechis (2011) French plans to topple Gaddafi on track since last November, Voltaire Network, March 25.

20- War propaganda: gay blogger in Damascus (2011) Voltaire Network, June 13.

21- Lebanon’s Hizbollah leader pledges support for Assad in Syria (2011) The National, May 26.

[1] Associate Professor of Islamic Azad University, Science and Research

[2] Ph.D of International Relations of Islamic Azad University, Science and Research