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In the beginning all people were one nation (Holy Qur'an, 2:213) Throughout human history, peace has always been the 'primary state' and war the 'accidental state'. Peace is beautiful, compassionate and constructive, while war is fearsome, merciless and destructive. Unfortunately, despite this, war has been one of 20th century's most major problems, and has proved to be the symbol of the beginning of the 21[st]century. As portrayed by the contemporary history of international relations, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia, war is not the solution, nor is it constructive or helpful in solving problems; rather, it causes problems and is the root of the continuation of violence, instability and insecurity.

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1. Establishing justice between the countries of the South and the North.
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4. Thinking globally and acting against extreme nationalism.
5. Realistic understanding of the realities of the world.
6. Upholding and respecting human rights and the principles of democracy.
7. Accepting and moving towards the destruction of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world/on a global scale

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4. Organising international scientific conferences dealing with regional and global issues.
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Articles فهرست

Statement on Weapons of Mass Destruction[1]

Seyed Salman Safavi
IPSC, Iran-UK
Religious Affairs Advisory Council, London

The production, storage and use of weapons of mass destruction[2] are morally and religiously indefensible. All governments should start to decommission their Weapons of Mass Destruction. The international community should oversee this process. Both the Bible and the Qu'ran emphasise the fact that all are created to live together in harmony rather than in conflict. The Qu'ran, al-Hujurat, 49.13 says that the various peoples of the world were created that they might "know one another" and similarly the Judeo Christian scriptures emphasise in Isaiah 11:9 that in a perfect world we will not "hurt or destroy".

Non-Discrimination[3]

Weapons of Mass Destruction, whether chemical, nuclear or biological, almost inevitably target civilian populations untrained and unequipped to deal with such an attack. Those who employ Weapons of Mass Destruction are unlikely to be able to avoid harming non-combatants when these weapons are deployed (most particularly the vulnerable such as the very old or the very young). Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDs), by their very nature, do not permit a sufficient level of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants. Even if WMDs were only deployed against military targets, it is hard to guarantee that they will only affect military personnel. Biological weapons are generally indiscriminate, as are chemical weapons in most circumstances and the effects of nuclear weapons are often so extensive that radiation continues to affect victims some years after the initial detonation of the atomic weapons (as was the case following the Second World War).

A clear distinction between a combatant and a non-combatant is required under Islamic law, and is also prioritised in Judeo-Christian concepts of a just war. It is well attested that The Prophet Mohamed, on seeing the body of a woman who had been slain, said 'She is not one who would have fought', and then ordered his men not to kill women or children (Bukhari 4.52.57 and Muslim 19.4319). Similarly, the Christian concept of the 'just war' prioritises a non-combatant immunity. The killing of innocents by intent is specifically singled out as immoral in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Indeed hands that shed innocent blood are an abomination to God (Proverbs 6:17).

Proportionality of Response

Weapons of Mass Destruction also generally kill or maim in such a gruesome manner that they violate Islamic teachings on killing humanely. The Quran accepts that its adherents may fight "those who fight against you", but adds the strong injunction "do not transgress" (*The Qur'an*, al-Baqarah, 2.190). Weapons of Mass Destruction 'transgress' limits on ethical and religious warfare both in the scale of destruction and in the gruesome effects of radiation, chemical or biological poisoning. In Christian conceptions of just war, combatants should not seek vengeance, but instead should seek to restore peace. Indeed Christians are told in no uncertain terms never to seek vengeance for God says "Vengeance is mine" (Romans 12:19). If the restoration of peace is the true goal, then only such damage as may be reasonably thought necessary to achieve that end should be caused. Weapons of Mass Destruction enact disproportionate destructive power

and create unnecessary suffering. Rather than working towards a restorative peace, WMDs, by their nature, are retributive.

In summary, Weapons of Mass Destruction are not morally justifiable. They are incapable of discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Their destructive power also prohibits proportional responses to conflict, and moreover, their use signifies a turn towards retributive rather than restorative conflict.

There are no circumstances in which the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction is defensible. They are an anathema to God.

Keywords: Weapon of mass destruction (WMD), Islam, religions.

Endorsed on behalf of the Religious Affairs Advisory Council by:

- Ayatollah Salman Safavi of Iran

Endnotes

[1] See definition in Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary: A nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon able to cause widespread devastation and loss of life.

[2] The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica: Weapon of mass destruction (WMD), weapon with the capacity to inflict death and destruction on such a massive scale and so indiscriminately that its very presence in the hands of a hostile power can be considered a grievous threat. Modern weapons of mass destruction are either nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons—frequently referred to collectively as NBC weapons. *See* nuclear weapon, chemical warfare, biological warfare.

The term *weapons of mass destruction* has been in currency since at least 1937, when it was used to describe massed formations of bomber aircraft. At that time these high-flying battleships of the air seemed to pose an unstoppable threat to civilian centres located far from any war front—as indeed they did during World War II (1939–45), notably in the firebombings of such cities as Hamburg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, when tens of thousands of civilians died in a single night. With the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, the fearsome power of conventional bombs paled

before the spectacle of an entire city centre destroyed and some 66,000 people instantly killed by the blast and heat of a single nuclear weapon. (By the end of the year, radiation injury brought the death toll to 140,000.) During the Cold War the United States, the Soviet Union, and other major powers built up enormous stockpiles containing tens of thousands of nuclear bombs, missile warheads, and artillery shells—so many that the military and diplomatic standoff of that era was sometimes described as a "balance of terror." At the same time both superpowers also amassed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, the two other principal types of modern WMD. Chemical weapons consist of liquids and gases that choke their victims, poison their blood, blister their skin, or disrupt their nervous system. Chlorine gas (a choking agent) and mustard gas (a blistering agent) were fired in artillery shells against entrenched troops during both World War I (1914–18) early in the 20th century and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) toward the end of the century. Biological weapons contain natural toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, or fungi; sprayed or burst over populated areas, they might cause limited but severe outbreaks of such deadly diseases as anthrax, pneumonic plague, or smallpox. Biological weapons have not been used in modern war since the Japanese spread plague-infected lice in areas of China during World War II. However, the relative ease with which both biological and chemical agents can be prepared, packaged, delivered, and set off have raised fears that they might become the weapon of choice of terrorists. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War the main concern regarding all WMD has been proliferation, that is, the potential for lesser powers, "rogue states," or international terrorist groups to acquire the means to produce and deliver WMD. Efforts to control the spread of WMD are enshrined in international agreements such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993.

[3] **Robert S. Norris** : Nuclear weapons produce enormous explosive energy. Their significance may best be appreciated by the coining of the words kiloton (1,000 tons) and megaton (1,000,000 tons) to describe their blast energy in equivalent weights of the conventional chemical explosive TNT. For example, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945, containing only about 64 kg (140 pounds) of highly enriched uranium, released energy equaling about 15 kilotons of chemical explosive. That blast immediately produced a strong shock wave, enormous amounts of heat, and lethal ionizing radiation. Convection currents created by the explosion drew dust and other

debris into the air, creating the mushroom-shaped cloud that has since become the virtual signature of a nuclear explosion. In addition, radioactive debris was carried by winds high into the atmosphere, later to settle to Earth as radioactive fallout. The enormous toll in destruction, death, injury, and sickness produced by the explosions at Hiroshima and, three days later, at Nagasaki was on a scale never before produced by any single weapon. In the decades since 1945, even as many countries have developed nuclear weapons of far greater strength than those used against the Japanese cities, concerns about the dreadful effects of such weapons have driven governments to negotiate arms control agreements such as the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968. Among military strategists and planners, the very presence of these weapons of unparalleled destructive power has created a distinct discipline, with its own internal logic and set of doctrines, known as nuclear strategy.

The first nuclear weapons were bombs delivered by aircraft. Later, warheads were developed for strategic ballistic missiles, which have become by far the most important nuclear weapons. Smaller tactical nuclear weapons have also been developed, including ones for artillery projectiles, land mines, antisubmarine depth charges, torpedoes, and shorter-range ballisticand cruise missiles.

By far the greatest force driving the development of nuclear weapons after World War II (though not by any means the only force) was the Cold Warconfrontation that pitted the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union and its satellite states. During this period, which lasted roughly from 1945 to 1991, the American stockpile of nuclear weapons reached its peak in 1966, with more than 32,000 warheads of 30 different types. During the 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, many types of tactical and strategic weapons were retired and dismantled to comply with arms control negotiations, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or as unilateral initiatives. By 2010 the United States had approximately 9,400 warheads of nine types, including two types of bombs, three types for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), two types for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and two types for cruise missiles. Some types existed in several modifications. Of these 9,400 warheads, an estimated 2,468 were operational (that is, mated to a delivery system such as a missile); the rest were either spares held in reserve or retired warheads scheduled to be dismantled. Of the 2,468 operational warheads, approximately 1,968 were deployed on strategic (long-range) delivery

systems, and some 500 were deployed on nonstrategic (short-range) systems. Of the 500 nonstrategic warheads in the U.S. arsenal, about 200 were deployed in Europe.

The Soviet nuclear stockpile reached its peak of about 33,000 operational warheads in 1988, with an additional 10,000 previously deployed warheads that had been retired but had not been taken apart. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia accelerated its warhead dismantlement program, but the status of many of the 12,000 warheads estimated to remain in its stockpile in 2010 was unclear. Given limited Russian resources and lack of legitimate military missions, only about 4,600 of these 12,000 warheads were serviceable and maintained enough to be deployed. Of the 4,600 operational warheads, some 2,600 were deployed on strategic systems and some 2,000 on nonstrategic systems. A global security concern is the safety of Russia's intact warheads and the security of nuclear materials removed from dismantled warheads.

Beginning in the 1990s, the arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, and China also underwent significant change and consolidation. Britain eliminated its land-based army, tactical naval, and air nuclear missions, so that its arsenal, which contained some 350 warheads in the 1970s, had just 225 warheads in 2010. Of these, fewer than 160 were operational, all on its ballistic missile submarine fleet. Meanwhile, France reduced its arsenal from some 540 operational warheads at the end of the Cold War to about 300 in 2010, eliminating several types of nuclear weapon systems. The Chinese stockpile remained fairly steady during the 1990s and then started to grow at the beginning of the 21st century. By 2010 China had about 240 warheads in its stockpile, some 180 of them operational and the rest in reserve or retirement.

Israel maintained an undeclared nuclear stockpile of 60 to 80 warheads, but any developments were kept highly secret. India was estimated to have 60 to 80 assembled warheads and Pakistan about 70 to 90. Most of India's and Pakistan's warheads were thought not to be operational, though both countries—rivals in the incipient arms race on the Indian subcontinent—were thought to be increasing their stockpiles. North Korea, which joined the nuclear club in 2006, may have produced enough plutonium by 2010 for as many as 8 to 12 warheads, though it was not clear that any of these was operational.(http://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon)

Explaining the Persistent Egyptian –Iranian Estrangement: A Multilevel Approach

Yosra El Gendi
Research Officer, American University in Cairo

Abstract

Iran and Egypt are two important states in the Middle East. They also play an important role as middle powers in the international system. Despite their long shared history in the Middle East relations, their diplomatic relations are severed since 36 years. This papers tries to understand the reasons the tension between both states and the reasons behind their estrangement. This paper argues that while the systematic approach to understand their position in the Middle East system has caused them rivalry, a state approach is also vital to understand how they constructed international roles for themselves that are oppositional. Based on this role that shapes their international relations we can understand their continued tension. While Iran's international relations tried to maintain its independence from great powers, this paper argues also how Egypt international relations are influenced by its need for regime security. The paper examines the bilateral relations of both countries since the end of the Second World War.

Iran and Egypt are two important counties in the Middle East. Their strategic importance in the Middle East system was described by Ahmed Davutoğlu in his book "The Strategic Depth" in which he tried to strategize Turkish foreign policy. He stated that the Middle East is composed of three triangles Iran- Turkey- Egypt, forming the outer triangle, Syria- Iraq- Saudi Arabia, the inner triangle and Palestine- Lebanon- Jordan as the dependent triangle. He argued that the outer triangle's balance will result in the balancing of power in the Middle East. Furthermore, based on this outer triangle, the alliances of the inner and secondary triangles will be follow (Ozkan, 2011: 22). The importance of Iran and Egypt to the balance of the Middle East system, cannot be overstressed.

Yet, relations between Egypt and Iran have been usually tense. Normal friendly relations have become the exception rather than the norm since 1959. Diplomatic relations were severed twice in the aftermath of the Second World War. First, President Nasser severed diplomatic relations with Iran after the Shah has made diplomatic relations with Israel in 1959 (Abu El Ela, 2014: 76). Second, Imam Khomeini severed ties in 1979, after Sadat decided to sign a peace treaty with Israel (al- Sabbagh, 2007: 177). Thus, relations between both states have soured over third state issues (Bishku, 2011: 3) . However, while differences between states are normal and usual, it is rare that states break their diplomatic relations for more than 36 years. Despite change of regimes, revolutions and even wars in the region over that period, diplomatic relations were not renewed. There were hopes that the relations improve in the aftermath of the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt, but this did not materialize.

Relations with Iran were not always as such. The royal families in pre-52 Egypt and pre 1979 Iran intermarried, highlighting the harmony of relations between countries at the time (Abu El Ela, 74). There were periods of fruitful cooperation between both states as in 1970-79. The strong relations between former President Sadat and Reza Pahlavi reached a level of personal friendship that was not shattered by the change in the political circumstances after 1979 (see Bishku, 2011: 15).

Yet the relationship between both states have not underwent much academic inquiry, unlike the relationship between Iran and the Gulf States or Iran and the US (Shama, 2013: 127). This lack of academic inquiry as well as solid policy research perhaps may be one of the factors that has contributed to the continued state of relations. The question that this paper tries to answer is what are the factors and reasons that contribute to the tension and lack of diplomatic ties between Iran and Egypt since 1979 until the present time. Indeed, Egypt and Iran would benefit from coordination on a number of foreign policy issues if diplomatic relations resumed. For example, they share similar positions on the ISIS threat as well as Syrian Civil War in addition to economic benefits they would reap from developed economic relations. Thus in this paper we attempt to answer: what factors explain the current state of relations between the two states severed until the present?

This paper argues that answering this question is done through a multifaceted multilevel approach. First, the tension is a result of the way Egypt and Iran are attempting to position themselves in the Middle East regional system. I argue that that Egypt and Iran's tension is due to the positioning of their foreign policy that will lead to different relations in the Middle East and with the great powers, prominently the US. I argue that the direct reason for the persistent estrangement is Egypt's focus on regime security that may be interpreted as a result of its positioning. These foreign policy orientations have internal consequences that limit policy choice at home.

Approach

In this paper, we adopt dialectic structure- agent approach to international relations. In our approach, we see that basis of state relations is their position in the international or regional system (Neack, 2008: 125). The processes of foreign policy makings, is affected by the constraints in the way that the states position (126). Their makings further contribute to a re-entrenchment of the state's position in the system. It is thus important to see how a state's positioning in the international system, imposes limitations on its foreign policy behavior(126).

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As Laura Neack notes that applying the systematic level of analysis, does not release analysts from the state level of analysis (Neack, 2008: 125,6). The structure of the international system encourages certain behavior by states, depending on their position within it, but does not determine it (126). In this respect, she notes that the position of states in the international system, offers them limited choices for foreign policy, in which they have to decide. In that respect, the states also have power to choose, albeit in a restricted manner, from given choices that are dictated by the system(126). In this manner, we have to understand, the economic, cultural and domestic politics of states that push them to take certain policy choices and not others.

The Concept of Middle Power

Both Iran and Egypt are middle powers in the international system. Middle power is a relative concept. These are states that have middle level military and economic capabilities, between great powers and small states (Ozkan, 2011: 35). They derive their role from their position in the international distribution of power (Neack, 2008:163). Their policy is a result of their "in-between status" (Neack, 2008: 163). Accordingly, they play a role in maintaining the regional balance of power, and can impact the polarity of their regions. At the same time, they play an important role in multi-lateral institutions, through lobbying and coordinating their positions.

Keohane places middle states between after great and secondary powers and small states. He defines a middle powers as "states that cannot hope to affect the system acting alone can nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances or through universal or regional international organizations: These may be labeled "system-affecting"" (1969: 295). This is different from secondary powers who can have substantive influence the system alone, but cannot change it, a characteristic of great powers only. He differentiates middle powers from small power, in that the latter cannot change the system without being part of a large group of states, in which its influence is minimal and it may be penetrated by a greater power (295-6). He thus differentiates middle power from small power in that it can maintain its autonomy among peers.

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One critique of such definitions is that there are no clear cutting indictors to allow us to classify states in a unified manner as middle or small. This is highlighted by Michael Handel, who sees such definitions would place states – that he does not consider middle states- in that category. Yet, nonetheless, he also sees that a clear cut quantitative definition of middle states based on population and GNP are also not satisfactory (Handel, 1990: 29). Perhaps, this lack of clear cutting indicators is also due that their impact on international political system is not solely derived from their hard power, but also their self-constructed roles (Neack, 2008: 164).

Construction of the role of middle powers open the way to array of relations with great or super powers. Relations between the middle powers and the great powers are mixed. Middle powers are not free from the constraints on their capabilities by greater power, where they rely on them for military technology, economic support..etc (Elik, 2008: 67). Relations may not always be an alliance based on free choice[1], they may sometimes devolve into patron-client relations[2] (Handel, 139). Yet, they try to increase their autonomy by expanding their international relations (Elik, 2008: 68).

They can diversify their international relations in a number of ways. They are capable of maintaining a regional balance, by increasing their links to other states (Elik, 2008: 67). Thus can reorganize the regional polarity (Elik, 2008: 68). Thus, regionally, middle powers can contain the disturbing effects of revolutions in the region and maintain regional balance of power (Elik, 2008: 70). In that way, their policy has a balancing effect (Elik, 2008: 67).They also have important role to play in multi-lateral institutions. They coordinate positions with other states so as to have a greater impact than acting independently (Ozkan, 2011: 35- 36). Middle power diplomacy depends greatly on their role in institutions (Ozkan, 2011: 37). This all increases their bargaining abilities with great powers (Elik, 2008: 69).

Middle power rivalry can take place, when different states, characterized as middle powers, construct opposing roles for themselves in the regional system and try to organize the regional polarity in their own circles. Thus, with some exceptions, they also tend

to be on opposing sides in terms of international security arrangements and/or their engagement with international institutions and tend to lobby for different resolutions and agreements. I argue that both Iran and Egypt are middle powers vying for influence in the Middle East with symmetrically oppositional agendas in a number of portfolios. This rivalry is marked by the fact that these states are important middle powers in the Middle East system, with very different constructed roles.

Constructivism

In constructivism, there is no objective reality. States do not respond to reality as it is, states take part in constructing it based on their perceptions and interactions with it. Thus states project the activities that they perceive of their social interest. In that manner they constitute international relations. States in this way construct their roles in the system and give meaning to their international interactions (Neack, 2008: 169). The concept of identity is an important one for constructivist, as state identity is constituted based on a process of interacting and interpreting the world. In constructivism, state identities inform who they are and who are the "others" and in this way are "basis of interests" and thus their foreign policy tendencies (Ozkan, 2011: 49-50). In this way, the concept of middle power, discussed above is a constructed role by states (Neack, 2008: 169).

As per Neack, middle power is a constructed self- identification that has been adopted by a number of countries in the aftermath of the first and second world wars. These include states that were not one of the P5s nor were they weak to the extent that they felt that could not have an influence in the system. These states, including Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian states sought recognition based on that position. When no states recognized that status, in any formal sense, they adopted that role and started acting upon it. They highlighted their roles as mediators, coalition makers and sought multilateralism in solution to international crisis. In this sense, they constructed the roles as middle powers (Neack, 2008: 164).Thus, middle power must be seen as a constructed role not merely as economic and military indicators. While indeed important, the will to affect a change in the political systems, is also of great importance.

Regime Security

However, while middle powers can act as strong in the face of great powers in some cases, middle powers can also act as weak states in some periods. For example, they might accept that they become clients of a super-power, a relationship which may restrict their international relations and policy choices (Handel, 1990: 139). In that respect, rather than diversifying their international relations, that is a source of power for them in the face of super power, they restrict their international relations within their patron's sphere of influence. This may be due to a heavy reliance on a patron. In particular, this may happen when they are trying to maintain regime security.

Weak states tend to focus on maintaining their regime security as a prime objective. Maintaining regime security is done through both foreign policy instruments as well as internal security instruments. Autocratic leaders ensure that they win both internal and foreign key supporters whose backing is important for them to remain in power (Shulman, 2009: 20-26). Internally, this may mean finding the support of key security institutions or businesses people (Shulman, 2009: 22). Internationally, this may mean ensuring the support of certain states who can act as sources of funds and international political support necessary in order to meet regime challenges (Shulman, 2009: 25-26). This thus is reflected in the country's foreign policy.

Iran and Egypt as Middle Powers

Both Iran and Egypt can be considered as middle powers. They both have large populations, about 78 million for Iran and 83 million for Egypt (World Bank, 2014). They both have middle ranking income with Iran's GDP being $415.3 billion and Egypt's being $286.5 billion (World Bank, 2014). They also have middle ranking military power. Egypt ranks number 18 worldwide with a power index of 0.6 while Iran ranks number 23 worldwide with a power index of 0.7 (Global Fire Power, 2015). They both have strategic geographical positions. Iran has a strategic position in Eurasia between Russia and Europe (Ehteshami, 2002: 284) . Egypt similar has strategic position in between two continents Africa and Asia, at the crossroad of the North Africa, the

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Mediterranean and Gulf (Stacher, 2014: 381). Furthermore, the Suez Canal links the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, was an important route for the colonial powers (McDermott, 1998: 136). Thus with respect to the solid aspects of hard power, they can both be seen as important middle powers.

The Constructed Roles of Egypt and Iran in the Middle East Regional System after 1979- 2011

Both Egypt and Iran had different constructed roles for themselves in the aftermath of 1979. Thus they had different foreign policy orientations. In 1953, Nasser built the new constructed role for Egypt on national liberation and pan-Arabism (Ozkan, 2011: 70). Egypt and Syria's unity also based the United Arab Republic. He called for Arab Unity to support and liberate Palestine(Ozkan, 2011: 75). Furthermore, Nasser supported national liberation movements in various parts of the Arab world and sub-Saharan African countries (Dessouki, 2008: 167). This however, led Nasser to expand his focus on international affairs on the expense of domestic affairs (Ozkan, 2011:71). Thus, after the 1967 defeat, Sadat, however, reconstructed Egypt's international role based on national interest and an Egypt- first approach (Ozkan, 2011: 83-4). Thus Egypt pulled out of the Arab Israeli conflict, through the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. Yet this role gave a narrow view of Egypt's interest and denied it any principled role in foreign policy. For that reason, Egypt's influence dwindled in the aftermath of 1979 (Ozkan, 2011: 80). While, still committed to this approach in principle, Mubarak tried to improve relations with Arab States in order get Egypt out of its isolation. While he has been successful in regaining relations with Arab and Islamic circles (Ozkan, 2011: 74) he has seldom taken lead in a path-breaking bold foreign policy in any issue (Ozkan, 2011: 104). The foreign policy orientations, did not change much in the aftermath of the revolution.

Iran's constructed role was seen as assisting oppressed Muslim states in their liberation from their oppressors through an Islamist revolution. A main pillar of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is the "export of the revolution." (Ehteshami, 2002: 287) This led to the increase of Iranian influence in the Arab and Muslim Worlds, despite its serious collision

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with many states including the conservative Gulf States (Ehteshami, 2002: 287), and contradicted with the Egyptian role- construction. The principle of the export of the revolution which referred to a form of revolutionary Islam akin to that of the Islamic republic's vision. The main vision of Khomeini can be summarized in supporting the revolution through which the people of the oppressed states (Mustaza'fin) overthrow their oppressing governments . As the oppressing governments are supported by the oppressor states (Mustakbirin), the revolution would eliminate the control of the latter. In the Muslim states, this would lead to the establishment of Islamic governments based on the Iranian model, after which cooperation would be established between the Islamic governments (Hunter, 1988: 734). Based on this vision, support was handed to Islamic movements in different parts of the world seeking to overthrow their states and establish an Islamic government.

The constructed roles impacted the way these states dealt with the superpowers. Sadat's foreign policy orientation, rejected Nasser's principle of non-alignment and attached himself to a single power, the US. He was under the impression, that the US would be the only strong power that would be able to pressure Israel to concede Egyptian lands that were occupied in the 1967 War (El Gendi, 2014). The peace treaty became the main tool of entering into the Western Sphere. Egypt received 1.3$ billion annually in aid in the aftermath of the treaty (Axelrod, 2011: 1). Many argue that this treaty has led to a status of political dependency for Egypt (Ozkan, 2011: 105). As a state, Egypt has become a weak state vis a vis the US .

It is not very difficult to see how this situation of hegemony is different in the Islamic Revolution's situation after 1979. The quest for independence is captured in the call of "Esteqlal, Azadi: Jomhouri Eslami" (independence, freedom, Islamic Republic) of the revolution (Ehteshami, 2011: 285)[3]. This focus on independence made Iran focus on assuring that its decisions are free from international hegemony. Iran ended Iran- US defense agreement of 1959 that was made by the Shah early on the revolution (Ramazani, 2013: 114). On the same day, it cancelled certain articles in a treaty with the USSR effecting allowing

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USSR to "intervene in Iran militarily whenever it judges that its security is threatened from Iranian territory" (Ramazani, 2013: 114). The Iranian behavior towards USSR was also vocal, during the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, and due to the situation of Muslim in the USSR (Ramazani, 2013: 118). None of the great powers that Iran has good relations with can be called a "patron" of any sort to Iran.

Why have relations between Egypt and Iran not normalized?

While it is clear that the different indeed oppositional role constructions of Egypt and Iran took in the aftermath of 1979, the main direct reason that kept relations from normalizing was a decision by the Egyptian side (Shama, 2013: 123). This is possibly due to Egypt's preoccupation with ensuring the security of the regime. It perceived Iran as a threat to its regime security in different ways (Shama, 2013: 138). Internationally, normalizing relations with Iran will hurt its relations with its main ally, the US. It will also hurt its Middle East relations within the 'moderate' camp states such as Saudi Arabia who also supply the regime with funds. Indeed, the support of Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided to Egypt in the aftermath of the June 30th events 2013 supported the regime against the challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In addition, Iran is feared as a force that has a different activist version of political Islam that might encourage Islamist groups to destabilize Egyptian status quo (Shama, 2013: 140) . For that reason, the Iranian portfolio has been handled in Egypt by the security institutions rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Shama, 2013: 142). Despite the lack of solid evidence that Iran poses a security threat to Egypt (141), there has been a "security complex" in dealing with the Iranian case. Iranian tourists were not allowed into Egypt possibly for that reason. The security apparatus saw that it was beneficial to keep Iran away as to avoid any risks (Shama, 2013: 142). Mubarak himself had a high sense of security as is clear in his words to Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Al- Gheit that Iranian tourists were intended to "penetrate Egyptian society"(Shama, 2013: 144) . For this reason of perceive security threat to both Egypt's international relations, of which the

regime depends for funds, and due to internal security concerns, diplomatic relations with Iran were sacrificed.

Historical Background of Iranian Egyptian relations Before the Arab Spring

Iran had normal relations with Egypt after Egypt's Declaration of Independence on 28 February 1922. Iran recognized the new independent state of Egypt. The consulate it had established in Cairo during the Ottoman era was now transformed to an embassy and both states had full diplomatic relations. The relationship between both countries developed quickly with a friendship treaty in 1928 and an economic treaty in 1930. The improvement of the relationship between the Egyptian monarchs and the Iranian Ruling Family was bolstered with a marriage between Muhammad Reza Shah, son of the Shah and Princess Fawziya the sister of King Farouk in 1939, however this marriage did not last long (Abu al- Ella, 2014: 73-74).

The relationship Egypt and Iran is divided here into four main phases since the established of the Republic in Egypt in 1953. From (1952-1970) relations were characterized by the rivalry of the Gamal Abd al-Nasser's decolonization project and the Shah of Iran, which was an ally of the US, leading to the rupture of relations.

After Sadat came to power and started developing relations with the US, relations between Egypt and Iran improved greatly. The second phase from 1970-1979 was marked by high levels of coordination and cooperation. After 1979 there was a vast reorientation of foreign policy in both Iran and Egypt after the Peace Treaty with Israel was signed, the Islamic Revolution succeeded in Iran and Mubarak came to power after Sadat's assassination. The differences led to a second rupture of relations in 1979. Between 1981- 88, the Iraq- Iran war took place and Egypt supported the Iraqi war effort. This marked the third phase of aggression and antagonism. After the dissolution of the USSR and Second Gulf War, there were persistent tensions leading to the continued severance of relations, a state that characterizes the state that Egyptian- Iranian relations are in today.

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The era of rivalry (1952-1970)

Iran returned to the American Sphere of Influence as a US client state, after the coup against Musaddaq succeeded. The coup against Nationalist Prime Minister Musaddaq was orchestrated by the CIA as Mossadaq nationalized the British managed Iranian oil company Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). On the other hand, in Egypt the 1952 Revolution led by Free Officers had set the course for Egypt's distancing itself from the Western sphere. Egypt and Iran were on the clash course. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact, which was a defense alliance including Turkey, Iraq and later included Pakistan and Britain (Shama, 2013: 115). This pact was heavily opposed by Nasser, seeing it a threat to Egypt's new position as a country calling for anti-colonialism and nonalignment (Shama, 2013: 115) but also for Arab unity. He perceived Israel rather than the USSR as the main threat to security in the region (Bishku, 2011: 5). He responded by the Egyptian-Syrian Unity in 1958. After a revolution in Iraq in 1958 broke the pact, Iran signed a defense treaty a 'bilateral executive agreement' with the U.S. (Bishku, 2011: 6).

However it must be highlighted, how both Iran and Egypt during that period of Cold War rivalry were inter playing the superpowers to increase the assistance they could get from them. With respect to Egypt, the tensions with the West particularly increased when the U.S. withdrew funding from the Aswan High Dam project and refused to arm Egypt, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and turned to the Soviet bloc for arms and military assistance (Dessouki, 2009: 167). Thus, during Kennedy's rule, it was decided that Egypt must be given assistance, so that they do not increase their ties to the Soviet bloc. Thus, Egypt received $700 million of grain and $500 million in loans, at a time in which it was a recipient of Soviet aid (Bishku, 2011: 6). Similarly, after the USSR was assured that the security arrangements posed no threat to it, it started assisting Iran economically. Iran became the "second largest third world country" to receive USSR economic aid (Bishku, 2011: 7).

Thus as we can see that the relationship between Iran and Egypt during the superpower Cold War was a rivalry for influence and assistance.

The first rupture took place when the Shah announced in July 23, 1959, on the anniversary of 1952 Revolution anniversary, that he had restored full diplomatic relations with Israel (Abu El Ela, 2014: 76). This seemed as an act of rivalry. Iranian oil was being exported to Israel and there was an office of the Jewish Agency opened in Tehran. A few days later, Nasser severed diplomatic relations with Iran. Nasser would then support and fund factions of the Iranian opposition (Shama, 2013: 115). About $150,000 were delivered to Khomeini, a then young cleric that supported the anti-Shah protests of 1963 (Bishku, 2011: 13).

However, two main developments made Iran and Egypt reconcile at the end of the 60s. These were the 1967 defeat of Egypt by Israel and a July 1968 coup in Iraq that led a Baathist regime to come to power. The 1967 defeat led to the end of the Arab Cold War which took place formally in the Khartoum Summit. This led Nasser to become more pragmatic in his foreign policy considerations (Shama, 116). The new Baathist regime in Iraq was trying to start confrontations with Israel and started border disputes with Iran over Shat Al-Arab. Thus, it was in the pragmatic interests of both Iran and Egypt to come closer to bring the Iraqi actions to a halt (Shama, 2013: 116). Iran also made conciliatory actions such as give up claims to Bahrain as the British were withdrawing from the region (Bishku, 2011: 14). A reconciliation took place through the mediation of many countries (including Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey)(Shama, 2013: 116). An interests section was open in Egypt, then full diplomatic relations were resumed in August 1970 (Abu El -Ela, 2014: 76).

The Era of Reconciliation and Cooperation (1970-1979)

With Sadat, relations between Egypt and Iran took a leap. This was due to a variety of factors. First, both of them had the same patron, after Sadat had come closer to the U.S. and thus established common policy goals. Second, Sadat had given up the discourse on decolonization, socialism and Arab nationalism that Nasser had raised (Dessouki, 2008: 168). Sadat saw that he needed to get closer to the US, as the US is the only country that can force Israel into peace with Egypt (El Gendi, 2014). In his view, Sadat saw that Iran as a supporter, having good relations with both US and Israel and thus an element of stability in the

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Middle East rather than a rival, thus an era of cooperation ensued. This cooperation can particularly be seen in the assistance Iran gave Egypt in the 1973 War and the economic and cultural exchanges that followed (e.g. al Sabbagh, 2007).

During the 1973 War, Iran took a very supportive position of Sadat. It allowed Soviet airplane to use airspace en route to Egypt. It refused transit through Tehran to Jewish volunteers from Australia to Israel (Bishku, 2011: 15). The Shah also condemned Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands (Shama, 2013: 116). However, Iran was also supplying Israel with oil and the diplomatic relations with both countries were unaffected (Bishku, 2011: 15).

Sadat saw the change of patron as mandatory in order to reach peace with Israel. He saw that the U.S. is the only power that could push Israel to accept peace. In 1972 he had expelled the 20,000 Soviet military advisers from Egypt. He also accepted the mediation of the U.S. in the disengagement that followed the 1973 War (Bishku, 2011:16). This was also supported by Iran. Iran offered Israel oil in place for the return of the Sinai oil fields to Egypt. Iranians also supported Sadat's call to visit Jerusalem in 1977 and called upon US president Carter to push Israel to amend their position (Bishku, 2011:18).

With the reconciliation with the Gulf monarchy States after the end of Arab Cold War in 1967, Egypt was reintegrated again in the security arrangements for Africa and Middle East. Thus, Iran and Egypt cooperated together in a number of security arrangements. This included the Safari Club, in which both Iran and Egypt (as well as Saudi Arabia, France and Morocco), to stop communism from spreading in the African continent (Bishku, 2011: 17). It played an important role in Zaire (now DRC) and Somalia (Bishku, 2011: 17).

The cooperation with Iran also took an economic and cultural turn. The economic cooperation that took place under Sadat and the Shah was the biggest in the history of the relations of both countries. Sadat visited Tehran in 1974 heading an economic delegation in which cooperation agreements were signed to reconstruct what was destroyed due to the

war (Abu El Ela, 2014: 79), Iran gave Egypt grants and loans to start reconstruction in port Said, Suez Canal area, and started several joint businesses. Sadat also gave the Shah access to the Mediterranean ports, allowing Iranian products to reach African and Middle Eastern markets (Shama, 2013: 117). In 1976, two aviation agreements were signed which allowed for biweekly trips from Tehran to Cairo and direct flights. Culturally, there were three protocols signed that for cultural exchanges in the fields of art and science (Abu El Ela, 2014: 79).

Sadat's memoirs documents the friendly personal relations between Sadat and the Shah. Sadat documented what he thought of the Shahs assistance during the 1973 War. "I shall never forget the day.. [when] ..he ..[the Shah] immediately supplied us with more than 500,000 tonnes. He actually ordered the oil tankers that were at sea to change direction and go directly to Egypt to offer help. He said 'Sadat is a brother to me, I shall respond to his request of the spot' (Cited in Bishku, 2011: 15). The positive personal relations between Sadat and the Shah cannot be overstated. It was thus only understandable that Sadat grants the Shah political refuge after the Islamic Revolution in Iran took place.

The Earthquake (1979- 81)

1979 was an important year in the history of Egyptian-Iranian relations. In February 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran led to the restructuring Iran's foreign policy that effectively removed itself from the American sphere of influence (Ramazani, 2013: 113). Yet, Egypt signed the Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty in March 1979, Egypt entered that sphere of influence and established a new precedent in the Arab World (Dessouki, 2008: 168). Both states were on another course to clash.

With respect to superpower alliance, Iran no longer allied itself with the United States. It rather sought a policy that highlighted its independence (Ramazni, 2013: 113-114). This meant that effectively, Iran preferred nonalignment but with a heavy dose of identity politics. Rather than support "stability" in Middle East, the new regime in Iran was activist and ideologically led to spread its message to the oppressed

Muslim people with a pan-Islamist vision of the Islamic Republic (Hunter, 1988: 734) .

When Sadat signed the peace agreement with Israel in March 1979, the second break happened and Khomeini severed diplomatic relations. There were various verbal skirmishes between both leaders. Soon after the treaty, Khomeini issued a short statement calling the treaty "a treason to Islam and the Muslims and Arab brethren" and accused Sadat of "dependency on the U.S. Government" (Full text in Al-Sabbagh, 2007: 177). While the Iranian newspapers started a counter campaign against the Egyptian Israeli peace treaty, the Iranian political position was neutral. Iranian Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi announced that the Iranian government would not support the treaty, but also would not stand with those who reject it (the rejectionist camp) (Al-Sabbagh, 2007: 176). Egyptian Iranian relations remain severed ever since. Soon after, Sadat was assassinated in 6 October 1981. Iran responded by naming a street in the name of Khalid Islambouli, the rebellious officer who shot Sadat, and issued a postage stamp in his name (Bishku, 2011: 18). This made relations even more tense and the media war intensify.

The events of 1979 led Egypt's influence in the Arab World to dwindle and that of Iran to increase. Egypt Israeli Peace treaty led to much division in the Arab and Islamic worlds. On the one hand, Egypt became isolated in the Arab world. First, Egypt was expelled from the Arab league and the headquarters of the league moved to Tunisia. In addition, all the Arab states with the exception of Sudan and Oman broke diplomatic relations with Egypt (Dessouki, 2008: 190). In addition, it also led Saddam Hussein to take upon a more vigorous leadership role by instigating the Iraq- Iran war and by trying to present himself as the defender of Arab interests. The change of balance of power in the region led the Gulf states to fear for their security and led to the establishment of the GCC in 1981 with full support from the U.S. and Britain (de Boer, 74). While Egypt regained its relations with the Arab states in the end of the decade, it had lost any claim to a leadership role (Ozkan, 2011: 80).

On the other hand, Iran was gaining ground by adopting a more activist policy in the Middle East. It increased its engagement in the Arab

World at a time in which Egypt lost regional influence. Based on Khomeini's principle of "exporting the revolution", Iranian foreign policy was aiming on getting other states to follow its lead. Militant Islamic group in the Arab and Islamic worlds were thus encouraged by the zeal of the Islamic Revolution (Hunter, 1988: 731). Some factions in Iranian Islamic Republic provided funding, military training and assistance to Islamic militant groups in the Arab and Islamic worlds (Hunter, 1988: 732). In this way, Iran influence expanded outside its borders.

Era of Antagonism (1981-1988)

While the Peace Treaty with Israel was supposed to bring to Egypt peace and stability, Mubarak saw no troubles to join wars against other states in the region. During Mubarak reign, Egypt supported Iraq in the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. Egypt supported the war effort against Iran. Mubarak main foreign policy objective was to return Egypt into the fold of Arab States that have broken relations with Egypt after signing the Peace Treaty with Israel. Egypt provided Iraq with military aid during the war effort worth of $2 billion by 1985 and sent military advisers (Bishku, 2011: 20). This led Iraqis to request the readmission of Egypt in the League of Arab States, also supported by Saudi Arabia which feared Iran. Egypt regained the membership of the League of Arab States in 1989 and the Organization of Islamic Congress in 1984 (Bishku, 2011: 19-20). On the other hand, Syria and Libya supplied Iran with arms from the USSR (Bishku, 2011: 20). Yet the war made relations between Egypt and Iran worsen. Egypt closed the Iranian interest section in Egypt 1987. After security council resolution 598, Iran released Egyptian prisoners of war taken during the war (Abu El Ela, 2014: 82).

Persistent Tensions (1989- 2011)

During the remainder of Mubarak's rule, Egyptian Iranian relations were characterized with a persistent tension. This was due to a multitude of factors. The first was the increased cooperation between Egypt and the US, after the demise of the USSR (Idris, 2011). This understandably, made an Egyptian Iranian rapprochement more

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difficult. The second was that in terms of Middle East politics, Iran was on the opposite side on almost all portfolios Egypt was heavily involved in (Idris, 2011). The Arab World to be divided into two main camps. The "moderate" camp in which Egypt stood with Saudi Arabia and Jordan (and other Gulf states) against the "rejectionist camp" including Syria, Libya and Iran. Thus Egypt stood at odds with Iran on most of regional issues: including the Palestinian question and regional security (Idris, 2011).

Iran stood on opposite sides to Egypt in with respect to the Palestine cause. Both Egypt and Iran had very different perspectives on how the Palestinian Israeli conflict should be resolved. Egypt became a main actor in the Palestinian Israeli peace process, as a mediator trying to resolve the conflict through negotiations (Idris, 2011). However, Iran rejected the peace process altogether seeing it as a way in which the rights of the Palestinian people is wasted and focused on the primacy of resistance (Idris, 2011). It came to fund and support resistant factions, such as Hamas. This made Egypt and Iran stand at odds and made Egypt perceive Iran as a challenge.

With respect to the Gulf Security arrangements since the 1990- 91 Gulf War Iran and Egypt stood on opposite sides. GCC States, have taken the path of alliances of external powers in order to ensure their security (Kishk, 2014: 82). Egypt thus supported Iraq during the Iraq- Iran War with billions worth of military assistance (Bishku, 2011: 20) and joined the US led coalition to liberate Kuwait in which Egyptian forces were second only to American forces in the coalition (Dessouki, 2008: 189). Iran on the other side, sees that the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of the 8 Gulf States, the GCC states Iraq and Iran. It vehemently rejects any foreign presence in the region (Kishk, 2014: 81). Thus, Iran and Egypt were on opposite sides with respect to the Gulf Security arrangements.

This led to Egyptian decision makers - mainly Mubarak- to increasingly perceive Iran as a challenge to Egypt's position (Idris, 2011). During Rafsanjani's and Khatami's time in presidency, Mubarak has repeatedly refused that relations with Iran be developed further possibly out of his perception that Iran was a security threat (Shama,

2013). The historic 50minute meeting that was held between Mubarak and Khatami in Geneva in 2003 had given high hopes on a renewal of diplomatic relations. However, Mubarak was not enthusiastic to renew diplomatic relations with Iran (Shama, 2013). When President Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, an offer of renewed diplomatic relations was extended to Egypt. Yet there was no positive response (Abu El Ela, 2014: 84). In April 2009, at the end of Mubarak's rule, relations between Egypt and Iran deteriorated after a Hezbollah cell was caught operating on its soil, aiming at transferring weapons to Gaza, and was accused of attempting to destabilize the country (Abu El Ela, 2014: 85).

Iranian – Egyptian Relations Post the Egyptian Revolution: New hopes turned down

Interim Period

Iran received the news of the Egyptian protests in 2011 with much happiness. First, it would strengthen its position in the Middle East if Mubarak's regime collapsed. Iran however, tried to give the January 25, 2011 Revolution Islamic leanings and portrayed it in the image of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, gave a rare speech in Arabic during Friday prayers on January 4, 2011. He stated that the forces of "global arrogance" are those that maintained the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ai in Egypt and Tunisia respectively, and strongly supported the protests. However, he warned that these forces were disguising themselves in the protesters side. He argued that these protests of an Islamic nature yet these forces of "global arrogance" are portraying them in secular light – merely as protest for economic and social issues- to cover the Islamic nature of these protests. He stated "the awakening of the Islamic Egyptian people is an Islamic liberation movement." (quoted in Parchami, 2012: 37). The Iranian leadership thus anticipated that an Islamic government would emerge in Egypt.

Elizabeth Monier discusses discursive rivalry that Iran and Egypt was engaged in at the early time of the revolution (together with Turkey as well). According to Monier, the attempt to highlight that the Egyptian

uprising was an "Islamic awakening" by Iran was a "discursive strategies to enhance ..(its) regional status and leader- ship role and .. appeared to see the Arab Spring as an opportunity to further these visions". This stumbled across the Egyptian narrative of the revolution as neither being of an Islamist ideology nor started by Islamists but a part of the Arab revolutionary movement. Thus, in the competition over framing the revolution, there was a seeming rivalry between the Iranian and Egyptian regional and leadership roles (2014: 427-428).

Yet the transitional period witnessed much confusion in Egyptian foreign policy making and in Egyptian- Iranian relations (Shahin, 2015: 14).The first government formed after the Revolution led by PM Essam Sharaf included Dr. Nabil al Arabi as Foreign Minister who made fundamental changes in Egyptian foreign policy and allowed the diplomatic institutions to supersede the security institutions in foreign policy making. This caused a reassessment of Egyptian-Iranian relations and he called for resuming diplomatic relations with Iran. He also called that the closure of the Egyptian Palestinian- Egyptian border during the war is a war crime. These statements made a shock throughout the foreign policy establishment and were not met well by the military rulers of Egypt at the time, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Dr. Nabil al Arabi was soon replaced by Muhamed Urabi who remained for one month (Shahin, 2015: 14).

Mohammed Morsi

Indeed, Morsi's foreign policy, was far from a revolutionary foreign policy. It seem to try to maintain the same Mubarak policies, but correct its excesses. Thus there was no reorientation of Egyptian foreign policy in terms of superpower alliances nor Middle East alliances. The US relations were maintained, military aid resumed to Egypt as normal (Morsy, 2013). However, Morsi's made an early visit to China to expand trade and attempt to join the BRICS (Darwisheh, 2015: 53). With respect to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, he assured that the Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty would be honored. He played the role of "Israel's security contractor, which Mubarak had performed" (Shama, 2013: 228) before. Morsi also went as far as drowning the tunnels linking Gaza to the Sinai in order to appeal to Americans

(Morsy: 2013). Saudi Arabia was the first country that he visited during his presidency, in order to assure good relations with it are maintained, it granted Egypt $4 billion to support the economy (Morsy: 2013). Yet, Egypt was getting closer to Iran. In this respect, closeness to Iran was not a revolutionary act of foreign policy reorientation, rather it was an attempt to re-balance Egyptian foreign policy.

When President Mohammed Morsi reached power, there was a new hopes that relations with Iran would be renewed. During the early days of Morsi's rule, he supported engaging Iran in resolving a number of problematic portfolios such as the Syrian war. Having met the Iranian president in the Exceptional Summit for the Organization of Islamic Conference in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, he called for quadripartite contact group including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tukey and Iran for resolving the Syrian crisis (Abu El- Ela, 2014: 91). This initiative was welcomed by the Iranian side. Two important state visits followed. That of the Egyptian president to Tehran to take part in the 16th Summit for the Non-Alignment Movement in August 2012 (Abu El- Ela, 2014: 91) and the Iranian president to Egypt to take part in the Islamic Summit meeting in February 2013 (Abu El- Ela, 2014: 92). Both these visits stirred a lot of controversy. Yet as early as August 2012, Yassir Ali the president's spokesman "dismissed speculation that Morsi planned to upgrade Egypt's relations with Iran to full diplomatic relations" (Kirkpatrick, 2012). Thus, despite the warmness of the relations between the leadership in the two countries at the time, diplomatic relations were not renewed.

The possible reasons for an Egyptian- Iranian proximity during Morsi's rule should be elucidated and analyzed. Morsi did not support a different policy related to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. (Darwisheh, 2015: 52). Furthermore, with respect to Syria, which was a strategic interest for Iran, Morsi took a strong position against the Syrian regime, and announced opening the door to Jihad in Syria against Bashar al-Assad and severing diplomatic relations with Syria (al-Ahram, 2013). In addition, the last days of Morsi's rule saw the brutal killing of 4 Shiites in Abu Mussuallam village in Giza, Egypt (Egypt Independent,

2013). However, these issues did not cause much trouble between Iranians and the Egyptian regime.

In this respect, Iran's attempt to renew relations with the Muslim Brotherhood regime, was not for short-term interests. It is was based on a understanding that the Muslim Brother rule in the long term, could lead to the development of better relations between both countries. This is based on the fact that they are Islamists, like Iran, and long oppositional to the Mubarak regime thus ideologically there can be elements of agreement, as it fit the Iranian worldview. Second, now that the Mubarak regime was gone and the traditional establishment was at bay, the Muslim Brothers could in the long run develop good relations with the Iranian leadership, Iran possibly calculated.

The main opposition to improved relations with Iran came from the security institutions. First, this was an issue that troubled Sisi's relations as a Defense Minister with Morsi (Wafd, 2013). There was a tension during Morsi's presidency between the presidential institution and the security establishment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During Mursi's era the presidency played a strong role in imposing new policies on all the Foreign Ministry and security institutions without having them examine it (Shahin, 2015: 14-15). This caused much tension between the different institutions. It is possible that Morsi did not want to increase this tension by taking such a revolutionary step.

Thus, to conclude, two matters characterize Mori's foreign policy making. First, Morsi did not take revolutionary decisions in terms of foreign policy, as he was restrained by the economic and social problems at home (Darwisheh, 2015: 52). This prevented Morsi from making a political reorientation in Egyptian foreign policy. Second, Morsi attempted to go beyond state institutions, as it was always in the power of the president to sideline the institutions and to act in his own will. The rise of the Islamists in Egypt was seen by Iran as an opportunity to mend relation with similar-minded Islamists.

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June 30, 2013 and Beyond

The June 30 events and the dispersal of Rab'ah al- Adawiyah sit-in was seen negatively in Iran. However, it refrained from taking a strong stance on the matter. The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iran stated after the deposal of former president Morsi that it "we do not see that it is suitable that the army intervenes in politics and deposes what has been elected democratically" (BBC, 2013). This statement soon got a reply from the Egyptian foreign Ministry which stated that intervention in internal affairs is an unaccepted matter (BBC, 2013). Soon after August 14, 2013 the day which marked the dispersal of the Rab'a al- Adawiyah sit in by force, the Iranian Ministry of foreign affairs called the use of force a "massacre against the Egyptian people' and stated that it points to the "possibility of a civil war"(Masoudi, 2013).

However, Iran's earlier strong attack against the events of June 30, Mursi's deposal and dispersal of Rab'ah al- Adawiyah soon calmed. In a phone call between the then Iranian Foreign Minster Ali Akbar Salihi and the Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad Kamil Amr Salihi in July 2013 <u>assured</u> that "Egypt is an influential state in the region, the Egyptian people should determine the future of the country and Egyptian Army is a national army"(Amwal ghad, 2013). This possibly led former Minister Adly Mansur to <u>invite</u> Iranian president Hassan Rouhani to attend the inauguration of president- elect Sisi in June 2014 and there were hopes of renewing relations (Ahram Online, 2014).

Yet, after President Morsi was deposed the army intervened as a policy maker. The intervention of the military was direct in the cabinet, as if there was a lack of trust to civilians (Shahin, 2015: 14). When Sisi became president, he seem to sustain this lack of trust to civilians. This seems to be a major difference from Mubarak's way of policy making that relied on the advice of civilian aides. His close circle was almost made entirely of military men and he slowly removed any civilians within his circle. This includes Amr Moussa, Abdel-Gelil Mustafa and Khaled Youssef who were close to the President and soon found themselves outside his circle. He also sought the advice of military aides rather than civilian ones. Thus, in Sisi's presidency the military

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became an all- important actor. Even in terms of the economy, rather than entrusting national mega-projects, such as the Suez Canal Project, to the private sector, it is the army companies that are carrying it out (Dawoud, 2015).

Sisi's foreign policy was based on an attempt to balance relations with the great powers. Egypt's relationship with the United States has been shaken in the aftermath of the June 30 and August 14 events. In October 2013, US suspended military aid to Egypt, and called for return to an elected government. This led Sisi to attempt to improve relations with Russia. In 2014, trade with Russia grew 50%. Yet this was seen possibly as a maneuver to push the US to release aid, which it did. (Egysource, 2015). Yet, the Storm of Decisiveness war that Egypt had joined cost it closer relations with the Russia and China, who held back assistance, in opposition the Egyptian participation. The Chinese President also cancelled a scheduled visit to Cairo. It is thus possible to see attempts to improve relations with China and Russia as attempts to gain more space for political maneuvering rather than any drastic change in policy (Egysource, 2015).

Sisi's Middle East foreign policy marked a strong return to the Saudi sphere. It was made clear that he prioritized his relations with Saudi Arabia and understood that that may cost him closer relations to Tehran. He stated while still a presidential candidate that Egypt's relations with Iran pass through the Gulf States (Hadath, 2014). The June 30 events have been supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Kuwait who pledged support to Egypt in the aftermath of Morsi's deposal. By early 2014 Egypt received $12 billion in aid from these countries (Dunne, 2014). Yet this deepened economic dependency led political dependency. This was clear in Egyptian involvement in the "Storm of Decisiveness" War which Egypt joined hesitantly (Ezzat, 2015). It is thus possible to understand Sisi's policy towards Tehran as a way of pleasing both his main allies, the US and Saudi Arabia.

What are the future prospects for relations between Cairo and Tehran?

It is important to understand how the very different role construction between both states, conceived as middle powers, led to view one

another as regional rivals after 79. While Egypt conception of its foreign role is based on national interest, it has pulled out of the Arab-Israeli conflict and developed good relations with the US to do so. It thus undertook a "moderate" path in Middle East as promoting peaceful resolution of the conflict. On the other hand, Iran focused on independence from domination as a foreign policy principle took an activist foreign policy, based on export of the revolution pillar. It called on resolving the Palestinian issue by force and provided assistance to armed groups calling for regime change.

It is important to highlight that Iranian- Egyptian relations cannot be understood historically without looking into the different relations these two states had with great powers. When they came under the same sphere of influence during the cold war period, both effectively seeking US patronage as during 1970-1978, their relationship became much better. But when they were in different spheres of influence (1952-1970), where the Shah was close to US interests and Nasser was trying to maneuver his relations with the US via getting close to the USSR, their relations was adversarial. Egypt is strongly in the American sphere of influence since the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel, which dominated a international system in the aftermath of the demise of the USSR. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran relations between the US and Iran have been extremely tense. It is yet to see how the recent agreement with P5 + 1 will power on Iran's nuclear potential will impact the relations between both states. Thus, it is important to shed light on relations with great powers as a factor that impacts the relations between both countries.

Factors that limit Egypt's ability to maneuver politically include the patron- client relations Egypt has with the US and Saudi Arabia. Its strategic relations with the United States, which became Egypt's international patron in the aftermath of Egypt's Peace Treaty with Israel provides political support and military aid to the Egyptian regime that upholds the treaty. In exchange, Egypt has accepted to stop military engagement against Israel and avoid assisting those who carry out military activities against it. In this way, Iranian Egyptian relations

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is made difficult, as Iran is seen an enemy of the US and Israel and thus seen as a danger to good relations with both these states.

Egypt is also a client of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, seeing the military importance of Egypt to the Gulf countries security in the midst of the Iraq- Iran war and in aftermath of the 1990-1 Gulf War, has also been supporter of the Egyptian regime, in order to reap security services. Based on this orientation as leading member of the "moderate camp" in the, Egypt as a middle power is trying to gain influence in the Middle East. In order to do so, it competes with the members of the resistance camp, which leads to a state of rivalry with Iran on Middle Eastern portfolios such as Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen.

Thus, based on its narrow view of national interest, Egypt views Iran as a political challenge and a security threat. The security institutions have systematically rejected better relations with Iran. They view relations with Iran as a source of trouble that is to be avoided rather than a possibly beneficial relation. The dangers to Egypt's strategic relations with the US and Saudi Arabia, both who are patrons of the regime, far exceed any possible benefits. However, this is not the view of the diplomatic corps which sees that resuming relations with Iran will help coordinating a number of regional and bilateral issues. Thus, it is a narrow-mindedness of a security mentality that is controlling Egypt foreign policy makers for more than 36 years.

Egypt's relations to Iran is thus multifaceted and complex. A recent development that has the potential to effect change in this relationship is the recent Nuclear Agreement reached between the P5+1 powers and the Islamic republic of Iran on 14 July (The Guardian, 2015). It is definitely a turning point in Iran's international relations. The improved relations with the American and European governments will give Egypt more space to improve relations with Tehran and more bargaining space with Saudi Arabia. Yet the intense Saudi position of the agreement and the continued Saudi engagement in Yemen against the Iran backed Houthis will delay a possible Egyptian – Iranian rapprochement. So far the immediate response, to the nuclear agreement is Egypt's announcement that its testing the capabilities of the now public Steam Boilers Company (al Maniyli, 2015), which was

an previously an attempt for a nuclear project, which denotes that Egypt's response maybe more security oriented than diplomatic. Yet with these developments Egypt's importance for Gulf security will increase so will Egypt's perceptions Iran's rivalry

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Endnotes

[1] Alliances are agreements based on the free choice between states. He states that when that is the case, issues related to sovereignty independence are minimal (Handel, 1990: 121).

[2] As per Michael I. Handel, a patron- client relationship is an informal relationship between two states. It is a reciprocal relationship in which both states exchange good and services. The relations are usually marked with voluntarism rather than coercion. But the reciprocity tends to balance the favor of the more powerful state. The patron is more powerful in the relationship in terms of resources and thus ability to bargain. The client on the other hand, is bound to the patron by an obligation that must be fulfilled. The client's behavior towards the client is determined by the availability of other patrons that could provide it with similar assistance and the extent to which there are other clients that could offer the patron the same service. Yet, while the theoretical concepts are clear, finding evidence for client – patron relations might be difficult to establish, as both countries will try to hide that such an unbalanced relationship exists (Handel, 1990: 132-133).

[3] However, some factions interpreted the call for independence as not having relationships with the superpowers and cutting relations with governments close to them (Ramazani, 2013: 116).

Geopolitics of Shiism and the Emancipative Role of Religion in Fighting with Daesh

Seyed Javad Miri
Associate Professor of Sociology and History of Religion
Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies

Abstract

Religion is a very complex phenomenon. Sociologists and anthropologists have attempted to study religious phenomena in different forms and shapes. In the context of social sciences in Iran there are few scholars who have looked at religious phenomena in relation to geopolitical and geocultural dimensions. The rise of DAESH in Mesopotamia is a very remarkable phenomenon which needs to be studied but Iranian social scientists have been passive in this regard. In this study, the author has attempted to look at DAESH based on his own fieldwork which took place in March 2015. The author argues that the question of DAESH and the emancipative role of Shiism are issues which cannot solely be studied in contemplative fashions. On the contrary, we need to do fieldwork and based on firsthand information draw conclusions which could be informative for further analyses in relation to the emerging Geoculture of Shiism.

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Keywords: Shiism, Emancipation, DAESH, Geoculture, Geopolitics

Introduction

This is important, initially, to note that the present article is a fruit of a fieldwork carried out from Najaf to Tikrit. The fundamental questions of this research which have occupied my mind as a sociologist are: "What is Daesh?" "Who are considered as Daesh forces?" and "What is the nature of Daesh?" The picture which is commonly presented from Daesh (national media or international media) is a blurred one, whereby no one may apprehend what are the origins and objectives of Daesh forces. In media, Daesh is depicted as an invincible group which easily undertakes to do any types of killing, genocide or massacres. Entirely vague, such pictures and illustrations are unable to present an all-inclusive image of the Daesh. This is only one side of the coin, whose another side is associated with absence of fieldworks by Iranian social scientists. Differently put, social scientists and anthropologists in Iran do not embark on original fieldworks and this is a serious challenge before Iranian social science community which needs to be reflected upon. Rather, they rely on the data translated from the studies performed by American, British, French, Japanese and other scholars who work outside Iran. (Miri, 2014) Iranian research atmosphere is, unhappily, devoid of *fieldworks* as far geopolitical and geocultural researches are concerned. In other words, one could describe the state of art in these fields as *armchair research programmes* where scholars 'contemplate' on sociological/ anthropological- cum-geopolitical/ geocultural issues rather than engagingly step into complex fields of research. I can give examples of how the mentality of researchers in Iran operates when it comes to geocultural questions. Recently, for instance, a researcher was seeking me for a well-written book and some good articles written by either European or American scholars on Daesh so he could publish them by good publishing houses as the market is thirsty for such kinds of works today in Iran. I have elsewhere explained concepts of 'filed mentality' and 'house mentality' and here I shall not repeat them. These concepts could be applied to various forms

of researches which we have today in Iranian academia as far as *terrorist studies* are concerned. (Miri, 2015) Being empty of a *field-centered* approach to the issue, this outlook is expressive of a lack of first-hand studies in this area. *Political anthropology* is another side of this problem, which means that we need a model that does not only confine political issues to the parameters of international relation models, but in its stead presenting an integrated model. A sociologist or anthropologist should possess an integrated viewpoint so as to be able to enter into the field and implement his/her investigation projects using first-hand information obtained from his/her field activities. Events occurring in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and even Pakistan are phenomena with not only political vistas, but with matters dealing with spirits, ethos, cultures, customs, cultural background, and history of such regions that should not be disregarded. This has, however, been neglected. For instance, in Iran, you may encounter people who, not only, know that Paris is the capital of France, but also are familiar with some Parisian streets; while, they have no rounded knowledge and conceptions about, say, Pakistan, as a neighboring country. We need to change these forms of cognitions by placing field-centered forms of researches in the context of Iranian academia.

The Thesis of Spontaneity of Daesh Revisited

In order to understand the positions of terrorist groups on the ground, we need to study the geography of the region more carefully- as we approach the Jordanian and Saudi borders, more Daesh forces are witnessed; whereas, Daesh forces are less when we move towards Shiite-dominated and Kurdish or Turkoman regions. Observations are expressive of the fact that Daesh is not a spontaneously developed group as depicted in media. It is safe to indicate that extremist Salafi forces have reached a consensus with Sunni Ba'ath Party adherents, who have little proximity with current Shiite government and are averse to presence of a Shiite government in Iraq. One could realize that important issues are implied when we study the political convergence of Salafist, extremist, and pro-Saudi forces in the region which has made up the very backbone of current extremism in Mesopotamia, Levant and beyond. (Weiss, 2015) It appears that this

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project is also backed by ex-Baath forces, Iraqi extremist Sunnis, and some in the US or Europe who are oriented toward extremist Islam or extremist readings of religiosity. If we would be able to deconstruct what is conceptualized as 'DAESH', then we would see nothing but Salafite extremist forces who are strongly opposed to Shiite states and Iranian presence and influence over the region. A full explication of this phenomenon is not intended herein, but it could be briefly explained that an ideology has, during the past eight decades or so, been formed by in the Arab world which contains the idea that Shiism is an Iranian and non-Arab product and it has no place among Arabs. This is not implausible to claim that Saddam has been motivated by the same impetus, based on which Arabs cascaded their supports of the Iraqi government. Based on this ideology (and excuse), Arab states could drive Shiism and Shiites off the political power. Under this framework, advent of a Shiite government in Iraq and appearance of a government with Shiite readings in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and even Yemen have disturbed the balance of power in Arab states. For instance, Shiism had no political significance in Lebanon until 1950s; it, however, changed into a powerful bloc after a while. This was the case in Syria and Iraq, too. Yemen is also experiencing the same evolution. Altogether, these have provoked a general and vicious antagonism against Shiism and Shiite forces in the world, in general, and the Arab world, in particular.

Shiism as an Emancipative Ideology

In order to get a more rounded picture we need to look at the situation on the ground in Iraq by asking what is the state of Shiite struggle now? In other words, "What is the role of Shiism as an ideology in its particular framework?" Before 2013, Iraqi government sought to make use of its army in classical forms, fighting against invading forces in traditional and symmetric styles. But the realities on the ground forced Iraqi authorities to change tactics by moving towards asymmetric styles of warfare. The historical verdict issued by the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, however, transformed the parameters of the game against terrorist forces in Iraq. While I was working in the field I came across interesting phenomena which should be studied very carefully as these

forms of religious associations belong to Shiites and researchers on the Shia world should find innovative modes of analyzing these Shiite forms of organizing battles against Daesh and other terrorist groups in the 21st century. For instance, in Najaf, Karbala, Kazemein, Samarra, Baghdad or Kufa one can come across a series of Iranian-like *Husseiniyes* (known as *mukeb*) which are administered by tribes, families or individuals who have social status in specific regions or districts. Of course, it should be mentioned that the presence of *Husseiniyes* in Shiite regions is of great historical significance as it seems they present a form of social resistance against official mosques during oppressive periods where the Shiite minorities could not express their views in mosques which were run by the oppressive forms of governance. Even the title of *Husseiniye* is remarkable as it refers to Imam Hussein who was martyred in the battle of Karbala at the hands of Yazid who was running the affairs of the Islamic State during the Umayyad dynasty. Anyhow, on the road from Najaf to Samarra, for example, free meals are served for passengers, whether you are Iraqi or otherwise. In other words, if you want to understand the core idea of these mukebs and *Husseiniyes* in Iraq, it would be more reasonable to revisit the idea of *basij* in Iran as this provides the role model of these newly Shiite forms of organizations in current Iraq- where militants are mobilized against Daesh by turning towards asymmetric forms of warfare rather than fighting in classical mode of combat. Each *mukeb* is a resistance core composed of a head and some armed members who are dispatched for fighting with Daesh after they pass required training programs. Although Daesh and Salafist forces are funded by Jordanian and Saudi petrodollars, nevertheless aforementioned popular forces have resisted and fought without any special supports- and their mode of fighting and forms of organizing against terrorist forces have proved more efficient than previous tactics and strategies. To put it differently, in fight against Daesh we need to have more than advanced weaponry as the question is not solely of technological nature. We, rather, need efficient ideas which have proved successful in the region and I think the idea of mobilizing mourners of Imam Hussein in the fight against terrorism would be a very strong strategical shift which has been neglected since the fall of Saddam in 2003. (Bensahel, 2008. 32)

What is the role played by Iran, after all? Is it presenting hardware or software roles? According to my field observations, Iran has not yet dispatched her Armed Forces into the region; while, it has sent its military advisors and contributed arms aids and provided anti-Daesh forces with intelligent supports.

Geocultural Map of Shiism

The study of terrorist activities in Iraq by Iranian sociologists or anthropologists should not be solely confined to academic concerns as the rise of organized terrorism in this region will have concrete effects upon the future of Iran and the Shiism as a political force in the world. In order to understand the possible trajectories of political alliances we need to look at Shiism as a geocultural reality which stretches from Elbrus Mountains in Russia into horn of Africa and southern shores of Mediterranean Sea as well as the Indian Subcontinent and so on and so forth. Is it, in other words, possible to talk about a Shiite geocultural reality? If the answer is affirmative then could we assume that this geocultural reality would have geopolitical consequences for the matrix of power in the regions which is connected to Iran? A look at the map of Shiism indicates that there are considerable Shiite populations in southern Russia in the regions of Dagestan, Caucasus, Georgia, Republic of Azerbaijan; parts of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, some Arab states of the Persian Gulf; parts of the Indian subcontinent including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India; regions in the Eastern Africa; some regions in Iran's northeastern borders; parts of Central Asia in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan; and even regions at northwestern China near Pamir and Iran as its central core. Shiite populations are not similarly dispersed in different regions. It is not a secret that all strategists in the world take advantage of all possibilities which history has created in different parts of the world. In other words, human agency in the context of history has created various possibilities which could be instrumental for geopoliticians and military strategists and in Iran we have come to a point where we are able to conceptualize these forms of possibilities in reference to the Shiite Geocultural World. Quds Force seeks, for instance, to take advantage of Shiite geopolitics to advance

its strategical goals. But the soaring question which needs to be asked is whether they are able to reach their strategical objectives based on their hardware capabilities. In other words, could we realize the geocultural potentials of the Shiite world through the hardware approach of the Quds forces? All military strategies in the world have always been couched with software policies and in the 20th century we can refer to ideals such as democracy, liberty, human rights and equality by superpowers that employed these discourses along with their military prowess. In other words, it is impossible in the 21st century win any military battle without constructing some sort of grand narratives or software ideals which should be employed next to other forms of controls. This is something that Iranian strategists should take into consideration as far the Shiite geocultural reality is concerned. Of course, this is not to deny the significance of the Islamic geocultural reality but there are obstacles in that front which strategists alone are unable to overcome and it is not the concern of this paper here either.

However, it is, at first, important to note that political units have, all during the past 120 years, been defined as the nation-state in the world system, especially in this region, meaning that first the state got established and then the discourses on nation-building got shaped and defined, namely nation of Iran, nation of Turkey, or so on and so forth. It seems due to current fast-beating developments which are taking place in the world some states are moving away from classical definitions of 'nation' and 'state'. In other words, today we are faced with situations where territorialized forms of nation-states are getting replaced by geocultural forms of governing bodies. One of these geocultural forms of governing bodies could be Iran and the peripheral regions which are deeply influenced by the Shiite modes of leben. Now having these issues in mind, we can take a second look at the question of the Revolutionary Guard of Quds which is operating with asymmetrical forms of strategies in volatile regions of the world. In other words, under these conditions, the Quds Forces seem to be unable to advance its objectives in case it relies only on hardware capabilities; it thus requires software strategies which could be only produced by sociologists and anthropologists who are well-versed in geocultural as well as geopolitical matrices. To put it differently, we need a group of

social scientists who have geo-cultural orientations and have embarked upon gathering first-hand information in the fields.

Shiism as an Inspiring Force

Now we need to inquire why sociologists or anthropologists in Iran are not interested in geocultural questions. This is a question which needs to be pondered upon. I think it is noteworthy here to reflect upon the definition of religion. In social sciences, particularly sociology and anthropology, repressive aspects of religion are typically taken into account, and religion is considered to be an instrument of tyranny and subjugation. This aspect of religion is discernible when one looks at the history of Islam and even other world religions but it would be a mistake to reduce the worldly functions of religion into one dimension as there are other possibilities which one can discern in religion as a universal phenomenon and that is its emancipative function. If we take this function of religion into consideration then question of Daesh in Iraq vis-à-vis the role of Shiism, then we may arrive at wonderful interpretations as far as the emancipative role of religion is concerned. In other words, we cannot talk about roles of religions in vacuum but they should be studied in their complex contextualized forms and in reference to objective realities and matrices of power. Otherwise, we fall into traps of verbose debates on idealism versus realism which is devoid of sensible importance.

For example, Daesh's ideology which ascribes itself to Islam and claims that they are the heirs of Prophet, not only disrespects and takes peoples' life but also considers their path is the divine path- and if they succeed to kill their enemies or be killed by them in either way they will be rewarded and paradise will be their ultimate abode. In other words, the notions of *Shahadat* and *Jihad* have been desecrated by ideologues of terrorism. In contrast to this ideology one can have a look at, for example, the Shiite ideology in Iraq and Syria where Shiism is playing an emancipative role, by bringing people under the aegis of a safe asylum which enables them to defend themselves. At the other extreme of these emancipative ideas stands Daesh's ideology that is fed by Saudi Arabia and extreme forces in Jordan and reluctant to comply with peoples' will, i.e., the role of democracy as a political criterion in

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running the affairs of Muslim societies in the region. Daesh is making its best efforts to stop this ideal to be institutionalized in the Muslim mind. When we look at the operative system of Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world we see very complex networks where in Egypt and against the Muslim Brotherhood it employed military junta and in Iraq and Syria Saudis use terrorist cells and in Yemen they wage war or in Bahrain they use occupying military forces of their own. In all these scenarios we can discern a very consistent approach and that is to rule out the idea of *popular participation* as Saudis consider this as one of the greatest dangers for their repressive modes of governments. (Ajami, 1992) But today in Iraq, we can see that Shiism through *mukebs* and other forms of associations is in favor of *popular participation*. To put it differently, based on fieldworks, I have realized that these mukebs are not lamenting for Imam Hussein who was slaughtered 14 centuries ago but they are using these channels for the removal of injustice and against terrorist forces which deprive people from having the right to live. These *mukebs* and the ideology which make up the very essence of their action-plan are functioning as a bridge linking the past and the future by implementing their emancipative ideas within the framework of Karbala's movement. Present-day Iraq and events happening there are like a theatrical scene whose protagonist's role is acted by Shiism. To understand this theatre in the Goffmanesque sense, we, as sociologists or anthropologists, need to go to the field and see in action the emancipative or oppressive roles of religions or ideologies of Shiism and Salafism in the context of Iraq. This is something which the Iranian social scientists have not yet done and that is why Daesh seems like an incomprehensible nightmare which could only be decoded by 'western' experts or intelligence officers of MI5 or CIA. (Little, 2002)

Final Remarks

The question of terrorism is one of the most challenging problems in the post-global context where actors and agencies have been transformed into different and unpredictable forms and shapes. To study post-global actors we need to be equipped with novel strategies which could widen our horizons as social scientists. In this article, I have tried to look at DAESH in Iraq and the emancipative role of

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Shiism in mobilizing the masses against atrocities forced upon Iraqis by regional and extra-regional actors. In this study, I have relied heavily on my own fieldwork which took place in March 2015 from Tehran to Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad, Kazemein, Samarra and Tekrit. There I had the opportunity to meet with different groups of Shiite partisans (Hashd Sha'bi) who are gradually changing the fate of the battles in Iraq. By talking to them I realized that they are not only a military force but a faith-based group of people who have taken Shiism as their point of departure. In other words, the story of Karbala is a theatrical canopy for them and they are not only viewers but actors who are enacting episodes of Karbala in the 21st century against Daesh forces. This is a very pivotal issue which needs to be studied carefully as far as the battle against DAESH in the region is concerned.

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Pakistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: seeking a space for playing a role

S. Motahare Hosseyni
Associated professor of political sciences,
Payam Noor University
Nozar Shfiee
Associated professor of political sciences, Azad University
of Isfahan
Asghar Shokri Moqadam
Lecturer of Payam Noor university

Abstract

The dynamic surrounding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) helps Pakistan to prevent other regional organizations from acting against its interests. It is important therefore to assess the results for Pakistan of being associated with this Organization, to understand the potentials and the precedence of acting in the Organization. In particular, one needs to analyse the hurdles of any that prevent Pakistani membership in the organization and, similarly, what would be the outcomes of such a membership in the region. In

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answering these queries, this chapter will detail the inducements for Pakistan to get in SCO, especially should India also join as a member.

The structure of this chapter thus consists in presenting the construction of the SCO, its characteristics, importance and functions (1), as well as the basic fundamentals of Pakistani foreign policy (2), in particular the purposes and programmes of Pakistani foreign policy in Central Asia (3). Further, the analysis of Pakistani goals of cooperating with SCO (4) will look at the obstacles, limitations and problems of Pakistan's cooperating with SCO (5).

Introduction

The Pakistani government is, in south Asia, the linkage between Middle Eastern countries and Central Asians countries. In this respect, the geopolitical situation points to the relation between Pakistan and India, its immediate neighbourhood, which burdens Pakistan's security role and prevents the latter from playing a significant role in the region. Pakistan, during the cold war, belonged to the western side, within the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTU) or Bagdad Pact alignment.[1] After this era, India got the nearest position with the U.S.A on behalf of Pakistan. However, the recent stationing of U.S. troops in Afghanistan enabled Pakistan once more to be situated in its own regional place.

The dynamic surrounding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) helps Pakistan to prevent other regional organizations from acting against its interests. It is important therefore to assess the results for Pakistan of being associated with this Organization, to understand the potentials and the precedence of acting in the Organization. In particular, one needs to analyse the hurdles of any that prevent Pakistani membership in the organization and, similarly, what would be the outcomes of such a membership in the region. In answering these queries, this chapter will detail the inducements for Pakistan to get in SCO, especially should India also join as a member.

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1- Constructing the SCO: characteristics, importance and functions

Originally, in 1996, the Shanghai Five or Shanghai Group brought together China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to help solve border disputes among China, Russia and Central Asia. The importance of this dynamic increased, in 2001, when Uzbekistan joined what then became the Shanghai Cooperation *Organisation*, later to be joined by Observers such as Mongolia in 2004 and in 2005 Iran, India and Pakistan, all invited to its annual Summit sessions, particularly after the bolding of the disputes between Russia and USA over Western support for the "colour revolutions", the expansion of NATO to the East and the issue of the missile shield. By welcoming in 2012 Turkey as Dialogue Partner and Afghanistan as Observer, the SCO developed into a potentially powerful regional organization. Some even call SCO the 'Eastern NATO' or the 'Nuclear OPEC'. However, the SCO was aformed for economic and regional cooperation and for controlling terrorism, separatism and radicalism. China in particular, as well as the Central Asian states, are not inclined towards entering the rivalry between Russia and the West. The SCO Charter of 2002 emphasized that the Organisation is not oriented against other states and international organizations (Karami, 2008: 251-264).

The SCO's importance related to its geographical expansion which includes today most parts of Asia as well as great regional powers. Two founder-members of the organization, China and Russia, are the most important economic and military-security powers of Asia. At to the regions in which the SCO acts, there are regional powers which own great spaces, large energy resources (especially gas in Russia and

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Turkmenistan, and oil in Kazakhstan and Iran), mineral resources and geopolitical geography where nurturing radical Muslims is one of its important characteristics. Most of these powers, especially the founder-powers are countries which worry about a uni-polar and hegemonic international system. This means that the SCO, as an Asian organization equipped with all the characteristics it needs, can help its members to coalesce against their security threat, especially those coming from the West and NATO.

The members of the SCO are seeking a way to settle their territorial discords, to oppose terrorists, factionists, separatists and fundamentalists, and also to improve their economic cooperation within the Organisation. Entangled geographic, ethnic and tribal, political, historical and economic crises in the region need a pervasive geopolitical strategy which endorses all members by their own problems and preferences.

2- Some basic fundamentals of Pakistani foreign policy

The constructing of the Pakistani state rests upon Islamic factors, as shown in the rules, national flag, slogans and foreign policy attitudes of the country. Up to Article 40 of the Pakistani constitution, the state strives to be in brotherhood relations with other Muslim countries in order to gain Islamic unity and support from common interests of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples and to improve international peace and security, nurturing understanding and friendship of nations and persuading to resolve international fractions in peaceful ways.[2]

The State of Pakistan enjoys great potentials of national power which form a defined geopolitical position up to an ideal determined identity and can pose a proper foreign policy. In reality, however, the State is based on the Islamic foundation versus Hinduism, with a powerful role of the army, in contrast with its traditional society (tribal and feudal) and security and has experienced military rivalry with India for six decades. These factors help national solidarity but hinder the State-

building process. The official State in Pakistan rules but inside its society, the State rules too formally and superficially.

The most important internal factor determining Pakistani foreign policy is the enmity with the Indian government and nation, who was an opponent to Pakistan's independence and has resulted in three wars. Actually, Pakistani foreign policy has been constructed through the gathering allies against India. Also this populous country does not possess enough natural resources or economic sources at large. This limitation affects Pakistani foreign policy.[3]

The second most important factor, internally and internationally, is Islam. Islam as a formal religion, as an attitude of liberal and moderate Muslims and authors of Pakistan and as an approach for radicalism plays different roles in Pakistani society. Islam as a moderate and liberal attitude is a way of thinking and acting for the Pakistani middle class, who try to develop an Islamic, not a radical but a free and liberal country. Islam as an approach for radical Islamists is a way of war against life. For political strategists and common people of Pakistan, Islam is a reason why Pakistan has shaped after the partition from India and a reason for continuing its existence despite three wars with India (Goodvin, 2003: 20-27; Farzinfar, 2006: 86-87).

The security of Pakistan and the need for economic sources are facts that forces Pakistan to resort to the support of the USA. However, Islamic factors in Pakistani foreign policy as well as current poverty have led Islamabad to propagate relations with Saudi Arabia and other rich Arabic countries. This shows especially in 1980s Afghanistan crisis, which Pakistan supported Taliban (Nazifkar and Norouzi. 1382: 162-165).

Before in the cold war era, Pakistan was part of CENTU (along with Iran and Turkey) and acted as a connection of NATO and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)[4]. After the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and the country's exit from CENTU in 1980, Pakistan sided with the Reagan doctrine 'strategy of low intensity warfare' and as the axle of western, Arabic and Afghani forces rolled in

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regional and international plays. Playing in Afghanistan was very different because of the direct involvement of Soviet combat forces there since late 1979; it was the Carter Administration that, in alliance with Pakistan and China, began to provide military aid to the mujahedeen as a way of raising the costs of intervention to the USSR. In the mid-1990s, General Nasrullah Baber and the Pakistani intelligence service organized the survivors of pro-Iran Mujahidin (headed by Ahmadshah Masud and Rabbani) accompanied by Talibans (students) of religious schools (Maktabs) in Serhad and Pashtoonestan provinces. These forces, known later as Talibans, conquered 70 percent of Afghani districts and Rabbani's forces, as the formal State, hightailed from Kabul to Mazarsharif and then to Afghanistan-Tajikistan districts.

In this way, US clients such as Pakistan increased security assistance and arms transfers. 'Our goal, in short indeed our necessity-is to convince the Soviet Union that the policies on which it embarked in the '70s cannot work', wrote Reagan. Sometimes referred to as Readiness Command, international troops of UN leading by U.S.A. reportedly has close to 300,000 service personnel under its control and has responsibility for the 'security' of some nineteen nations from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Pakistan and Afghanistan: its tasks are to deny further expansion by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the region, to afeguard Western access to Gulf oil supplies, to provide security assistance to America's clients in the so-called arc of crisis, and, in the words of the Secretary of Defense, 'if possible reverse, the spread of Soviet influence' (Pratt, 1987: 61-85).

The Islamic factor, accompanied with economic poorness of people, the latter longing to the government for providing wealth sources, has led to the deepening of ethnic, tribal, religious, factional and class gaps which resulted in the expansion of the military nature of the State in Pakistan. Some have called this militarisation of the government and management in Pakistan a drift towards a "Garrison State" whose administering function of the Nation has been over-cast.

Being in a geopolitical deadlock makes Pakistan, and also Afghanistan, a buffer region between three problematic areas - the Middle-East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent - under the influence of the Russian-Chinese-American rivalry. This is another important factor which affects the Pakistani foreign policy making-process.

3- Pakistani foreign policy in Central Asia : purposes and programs

Pakistan and the five Central Asian countries are close geographically and culturally. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, these six countries strived to establish relations, especially economically. After the outburst of the Taliban regime in the 1990s, these countries need each other strategically, notably to counter fundamentalism. In this purpose, Pakistan actively pursued relations with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The first country, Tajikistan, is in the border vicinity of Afghanistan, and therefore is a pass way for radical Islamists and drug smugglers to Central Asia. Uzbekistan is an important neighbour, geopolitically, because of the city of Termez, in the border-area of Afghanistan and the Ferghana Valley, meeting place for radical Islamists and drug-smugglers who pass from Afghanistan to Central Asia and from there to all of the western regions : the Caucasus, Eurasia and Europe (Hosseyni, 2010).

After the intervention in Afghanistan by a US-led military coalition under UN umbrella, Pakistan earned an opportunity to act as a member of this American-U.N. league. With the collapse of the Taliban regime, the Pakistani effort towards economic relations, especially with Turkmenistan for the purpose of purchasing gas gusted gas pipelines and gas exports to South and Eastern Asia.[5] Exporting to Uzbekistan as the more populous and developed country of Central Asia and controlling Islamist radicalism are the other cooperative lines of Pakistan-Central Asia rapprochement (Hosseyni, 2011).

"Pakistan's security policy, long dominated by a fear of India and the search for a superpower patron to counter that threat, now must confront spill-over threats from civil wars in Tajikistan and

Afghanistan. Islamabad's hopes that the new states of Central Asia would provide it with strategic depth, Islamic allies and collective security partners in its struggle with India have been dashed. Geographical constraints and concerted efforts by non-Islamic neighbours, especially Russia and China, have stymied her efforts to become a major player in Central Asia. But, through bilateral ties and agencies such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO),[6] Pakistan can still provide technical and economic assistance to the Central Asian states' efforts to resolve the issues threatening their domestic Stability" (Smith, 1996: 12-14).

In Central Asia, Pakistan seeks for ways to escape from its geopolitical limits, especially ways which are to help Pakistan find some roads, resources and allies. As a goal of fundamentalists' ways, Central Asia is a destination for Islamic radicals. Pakistan in Central Asia tries to control these currents with various instruments such as the destruction of haven places of boarders for Islamic combats, attacking drug smugglings, intelligence services with Central Asian countries and to get close to Eurasia as one of the lean regions towards which Pakistan may play a role. Rolling in this region may improve Pakistan's status in international arena, as in other neighbourhood regions such as India, China and the Middle East, which are top actors in the international equation.

The secular States of Central Asia are akin to the Pakistani pro-secular state or actually the secular part of the Pakistani government, who prefer to separate religious institutions from administrative functions. Even so, the pro-Islam part of the government , such as the supporters and patrons of Taliban, Al Qaeda and other radical sects, have found Central Asia as a goal-place for refuge from American troops and bases in Afghanistan and in Persian Gulf countries. Aiding the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and sheltering some other Islamic radical groups is the outbreak of Pakistani paradoxical foreign policy in Central Asia (Shayan, 1386: 428).

4- **Pakistani goals in cooperating with the SCO**

In this context, the intricate and yet logical strategy on the part of Pakistan towards the construction of Asia points towards the following reasons for Pakistan's attitude towards joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

First, a distrust of India. After the independence of Pakistan from India in 1947, the two countries have engaged in fighting on three occasions. Membership of the SCO would help Pakistan to establish firmly a more tenacious relation with regional great powers, such as China and Russia. This would tilt the situation towards the end to the isolation of India in the region.

Second, membership in the SCO would improve Pakistan's relations with neighbour countries, which would be an asset in the country's regional investment and nurturing of a role for its foreign policy, especially in the commercial arena.

Third, membership in SCO will empower Pakistan in the region and provide the country with a standing towards the improvement of not only its regional place but also of its international prestige as well.

Fourth, membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation would be a sign for regulating relations of Pakistan with the USA as well as with the rest of the West (Anvari, 2008: 61), among which the former colonial powers of South Asia and Asia in general.

Fifth, keeping influence over Afghanistan. The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are problematic not only because of fundamental Islamists who act in Afghanistan but, more than this, because of territorial struggles in the Pashtoonistan province of Pakistan, whose people are Afghan in origin and ethnicity. Influence over Afghanistan is vital for Pakistan to save the country from radicalism and save Pashtoonistan from ethnic conflicts.

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The most important factors of Pakistani foreign policy are in relation with the basic needs of managing a country with deep enmity with India, radical fundamentalism, militarisation, economic poorness and geopolitical stalemate. Countering India is the intrinsic ground of decision-making in Pakistan. This facet affects all minds and actions, and so logically characterise Pakistani policies on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation too.

China is a strategic ally for Pakistan and actually the more regional strategic ally and a supporter of an active role of Pakistan in the SCO. Coming along with the SCO would help Pakistan improve its economic relations with China, especially with roads that the SCO offers to Pakistan, military cooperation and intelligence services with SCO-members who help Pakistan to improve its relation with China in regard of America and the West. All these utilities empower Pakistan over India and may improve its role in the international arena.

5- Obstacles, limitations and problems in Pakistan's cooperation with the SCO

China is on the side of Pakistan for joining this country to the SCO. However, Russia is on the side of India and against China, that is there is a Russian opposition to joining Pakistan as an active member of the SCO. Russia and India have a continuous relations on technical and militarily affairs. They both challenge China's territorial policies and Islamist movements which they believe are based on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders. Activation of Pakistan as a constituent member of the SCO may empower the strategic triangle of China-Pakistan-America which both China and Russia dislike (Shayan, 1386: 432-433; Lukin, 2007; Cohen, 2006).

India is a very stringent factor in Pakistani international policy-making aspects, one of which is acting in the SCO. India, allied with Russia, is inclined to preventing a more active role of Pakistan in the region. Russia is an economic and militarily partner of India, and so opposes Pakistan as an intruder-power in this relation. Pakistan, as an ideal place for Chechen Islamists and a supporter of radicalism, is a big

'enemy' for Russia which sees one of the most important hazards for Russia's future in radical Islam in the Caucasus. America is an ally of Pakistan in the coalition against terrorism (meaning Islamism) facing the SCO, Russia and China. Again, there lies a clear paradox in Pakistan's role in the international arena : is it to foster a coalition with the USA and the West or with China and the East ?

As Pakistan cannot decide in this matter; internal impotents and external pressers prevent such a clarification. As the Pakistani State strives to control radical Islamists, public opinions of Pakistanis prefer the country to be in the league of Islamic countries not alongside with Christians such as the USA and Russia or not religious countries such as China, all of which States repress their Muslim populations. Internal Pakistani State-making problems make this gap all the worse. The **multi-aspects** State does not correspond to any special class or ethnic or social groups or social powers and has no real other choice than relying on the military and therefore dysfunction.

Conclusion

Pakistan needs to obtain membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This will be a way, geopolitically, to find new allies and roads which will let the country play an active role, regionally and internationally. Also, being in the SCO brings trade benefits with large regional economics, which Pakistan deeply favours.

The SCO is a favourite avenue for the Pakistani State, which actively pursues the aim to control radicalism. For the pro-Islam groups in Pakistan and Pakistani society, they prefer to be in relation with Muslim countries of Central Asia. If Pakistan becomes a member of the SCO, Central Asian countries and even south Asians will better able to control fundamentalism in the region.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 till 1992, Pakistan lost its position for years. Afghanistan was controlled by an Iranophile State and Pakistan was in the outbreak of internal problems. From 1996 to September 2001 and American attacks on

Afghanistan, Pakistan was in hope to escape from the geopolitical deadlock, that specially troubled the country in 1996-98, by controlling Afghanistan. But the American 'storm' in Afghanistan pulled war to the Pakistani borders and made difficulties for Pakistan. Constructing the SCO, Pakistan tries to get in the organization, along with China, to escape these difficulties.

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Endnotes

[1]. The Central Treaty Organization (also referred to as CENTO - Central Eastern Treaty Organisation - and its original name being Middle East Treaty Organization or METO) also known as the Baghdad Pact was formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and dissolved in 1979.

[2]. From the Green Book of Pakistan, 2009, page 219.

[3]. Ibid, Green Book of Pakistan, 2009, page 221.

[4] SEATO was an international organization for collective defence in Southeast Asia created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, or Manila Pact, signed in September 1954 in Manila, Philippines. The formal institution of SEATO was established on 1955 at a meeting of treaty partners. Eight members joined the organisation. Despite its name, SEATO mostly included countries located outside of the region but with an interest either in the region or the organization itself. They are: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (including East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States Primarily created to block further communist gains in Southeast Asia, SEATO is generally considered a failure

because internal conflict and dispute hindered general use of the SEATO military; however, SEATO-funded cultural and educational programs left long-standing effects in Southeast Asia. SEATO was dissolved on 30 June 1977 after many members lost interest and withdrew.

[5] (Green Book of Pakistan, 2009: 291-296)

[6]. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an intergovernmental organization involving seven Asian and three Eurasian nations, part of the South-central Asian Union. It provides a platform to discuss ways to improve development and promote trade, and investment opportunities. The ECO is an ad hoc organization under the United Nations Charter (Chap. VIII). The common objective is to establish a single market for goods and services, much like the European Union. ECO's secretariat and cultural department are located in Tehran, its economic bureau is in Turkey and its scientific bureau is situated in Pakistan. The organization's population is 416,046,863 and the area is 8,620,697 km². The organization was founded by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. ECI's Charter was signed on 15 March 1995 in Islamabad, Pakistan. Economic Cooperation Organization is an intergovernmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the member states. It was the successor organisation of what was the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), founded in 1964, which ended activities in 1979. In the fall of 1992, the ECO expanded to include seven new members, namely Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.The date of the Organization's expansion to its present strength, 28th November, is being observed as the ECO Day. The status and power of the ECO is growing. However, the organization faces many challenges. Most importantly, the member states are lacking appropriate infrastructure and institutions which the Organization is primarily seeking to develop, to make full use of the available resources in the

region and provide sustainable development for the member nations. The Economic Cooperation Organisation Trade Agreement (ECOTA) was signed on 17 July 2003 in Islamabad. ECO Trade Promotion Organization (TPO) is a new organization for trade promotion among member states located in Iran (2009). Under the agreement reached between ECO members, the common trade market should be established by 2015.

Transnational Responsibilities and Human Rights in the Foreign Policy of Iran

Seyed Sadegh Haghighat
Mofid University, Qom, Iran

Abstract

In one side, transnational responsibilities might be compatible with human rights. It includes both international conventions, such as the public statement of Amnesty International, and Islamic thoughts based on the holy Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions. On the other side, some countries may use international law and human rights as a tool for initiating war, advocating terrorism all around the world, and offending civil and constitutional rights.

Keywords: Transnational responsibilities, National interests, Human rights, Idealism, Realism, jihad

To answer if human rights matter in foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this article is to tie the issue of human rights to religious conception of transnational responsibilities. It seems that this key word can play dual role for and against human rights.

Realism in I.R./National Interests

National interests are defined as the goals and aims of a nation which should be followed realistically. Since there is no single "interest", it might be used as plural: "interests". According to Plano and Olton, "national interest is the fundamental objective and ultimate determinant that guides the decision-makers of a state in making foreign policy. The national interest of a state is typically a highly generalized conception of those elements that constitute the state's most vital needs. These include self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being."[1]

Iain McLean refers to two different conceptions of this term: "National interest is the interest of a state, usually as defined by its government. Accordingly, two broad senses may be distinguished:

1) Used by politicians to justify a particular course of action, especially in foreign policy. In foreign policy, the term invokes an image of the nation, or nation-state, defining its interests within the anarchic international system where dangers abound and interests of the nation are always at risk.

2) Used as a tool for analyzing foreign policy issues, particularly by political realists, such as Hans Morgenthau. Here national interest is used as a sort of foreign-policy-related interpretation of "public interest" – indicating what is best for the nation in its relations with other states."[2]

Comparing these two definitions, we can conclude that the first is more general than the second. As McLean indicates, the second use of that term emphasizes not merely the threat to the nation from the international anarchy, but also the external constrains such as the

interests and power of other states, and the other factors beyond the control of the nation like geographical location and dependence on foreign trade. The realists' use of the term national interest in evaluating foreign policy focuses on national security as the core of national interest.

But what are the national interests of a state? And how can we recognize the national interests of a certain state from those of others? Although "interest of state" and "national security of state" are closely allied terms, [3] it is necessary to notice that there is no agreed methodology by which the best interests of a nation can be tested. In fact there are two different ideas to determine them. Some writers have argued that the best interests are, nevertheless, objectively determined by the situation of the state within the international system and can be deduced from a study of history and the success/failure of the past policies. According to others, national interest is subjectively interpreted by the government of the day. In this version, it is merely what the politicians consider in this regard.[4]

Idealism in I.R./Transnational Responsibilities

Transnational responsibilities, here, can be defined as the responsibilities that an ideological state pursues out of the nation-state borders as an ideological "duty", though the term is more general than being limited to ideological sates.[5] In fact, this criterion differentiates between secular states and ideological ones. According to secularism, religion and state must be divided. So duties and responsibilities rooted in religion do not confine the frameworks of foreign policy. In an Islamic state, however, the conducts of the government and its nation – if not all, at least the guidelines – are defined by religion. A country which does not act completely according to religion may be a non-religious one or just ostensibly religious.

"Transnational responsibilities" are more general than being restricted only to "religious states". So there are some kinds of non-religious states which realize some transnational responsibilities for themselves. Marxist states like the Soviet Union used to act drawing on the

Marxism teachings. The main difference between religious and Marxist states on the one hand, secular states on the other hand, is that for the first group religious/ideological "duty" has priority over "national interest". So they may take a position in their foreign policy regardless of whether their national interest is for or against it.

Borrowing from Max Weber, we can consider "national interests' and "transnational responsibilities" as two different *ideal types*. Consequently, there is no pure concept of them in practice. Hence some states in order to synthesize new concepts, try to combine them. Surely, the new synthesized concept will be some thing else. It is true for the I.R.I's foreign policy after the Islamic Revolution and it is one of the main reasons that make it difficult to understand. In spite of secular states, ideological states establish their foreign policy idealistically. According to Plano and Olton "the idealist approach believes that foreign policies based on moral principles are more effective, because they promote unity and cooperation among states rather than competition and conflict. According to the idealist, moral power is more effective than physical power."[6]

Islam and Trans-national Responsibilities

Transnational responsibilities of an Islamic state are based on divine revelations, but the transnational aims of the secular and modern nations, especially in the age of globalisation, are based on interests. In other words, Islamic states are to do their transnational responsibilities regardless of whether they fulfil their interests or not. Transnationalism features a de-territorialized mode of action. The rhetoric of mobilisation recentralises, in a non-territorial way, identities that have become fragmented within the nation-state context. The rhetoric of "Ummah", that is a worldwide unified Muslim community, can be reinterpreted to reframe all national diversity as one imagined "political" community, thus shifts away from its religious notion. Transnationalism creates new expressions of belonging and political engagement as well as a "de-territorialized" understanding of "nation".

Referring to the Holy Qur'an, religious states consider all Muslims as one community: "Surely this Islam is your religion, one religion (only), and I am your Lord, therefore serve me."[7] In this way, the 11th article of the I.R.I's Constitution refers to that verse of the Holy Qur'an, and concludes that the Islamic state's "duty" is to unite Muslims in political, economic and cultural aspects. As a result, we can say that it is an obligation for the Islamic state, not a "right". Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) says: "If you hear a man calling all other Muslims, and you do not help him, you won't be a true Muslim."[8]

 A secular state may believe in these creeds, but based on its interests and not as the duty of the state. With regard to the current Iranian Constitution and Iran's foreign policy conduct over the last three decades, the objectives may be classified into three areas:

 a) Economic growth and development, preserving territorial integrity and national sovereignty;

 b) Upholding the rights of Muslims and defending liberation movements, on the one hand, and confrontation with Israel and the West (notably the United States);

c) Establishment of an Islamic polity based on Shiite principles.

To achieve the three levels of objectives found in the Constitution, the Islamic Republic of Iran needs coalition and alliance with other countries.

Offensive Jihad

Jihad is one of the most important issues which differentiate between transnational responsibilities and human rights. Considering one of the definitions of Jihad disregarding the relationship between text and context, the United States Department of Justice has used its own *ad hoc* definitions of jihad in indictments of individuals involved in terrorist activities:

- "As used in this First Superseding Indictment, 'jihad' is the Arabic word meaning 'holy war'. In this context, jihad refers to the use of violence, including paramilitary action against people, property or governments deemed to be enemies of a fundamentalist version of Islam".

- "As used in this Superseding Indictment, 'violent jihad' or 'jihad' includes planning, preparing for, and engaging in, acts of physical violence, including murder, maiming, kidnapping, and hostage-taking."[9]

These kinds of misconceptions, ignoring the relationship between text and context, try to bring a special case from a couple of centuries ago to this time, and condemn the implications. The same is Karl Popper's critics on Plato. The point is that it is not enough to use Quranic or Prophetic texts without adequate knowledge of the human situation and cultural milieu in which they were revealed and first applied, as well as the precedence of some verses over others based on order of revelation or abrogation. In other words, context and circumstance of Quranic revelation and traditions (Hadith) are crucial in coming to terms with jihad.[10]

Ambiguity of the Foreign Policy of the I.R.I.

According to professor Sariolghalam "Iranian foreign policy practitioners have constantly faced with the problem and the dilemma of coalition in resolving foreign disputes and/or in more extensive cooperation and coordination. Iran's cultural, geographical and economic particularities determine to a great deal the orientation and type of foreign transnational coalitions and formulations. There is a degree of tension in Iran's foreign relations with all of its neighboring countries. Perhaps the main reason is because of the uniqueness of the Islamic Republic of Iran's political system being in disharmony and incompatibility with the mainstream international trends. This disharmony is not necessarily negative, but it is merely unique and different. Its continuation is also not cost free. It is within this system of paradoxes and contradictions that the Islamic Republic of Iran is trying

to pursue its goals both at the internal as well as the external environments." [11] It is a reality that western diplomats can not understand Iranian foreign policy easily. The obscurity in the foreign policy of the I.R.I. might trace back, at least, to three main factors:

1- **Transnational responsibilities / national interests:** Because of the ambiguity of the relationship between national interests and transnational responsibilities, Iranian's foreign policy is not obvious. It is because of the dual role against other countries and institutions: an Islamic country with huge transnational responsibilities, and a nation-state which pursue its interests in the modern international milieu.

2- **Nation / "ummah"**: the notion of territory plays a powerful role in terms of demarcating transnational state responsibility. Thus, while citizens (and even non-citizens) within a particular country generally enjoy a plethora of protection under international law against abuses committed by this state, protection for those living in other countries remains uneven and uncertain. At heart, Islam wishes to reintegrate the individual into the natural order. The sacred text of Islam, the Qur'an, uses term, ummah, to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both individual communities, great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the worldwide community of believers - in the latter sense of the term it is synonymous with *dar al-Islam*, or "The Land of Islam," which refers to the world Islamic community. The Ummah, Muslim community, is considered as an interpretive community. As a concept, it means three things: (A) The Ummah is a dynamic concept, reinterpreting the past and meeting new challenges and (B) the Ummah must tackle global problems. The Ummah as a community is required to acknowledge moral and practical responsibility for the Earth as a trust; its members are trustees answerable for the condition of the Earth and its inhabitants. (C) The Ummah should be seen a critical tool, as the process of reasoning itself.

As Sohail Inayatullah holds "to create a future based on the Ummah equity and justice are prerequisites. This means a commitment to eradicating poverty. It means going beyond the development debate since development theory merely frames the issue in a political

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language. This means rethinking trade, developing south-south trade as well as new instruments of financial accounting and the financing of new routes and transportation infrastructure. But perhaps most significant is a commitment to literacy for all. We need to recover that historically the Ummah meant models of multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and pluralist societies. A true Ummah respects the rights of non-Muslims as with the original Medina state".[12]

3- Ambiguity of "expediency": According to the 5th and 110th articles of the Iranian Constitution, the supreme leader, one of the grand Ayatollahs, has the highest authority to legitimate political power. So he can initiate war or make peace with other countries. The main decisive factor of governmental decrees is expediency; however, its very criterion is not clear. Although the supreme leader is the one who recognizes expediencies at last, specialists can give consultations to him. It is not known exactly if expediency can put only "the secondary decrees of the shari'a" aside or it can disregard even "its primary decrees" too. Some scholars believe expediency itself is considered as one of the important issues that might secularize Islamic fiqh. However, the definition, frameworks and borders of expediency are issues which need more clarification.

Conclusion

Considered as a double-edged concept, transnational responsibilities play dual, and sometimes opposite, roles with regard to human rights. In the public statement of Amnesty International, human rights responsibilities are strictly recommended. [13] Moreover, Islamic government, according to the holy Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions, has to help the needy all over the world. In most cases, Islamic transnational responsibilities and human rights put in one direction, though, on the other hand, they may contradict each other. Since the border between the transnational responsibilities and national interests of the Islamic government is not obvious, and since the implications of distinction between "Ummah" and nation in the modern era is not clarified, and for the ambiguity of expediency in the Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence), transnational responsibilities might have two diverse

kinds of implications for human rights. On the one hand, Islamic transnational responsibilities and human rights are considered in one line, but on the other, some cases might contradict internal laws of nation-states or other international laws.

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The Right to Participation in Islamic Sources
(with Special Reference to the Environmental Affairs)

Mohammad Hassan Mozafari
HK Professor IMS, Busan University of Foreign Studies,
Korea

Abstract

The Right to participation in public affairs is an important principle of democracy and social equality. It influences economic, social and political decisions. Participation in all its forms can build public support, and educate the public about public plans and activities. It increases trust and boosts people's willingness to participate in public affairs. This paper attempts to examine the right to participation in public affairs in the Islamic Sources. The data for the research has been collected from a number of academic books, the Quran, the Tradition (Hadith) and reliable internet sites. By referring to some dictionaries and the international law documents, the concept of "participation" is defined first, and then the article examines various forms of participation such as Consultation, Duty and Right to Public Surveillance on Public Affairs, Advising the Authorities and also the Right to Cooperation from the perspective of the Quran and Tradition. Based on the Islamic Sources, public

participation is not only a right but a duty and responsibility too (as far long as the subject is not in conflict with Islamic teachings).

Keywords: Right, Duty, Participation, Consultation, Advising, Cooperation. Public Participation, Public Surveillance, Quran, Tradition.

I. Introduction

Right to Participation in all aspects of public affairs is one of the most important means to prevent and cure major and public problems. Among all public and global problems, the environmental issues now have become a global crisis that needs active public interventions. The technological advances in the past few decades have caused serious environmental problems: exploitation of natural resources, overconsumption, air, land and water pollutions, wastes, dangerous chemical products, nuclear radiation, nuclear accidents, genetic engineering, desertification, deforestation, ecological collapse of seas, and global warming, to mention a few. This endless list of issues indicates that the methods of production and consumption are erroneous and environmental resources are not managed properly.

In this state of affairs, old principles of law and regulations cannot control every aspect of the threats, because they are based on the principle that every economic activity should be allowed and restoration and compensation should be required if any damage occurs. The religious and traditional systems may have been adequate before, but are not so today. To prevent any dangerous incident or crisis from occurring, the modern system of law stresses preventive methods for participation, consultation, supervision and control of plans and projects. To protect and improve environmental health, plants and animals and the natural systems on which all life depends, public participation is needed from individual to global levels.

This paper attempts to examine the right to participation in public affairs in Islamic sources. The data for the research has been collected from a number of Persian and Arabic books, the Quran, the Hadith (Tradition) and relevant internet sites. Referring to some dictionaries

and international law documents first specifies the concept of "partnership." Then various forms of the Right to Participation (Consultation, Duty and Right to Public Surveillance and Cooperation) are examined before finally reaching a conclusion.

II. The Concept of Right to Participation in Dictionary and International law

Every word, term and idiom has a certain meaning and transmits a specific message. Words play an important role in establishing a common understanding. With the help of words, we can think and reason. However, the concepts of words are not always fixed. Different times, places or in fields may give different meanings. Therefore, this article begins with the dictionary meaning of the right to participate.

a. The Concept of the Right to Participation

Participation means taking part in some action or attempt (ReferenceDictionary). It is the process during which individuals, groups, and organizations are consulted about or have the opportunity to become actively involved in a project or program (wiktionary). Public participation is an important principle of democracy or social equality (thefreedictionary). Participation in social science refers to different mechanisms for the public to express opinions - and ideally exert influence - regarding political, economic, management or other social decisions. Participatory decision-making can take place within any realm of human social activity. From the administrative viewpoint, participation can build public support for activities and educate the public about activities. It can also facilitate useful information exchanges regarding local conditions. Participation enables individuals and groups to influence the public decisions in a representational manner. Participation increases trust and boosts people's willingness to participate in public affairs. Meaningful participation in public affairs also needs sufficient information and transparency. However, the quality of public participation is not the same everywhere. To have more accurate understanding of the concept and the quality of the participation in a community, it is important to answer these key

questions: who is allowed to participate, and whether they are representative of the population?; what is the method of communication or decision-making and; how much influence or authority is granted to the participation?

Today due to the widespread use of information technology, a new term 'E-participation,' has been introduced into the literature. Through active and meaningful participation in the cyberspace, people have better and faster influence on the decisions of government officials. 'E-partnership' is intimately linked to the E-government and E-governance (Wikipedia). The right to participate has an important place in the international law, regional co-operations, and in the constitutions at domestic level.

b. The Concept of the Right to Participation in International Law:

In the United Nations, the issue of public participation became prominent in the context of the right to democracy, development and protection of environmental protection, calling for governments to adopt measures for the participation of all elements of society in social and economic development planning. It concerns the right to participation in decision making, ensuring the efficiency of the legislative body, laws and ensuring the healthy operation of public power. The right to public participation in general is enshrined by the human rights documents. For instance, the right to freedom of association and freedom of assembly covers all aspects of public life. The United Nations Declaration on International Human Rights is the first document that emphasized on the right to participation for any individual in public affairs, affecting his wellbeing (United Nations, 1948). Yet, those who were preparing the draft and voted for this document did not consider any environmental question at that time. According to Article 1/21 of the above mentioned document, "everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives." Article 25 (a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 further states, "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and

without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives…"

Several articles of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United Nations Organization) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child also concern the right to participation directly or indirectly. For instance, Article 12 of the Rights of the Child says: "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child." Based on this article, children have the right to participate in decision-making processes in all matters affecting them. They also have right to express their views. It does not mean, however, that children's opinions should be automatically endorsed (UNICEF). Articles 13, 17, 23, and 28 of the Convention are about the right to information, which is an important element for effective participation (Conv. on the Rights of the Child, 1989). In fact, the right to participation is not meaningful without relevant and sufficient information.

There are other relevant documents in this regard that enshrine the right of public participation such as Articles 10 and 19 of the Rio Declaration (1992). The Rio Declaration states: "environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level." Article 10 of the Declaration also stresses on the link between public participation and the right to access to information. It adds: "At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided." (Rio Declaration, p. 1992). Several sections of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights (1993) such as paragraphs 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 31and 63 put an emphasis on the right to participation in the political, economic,

social and cultural systems for all people and referring to women, indigenous people and disabled persons in particular. However, it should be noted that expressing an opinion and right to participation doesn't mean taking a decision, but it implies the ability to influence decisions. Other than international documents, there are also many regional conventions such as the European, African, American, Asian and Muslim countries. Among them all, the Islamic Human Rights Declaration will be discussed here.

c. Right to Participation and the Muslim World

With the expansion of modern thoughts in Islamic countries, Muslim scholars have been divided into three main groups: the traditionalists, moderates, and modernists. The hard-line traditionalists such as 'Salafis' and 'Wahhabis' reject modern thoughts as innovation (bid'ah البدعه). According to them, Muslims should protect their cultural identity and intellectual independence. Modernists, however, are in favour of modernity and demand changes in all aspects of life. They believe that development and modernity go side by side. According to them, Muslims do not have any option other than following modernity. Some adopt contemporary thinking, as long as it is not in conflict with Islamic teachings. They have held the view that the Muslim world should comply with modern developments to attain a prosperous life.

Since the 1980s, Muslims have been attempting to define their own Islamic code of human rights. The Islamic Human Rights Declaration (1990) attempted to incorporate concepts such as the idea of responsibility. Muslim states have always asserted that "human rights norms" is a Western (modern) product, and that it is often incompatible with Islamic culture. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that many state parties of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sought to adopt an Islamic Human Rights Declaration. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam incorporated notions such as responsibility, spirituality and family environment, keeping in view the provisons of the Islamic Shari'a. Meanwhile, it attempted to liberate human rights concepts from the burden of individualism and secular

liberalism without any reference to the Universal Declaration. The Cairo Declaration has a preamble and 25 articles.

Terms and expressions such as duty, responsibility and obligation have been frequently used in several articles. About the 'right to life and freedom,' for example, it says: '…safeguarding of those fundamental rights and freedoms is an individual responsibility of every person and a collective responsibility of the entire Ummah.'Article 1 states: 'All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. Article 2 says: 'Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the duty of individuals, societies and states to safeguard this right against any violation…' Article 9 has changed the right to education to an obligation. It says: 'seeking knowledge is an obligation and provision of education is the duty of the society and the State. Article 11 talks about the responsibility towards other nations:, saying,'It is the duty of all States and nations to support the struggle of colonized peoples for the liquidation of all forms of colonization and occupation, and all States and peoples have the right to preserve their independent identity and control over their wealth and natural resources.'

Regarding the right to participation, article 23 of the Cairo Declaration states: "(a) Authority is a trust; and abuse or malicious exploitation thereof is explicitly prohibited, in order to guarantee fundamental human rights; (b) Everyone shall have the right to participate, directly or indirectly in the administration of his country's public affairs. He shall also have the right to assume public office in accordance with the provisions of Shari'ah." (Cairo Declaration, p. 1990). Unlike human rights instruments that emphasize more on the rights, the Cairo Declaration places more emphasis on the responsibility in the above-mentioned articles. This is one of the important differences between the international Human Rights and the Islamic Human Rights; which each have root in its respective sources.

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In fact, the right to participate is the continuation of the demands of the worldwide human rights movement. After the first and second generations of the political, social, and cultural rights reflected in the Covenants (Human Rights Committee), the 'Right to Participation' is a part of the third generation of human rights known as the Solidarity Rights (UN General Assembly). In this environment, the participation of individuals in public affairs has been introduced as a right, while it is a task-oriented issue.

From the Islamic point of view, taking part in the public decision-making process and other aspects of public life is not only a right, but also an important task of government and every member of the society. Prophet Mohammad said: "whoever does not care about the Muslims affairs is not a Muslim." (Kolaini, p. 163). [1] If all the required individual and social conditions do exist, then man is obliged (mokallaf) to perform his role. Some public duties would not be accomplished, unless a large number of people were involved in doing them. In such cases, everyone is responsible and must be involved in the public affairs. So it is more duty-oriented issue. The jurisprudential texts also consider the participation as a 'task' (Sufficiency obligation or Vajeb e Kafaei).

If enough people attempt to participate to solve a problem, it is natural that the task is removed from others. If no one takes any action, then all are responsible and guilty. If only certain people have an ability to solve the problem, then, they have to take action. Otherwise, they are the only people who are responsible. For example, in the early history of Islam, the mob entered the third caliph's home and killed him. As they did not have a clear plan, and there was not any popular person to lead them, they came to conclude that they must go to Imam Ali and ask him to accept the new leadership. Foreseeing the dark cloud in the sunrise of future, Ali was not prepared as a politician to accept their suggestion. Yet, he accepted the leadership for he saw it as a religious duty and believed that the general public must participate in controlling the social and political situations (Sobhi Saleh, p. 50). [2]

While pondering over the words of wisdom and explaining the right of participation in public affairs, we find that social responsibility flows from therein. Accessing power is not an opportunity for prospering and plunder. Rather, it is a grave responsibility. According to this school of thought, acceptance of responsibility is to implement the right of the people, and to establish the rule of law and justice in all domains including environmental issues. Thus, the 'right to active and effective participation' in social affairs is not to draw benefits but to serve God with responsibility unto Him and His creatures. Active and effective social participation is a guarantee for the well-being of society. Protecting God's bounty and natural gifts that have been bestowed by Him for the benefit of His creatures is possible through public participation only. Otherwise, the results would not arrive at the satisfaction of all the beneficiaries.

Right to Participation in the Quran and Tradition

The above discussion made it clear that according to Islam, the participation in the public affairs is a broad, serious, effective and obligatory issue. It is not an optional right that individuals or governments could choose or abandon. Rather, it is an important responsibility. Based on the Quranic teachings, there is a deep linkage between public participation and prosperity, victory or defeat of a nation (The Holy Quran , pp. Al-Rrad,11). Even this link is, in fact, an unchanging tradition and law of His (Allah) creation[3]. According to the Quran, there will be no evolution and alteration in the destiny of any society, unless evolution and alteration occur in the character of the people themselves. In another verse, God has stated this dominant rule in the system of creation: "Surely God will not alter the gift that he has given to a society, unless the characteristic and nature of the people of that society change." (The Holy Quran , pp. Al-Anfal, 53). [4]

In another place, the Quran reminds the historical errors of a nation that refused to follow their Prophet and fight their unjust enemy: "They told: O! Musa! We will never enter the city as long as enemies are in; so you and your God go to the battle. We will join you after the victory." (The Holy Quran , pp. Al-Maedeh: 24).[5] The Quran emphasizes that felicity

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and participation go hand in hand, and that without participation attainment of felicity is impossible. It means that everyone should rise to support and defend the public right to accomplish justice. Nobody should think that Prophets and peacemakers would bring them justice from behind the clouds in heavenly consignment. Attaining the public right to justice is the result of individual, social, and public efforts (The Holy Quran , pp. Al-Ssaba: 46). [6]

From the Quranic point of view, prophets, reformers, and leaders are tasked with delivering Guidance, such as teaching equality, righteousness, fair-mindedness, honesty, integrity, justice, and imparting training. But attaining these virtues and implementing justice is impossible without the public effort and participation. Thus, what is required to accomplish all of the above is that government prepares the necessary ground for an active and creative public participation. To extend justice, in their decisions, plans, and development programmes, decision makers should keep in view interests of the people, and provide a firm basis for active participation by the people (The Holy Quran , pp. Al-Hadid: 25). [7] However, participation in public affairs may be in various forms, such as consultation, surveillance, and involvement, which will be discussed below.

a. Duty and Right to Consultation:

According to the Quranic teachings, consultation means to search for other's opinion. It refers especially to seeking the best and truest opinion concerning any problem to help attain good results (The Holy Quran , pp. Al-Zzomar: 17). [8] There are two verses, which pertain to consultation. In fact, one verse is directed to the Prophet as the leader of a community and the decision maker, and the other addresses the people: "O, Prophet! Consult them in the affair" (The Holy Quran , pp. Ale Imran, 159); [9] "And conduct their affairs by mutual Consultation" (The Holy Quran , pp. Al-Shawra:38). [10]

It should be noted that consultation within the Islamic framework is completely different from the consultation and referring to public opinion in democracy. Islam has an extensive set of personal and social

laws and there is no need to refer to public opinion, or make a reference to any other sources. However, in other social, economic, and cultural affairs that Islam does not have any commands, or regarding methods of implementation of the law, consultation is allowed. Some interpreters believe that the Arabic phrase "wa amruhum (وامرهم)" in the verse has a commanding imperative meaning, and this is the reason for incumbency in consulting.

This verse came after the battle of Uhud in which the Muslims were defeated, because a group of them violated the Prophet's commands and some of them escaped the battle field. Basically, in this condition, they had to be deprived of consultation and participation in decision-making, but, in spite of this, Allah issued a command to the Prophet to consult them.

The reason and motivation for the acceptance of 'right of consulting,' as well as expressing this command in such a condition, tends to highlight the importance of consultation and participation by the people in their affairs. It means that rulers are responsible for providing necessary legal and administrative arrangements for consultation and participation of people in decision-making.

Meanwhile, concerning the theory of the compulsion of consultation, some thinkers such as Ghertabi take the command in this verse not as a compulsion, but as a recommendation (al Istihbab الاستحباب). However, in this critical situation and in the conflict where many companies refused to comply with the orders thus revealing that they are not reliable, God commands the Prophet to consult them. In this way all normal rulers and officials have to consult people regarding public affairs. Each of these two theories, separately defined either as a 'compulsory' (Wujub), or as a 'recommendatory' (Istihbab) matter, considers it to be preferable to consult the people.

On the other hand, what is the meaning of the obligation to consult? Does it mean obligation to follow the majority? There are two different main viewpoints in this regard.

- **Consultation in a Democratic Way:**

It is compulsory to consult and refer an issue to the people for their opinion. But the question remains whether consulting is just to collect different opinions and find out all the aspects of an issue and to bring the mistakes and faults to least degree, or is it to prefer the vote of the majority over the minority to ensure public support? One view considers 'consultation' as an agreed point among all societies and intellectuals, and as an accepted method practiced in all contemporary societies and political systems. According to this view, preferring the views of minority to the majority opinion is not reasonable, because it will obviously amount to choosing what is 'not preferable' to what is the 'preferable' (Sanei, pp. 21-22).

- **Obligation to Consult Does Not Mean Obligation to Follow**

Some believe that referring to public opinion as a means and acceptance of the majority opinion is a wrong interpretation of the subject. Even if consultation is compulsory, preferring the vote of a majority over minority is not the rule, as the relevant verses do not take any stand in this regard. There is another verse (Chapter Al-Ahza'b: 6) that gives priority to the Prophet's views even within those pertaining to the personal affairs of Muslims[11]. Therefore, 'consulting' does not, here, mean to prefer majority votes to minority (Marefat, p. 14). At this point a reference may be made to the right of dissolution of parliament by a president in some political systems. If done so, it would amount to placement of the 'preference of majority' in a weak spot. It is an agreed principle among intellectuals (Banaye Uqala) that such a principle is decidedly not the 'firm' one.

Of course, this method is also deniable, because the right to dissolve the parliament by a president, based on political and social interests, as designed in some political systems, is established by the majority vote. In other words, this right is entrusted to the president by the majority of the people. However, this is not a correct claim when one refers to majority opinion. It is not correct to claim that the Quranic verses prefer the opinion of the majority to the minority in the case of

consultation. The merits of majority vote and democracy have been largely propagated, but there is no doubt that the philosophy of 'consulting with people' as in the past and present also carries weight with regard to taking their opinions into consideration. Thus, consultation in itself is an accepted 'principle among the intellectuals.' What has been mentioned in the Traditions is to pay attention to the motif of consultation and to using the people's opinion in decision making. Yet, the obligation to accept the majority vote or an opinion after consultation is not proven by the Traditions. Referring to different votes and opinions is, in fact, sharing the reasoning and thought of others, as it wends in reducing the faults in decision-making.

If any person welcomes different opinions, he can be aware and locate the errors (Saduq , 2001, p. 385). If anyone consults with the people, he, in fact, shares other's mind and meditation (Murtada, p. Hekmat No. 161). It is worth for a wise person to add the opinion of scholars to his own opinion and to add their knowledge to his own knowledge (Amudi, p. 441). According to Muslim belief in the Prophet's knowledge and his deep understanding of human affairs, the Prophet did not need any consultation with others. Verily, this kind of consultation, for benefiting from other's meditation and knowledge, had no meaning for him. When he consulted his companions, it was for intimating hearts, for unanimity and for bringing unity among Muslims. He did it all to teach the basics of consultation, emphasizing its importance to help make the people be responsible. It is said that the Prophet was holding consultations with the Muslims in many different situations, so much so that he was referred to as Kasirul Mashwirh (Awrai , 2004, pp. 76-95).

However, this was the summary of the arguments of both sides. In fact the aim of consultation is not only to know what is right and wrong or to find out the implementation methods. It has other important purposes. As mentioned, public participation is an important principle of democracy and social equality, and to influence the political and economic management or other social decisions. Participation in all its forms, including consultation can build public support for activities and educate the public about those activities. It can also facilitate useful

information exchange regarding local conditions. Participation and consultation increase trust and boosts people's willingness to participate in public affairs. Further, the historical facts show that Muslims used to follow the majority in their consultation. For instance before the Uhud conflict, Prophet Mohammad consulted Muslims whether they should stay in town and defend themselves against the enemy, or should they fight them outside. The majority voted to face the enemy outside. Unlike his opinion the prophet followed the majority.

Participation means the real representation of the people, and consultation is the environment in which they can freely express their views. Therefore the arranged and artificial councils whose members reflect and repeat in one voice are not more than a meeting with many loudspeakers. Appointed Council without authority and freedom of expression is not a meaningful and effective Council. This is why Imam Ali regrets to talk about such a council by saying: 'O! Allah; and the Council!' (Sobhi Saleh, p. 48) [12].

b. Duty and Right to Public Surveillance:

In the Islamic teachings, 'the public surveillance' or 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil' (Amr bi'l-maruf wa Nahyi an'il-munkar) are two significant elements of the effective and meaningful participation. 'Enjoining the good' means to order people to do whatever is recognized as a decent and acceptable behaviour by the reason or Islam, and 'forbidding the evil' means to forbid people (natural and legal persons) of committing whatever is recognized as wrong by the reason or Islam. For instance, polluting the environment and destruction of living species and food sources are evil and wrong. Therefore, all members of society should be sensitive toward these violations, and within the framework of laws and regulations, they should give necessary commands to protect the environment. Public surveillance in public affairs is not only a rational and religious right, but a duty. Even its compulsion does not need any religious proof and reasoning. In fact, religion has justly emphasized on such a rational affair (Najafi, p. 358).

Several Quranic verses and Traditions warn Muslims against disregarding this duty. This right and duty is so important that we find a separate chapter on it in the collections of the Traditions and also in the books of jurisprudence. We find that Amr bi'l-maruf wa Nahyi an'il-munkar has been repeated in several verses of the Quran, and they are among the ten most important practical religious duties (فروع الدين) 'Furu' ud-din' (The Holy Quran , p. Ale Imran: 104) [13]. According to jurists, when society is in a grave danger, this duty should be observed even at the cost of one's life (Najafi, p. 358 Vol: 21) [14]. In some verses, this principle heads some other religious commands like those concerning offering prayers and giving alms, which are indicative of the importance of the said principle[15]. According to the teaching of the Quran, it is a decisive factor for a good nation: "You are the best people raised for the good of mankind; you enjoin what is good and forbid evil and believe in Allah" (The Holy Quran , p. al Baqareh: 110); "And the believers, men and women, are friends one of another. They enjoin good and forbid evil" (The Holy Quran , p. Al Tawbeh: 71). There are also many traditions about the importance and the necessity of public participation. The prophet said: "My nation (Ummah) would be healthy and good as long as they enjoin the good, forbid the evil and cooperate in good and clean deed. But if they give up, the blessings will be taken from them and some of them will attain undue dominance over others; so there won't be any one to lend them a hand in the earth and the sky" (Ameli, pp. 123, Vol. 16) [16]. Imam Ali says, 'Amr bil maruf va Nahye an el mokar' is more important than the battle in the path of God, which with all its difficulties, is evaluated as a drop in front of a boundless ocean (Faizul Islam, p. Hekmat No. 366).

Obviously, if a society keeps quiet against political, social, cultural and economic corruptions, and does not supervise public affairs and gives up criticizing wrongdoers, it should face pollution and corruption, and suffer from dictatorship. Imam Ali said, "to correct the people (society), the 'enjoining the good' became an obligatory duty." (Faizul Islam, p. Aphorism: 252) [17]. Imam Muhammad Baqir, the Prophet's grandson (4th generation), said, "the principle of 'Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil' is the path of the prophets and the manner of the righteous men. It is a great duty and because of this, other rules and

regulations are in operation, roads are safe, incomes are lawful, oppression is returned to the original owners, lands flourish, and rights are taken from enemies and government is sustained." (Aameli, p. 119)[18].. In another hadith, Imam Ali said, "it is because of the principle of the 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil,' that Laws are sustained. Whoever doesn't reject the 'wrongs' by his heart and hands and his tongues, he is like the dead among the living." (RayshahriMohammad, 2005). The principle of 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil' is not just an official task. It is a public duty. Based on these sources, those who prepared the Iranian constitution (prominent lawyers and jurists) had the same interpretation, as the article 8 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which states: "In the Islamic Republic of Iran, al-amr bi'l-maruf wa nahyi an'il-munkar is a universal and reciprocal duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the government with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the government. The conditions, limits, and nature of this duty will be specified by law." (This is in accordance with the Quranic verse; 'The believers, men and women, are guardians of one another; they enjoin the good and forbid the evil' [9:71] (Iranian Law and Government). Since the principle of 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil' is a universal and public duty, it is an 'obligatory sufficiency' for everyone to take action. It means that as long as sufficient people involve themselves in implementing the task, others are free. However, if all give up their duty and refuse to take action, then all are violators and religiously responsible. As a jurist scholar, Imam Khomeini said that this type of public surveillance was a universal right and duty to reform the society. 'Enjoining good and forbidding the evil' are two main principles that make the government agencies and non-governmental organizations honest and stop them from corruption (Imam Khomeini, p. 112). However, implementing the public duty needs certain practical regulations, otherwise, it could end in chaos. To prevent such a problem, the constitution says that the conditions, limits, and methods of its implementation will be determined by law. Concerning the issue, at the inaugural ceremony of Presidency in 2014, Ayatollah Khamenei's said that "forbidding the evil is not only permissible, but also a universal obligation. It should not be given up in any circumstances.

Yet at the implementation level, all must act in accordance with law. None can say I take action because the police and the judiciary are not effective." (KhameneiAli, 2013). However, to implement this civil task, it is necessary to ensure certain conditions and qualifications.

Those who are involved in recommending or prohibiting task should have complete knowledge about good and evil deeds (Maruf and Munkar). For example, if someone wants to take any steps regarding the environmental pollution, other than having general information about the issue, he should have necessary knowledge about the contamination limits and the criteria. Ill-mannered engagement in this type of sensitive matters is against the philosophy underlying this right and duty, as it will more often add to problems (Kulaini, p. 77). Nevertheless, to implement the principle, the books of jurisprudence defined four key requirements:

- 'Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil' should not cause any harm and damage to other's life, property, and dignity, or the acting individuals.

- Effectiveness: it is obvious that without the possibility of influence, any recommendation and prohibition is in vain and has no result in conclusion (Khomaini, p. P.473).

- Those who engage themselves in these issues should obey and observe the norms (Seyed Radi, p. Semon No. 105). Imam Ali says, "O' people! I swear by my God that I don't summon you for an action which I myself have not done before you, and I don't prohibit you from a wicked action that I myself have not avoided before." (Seyed Radi, p. Semon No. 105) [19]. In addition, he said, "whoever has relied on recommending others to perform good deeds should train and educate himself before training and educating others." (Sobhi Saleh, p. 250) [20].

- If the competent authorities and the organizations for the enforcement of law and regulations are available; others are not allowed to take any action (Khamenehei, 2005, p. 232).

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c. Duty and Right to Advice Authorities

Advice could be an opinion, warning, caution, guidance, recommendation, or suggestion offered to someone. Here, it means to advise the authorities to take an action or to change a conduct or policy. In general, advice has a significant place in Islam. Advising is a reciprocal right between individuals and authorities. It could be in all dimensions of life including the environmental affairs. In Prophet's word, religion means advice (Majlesi, p. 273 Vol. 64) [21]. Since healthy environment has a basic role for the quality of life of human beings, exchange of information between individuals, people, and the government, giving notifications and instructions in this regard is a vital issue. Advice and generosity is the reciprocal right of Muslims over each other (Kulaini, p. 166 Vol. 2) [22]. Imam Ali as a leader said to his people that we have several rights or responsibilities towards each other: "however, my rights to you are to be faithful to me, to advise me in my presence and absence, and to responsde whenever I call you and to follow my commands, but your rights are to give advice whenever we meet, to protect you, to inform you about public affairs, and to educate you." (Sobhi Saleh, p. 79) [23]. There is also another narrative from Imam Sadegh that says: "while meeting God in the other world, there will be no deed for man higher than his advising people for the sake of God." (Kulaini, p. 163 Vol. 2) [24].

d. Duty and Right to Cooperation

Cooperation in general is a joint operation, assistance, or acting together for a common purpose or benefit. Social cooperation is a shared activity for mutual benefit. Cooperation can be in different fields. It could be at micro- and macro-levels, and also in various forms of volunteer, non-volunteer, profitable and non-profitable ones. Islam wants every Muslims to have strong moral and legal responsibilities towards others. They have to have collaboration in public affairs (أَمْرٍ جامِعٍ) and should not leave without permission. According to the Quran, the Prophet's command (as a leader) is a public demand. If people do not take his word seriously or escape their responsibilities, then the community may face problems and the infliction of intense pain (The

Holy Quran , p. Annour: 62) [25]. For example, the current situation, at national and international levels, the environmental issues as public affairs are among the most significant. Pollutions, depletion of natural resources, and destruction of the living and non-living resources are threatening not only mankind, but all the living creatures as well. So, when individuals, public and private sectors are called to tackle the problems, they should all be ready to meet their responsibilities. In these cases, any negligence and irresponsibility threaten health and lives of everyone.

The Quran commands Muslims (تعاونوا) to go beyond the consultation, participation in decision-making or surveillance, and to cooperate more actively when it is a good and vital affair. Charity, donations, and interest free loans are examples of meaningful and effective participation [26]. Charity (احسان) and sacrifice are the highest forms of participation. Contribution in the form of 'Ithar' (sacrificing) is an extremely responsible form of participation. It means to prefer a public affair or an individual's needs over your own essential needs [27]. This type of partnership is for the sake of Allah only, and the donor does not want anything in return, not even expecting appreciations (The Holy Quran , p. Al Insan: 9) [28].

Conclusion

More than ever, today human activities have a destructive impact on environment. By various methods of production and consumption, billions of people participate in pollution and destruction of our environment and are involved in the environmental degradation. Thus, without public and global participation, the protection of the environment is impossible. Accordingly, in the last decades, the international instruments have emphasized the public participation. Given the importance of this issue, this paper has an overview of 'the participation' in international instruments and attempts to examine the issue by consulting the primary sources of Islam.

From the above discussion, we conclude that according to Islamic teachings, people have a duty and a right to participate in all public

affairs, including social, cultural, political, and environmental activities. People have a right to take part in decision-making and monitoring the operation of the plans and programs, which may affect them. Government, officials, companies, and other activists in the public affairs are not fully free to do whatever they want. The phrase "consult them (شاورهم)" in the Quran is imperative. That means authorities have to provide the necessary arrangements to engage the public in the public decision-making procedure. However, this 'right' is not a 'personal right and an individual privilege.' It is an important social responsibility like 'Right to Defense', which is not excusable.

Based on the aforementioned sources, the right to participation in public affairs (consultation in decision-making, surveillance, and co-operation) is a right and a public duty as well. Every member of society is responsible and accountable in this regard, unless enough volunteers take action; in case the rest of the people are free. However, if the case is a special issue, such as radiation contaminations, with which not everyone can take action, only the professionals are responsible. It should also be noted that the participation in good deeds, virtue, and expansion of environmental justice is an obligation, but taking part in violating the rights of others, oppression, and unjust activities is strongly condemned and prohibited.

Since Islam considers the right to participation in the various forms of consultation, public surveillance, advising the authorities and cooperation a religious duty, participation is not always a voluntary action. Depending on the importance of the issue, it is, sometimes, a heavy duty. Therefore, from a religious point of view and Islamic law, 'the Right to Participation' is effective and meaningful. Last but not least, it should be noted that unfortunately, most of the Muslim countries and communities are, in practice, far from the Islamic teachings clearly conveyed in the primary sources.

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Endnotes

1 -(الكافى، ج ٢، ص ١٦٣، ناشر اسلاميه، تهران).من اصبح و لم يهتم بامور المسلمين فليس بمسلم

2 -"I swear …that if there wasn't the promise of intellectuals to God that they should not tolerate the aggression of aggressors against innocents, surely, I would have left the rope of the sovereignty on its neck and would have given its last glass to its first thirsty..."

لَوْ لَا حُضُورُ الْحَاضِرِ وَ قِيَامُ الْحُجَّةِ بِوُجُودِ النَّاصِرِ وَ مَا أَخَذَ اللَّهُ عَلَى الْعُلَمَاءِ أَلَّا يُقَارُّوا عَلَى كِظَّةِ ظَالِمٍ وَ لَا سَغَبِ مَظْلُومٍ لَأَلْقَيْتُ حَبْلَهَا عَلَى غَارِبِهَا وَ لَسَقَيْتُ آخِرَهَا بِكَأْسِ أَوَّلِهَا(نهج البلاغه، صبحى صالح، ص ٥٠).

3- "Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in their hearts."

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُغَيِّرُ مَا بِقَوْمٍ حَتَّىٰ يُغَيِّرُوا مَا بِأَنْفُسِهِمْ(قرآن،الرعد: ١١).

4 "Because Allah will never change the grace which He hath bestowed on a people until they change what is in their (own) souls."

ذَٰلِكَ بِأَنَّ اللَّهَ لَمْ يَكُ مُغَيِّرًا نِعْمَةً أَنْعَمَهَا عَلَىٰ قَوْمٍ حَتَّىٰ يُغَيِّرُوا مَا بِأَنْفُسِهِمْ(القرآن، الانفال: ٥٣)

5 - "They said: O Moses! while they remain there, never shall we be able to enter, to the end of time. Go thou, and thy Lord, and fight ye two, while we sit here (and watch).' 'Allah said: therefore will the land be out of their reach for forty years: In distraction will they wander through the land: But sorrow thou not over these rebellious people."

قَالُوا يَا مُوسَىٰ إِنَّا لَنْ نَدْخُلَهَا أَبَدًا مَا دَامُوا فِيهَا فَاذْهَبْ أَنْتَ وَرَبُّكَ فَقَاتِلَا إِنَّا هَاهُنَا قَاعِدُونَ. قَالَ فَإِنَّهَا مُحَرَّمَةٌ عَلَيْهِمْ ۛ أَرْبَعِينَ سَنَةً ۛ يَتِيهُونَ فِي الْأَرْضِ ۚ فَلَا تَأْسَ عَلَى الْقَوْمِ الْفَاسِقِينَ (القرآن، المائده: ٢٤)

6 - "SAY: I preach only one thing to you: that you stand up in pairs or singly for God."

قُلْ إِنَّمَا أَعِظُكُم بِوَاحِدَةٍ ۖ أَن تَقُومُوا لِلَّهِ مَثْنَىٰ وَفُرَادَىٰ(القرآن، سباء: ٤٦)

[7]- *"We have sent Our messengers with explanations, and sent the Book and the Balance down along with them, so that mankind may conduct themselves with all fairness."* See Chapter Al-Nnesa' Verse 135: *"Ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice."*

(القرآن، الحديد: ٢٥) لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ

(القرآن، النساء: ١٣٥) يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ بِالْقِسْطِ

[8] - *"so announce good news to My worshippers; those who hear/ listen to the word (opinion and belief) so they follow its best, those are, those whom God guided them, and those, they are) owners (of the pure minds/ hearts."*

فَبَشِّرْ عِبَادِ؛ الَّذِينَ يَسْتَمِعُونَ الْقَوْلَ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ أَحْسَنَهُ ۚ أُولَٰئِكَ الَّذِينَ هَدَاهُمُ اللَّـهُ ۖ وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمْ أُولُو الْأَلْبَابِ

(القرآن، الزمر: ١٨- ١٧).

9 - وَشَاوِرْهُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ (القرآن، آل عمران: ١٥٩).

10. - وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورَىٰ بينهم (القرآن، الشورى،: ٣٨).

[11] - النَّبِيُّ أَوْلَىٰ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ مِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ(القرآن، الاحزاب: ٦)

[12] - فيا لله و للشورى. (نهج البلاغه، للصبحى صالح، ص: ٤٨ الخطبه الشقشقيه)

[13]- *"And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful."*

وَلْتَكُنْ مِّنكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ ۚ وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ

(القرآن، آل عمران: ١٠٤)

[14] - See also Makarem Shirazi, Tafsir Nemuneh, vol. 3, p. 35 and Vasa elu Shiah, vol. 11, p. 399.

[15] - Qora'n, Chapter Al-Tawbeh, verse 71.

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ وَيُقِيمُونَ الصَّلَاةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ الزَّكَاةَ وَيُطِيعُونَ اللَّـهَ وَرَسُولَهُ أُولَٰئِكَ سَيَرْحَمُهُمُ اللَّـهُ إِنَّ اللَّـهَ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ

16 - لَا تَزَالُ أُمَّتِي بِخَيْرٍ مَا أَمَرُوا بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَ نَهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَ تَعَاوَنُوا عَلَى اَلْبِرِّ وَ اَلتَّقْوَى فَإِذَا لَمْ يَفْعَلُوا ذَلِكَ نُزِعَتْ مِنْهُمُ اَلْبَرَكَاتُ وَ سُلِّطَ بَعْضُهُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ وَ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُمْ نَاصِرٌ فِي اَلْأَرْضِ وَ لَا فِي اَلسَّمَاءِ.

17 - فَرَضَ اللهُ ... الْأَمْرَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ مَصْلَحَةً لِلْعَوَامِّ.

18 - إِنَّ اَلْأَمْرَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَ اَلنَّهْيَ عَنِ اَلْمُنْكَرِ سَبِيلُ اَلْأَنْبِيَاءِ وَ مِنْهَاجُ اَلصُّلَحَاءِ فَرِيضَةٌ عَظِيمَةٌ بِهَا تُقَامُ اَلْفَرَائِضُ وَ تَأْمَنُ اَلْمَذَاهِبُ وَ تَحِلُّ اَلْمَكَاسِبُ وَ تُرَدُّ اَلْمَظَالِمُ وَ تُعْمَرُ اَلْأَرْضُ وَ يُنْتَصَفُ مِنَ اَلْأَعْدَاءِ وَ يَسْتَقِيمُ اَلْأَمْرُ.

19 - ايها الناس انى و الله ما احثكم على طاعه الا و اسبقكم اليها و لا انهاكم عن معصيه الا و انتاهى قبلكم عنها.

20 - من نصب نفسه للناس اماماً فليبدا بتعليم نفسه قبل تعليم غيره و ليكن تاديبه بسيرته قبل تاديبه بلسانه و معلم نفسه و مودبها احق بالاجلال من معلم الناس و مودبهم.

21 - إن الدين النصيحة (بحار لانوار، ج ٦٤، ص ٢٧٣، بيروت)

22 - يَجِبُ لِلْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِ النَّصِيحَةُ لَهُ فِي الْمَشْهَدِ وَ الْمَغِيبِ. (الكافى، ج: ٢ ص: ١٦٦،

اسلامیه)

23 - على ع: أَمَّا بَعْدُ فَإِنَّ لِي عَلَيْكُمْ حَقّاً وَ لَكُمْ عَلَيَّ حَقٌّ فَأَمَّا حَقِّي عَلَيْكُمْ فَالْوَفَاءُ بِالْبَيْعَةِ وَ النُّصْحُ لِي
فِي الْمَشْهَدِ وَ الْمَغِيبِ وَ الْإِجَابَةُ حِينَ أَدْعُوكُمْ وَ الطَّاعَةُ حِينَ آمُرُكُمْ وَ إِنَّ حَقَّكُمْ عَلَيَّ النَّصِيحَةُ لَكُمْ مَا
صَحِبْتُكُمْ وَ التَّوْفِيرُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَ تَعْلِيمُكُمْ كَيْلَا تَجْهَلُوا وَ تَأْدِيبُكُمْ كَيْ تَعْلَمُوا (نهج البلاغه صبحی صالح، ص
۷۹) و فى روايه اخرى: ثَلَاثٌ لَا يُغِلُّ عَلَيْهِنَّ قَلْبُ امْرِئٍ مُسْلِمٍ إِخْلَاصُ الْعَمَلِ لِلَّهِ وَ النَّصِيحَةُ لِأَئِمَّةِ
الْمُسْلِمِينَ وَ اللُّزُومُ لِجَمَاعَتِهِمْ فَإِنَّ دَعْوَتَهُمْ مُحِيطَةٌ مِنْ وَرَائِهِمُ الْمُسْلِمُونَ إِخْوَةٌ تَتَكَافَأُ دِمَاؤُهُمْ وَ يَسْعَى
بِذِمَّتِهِمْ أَدْنَاهُمْ. (الكافى، ج: ۱ ص: ۴۰۲، اسلاميه)

24 - سمعت أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع يَقُولُ: عَلَيْكَ بِالنُّصْحِ لِلَّهِ فِي خَلْقِهِ فَلَنْ تَلْقَاهُ بِعَمَلٍ أَفْضَلَ مِنْهُ. (الكافى، ج: ۲
ص: ۱۶۳، اسلاميه)

25 - إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَ رَسُولِهِ وَ إِذَا كَانُوا مَعَهُ عَلَى أَمْرٍ جَامِعٍ لَمْ يَذْهَبُوا حَتَّى يَسْتَأْذِنُوهُ
إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يَسْتَأْذِنُونَكَ أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَ رَسُولِهِ فَإِذَا اسْتَأْذَنُوكَ لِبَعْضِ شَأْنِهِمْ فَأْذَنْ لِمَنْ شِئْتَ
مِنْهُمْ وَ اسْتَغْفِرْ لَهُمُ اللَّهَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيم (القرآن، النور: ۶۲)

26 - لَيْسَ الْبِرَّ أَنْ تُوَلُّوا وُجُوهَكُمْ قِبَلَ الْمَشْرِقِ وَالْمَغْرِبِ وَلَكِنَّ الْبِرَّ مَنْ آمَنَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ
وَالْمَلَائِكَةِ وَالْكِتَابِ وَالنَّبِيِّينَ وَ آتَى الْمَالَ عَلَى حُبِّهِ ذَوِى الْقُرْبَى وَالْيَتَامَى وَالْمَسَاكِينَ وَابْنَ السَّبِيلِ
وَالسَّائِلِينَ وَ فِى الرِّقَابِ وَ أَقَامَ الصَّلَاةَ وَ آتَى الزَّكَاةَ وَالْمُوفُونَ بِعَهْدِهِمْ إِذَا عَاهَدُوا َالصَّابِرِينَ فِى الْبَأْسَاءِ
وَالضَّرَّاءِ وَ حِينَ الْبَأْسِ أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ صَدَقُوا وَ أُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُتَّقُونَ». (سوره بقره/۱۷۷)

27 - "… but prefer [the Immigrants] to themselves, though poverty be their
own lot. And those who are saved from their own greed—it is they who are
the felicitous" (The Quran, Al Hashr, verse 9).

(القرآن، وَيُؤْثِرُونَ عَلَىٰ أَنفُسِهِمْ وَلَوْ كَانَ بِهِمْ خَصَاصَةٌ وَمَن يُوقَ شُحَّ نَفْسِهِ فَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ
الحشر:۹). محمد (ص): مثل المؤمنين فى توادهم و تراحمهم و تعاطفهم مثل الجسد اذا اشتكى منه
عضو تداعى له ساير الجسد بالسهر و الحمى (الكافى، ج: ۲ ص: ۱۶۶، اسلاميه).

28 - إِنَّمَا نُطْعِمُكُمْ لِوَجْهِ اللَّهِ لَا نُرِيدُ مِنكُمْ جَزَاءً وَلَا شُكُورًا

The Issue of Atabat Visitors Between The Ottomans and Qadjars in The 19th Century; A Special Refference To Karbala Incident of 1842 – 43

İsmil Safa Üstün
Department of IslamicHistory
Faculty of Theology
University of Marmara

Abstract

From the very early years of 16th century, visitation to atabat cities by shii muslims had been one of the hot issues of Ottoman – Persian relations.

As a result of a changein the mentality of the Ottomans concerning international relations from 18th century,there had been,in contrast to previous centuries,a constant flow of visitors throughout the 19th century from everywhere, mainly from Iran. Accordingly,shiimuslims had started to have themselves felt in the province from early 19th century. This led to many new issues and problems between the Ottomans and Qadjars that were not seen in previous centuries.Therefore, atabat related matters were always on the table between them.

Most of the problems were related to citizenship of the visitors. Because a good number of Iranian visitors were having a permanent residance in the province of Baghdad. Visitors coming to Karbala is a good example. In fact, we tried to focused onthis case, basing ourselves on the Ottoman archive papers.

According to the reports available in the archives sent by Necip Paşa, who was appointed as the governor of the province in 1841, the Ottomans had lost control of atabat cities, especially Karbala accommodating thousands of mainly Persian visitors, from early 19th century. Karbala was under the control of a group of gangs, refusing any access of the governors of Baghdad to Karbala and terrorising the city. In accordance with Tanzimat principles, Paşa decided to have the central authority felt in the city. Unfortunately, it was only after a military operation that Paşa was able to have a full control of the city, causing many human life.

However, Qadjars perceived this issue as a secterian move by Ottomans. As a result, the incident turned into a crisis between the Ottomans and Qadjars, almost leading them to the war.

It was only throughout the medition of British and Russian efforts that the two states did not engage at war with each other.

Key words; Baghdad, Karbala, Tanzimat, yaramaz, visitors, atabat,

Introduction

As we all know, *atabat* cities in modern day Iraq were very highly respected by *shii isna ashariyya* muslims. Visiting these places became a part of religious life. As a result, there had been a very powerful inclanation by *imamiye* muslims towards these places throughout the centuries.

However, because of the tensions between the Ottomans and Safawids since very early years of 16th century, pilgrimage to *atabat* cities had been one of the hot issues of Ottoman – Persian relations.

Policy Change by Ottomans

In contrast to previous centuries, throughout the 19th century, there had been a constant flow of visitors from everywhere, mainly from Iran.

There may be two resons for this change;

First, changing the mentality of the Ottomans concerning international relations, adjusting themselves to the new concepts of international relations, as a consequence of two peace agreements with Austrian Habsburgs and Russians; Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 and Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*in 1774. By these two agreements, the Ottomans suffered a big set back loosing huge territories in Europe. This forced them to think about their islamic and dynastic legitimacy. For example Ottoman Sultan and Habsburg monarch in accordance with the treaty were treated as equal, contrary to previous attitudes. This was something first time ever happening. Equally, there appears to be a redefinition of relations with Iran. The attack of Nadir Shah on the province of Baghdad in 1736 – 1746, and negotiations afterwards contributed too much to this policy change.

Secondly, weakening authoritiy of the Ottomans and losing their firm grasb in the province of Baghdad in 19th century. The *Memluk* system that had emerged and lasted about 80 years after Nadir Shah's attack on the province, contributed too much to relaxing and thawing the Ottoman authority.

A new Era in *Atabat*

First time after more than 80 years of *Mamluk* period, a governor called Ali Riza Paşa was apponted directly by *bab-i ali*in 1831.

According to the next governor Necip Paşa, governor Ali Riza Paşa himself was a *bektaşi meşreb*. Before Ali Riza Paşa, *shia* were performing *aşura* riutals secretly in *sirdabs*. Encouraged by Ali Riza Paşa, they had started performing these seremonies openly.

In fact, *shia*in the province had started to have themselves felt from early 19th century. Numbers of visitors from everywhere increased. As a result of this increase in number, many new issues and problems emerged between the Ottomans and Qadjars that were not seen in previous centuries. Therefore, *atabat* related matters were almost always on the table between them.

The matter this time was not, as it used to be before 19th century, whether visitors would be allowed to the province or not. In the 19th century, the matter was rather to do with problems that had emerged during and after visitations of *atabats*.

As far as we can understand from the Ottoman archive sources, disputed points and issues concerning *atabat* visitors between the two dynasties during the whole 19th century were mainly as follows;

- The amount of fees that visitors had to pay on the border,
- The custom duties of the goods visitors brought along with them
- Quarantina regulations
- Extra taxes under different names and titles,
- Fees of burial places
- Duration of visit
- Status of those having long time residance

Most of the problems were related to citizenship of the visitors. It seems a good number of Iranian visitors were having a permanent residance in the province, buying estates and buildings, establishing businesses, getting marriage with Ottoman women, having families and children. From the Ottomans point of view, this was causing countless problems. For example, the status of a child born out of a marriage between an Ottoman women and a Persian visitor was becoming a problem. Because, in due time, question of whether the child will do military service or not was raising. Because, military service was made compalsory on every male individual in the province in 1869.So visitors of this type were very disturbed. Consequently,it became a source of a crisis between the Ottomans and Qadjars.

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Karbala Incident of 1842-3

There are lots of things to be dicussed on each one of these in details. However, I will rather concentrate on *atabat* city of Karbala in which an incident had taken place in 1842-43, causing a huge crisis between the Ottomans and Qadjars. It was only through the Erzurum agreement of 1847 that the issue was finally setteled.

According to the Ottoman archive papers, *atabat* city of Karbala was totally out of control of the governors of Baghdad for 30-40 years. So, only three months after his appointment in September 1842 governor Necip Paşa decided to put the city under his authority, and in December 1842 he stormed Karbala. Despite negotiations and efforts spent to convince the people inside, governor of Baghdad was denied to get into the city by a group of people who were seemingly controlling Karbala.

Previously, the city had been put under siege twice, first by Davud Paşain 1824 and than secondly Ali Riza Paşain 1835. But, both attempts had been unsuccessful and both governors had not been able to get the control of the city.

The city was being run by some groups of gang whom archive papers call as "*yaramazlar*". More than 30 groups were mentioned in the archive papers. Each group was led by a gang leader commanding between 100 and 200 armed man. Among them Ibrahim Zafarani, Mirza Salih and Muhammad Ali Han were the most powerfull. Necip Paşa mentions that one of the leaders of these *yaramaz* groups was a descendent of a Persian officer who was sent and paid, along with his 300 armed men by Fethi Ali Şah in order to protect Karbala from Wahhabi attacks that took place during early years of 19th century. They were in full control of Kerbela. They were collecting taxes, and sending a minimum amount to Baghdad, sharing the big part among themselves. According to Necip Paşa, they were robbing, harrasing and abusing the visitors in every possible way. They were even harrasing leading *mudjtahids*. A group among *yaramaz* was supporting Seyyid Ibrahim Kazvînî, while the other was backing Seyyid Kazim Reştî(d. 1259/1843). It should be the reflection of a rivalary between *usuli* and

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*shaykhiyya*schools So, each group was harrasing the other's *mudjtahid*. Archive papers relate a hearsay that they even had kidnapped Ibrahim Kazvînî and demanded ransom from the Shah.

Additionally, *yaramaz* groups had the advantage of very solidly built high walls that were surrounding the whole city. This city wall was started to be built by the governor Suleyman Paşa the Great(1780– 1802)in order to defend and protect the shrine against Wahhabi attacks that were taking place in early years of 19th century. But it was only completed with important financial help from one of the Indian Shahs. There were 28 tower on the wall. A canon was placed on each one of them. Ironically, the same city wall this time had prevented the governor to get into the city.

In sum, because of these *yaramaz*, there was a total anarchy in *atabat* city of Karbala. In fact, the exiled Qadjar princes having residence in Karbala, leading *ulama,* Persian *şehbender*in Baghdadand visitors were all complaining about the situation.

Useful informations about Karbala are also available in the archive papers. According to archive papers, population of Karbala was between 15 – 20 thousand. However during the pilgrimage season, population was enourmusly increasing, reaching as far as a hundred thousand, and city was becoming over crowded. So much so that people some times had to walk in the same direction of the crowd and not able to go where they intended.

Half the population was Arab. And rest was consisted of Persians, Turkomand, Indian and Bahreynis who had emmigrated and settled Karbala for various reasons. Some of them were even born here. So, Karbala became home for non-arabs. They bought estates, cultivated lands, run small shops. Some of them took refuge in shrines and some in rooms available in *madrasas* to get education.

So, immigrants were treated as Ottoman subjects. All the people in Karbala were bilingual, able to speak both in Arabic and Persian. It was

impossible to differentiate Arabs from non-arabs. People of Karbala were known as *Kerbelali*.

According to archive reports, there were 2.850 houses in Karbala, 865 of which had belonged to Persians and 1975 of which had belonged to Arabs.

So, this was the situation in Karbala. It was really difficult for Necip Paşa to capture the city from *yaramazlar*. It took almost a month to overcome them. Before attacking on the city, negotiotions took place between Paşa and the people of Karbala through leading ulama and Persian counseller in Baghdad. Both Kazvînî and Kazim Reştî were very helpful to Necip Paşa. They were mediating between Karbala and Necip Paşa, and encouraging the people to accept the terms of Paşa. Negotiotions took some weeks. He had offered *yaramazlar* to surrender and promised them a total amnesty. Paşa also informed the people inside to leave the city as a measure in case of a clash.

But unfortunately all was in vain. Clash seemed unavoidable. Situation was already very tense. Because during negotiotions, quite a few fires were opened on Necip Paşa's army from Karbala. Paşa finally decided to storm the city. However, considering the city wall and the canons placed on it and hundreds of the armed men of *yaramazlar*inside, the situation for Necip Paşa was very critical. Besides, they were able to produce ammunition for themselves. Moreover, *yaramazlar* may well get help from surrounding Arab tribes. Because, during all 30-40 years of anarchy in Karbala, a connection based on common interest was established between beduoin Arab tribes and *yaramazlar*inside Karbala. So, this threat of attack from bedouins was also real.

However, Necip Paşa was able to break the resistance. Even after getting into city, there was still a danger for the soldier. Because fires were shot at soldiers from houses. Indeed, Paşa lost quite a lot of soldiers before establishing full control.

Following friday prayer,*hutbe* was read on be half of Ottoman sultan. Officials were appointed. Law and order, official administration were

all established. After leaving sufficient military garisson in the city, Paşa had turned back to Baghdad.

Unfurtunately, a lot of people of Karbala were killed during the fighting. In spite of the warnings of Necip Paşa that they should leave, they remained in the city. Because they were threatened by *yaramazlar* as to not to listen to Necip Paşa and to stay in. It appears that they were simply trapped in the city. According to reports after investigations, between 3 – 5 thousand people were killed during the incident.

Effect of the Incident on Ottoman – Persian Relations

This incident had occured just before border negotiations were about to began between two countries at Erzurum. Because previous years, that is in 1838 and in 1840, border clashes took place. Now upon this Karbala incident, Shah ordered Mirza Cafer Han, the would be negotiator for Iran at Erzurum, not to go for negotiations. So, negotiations were at stake even before having a start.

Yet this was not all. Shah at the same time had given orders to make war preperations.

I think this step probably was taken by Shah to relief public cry in Iran concerning the incident. Because news about the incident was enourmously exagrated in Iran, arguing that up to 50 thousand *shi'i* were killed by *sunni* Ottomans and many women and children were taken as captives, and so on. And unfourtunately this type of news had reached to the ears of people on the street in different cities of Iran. According to the Ottoman counseller's report, ulama encourged and provoked crowds at bazars to protest against *sunni* Ottomans, so turning this issue into a secterian dispute between two countries. The counseller carried on saying that they were not able to go out and there was a real danger of get killed by mobs who had even tried to attack on the counsulate.

There were a few other reports by other counsellers from different regions of Iran. As a result, Ottomans also started making preparations for war. So, the two states took the war position.

On the other hand England and Russia very much disturbed about the developments that had emerged out of their knowledge. Because each was following an emperial policy in the region they designed for their own benefit. Especially England seemed to have worried too much. Because British was regarding the Ottomans as effective means to prevent Russian infiltration intothe mediterranean sea. In another words, as far as Britain was concerned, the Ottomans were supposed to act as a kind of security belt for British interests against Russia. Russia on the other hand seemed to be supporting Iran, so balancing the British policy in the region.

As a result, both England and Russia were deeply involved in the incident. They strongly protested *bab-i âlî*, and British ambassador demanded that the governor Necip Paşa be dismissed, that was something Ottomans rejected. However it was decided that the incident was to be investigated by Russian and British inspectors. Major Farrant visited Karbala to investigate the incident and prepare a report on be half of both Britain and Russia. On the other hand, the Ottomans had also investigated the incident. According to the detailed reports prepared individually by both Farrant and the Ottoman investigator Namik Paşa, the loss of life was between 3.000 – 5.000. Of course still too much, but it is not as much as it was exagerated.

Conclusion

As I tried to point out at the beginning,the Ottomans changed their concept of international policy from early 18th century. This does not mean that the Ottomans gave up their caliphate claim. On the contrary they underlined from *Küçük Kaynarca* agreement that they were caliphs of all muslims. However they modified the concept of caliphate in the sense that two muslim states would treat each other legally and eaqually. For example, there does not has to be far distances or oceans

between two states, as it was argued in classical political theories in the literature.

So accordingly, different from previous centuries, the Ottomans seemed to be recognizing Irans' right to exist. Moreover, Iran was treated as *daru'l islam*, not *daru'l harb*. There is no heresy accusation of Iran, to my knowledge any more, after Nadir Shah, including Zend dynasty. Again to my knowledge, there is no *fatwa* what so ever issued against Qadjars during the war of 1821-23, and non afterwards.

I do not mean that, the Ottomans were not worrying about the spread of shi'a in the province. They worried a lot and tried to stop it. This is something else. Because they were thinking that Qadjars were using shi'a to get the whole province. In fact Qadjars were regarding Baghdad as belonging to them. One of the titles used by *şehzade*in Kirmanshah for example was *serhaddar-iiraqeyn*, and they were interfering the affairs in the province.

Important thing, as pointed in the reports, here is I think the action of Necip Paşa seemed to be rather to do with administrative engagement than secterian stand. This should have been the case really. Because, at about that time, not only in Baghdad province, but in all other provinces of empire, the Ottomans were trying to implement *Tanzimat* policies of 1839 everwhere in the empire. *Tanzimat* policies mean to create a centralized bureucracy and state structure. That in turn means facing the anger of different classes of the society, not only from the province of Baghdad, but from every corner of the empire. There had been many consequences of these principles. *Tanzimat* policies had been responsible for many internal crisis within the empire in the coming years of 19th century. So, the incident of Karbala was only one of them. Crushing the *yaramaz* groups in Karbala and having control over the city means collecting the whole taxes directly by central government, not through certain individuals and groups as it used to be for centuries. This in turn means geting the enemity of interest groups and individuals. In fact Necip Paşa was complaing and criticizing the exploitations of *mutesellim* Abdulvahhab efendi and *yaramaz* groups about their plundering the revenue of Karbala. *Mutesellim*in

collaboration with *yaramazlar* was not sending the amount he was supposed to. Only a small part of the money he collected from Karbala, a symbolic amount was being sent to Baghdad. This meant loss of tax, something against the principles of *Tanzimat*.

So, historically we have the reason to believe that Necip Paşa's policy was rather administrative than secterian.

The interference of British and Russians into the incident is another point we have to think about. It is unfortunate and interesting that thanks to the British and Russian efforts that the two dynasties did not engage at war with each other. The two dynasties, instead of getting into a direct dialog with each other, they needed the mediation of Russians and British to settle the matter between them. It mighthave been that they were even hoping to get some kind of help from them against each other.

It is even more unfortunate to see that the same attitude seemed to beinherited by contemporaryislamic world. The situation within muslim societiesis not different from 19th century, probably even worst. That is,islamic world is even more drawn into secterian fights, not able to solve their own problem, waiting for a help from outside.

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